The Impact of Power Structures on Supply Chain Enterprises with Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions


  •  Fan Dandan    
  •  Xu Qi    

Abstract

This paper focuses on analyzing the impact of power structures of supply chain enterprises on their carbon emission reduction decisions. First, three game models (Nash, Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg) are constructed according to members’ different bargaining power, respectively. Then, the optimal carbon emission reduction decisions and profits of supply chain enterprises in different game models are solved and compared. The research results show that supply chain enterprises have the lowest carbon emission reduction rate in Nash game, and their corresponding profits are the least. As for Stackelberg game, the carbon emission reduction rate as a leader is greater than that as a follower, but the profit as a leader is less than that as a follower. The total profit of the entire supply chain system in Manufacturer Stackelberg model is always greater than that in Retailer Stackelberg model.


This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
  • ISSN(Print): 1833-3850
  • ISSN(Online): 1833-8119
  • Started: 2006
  • Frequency: bimonthly

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