The Effects of Corporate Governance Practices on the Choice between Efficient and Opportunistic Earnings Management

  •  Tim Vervaat    
  •  Georgios Georgakopoulos    
  •  Konstantinos Vasileiou    
  •  Ioannis Sotiropoulos    


This study aims to explore the preferences of the publicly listed companies on the S&P 500 index regarding their earnings management (efficient or opportunistic) as well as the impact of the corporate governance practices (audit committee, board independence and audit quality) on their decision. Using two separate regression models, it was found that American firms listed on the S&P 500 index tend to conduct efficient earnings management, which is in line with the findings of prior research. Moreover, it emerged that the earnings management selection does not depend on the amount (high vs small) of audit fees paid by the companies. Additionally, the governance practice of employing more outside directors in the audit committees leads to more efficient earnings management. Finally, according to the study results, the impact of discretionary accruals on future profitability is not significantly related to the proportion of independent members on the board of directors.

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