An Analysis of Pricing Strategies in the Process of Business Acquisition


  •  Duo Feng    
  •  Limin Wang    

Abstract

In the process of enterprise merger, how to make transaction price much more rational has become a difficult
problem theoretically and practically. This article applies the method of game theory to analyze the equilibrium price between the buyers and the sellers or just the buyers existing in enterprise merger market, and then puts forward the optimal bidding strategies in the merging process. Moreover, it also indicates that Bayesian balance lies in the competition between the buyers, while the best response of every game player is that its quotation should be half of its evaluation of the merged enterprise.



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
  • ISSN(Print): 1833-3850
  • ISSN(Online): 1833-8119
  • Started: 2006
  • Frequency: bimonthly

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