Determinants of CEO Compensation Evidence from UK Public Limited Companies


  •  Kibet Buigut    
  •  Neddy Soi    
  •  Irene Koskei    

Abstract

In spite of more research on CEO compensation, where more of this research is anchored in agency or managerialist perspectives, less has been done on its determinants in firms. This paper contributes to the literature by determining the effect of Independent directors, CEO ownership and Profitability on executive cash compensation in UK. Agency theory informed the study. The study adopted an explanatory design Census technique was used as the study only included all the 20 firms for the past 3 years from 2008–2010. The study findings have shown that CEO ownership has a positive and significant effect on CEO compensation. The results have also show that the percentage of independent directors is significantly related to a decrease in the compensation levels of CEO compensation. Firm profitability was positively related to CEO compensation positing that CEOs salary as well as compensation increased with an increase in firm performance. It is therefore imperative for firms to link reward to corporate and individual performance so as to counter the agency problems. The interaction between corporate governance and CEO compensation is an avenue for more research for instance the relationship between shareholders and CEO compensation.


This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
  • ISSN(Print): 1833-3850
  • ISSN(Online): 1833-8119
  • Started: 2006
  • Frequency: bimonthly

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