Abstract

In developing countries, and more specifically in the franc zone economies, the weight of the public sector seems to be preponderant, both in a situation where the State is a direct actor in the face of pressure groups and in a situation where it is an arbitrator between pressure groups.

From a theoretical model supported by an empirical verification, whose assumptions are based on the Gabonese economy, we wanted to know in what terms this problem arises in a rent economy in which the State has a strong hold on all economic and social levers.

The lessons learned from the model indicate that the explanation for this state hegemony lies in a deliberate weakening of the bargaining power of pressure group leaders through the lever of corruption. It turns out that the impact of such a choice of public policies is still harmful to unemployment, economic growth and poverty. Moreover, the game between the State and the unions in Gabon generates unstable economic balances as long as the structural reforms of the Gabonese economy remain embryonic in an increasingly open world. All of which worsens the state of poverty in this small country, which is nevertheless endowed with potential wealth.

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