Attack on ``Strong Diffie-Hellman-DSA KE" and Improvement

  •  Demba Sow    
  •  Mamadou Camara    
  •  Djiby Sow    


In this paper, we do a cryptanalyse of  the so called ``Strong Diffie-Hellman-DSA Key Exchange (briefly: SDH-DSA-KE)" and after we propose ``Strong Diffie-Hellman-Exponential-Schnnor Key Exchange  (briefly: SDH-XS-KE)"  which is an improvement for efficiency and security. SDH-XS-KE protocol is secure against Session State Reveal (SSR) attacks, Key independency attacks, Unknown-key share (UKS) attacks and Key-Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attacks. Furthermore, SDH-XS-KE has Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) property and a key confirmation step. The new proposition is not vulnerable to Disclosure to ephemeral or long-term Diffie-Hellman exponents. We design our protocol in finite groups therefore this protocol can be implemented in elliptic curves.

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