A Note on Public Sector's Corruption Equilibrium and Network Economy
- Yaron Zelekha
Abstract
Most of the studies on Public Sector's corruption focused on the micro economic aspects of the criminal behavior and only limited research has conducted on the macro level in general and market equilibrium in particular. In an attempt to better understand the phenomenon of corruption this paper uniquely analyzes corruption in view of the 'network economy' theory and suggests a theoretical framework for understanding corruption equilibrium. I claim that corruption reaches equilibrium under two extremes which make it difficult for countries to move from one to the other. Unfortunately, it is thus almost impossible for a country to make a significant transition on its own and the chances of gradual reforms are generally not very good.
- Full Text: PDF
- DOI:10.5539/par.v2n2p185
Journal Metrics
h-index (2017): 7
i10-index (2017): 6
h5-index (2017): 7
h5-median (2017): 13
Index
- CNKI Scholar
- COPAC
- CrossRef
- DTU Library
- EBSCOhost
- EuroPub Database
- Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA)
- Genamics JournalSeek
- Ghent University Library
- Google Scholar
- Harvard Library
- Infotrieve
- Jisc Library Hub Discover
- LOCKSS
- Mir@bel
- Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD)
- Open J-Gate
- PKP Open Archives Harvester
- Publons
- ROAD
- Scilit
- SHERPA/RoMEO
- Stanford Libraries
- Ulrich's
- UniCat
- Universe Digital Library
- UoS Library
- WorldCat
Contact
- Gabriel TaiEditorial Assistant
- par@ccsenet.org