Equivalent Bilevel Programming Form for the Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem
- Lianju Sun
Abstract
Generalized Nash Equilibrium problem is widely applied but hard to solve. In this paper, we transform the generalizedNash game into a special bilevel programming with one leader and multi-followers by supposing a suppositional
leader, that is an upper decision maker. The relations between their solutions are discussed. We also discuss the further
simplification of the bilevel programming. Many conclusions and the further research are drawn at last.
- Full Text:
PDF
- DOI:10.5539/jmr.v2n1p8
Journal Metrics
- h-index (December 2021): 22
- i10-index (December 2021): 78
- h5-index (December 2021): N/A
- h5-median (December 2021): N/A
( The data was calculated based on Google Scholar Citations. Click Here to Learn More. )
Index
- Academic Journals Database
- ACNP
- Aerospace Database
- BASE (Bielefeld Academic Search Engine)
- Civil Engineering Abstracts
- CNKI Scholar
- COPAC
- DTU Library
- EconPapers
- Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek (EZB)
- EuroPub Database
- Google Scholar
- Harvard Library
- IDEAS
- Infotrieve
- JournalTOCs
- LOCKSS
- MathGuide
- MathSciNet
- MIAR
- PKP Open Archives Harvester
- Publons
- RePEc
- ResearchGate
- Scilit
- SHERPA/RoMEO
- SocioRePEc
- Standard Periodical Directory
- Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB)
- The Keepers Registry
- UCR Library
- Universe Digital Library
- WorldCat
Contact
- Sophia WangEditorial Assistant
- jmr@ccsenet.org