Abstract

Aim: This phenomenological study explores factors driving the spoils system in Iran’s public organizations.

Background: The spoils system, favoring political loyalty over merit, weakens governance, especially in Iran’s post-election administrative reshuffles.

Method: Employing Colaizzi’s method, 17 employees from a municipality, a provincial ministry, and two state-owned enterprises in Isfahan were interviewed, following COREQ guidelines.

Results: Five themes emerged: unchecked discretionary authority, weak human resource management, ineffective oversight, prevalence of anti-values, and external influences like political interference, economic sanctions, and regional disparities, highlighting systemic, cultural, and psychological roots of patronage.

Conclusion: The findings enhance principal-agent theory by integrating Iran-specific dynamics, confirming patronage’s entrenched nature.

Implications: Conducted as a master’s thesis, this study proposes reforms—merit-based recruitment, digital transparency tools, and ethical training—offering innovative governance solutions for developing countries facing similar challenges.

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