Abstract

The global electricity supply from non-hydro renewable energies, such as wind and solar, has being growing at a high rate, and it is expected that this trend persists. In China, Wind power is one of the most mature renewable energy technologies and it is possible to be utilized in large-scale. However, in the long run, the malicious competition will break the rule of the monopoly wind power market under control of electricity utilities in China and prevent the development of Chinese wind power. Reasonable competition of the investment market is a key to promote healthy development of the wind power industries in China. Based on game theory, this paper investigates competitive behavior of the wind-farm investment companies. The competition mechanism and malicious competition behavior of the investment market of the non-asymmetric enterprisers, and the wind-farm investment market are discussed by the Stacklberg model and the Cournot-Nash model, respectively, and moreover, the theoretic analysises are verified to be effective by an example. Furthermore, some policy advices are put forwards to the Chinese wind power investment market.

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