Labor Contracts and Shirking in Cameroon

  •  Roger A. Tsafack Nanfosso    
  •  Benjamin Fomba Kamga    


This paper evaluates and analyzes the effects of labor contracts on shirking in Cameroonian firms. This study uses the survey data collected in 2006 in Cameroonian manufacturing firms having more than 15 employees. Data processing produced a sample of 65 companies and 1809 employees. In addition to permanent or temporary distinctions, we considered the verbal aspect of labor contracts, affiliation to social security and promotion within the labor market. Econometric estimations take into account the endogeneity of the contractual trajectory of employees. Results are estimated in 2 stages. First, we evaluate the determinants of contract choice and the second; we estimate the degree in Cameroonian firms. This degree is measured by the level of effort deployed by workers. Results show that permanent employees after a verbal contract work harder than those who are permanent since their recruitment. In addition, the employees under short term contracts since their recruitment are more inclined to shirk as well as those who are permanent since their recruitment. Employees without social security are likely to cheat than those with social security and recruited permanently since the beginning.

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