Abstract

This paper aims at explaining the financing structure of the Tunisian companies by the information asymmetry phenomenon as well as at checking whether the low share of loans in the financing of the Tunisian companies is reflected in a credit rationing. We have focused on the informational factor between banks and corporates since the contract between lenders and borrowers may include some limitations even if the legal rules do exist and are properly applied. Our analysis deals with the credit operations. We have restricted our study to the case of small and medium enterprises seeing their importance in our industrial network. We have analyzed the behavior of credit managers dealing with loan applications based on a survey addressed to the credit managers of small and medium enterprises. Our results suggest that Tunisian credit managers be risk averse-which results in a credit rationing. The estimates display that the reliability of accounting documents, the risk of adverse selection and the inefficient recovery procedures are the determinant of this rationing.

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