Abstract

This study explores the influence of non-state shareholders’ board power on the internationalization of state-owned enterprises and demonstrates the moderating effect of the business expectation gap and industry competition. Taking SOEs listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share markets as the research sample, the study examines the influence of non-state shareholders’ board power on SOEs’ internationalization behavior and explores the regulating effects of two situational factors: business expectations gap and industry competition. Results show that (1) non-state shareholders’ board power positively impacts SOEs’ degree of internationalization. (2) The historical business expectations gap strengthens the positive impact of non-state shareholders’ board power on SOEs’ degree of internationalization, whereas the social business expectations gap weakens the positive impact. (3) The positive impact of non-state shareholder board power on internationalization degree is stronger in SOEs with high industry competition than with low industry competition.The study analyzes how non-state shareholders’ board power promotes the internationalization of SOEs in the mixed ownership reform and provides governance efficiency evidence of the mixed-ownership reform from the perspective of SOEs’ international practices.

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