Market Structure and Optimal Payout Policy
- Robert Beach
Abstract
This paper considers the relationship between market structure and payout policy within the context of an oligopoly in which firms must consider the strategic responses of their competitors. A differential game approach with a finite planning horizon is used for the analysis and a Markovian Nash equilibrium is obtained using a numerical method. The results suggest that given optimal payout policy market competition in the form of a duopoly results in greater reinvestment and earnings than that of a monopoly.
- Full Text: PDF
- DOI:10.5539/ijef.v14n3p76
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
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