Maximizing Stockholder Wealth under Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Evidence from EGX
- Osama Wagdi
- Eman Salman
- Walid Abouzeid
Abstract
The study dealt the corporate governance mechanisms (CGM) to achieve the goal of maximizing stockholder wealth. That under the dividend decision is the crux of the agency problem. A quantitative sample of 15 companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange for the period from 2005 to 2019. According to the quantitative analysis, the interpretation rate of corporate governance mechanisms is 60.97% of maximizing stockholder wealth in the Egyptian business environment. While the qualitative analysis included 417 individuals that have been examined according to a survey (questionnaire). The results concluded that there is a significant difference in the attitudes of stakeholders towards the role of CGM in determining dividend decision.
- Full Text: PDF
- DOI:10.5539/ijef.v13n4p1
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
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