Price Discovery, Competition and Market Mechanism Design
- Fangliang Huang
- Yong Han
Abstract
Based on the wide application of relevant classical and modern economic thoughts, this paper analyzed the implications of price discovery and competition, compared the market auto adjustment mechanism and the government control of economy, explored market failure and price distortion, and drew the conclusion of the necessity of market mechanism design which is especially helpful for the reform of transitional economies. We point out that market competition plays an important role in the process of price discovery. To promote the efficiency of price discovery, market competition can not be absent. But competition can not be the only solution to efficiency. Moderate government interference is needed in some circumstances. Optimal mechanisms should be designed to complement the incompleteness of competition.- Full Text: PDF
- DOI:10.5539/ass.v4n6p122
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
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