Abstract

China’s State-Led Project System (SLPS) has delivered significant rural infrastructure but generated a persistent governance dilemma. This paper analyzes a "dual dilemma": the coexistence of passive farmer participation and elite capture of resources. Based on a case study of a rural tourism project in Village W, it finds the SLPS's top-down, target-driven logic renders farmer involvement merely symbolic. This disempowerment creates an institutional vacuum that enables local elites to exploit information asymmetries and patronage networks to appropriate project benefits. We argue these dynamics are mutually reinforcing, forming a vicious cycle that erodes farmer agency and subverts inclusive development goals. The study contributes to rural governance literature by conceptualizing farmers’ response as "negative agency"—a strategic disengagement distinct from overt resistance, which offers new insights into the complexities of authoritarian governance.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.