Abstract

The purpose of this study is to analyze the asymmetry in cost behavior (cost stickiness) and to identify the impact of CEOs' compensation on the degree of cost stickiness behavior. The study population consists of the public shareholding companies listed on the ASE, which number (56) industrial company. Data were collected from (35) industrial companies for the period (2009 - 2019). To measure the degree of costs stickiness, The Model of Weiss (2010) was used. The Model of Weiss (2010) takes into account the costs and changes in the level of activity (sales) for the last four quarters of the company, Weiss (2010) model constructs the difference in logarithmic ratios of changes in cost. The study found that the CEO's compensation in Jordanian industrial companies consists of two forms. The companies pay fixed salaries or performance-related bonuses. The study found that the form of compensation that is paid to the CEO affects the behavior of managers. The results indicated that the performance-related rewards are accompanied by a decrease in the level of cost stickiness, and the compensation paid in the form of fixed salaries are accompanied by a high level of cost stickiness. The study recommends that companies should understand the role of the compensation form in administrative decisions, especially with regard to resource modifications, as management motives in relation to resource modifications must be taken into account because of their clear and direct impact on the cost structure of companies.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.