Abstract

‘Judicial crisis’, linked to lack of judicial accountability, stems from judges’ partisan use of legal power based on litigants’ identities. Courts, especially in less dominant democracies, are popularly perceived as tending to rule in the government’s (and other powerful actors) favour. However, the scientific validity of these conclusions remains unanswered. This research addresses this notable gap in the current literature by utilizing quantitative data to discern patterns of judicial capture. It draws on 237 civil and criminal cases to explore what this study describes as an ‘identity judgment’ scheme. That is, the tendency of dominant litigants to obtain outcomes based on their political, social, or economic status. The study disaggregates the data into contestations between the dominant party (federal government/central government) used as a response (dependent) variable and both influential litigants (state governments, companies, and other influential individuals) and ordinary litigants as explanatory (independent) variables. The resulting analysis reflects an endemic culture that proves the hypothesis that litigants' performance is a factor of the degree of their ability to influence the court. This research is important as it exposes the non-linear nature of interference in judicial decision-making and enhances the contextual understanding of judicial independence.

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