Abstract

This article, aiming at the reality of the appearance of optional governance structure between the supervision of the supervisory board and that of the board of independent directors, firstly applies the model to analyze the efficiency of this oversight pattern, and then on the basis of relative data, analyzes the status quo of internal supervision system implementation. The research shows, although there is still some doubt about whether the board of independent directors could brandish its role after being introduced into Japanese corporate governance environment, primarily it could be affirmative that this kind of introduction is efficient. Moreover, from its future trend, although internal overseeing mode of Japanese corporation could realize optimal choice by developing the superior and weeding out the inferior between the board of supervisors system and the board of independent directors system, which are sure to be co-existing and play a very important role for the time being, and the revelation from which is that no matter how to choose governance system, as a general rule to be obeyed, it should reflect definite policy direction and make spontaneity and self-organization to dominate. However, What kind of governance system to be chosen by the enterprises should be decided by China listed companies themselves during their trial and error process, while the supervising idea that monitoring departments should believe in is “invisible hands”.

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