Risk, Preference, Capital Structure and Incentives
- Zhongwei Wu
Abstract
Using the surplus theory of the firm, we examine capital and labor as inputs of a surplus generating firm, and study the capital structure of the firm. We derive two equilibrium models on: (a) the capital structure and ownership of the firm and (b) alternative incentive compensation structures. Within the framework of the firm as a cooperative surplus generating enterprise, we introduce the concepts of risk, preference and resource constraints, to provide a framework for analyzing more sophisticated methods of dividing the risks and rewards of the firm’s surplus.
- Full Text: PDF
- DOI:10.5539/ibr.v11n7p20
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