Reorganization, Not Reversal: Economic and Geopolitical Insights from the 2025 U.S. Tariff Regime


  •  Daniele Schilirò    

Abstract

This paper examines the 2025 U.S. tariff regime, highlighting the shift in U.S. commercial policy toward its most protectionist stance in decades. The aim of the study is to evaluate the economic and strategic implications of the 2025 tariff regime, with particular attention to its effects on trade flows, sourcing patterns, supply-chain organization, trade balances, and the governance of the international trading system. Given the brief timeframe analyzed, the paper provides initial insights and emerging trends regarding long-term responses to the new tariff regime. Using an analytical-descriptive approach grounded in recent empirical and theoretical literature, the paper explores whether the regime primarily reduced international trade or prompted a reorganization of trade and production networks. The analysis shows that the 2025 tariff regime did not cause an immediate collapse of global trade. Rather, firms and trading partners responded through various adjustment mechanisms, including front-loading, inventory accumulation, supplier substitution, trade diversion, and global value chain restructuring. While tariffs generated substantial fiscal revenue and reduced U.S. imports from China, their broader economic effects were mixed. Tariff costs were largely passed on to U.S. importers and consumers, while trade diversion and supply-chain restructuring generated additional adjustment and efficiency costs. The study further suggests that the principal significance of the 2025 tariff regime lies not in a simple contraction of global trade, but in the reorganization of trade flows and the rising weight of geopolitical considerations in international economic relations. Consequently, this tariff experience marks a reconfiguration of international trade — one characterized by a heightened emphasis on resilience, strategic autonomy, geopolitical alignment, and bargaining power, with lasting implications for the governance and structure of the international trading system. Finally, the paper contributes to the broader literature on modern protectionism and international trade governance.



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.