Dual Class Model and Shareholder Agreements: An Analysis of Italian Companies

  •  Anna Paola Micheli    
  •  Carmelo Intrisano    
  •  Anna Maria Calce    


This paper analysed the changes in ownership concentration of the Italian financial market and the recourse to dual class model and shareholder agreements by Italian listed companies in the period 2009-2020. The analysis shows that the control market did not show signs in the period that would lead to presume an increase in the contestability of our companies. The attenuation in ownership concentration, highlighted by the reduction in the value of the Shapley-Shubik index, and the increase in the average market participation did not produce an increase in the contestability of Italian listed companies since the high concentration and limited contestability of control continue to characterize their ownership structures. Findings also show less recourse by the Italian companies to the instruments of separation between ownership and control in the considered period. The reduction in the number of companies that resort to the issue of shares without voting rights and the shareholders' agreements is also reflected in the lower incidence of the capitalization of these companies compared to the market capitalization.

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