

International Drug Trafficking and National Security of Turkey

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Abstract

Drug trafficking is an ever growing international security conundrum. Transnational crime syndicates have proved to be extremely resilient to counter-narcotics initiatives. Despite the efforts of national and international institutions, enormous amounts of drugs are produced, trafficked and consumed throughout the world. Transnational crime syndicates manufacture new psychoactive substances when the governments increase controls over existing drugs. Annual number of drug-related deaths has increased to 250,000 globally. Illicit drug trade proved to be an insidious threat that finances terrorism, instigates corruption, undermines economic development and erodes state authority. Turkey is exposed to massive flows of narcotics as it lies at a strategic location between major production and consumption markets. Turkish National Security Council (MGK), however, downplays narcotics as a national security problem. Counter-narcotics policy is often subdued by counter-terrorism and geopolitical conflicts in the MGK summits. Indeed, for many high-level security officials, narcotics threat is as important as its affiliation with the counter-terrorism campaign of the government. This paper investigates the broader security implications of illicit drug trade for Turkey. It presents the socio-economic costs of the drug problem as well as analysis of the impacts on corruption, public order and state authority. It argues that illicit drug trade should be a greater national security agenda in the upcoming years.

Keywords: drug consumption, international drug trafficking, national security, Turkey, security and development, narco-terrorism

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Students of international security observed deepening and widening of the security agenda over the past three decades. As the war fighting among the major industrialized states became obsolete, security analysts shed more light on the non-traditional security challenges. Many states re-evaluated and shifted their national security policies in accordance with the rising non-state threats. In this context, it is acknowledged that transnational drug cartels pose a serious threat to international security with their tremendous annual turnover, insidious nexus with terrorism and the capability to corrupt government institutions. Concomitantly, drug trafficking has moved from being a mere criminal-justice issue to a national security agenda for many governments. International security literature often projects drugs as a national security challenge for weak states. However, advanced states such as the United States, United Kingdom and Germany have long been dealing with the drug trafficking and transnational crime as a national security challenge (Morales, 1989; Andreas & Price, 2001; Swanstrom, 2007).

Even though many international analysts recognized the threat of transnational crime in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, international drug trafficking has been a major challenge for Turkey since 1970s (Erdinc, 2004). The scale and the nature of the drug threat changed in accordance with the macro-level changes in European and Near Eastern markets. Turkey's precipitated economic integration with the neighboring markets provided ample opportunities for illicit drug transportation. Transnational organized crime groups (TOCs) increasingly exploited the free movement of people, legitimate businesses and foreign trade (Ekici & Unlu, 2013). In this context, the number of drug interdictions in Turkey increased more than 16-fold over the past ten years, from 5,052 in 2003 to 83,135 in 2012 (TUBIM, 2012). The exponential growth of the drug problem is also clearly visible in the number of drug-related arrests. In 2003, Turkish agencies arrested 10,855 people for drug-related crimes and the number of drug-related arrests increased 12 folds over the past ten years (130,049 in 2012) (TUBIM, 2012).

Turkey lies along the well-known Balkan Route of Afghan heroin destined for the European markets. International security literature discussed various aspects of the heroin trade throughout Turkey for more than three decades. In the recent years, however, the flow of narcotics has diversified and the TOCs began to transport other types of drugs such as amphetamine-type stimulants, cocaine and cannabis via Turkey (TUBIM, 2012). Seizures of these substances increased sharply over the past decade. Moreover, the profiles of the traffickers diversified and increasing numbers of Europeans, West Africans, Iranians, Latin Americans and Central Asians have been arrested for drug trafficking via Turkish territories (Ekici, 2013b).

Despite the exponential growth of drug-related crimes, Turkish National Security Council (MGK) perceives narcotics as a secondary threat. Indeed, illicit narcotics trade is perceived as a national security agenda to the extent that it is associated with financing of terrorism (Ekici, 2014). In line with the perceptions of the MGK members, security literature dealt mainly with terrorism and external security threats. There is a dearth of academic works in Turkey explaining the national security implications of drugs and transnational organized crime. This study aims to fill an important gap in Turkish and international security literature through extensive field research on national security repercussions of transnational drug trade.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

Drug trafficking is carried out by transnational criminal networks that are profit-oriented non-state actors. The nature of the threat is elusive, pervasive and highly responsive to the security measures of the governments. The states confront an insidious challenge that erodes the societies from within rather fighting against distinct external military threats. It is hard to adopt the premises of classical theories of International Relations as an analytical framework for studies of transnational crime threat. It is obvious that analysis of drug-driven security challenges necessitates a more complex theoretical framework.

As a proponent of widening Barry Buzan (1991a) acknowledged military issues as a subfield of strategic security studies and asserted that traditional realist frameworks can no longer handle more sophisticated and broadened security issues in international politics. For him, multi-polarization, blurring of the center-periphery line, demise of ideological confrontation, irrelevance of the Cold-War military alliances, strengthening of international community and emergence of non-state threats complicates the agendas of security policy makers. In this context, he presented a promising framework that can be adapted to broader issues of national security (Buzan, 1991a & 1991b; Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). Buzan (1991a) asserted that “the national security problem in which individuals, states and the system all play part, and in which economic social and environmental factors are as important as political and military ones” (p. 368). In this context, Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998) laid out a more comprehensive and coherent analytical framework of national security that addresses political, military, economic, social and environmental aspects. In their epistemological methodology each component of security is intricately related to others and none of these pillars can individually address the national security dilemma. In contrast to the statist realist perspective, Buzan Waever and Wilde asserted that non-state actors such as transnational crime groups and terrorist organizations should be perceived as other key issues in international security discourse.

Several scholars adopted broader security frameworks to analyze transnational crime. Phil Williams operationalized organized crime and national security under four categories: threats against the territorial integrity, threats against the “system of rules”, threats against the “institutions” and the threat against the “people” (Williams, 1994). Williams postulated that the transnational criminal networks can “challenge the state monopoly of coercive power”, “replace the rule of violence”, “intimidate judiciary and law enforcement” and “threaten business (Williams, 2007). Louise Shelley (1995) developed a four dimensional framework in her analysis of transnational drug trafficking. For Shelley, drug networks; i) undermine rule of law and state legitimacy, ii) instigate corruption, iii) disrupt economic development and financial stability, iv) generate pervasive drug dependency that casts enormous social costs. Engwal (2005) adopted Buzan’s framework and asserted that drug networks’ national security challenges can be analyzed in three respects; i) financing of separatist terrorist organizations, ii) socio-economic hazards of drug abuse, and iii) facilitation of corruption in state institutes.

This study adopts an integrated framework that combines the analytical approaches of Barry Buzan, Phil Williams and Louise Shelley. The research framework is based upon five pillars. The first pillar analyzes the political and military threats driven by drug trade. It is based on the assumption that drug trafficking generates billions of dollars for the terror networks, which undermine political stability and territorial integrity of the states. Second pillar deals with the economic threats of the illicit drug business. It is based on the proposition that illicit drugs undermine licit economy and the work force. Third pillar deals with the threat to state institutions and

addresses whether drug networks infiltrate government organizations or corrupt politicians, judges, prosecutors and police officers. Fourth pillar deals with the threats to the population and investigates how it undermines human capital through widespread consumption and drug-related deaths. Fifth pillar of the framework analyzes how drug networks undermine public order through engulfing in wide range of criminal activities such as mass murder, violence, extortion and burglary.




Figure 1. Analytical framework for national security and drugs

1.3 Research Questions and Methodology

This paper seeks to address the following questions:

- I) How do the terror networks in Turkey generate funds from drug trafficking?
- II) How does the drug problem undermine economic development in Turkey?
- III) How does the drug abuse undermine human capital in Turkey?
- IV) How does the drug trade affect corruption in the Turkish government agencies?
- V) How does the drug trade affect crime and public order in Turkey?

The analyses are based upon both first-hand and secondary information. First-hand data is driven from 22 interviews with key drug enforcement administrators and investigators, as well as demand-reduction experts. The secondary information is obtained from the statistics and analytical reports of drug enforcement agencies and independent research organizations that work on various aspects of the drug threat in Turkey.

2. Political and Military Threat: Financing of Terrorism

Drug traffickers can directly and indirectly undermine the political stability of the states. As in the case of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Note 1), they can directly confront the law enforcement and military forces. This can lead to thousands of casualties and political decay. On the flipside, TOCs can instigate widespread criminal activities and provide funds for the terror networks that can indirectly erode the political system (Williams, 2007).

During the field research it is observed that Turkey faces an indirect political/military challenge from the transnational drug traffickers. Almost all the interviewees reported that drug traffickers pose no significant direct challenge to political stability or territorial integrity of Turkey. Asymmetric power dissuaded the traffickers from a straight armed confrontation with the state. According to Mahir Cakalli, the former Director of Narcotics in Istanbul Province, Turkish law enforcement agencies have dismantled all major drug networks over the past two decades (TRT, 2010). For him, there are no “Cali”, “Jakuza” or “Tjuana” type cartels in Turkey that challenge the state authority. The existing drug trafficking organizations work in cell structures, which are composed of 3-15 individuals. These groups do not have the men and firepower to challenge the law enforcement agencies. Indeed, no law enforcement officers lost their lives in an armed clash with the drug traffickers over the past five years. Challenging the state institutions has been out of the *raison d’être* of the transnational drug networks operating in Turkey.

The real challenge to Turkish territorial integrity has been terrorism for more than three decades. The PKK/KCK terror network aims to establish a free Kurdistan in Southeastern Turkey, Northern Iraq and Northwestern Iran. Starting from 1984, a total of 35,000 people lost their lives in the prolonged conflict in the Southeastern Turkey

(Laciner, 2012). High profit range associated drugs appealed the network especially after the Cold War, when it experienced difficulties in generating financial inflows. According to a recent research by the author, Turkish law enforcement agencies arrested 1251 members of the terror networks in 380 operations (Ekici, 2014). A total of 4,784 kg heroin, 57 tons of cannabis resin, 18 million cannabis plants, 4.3 tons of morphine base, 27.5 tons of acetic anhydride, 710 tons of cocaine, 8 kg of opium, 337,412 amphetamine type stimulant (ATS) tablets and 20 heroin laboratories has been seized along with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK/KCK), Revolutionary People's Liberation Party (DHKP/C) and Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP-ML) operatives. Out of 380 cases, 62 interdictions were made at PKK shelters along with numerous propaganda documents, weapons, ammunition and food.

2.1 PKK and Drug Business

Investigations revealed that the PKK terror network have engaged in all the stages of illicit drug business, from cannabis cultivation to heroin distribution in Europe. Many of the interviewees indicated that drug trade provided the largest financial source for this terror network. The PKK and the major heroin traffickers coexisted in the same realm and recruited members from the same neighborhoods. PKK operatives had deep knowledge of the members and activities of the drug networks. In the earlier years, PKK operatives were satisfied with sole taxation of the drug traffickers. The taxation was carried out in two ways. First, the PKK operatives placed a duty of \$50 kg per kilogram or 10% tax on heroin traffickers at the illicit custom check points located on Turkish-Iranian border (Ekici, Williams, & Akbulut, 2012). This fact is confirmed by the statements of hundreds of PKK operatives and drug traffickers. Second, the PKK placed annual taxes on major heroin networks coercively. The annual tax ratio changed in accordance with the scale of generated money from drug trade. On several occasions the ratio of taxation increased to \$2 million for heroin kingpins.

The PKK played a significant role in heroin production in Iran and Turkey, especially during the 1990s. Turkish security forces dismantled nearly 20 heroin labs and arrested 48 PKK operatives involved in manufacturing of heroin (KOM, 2005). The latest PKK lab was dismantled in Hakkari province and a total of 200 kg of fresh heroin was seized, while four PKK operatives were arrested on Turkish-Iranian border (KOM, 2012). Apart from heroin manufacturing, PKK operatives played a significant role in procurement of chemical precursors. Turkish security agencies seized 26 tons of acetic anhydride (AA) from the PKK members (TUBIM, 2013). For instance, in 2002, within the framework of Operation MATRUSKA, KOM seized 3.5 tons of AA and arrested 14 traffickers in collaboration with the DEA and Russian counter-narcotics agency (Pek & Ekici, 2007). The trafficking scheme was organized by PKK operatives and the substance was diverted to illicit markets by the top PKK operative in Russia. The AA was transported to the PKK's heroin laboratories in northwestern Iran.

PKK operatives played an increasingly active role in cannabis cultivation in rural parts of southeastern Turkey. Security and intelligence organizations agree that the PKK organizes cannabis cultivation in Diyarbakır and Batman provinces (Interviews with security officials, April 2-3, 2013, Ankara). On various occasions Turkish experts estimated that the PKK generates nearly a billion liras (\$400 million) on annual basis from cannabis cultivation in southeastern Turkey and its distribution in western Turkey (Arpacik, 2013). Turkish security agencies seized increasing amounts of cannabis from PKK operatives. For instance, on July 18, 2012, KOM and Gendarmerie carried out a joint operation to eradicate cannabis fields in 12 villages of Diyarbakir province (Ekici, 2014). The operation resulted in seizure of approximately 3 million cannabis plants, 1 ton of cannabis resin, 328 kg marihuana along with 32 individuals (Arpacik, 2013). The background check of the arrestees revealed that 17 of them were members of the PKK terror organization. More interestingly, PKK operatives opened fire on the eradication teams to discourage from the operation.

Several research papers indicated that the PKK was accountable for 50-80% of the heroin supply to Europe (UNODC, 2011; Ventura, 1998; Ekici, Williams, & Akbulut, 2012). These studies demonstrated that the PKK generated enormous amounts of money by coordinating drug trafficking. Similarly, large numbers of counter-narcotics operations revealed that PKK operatives led drug trafficking in Turkey and Europe. Some of the recent operations include the following. First, in October 2010, KOM seized 142 kg of heroin and arrested 10 members of an international drug network (KOM, 2012). The investigations revealed that the PKK was coordinating the heroin shipments from Iran to Europe by means of semi-independent cells. The PKK was laundering drug money in currency exchange and jewelry shops with the illicit proceeds being finally transferred to the PKK operatives in Northern Iraq. Second, in August 2010, Gendarmerie seized 65 kg of explosives along with 65 kg cannabis, all transported on one vehicle. The shipment was coordinated by PKK operatives in Diyarbakir province (KOM, 2012). Third, in December 2010, Gendarmerie arrested a major PKK operative with 25 kg of cannabis resin in Diyarbakir province (TUBIM, 2013). An arrest warrant had been issued by the court for the transporter ring for plotting major terror attacks in Istanbul province. Fourth, Moldovan authorities seized

200 kilograms of heroin in March 2008 along with arrest of two Turkish nationals. One of the arrestees was the PKK's top executive in Moldova (Ekici, 2014). The Turkish Court of Serious Crimes had convicted him for 10 years of imprisonment for extensive terror activities. He was imprisoned for two years in Germany for drug trafficking and seven months in Romania for extortion and violence on behalf of the PKK.

Starting with the early 1990s, PKK operatives coordinated street distribution of heroin in major European markets. The heroin markets in the Netherlands, Germany and some parts of the U.K. were controlled by PKK heroin cells by the mid-1990s (KOM, 2005). The PKK used its well-established, trained, armed and hierarchically organized cadre for carrying out this clandestine drug business. One of the former KOM investigators noted that "PKK recruited illegal immigrants in Europe for heroin distribution by coercion. The immigrants do this because they are mostly unemployed and hungry. They always face the risk of deportation. They are threatened with being reported to police" (Interview with a KOM investigator, June 20, 2013, Ankara). The interviewed expert reported that the PKK exploited the political protection in Europe and used refugee camps and cultural centers as heroin distribution hubs. They frequently recruited Kurdish teenagers for street deliveries.

The drug money was mainly used for propaganda and purchasing weapons in the underground markets. Semdin Sakik, the former deputy head of the PKK/KCK terror network, stated that "the resource of our money was drug trafficking. The PKK and Apo (Abdullah Ocalan) have always gotten a big share from the drug trafficking in Turkey. We bought arms with the money gained from this" (KOM, 2003). Money is mainly laundered by PKK accountants in Europe, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. A joint operation of KOM and French police revealed PKK's money laundering schemes in Europe (Interview with a Superintendent in Istanbul Narcotics Division, February 20, 2013). According to the interviewee, French police arrested two PKK operatives in Paris along with €190,000 at an exchange shop. The money was composed of €5-10 bills and they were attempting to exchange them into U.S. dollars. The PKK operatives were arrested for money laundering and the money was confiscated by the French police. Forensic analysis of the bills revealed heroin residues at the confiscated money. Additional €110,000 were confiscated from the residences of the convicts along with PKK flags, documents, pictures with known terrorists, as well as several plastic bags with heroin residues. The interviewee noted that the follow up investigations of KOM and French police identified their links with a Kurdish heroin kingpin who was imprisoned in Istanbul along with seizure of 57 kilograms of heroin. For him, this operation clearly indicated that the PKK has been generating substantial amounts of money from illicit drug trade.

2.2 Other Terror Networks and Illicit Drug Trade

TKP/ML was another terror network that generated significant amounts of money from drug trade. The organization carried out sensational attacks in key metropolitan cities. TKP-ML was divided into two parts due to the conflict over heroin trafficking (KOM, 2005). The organization went through a finance crisis during the 1980s and 1990s. One part of the organization was in favor of engaging into drug trafficking to generate funds to maintain their terror campaign. The other camp strongly opposed this involvement and claimed that heroin trafficking contradicts the political aims of the organization (KOM, 2003). According to KOM (2003) the two camps engulfed into armed clashes and eventually the TKP/ML was divided into two parts. Several members of the organization were arrested while trafficking heroin from Turkey to Europe. Other militants accused them of betraying their "cause".

DHKP-C is a Marxist-Leninist terror organization that seeks to overthrow Turkish government through a violent revolution. The organization was very active during the 1980s and 1990s. Top members of the DHKP/C terror network were involved in drug trafficking. For instance, in 1995 Turkish security forces seized 10 kg of heroin in Istanbul (Ekici, 2014). The shipment was coordinated by the top executive of the DHKP-C terror organization. In another case, in 1998, KOM units seized a container with 603 of cocaine and arrested 8 DHKP/C members. One of the arrestees was the provincial head of the organization in Adana. Another arrestee was previously convicted for trafficking weapons on behalf of the DHKP/C (KOM, 2005).

Turkish diplomats experienced shocking terror attacks carried out by Armenian Revolutionary Army (ASALA) during the 1980s. ASALA members killed 24 Turkish diplomats in Europe, Iran and North America between 1979 and 1984 (Erdoğan, 2004). These attacks instigated a backlash among both the Turkish government and society. The rapid spread of ASALA terror led to government investigations on financing of the network. The investigators found connections of ASALA operatives with several heroin traffickers (Erdoğan, 2004). The most interesting figure among them was Behçet Cantürk, whose uncles were key ASALA operatives. Cantürk was a well-known heroin kingpin who transported multiple-tons of heroin to European markets every month. Cengiz

Erdinc (2004), who conducted the most comprehensive research on heroin trafficking in Turkey, reported that Behcet Canturk had transferred significant amounts of money to ASALA members

3. Threat to Population: Erosion of Human Capital

National security analysts devote special attention to human capital as a major component of national power (Buzan, 1991). Erosion of human capital has been projected as a principal threat to the future of the state. In the traditional sense, wars have been the principal causes of the erosion of human capital. For Buzan, however, there are alternative threats such as drugs and terrorism that turned out to be much more deadly than interstate wars. According to the UNODC, nearly 250,000 people lose their lives due to drug consumption (UNODC, 2012). U.S. government has been dealing with drugs as a principal national security threat as the drug related deaths exceed 38,000 per year (Jones, Mack, & Paulozzi, 2010). Majority of the existing literature in Turkey, however, perceived the drug abuse as social, criminal and health problem rather than a national security threat.

The research findings revealed that intensive international drug trafficking increased the availability of drugs in Turkish markets. Many government reports and individual studies indicate that heroin, cocaine, ecstasy, amphetamine and cannabis have become widely available especially in metropolitan cities (KOM, 2012). During the field interviews, several experts stated that transnational drug networks began to target domestic markets in addition to exploitation of Turkey as a transit route. A former deputy director of Central Narcotics Division stated that “drug traffickers are no longer bypassing Turkish markets. They exploit the growing demand here. We have been the final market of ecstasy and captagon. Now we are seeing a tremendous increase in cannabis trafficking. All these poisons target our citizens. They are killing the Turks not the Europeans.” (Interview with the Former Director of TUBIM, February 12, 2013, Ankara).

High availability of the substances decreased the prices in local markets. Although the heroin and cocaine abuse has been relatively low, use of “club drugs” and cannabis rapidly spread among the Turkish citizens. According to the latest joint survey of Turkish Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBIM) and Turkish Institute for Statistics (TUIK) in 2011, life time use of drugs was 2.7% among the people aged between 15 and 65 years (TUBIM, 2012). Life time use among the males was higher (3.1%) than females (2.2%). Some of the empirical studies and government reports indicate that the starting age of drug abuse decreased to 10 years in Turkey (Dilbaz, 2008). In this context, media “speculations” created dismay among the Turkish society. Especially the families in the metropolitan cities became highly concerned with the drug abuse in the secondary schools and existence of drug distribution networks within their neighborhoods.

Turkish military officers are also concerned about escalation of drug use among the soldiers (Saymaz, 2013). When the drug consumers are enlisted in the army, they not only maintain their habits but also spread the substance abuse to their peers. According to Saymaz, some of them start to sell the substance in military compounds to earn money to maintain their habits. Even though the Turkish armed forces have always been highly disciplined, officers are worried that drug consumption can undermine fighting power of the soldiers as well as causing accidents and false alarms that can endanger both strategic and tactical forces.

The escalation of drug abuse is clearly visible in government statistics but these figures often underestimate the ratio of the phenomenon. In Turkish culture drug consumption is a humiliation that leads to isolation in society. Family members pay special attention not to reveal the drug addiction, which can lead to unemployment and stigmatization among the peers. Most of the respondents do not report the truth to the drug addiction surveys. Many of the interviewed experts reported that the actual number of drug abusers is significantly higher than official government reports.

Drug related deaths are a clear indicator of erosion of human capital. According to TUBIM a total of 365 people lost their lives as a result of direct and indirect effects of drug consumption in 2011 (TUBIM, 2012). For TUBIM, the number of drug-related deaths increased by 163% over the past five years. Even though the death rates are relatively low in Turkey in comparison with the United States and Europe, its growth rate is alarming. Almost all interviewed experts reported that the existing official data underestimates the scale of drug induced fatality. As there is no integrated data collection system, the information on drug-related deaths is collected via special requests to the hospitals. Many of the hospital administrations do not reply to the questionnaires. Moreover, there is no reliable data on traffic and job accidents occurred under the influence of drugs.

A real challenge in Turkey is the insufficiency of public and private treatment programs. There are only 25 treatment centers with a total of 544 beds (TUBIM, 2012). Ali Unlu, a demand reduction expert, reported that there were 155,099 applications for treatment in Alcohol and Substance Treatment Center (AMATEM) for 2011 and only 2,117 drug abusers could undergo in-house treatment programs (Unlu, 2013). Bulk of the applications was rejected due to insufficiency of the treatment facilities. Unlu reports that AMATEM treatment centers are

located in 15 provinces and there are no facilities in 65 provinces. Problem drug users have to wait long before getting admitted to treatment centers. Some of them get overdosed while waiting in the treatment line. AMATEM doctors are overburdened with intensive treatment demand and continuous work at full load. The Director of TUBIM complained that “there are only 25 treatment centers in Turkey. This number increases to 2445 in Germany and 794 in Sweden. A small country like Slovakia has 590 treatment centers. We are way behind our schedule on this issue. There are only 35 beds allocated for teenage drug users throughout Turkey” (Unlu, 2013).

Rehabilitation programs are also insufficient in Turkey. Turkish government has not implemented comprehensive reintegration programs that encompass employment, sheltering, education, social networking and financial aid. Recidivism is comparatively high among problematic drug users. According to TUBIM, 47% of the treatment entrants had already been treated in AMATEM facilities (TUBIM, 2012). The high rate of repetitive treatment is mainly driven by lack of sophisticated rehabilitation centers. As nearly half (49.3%) of the treatment entrants were unemployed, experts underline the importance of government backed employment programs for drug addicts (Unlu, 2012). However, neither public nor private executives are willing to employ drug abusers even if they undergo treatment.

4. Drugs as an Economic Threat to Turkey

Economic development is a principal agenda in national security councils throughout the world. For Buzan (1991a), economic strength ensures purchase of weapons, equipment and recruitment of law enforcement and military staff. Moreover, strategic power projections of the states rely on the sustainable economic backup. As in the cases of Afghanistan and Guinea Bissau, the states often fail to provide security to its citizens when there is lack of economic resources. Underpaid law enforcement and military officers often fight for the drug lords rather than their governments (Williams & Felhab-Brown, 2012).

Intensive flow of narcotics generated significant amounts of dirty money in Turkish economy. The total retail value of the seized drugs is around \$1.1 billion for heroin, \$ 1.2 billion for cannabis, \$44 million for cocaine and \$110 million for the ATS (Ekici, 2013b). The interviewed experts reported that the interdiction ratio in Turkey is around 20 percent. Once we add the non-interdicted substances, the scale of drug money increases sharply. The total annual of drug generated money is estimated around \$15 billion (Ekici, 2013).

At first glance, it might be argued that the drug trade bolsters financial reserves, generates capital and creates employment, which accrues to overall economic growth. In reality however, drug money has no significant macroeconomic push effect and makes no meaningful contribution to the prosperity of the Turkish community. High-risk high-gain nature of illicit drug business hinders sustainable input into productive sectors of the national economy. Drug production and trafficking undermine export oriented sectors and currency stability. Illicit drug economy can have direct and indirect costs on the nations. Field investigations revealed that it undermines economic development and financial stability in Turkey in several respects.

First, drug generated money is exfiltrated out of the pockets of Turkish taxpayers and transferred to transnational criminal networks. The money is never taxed and used for sustainable investments. Organized crime syndicates exploit the money to purchase additional drugs, weapons and shell companies. On many occasions, drug money is invested in off-shore banks, casinos and hotels in Cyprus, Switzerland, Iraq, UAE and Central Asia (Yetim, 2000). Drug money is mostly untraceable, as it transferred through Havala system, mainly by means of jewelers and exchange shops. Astute traffickers never buy properties on their names. Real estates, cars and land are registered on one of the relatives. A significant portion of the money has been spent for hiring gunmen, concealment makers, couriers and new vehicles for transportation. Major drug traffickers have a common tendency of buying luxury goods such as gold watches, weapons and expensive cars. This creates inflation in the districts where there is intensive drug trade. For instance, an investigator in Diyarbakır province reported that drug trade had significant impact on apartment rents (Interview with a drug investigator, on April 2, 2013, Ankara). Drug criminals pay exorbitant prices for apartments in the city center. This drew up the prices and average people have hard time paying the rents.

Second, drug trade generates an unrestrained and large black market. The uncontrolled and untaxed money downgrades financial stability. Turkish economy has undergone several crises due to immediate outflow of liquid money. The most dramatic crisis erupted in 2001 when top executives engulfed in prolonged conflicts how to tackle with the unregistered economy and underground markets. Many Turkish experts believe that drug trafficking generates the largest flow of dirty money in black markets (Yetim, 2000; Erdiç, 2004). This money is handled by criminal figures that are expert at evaporating money when they face financial crisis or strong enforcement. Immediate outflow of black money was a major problem for Turkish economy during the 1980s

and 1990s. Due to high liquidity of drug money Turkish state failed to build healthy macroeconomic planning. However, the sound fiscal policies of the governments in the new millennium prevented eruption of crisis for this reason. Currently annual turnover of drugs constitute 0.013% of the national GDP (PPP) and immediate withdrawal of the dirty money poses no significant challenges to financial stability.

Third, drug consumption erodes productivity of the labor force. There is no existing study in Turkey that calculates the productivity loss caused by drug consumption. Moreover, there is lack of official data on the financial costs of illicit drug trade and abuse. According to TUBIM, lifetime prevalence of drugs is 2.7% among the people aged 15-65. Various other studies indicated that nearly 1-3% of the population used drugs in the last year (TUBIM, 2011). When we exclude the children and elderly the total number of drug users is estimated around 1 million in Turkey. Given the \$17,000 GDP per capita, 1 million people can generate 17 billion dollars. Around 30% productivity loss brings 5.1 billion costs to Turkish economy. However, there is no available data on the economic costs of drug-related absenteeism, impaired performance, disciplinary problems, premature mortality, treatment, hospitalization, incarceration, homicides and violence. Demand reduction experts assert that the aggregate economic cost of drug abuse is larger than 7 billion dollars (Interview with a demand reduction expert, June 25, 2005, Ankara).

There are various uncalculated collateral costs of drug abuse in Turkey. Drug abuse undermines social values, national cohesion and contribution of citizens to the prosperity of the community. It is difficult to calculate the costs of dissolution of families and psychological impact on the other members of the family. Needle exchange and uncontrolled sex among the drug users is a major drive of the spread of HIV/AIDS, nevertheless there is no study measuring the costs of drug induced HIV infections in Turkey. Drug-driven problems reduce the number of vibrant employees among the college graduates and undermine the quality of workforce. As it leads to school dropouts and underperformance, significant amount of money invested in education is wasted.

Fourth, illicit drug markets generate economic employment for approximately 300,000 people, who have no insurance and job security. Over the long term, bulk of the drug users turn into street dealers to maintain their habits. Government statistics indicate that even larger numbers of people are trapped in perpetual drug related recruitment. Once the young adults are convicted of drug-related crimes, it becomes highly unlikely for them to get employment in the public sector. Drug addicts and traffickers are the last choice for recruiters even in the private sector. Almost all of the interviewed Turkish drug enforcement experts emphasized that a vast majority of drug convicts are re-deployed in the trafficking schemes. Once the drug traffickers professionalize in the sector, they become “path dependent”, either for the reason of being unable to get re-employed in licit economy or for the reason of their expertise in illicit trade. They build all professional relationship with drug suppliers, transporters, concealment makers and distributors. Another factor is the contempt of the money generated in the legal sector. A professionalized drug dealer earns millions of dollars in a year, which is extremely higher than they could earn in a “blue collar” job. Monthly salaries of average workers range between \$500 and \$2,000 dollars. The sharp contrast between the licit and illicit income is a primary incentive for recidivism, which undermines the productive workforce of the Turkish community.

Fifth, prolonged and intensive smuggling activities retarded emergence of a fully-fledged market economy, sustainable development and employment in Southeastern Anatolia Region. It led to a “Dutch disease” where reliance on the illicit sector hindered development of other core sectors that drive regional economic development. Bulk of the smuggling activities are clustered in the provinces bordering Iran and Iraq. Thousands of families in these provinces are dependent on sustainability of trans-border trafficking of illicit substances such as tea, oil, heroin and cannabis. Even though drug trafficking generated a super wealthy elite, it exacerbated income disparities. The region is the least developed part of Turkey and GDP per capita is less than a third of Istanbul (\$4,400 vs. \$18,100) (TUIK, 2013). Reliance on illicit activities created a vicious cycle of dirty money and under investment in licit production industry. The legal entrepreneurs are outbid in contracts by the new “businessmen” who earned enormous amounts of money from illicit drug trade.

Sixth, drug enforcement, correction and treatment inflict significant economic burdens on the government. According to TUBIM, identified economic costs of drug enforcement exceeds 564,000,000 Turkish liras per year (TUBIM, 2011). A daily cost of an inmate is around 25 liras (\$12) and there are nearly 25,000 drug-related prisoners. The annual total cost of drug convicts in prisons is calculated to be around 228,125,000 liras (approximately \$110 million). With all the unidentified expenses, the fight against the drug problem costs more than a billion Turkish liras (approximately \$ 560 million). The sharp increase in consumption and trafficking indicates that the drug threat will inflict even higher economic costs to the Turkish state.

A real challenge for Turkey is insufficiency of investigations on financial proceeds of drug related crimes. Currently, Proceeds of Crime Unit of KOM and Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) are the two principal institutions in charge of money laundering investigations and asset recovery. There is a limited number of investigators at the center and provincial units of these organizations. Turkish law enforcement agencies carry out approximately 80,000 counter-narcotics operations per year. It is unlikely for the investigators to conduct follow up money laundering investigations after every drug interdictions. Moreover, financial investigations and asset recovery processes are long lasting and cumbersome as the Turkish State has the burden of proof. Only limited numbers of confiscations and asset recovery can be made each year in drug trafficking cases. This is a major barrier in neutralizing the activities of criminal organizations. Even though the drug traffickers are imprisoned for several years, they maintain financial power to keep up with illicit activities.

5. Institutional Threat: Drug Driven Corruption

States develop law enforcement and military institutions to fight against the internal and external threats. Well-functioning institutions are key elements of the national security system (Buzan, 1991b). States enact necessary legislations to define the functions of security officials. National legislations aim to prevent corruption, which undermines states' response to security challenges. International drug trade generates enormous amounts of money that appeals to underpaid law enforcement and military officers across the globe. International literature often reports prevalent drug driven corruption in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Russia, Latin America and Africa (West, 2006; Thachuk, 2005). Corrupt government officials can provide a safe-haven to major drug traffickers. Criminal networks may infiltrate into state institutions and even capture the chain of command (Williams, 2007). As Phil Williams put it, drug driven corruption undermines the legitimacy of the governments, the respect to rule of law and fair distribution of wealth among the citizens.

As significant amounts of drugs are transported over Turkey, drug money has a potential to corrupt government officials. Indeed, many academic works in 1980s and 1990s draw attention to existence of corruption among the security officials (Kırbaş, 2012; Erdinç, 2004). Tuncay Yılmaz, the former Executive Director of KOM in early 1990s, emphasizes that "the money is power. Tremendous amount of money is raised from drug trafficking in Turkey. Obviously the organized crime groups will share this money with many people who are facilitating their activities" (İnce, 2002, p. 11). Especially during the 1980s, the government was overwhelmed with counterterrorism and caught off-guard by organized crime syndicates and corruption.

Fighting against corruption became a government priority after the "Susurluk Incident" (Note 2) in 1996. Saadettin Tantan, a former Minister of Interior, believed that the most important threats for the Turkish national security were "organized crime, corruption and manipulation of the economy by the criminal enterprises." (Bal, 2006). Tantan launched a nationwide campaign to eliminate corruption within the government sphere. The parliament enacted several legislations against corruption, drugs and organized crime. First, the legislators passed the 4208 numbered law on money laundering and financial investigations. The law laid the basis for the foundation of Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK). Before the enactment of this law, financial crime investigations and confiscation of criminal proceeds were very complicated processes in Turkey. Second, 4422 numbered law empowered the law enforcement agencies with intelligence and modern investigation tools. These legislations were a revolution for anti-corruption investigations. Third, special courts were created and high powered prosecutors were appointed to organized crime and corruption cases.

By the new millennium, Turkish drug enforcement agencies eliminated corruption to a great extent. Law enforcement and military agencies expelled corrupt officers. Especially counter-narcotics agencies have implemented well-routed anti-corruption schemes to prevent exfiltration of investigative information and protection of organized crime syndicates. Field research revealed that KOM, the primary drug enforcement agency in Turkey, has implemented several strategies to prevent corruption. First, before recruiting an officer in the agency, comprehensive investigations are carried out on the candidate. All connections and activities of the officers are scrutinized for nearly a year. The investigators are carefully selected and effectively monitored to prevent bribery and corruption. Second, KOM uses cutting-edge electronic and physical surveillance techniques and comprehensive intelligence analysis to detect corrupt officials. Contacts with drug traffickers are easily detected. Third, government increased the salaries of law enforcement officers significantly. Counter-narcotic officers receive financial rewards from drug seizures, which allow them to have a good life standard. Underpayment is not a pretext in Turkey for developing shady relations with the drug trafficking networks.

After the introduction of drastic measures, drug-driven corruption poses no significant threat to national security of Turkey. The number of government officers engaged in drug-related crimes is very limited. Over the past three years none of the KOM officers were involved in drug trafficking incidents. Drug traffickers exert no

significant influence on the political government or security institutions. Drug enforcement agencies face no external political pressure during the investigations. The high interdiction ratio is a clear indicator of the minimalized corruption. Turkey is currently a global leader in heroin seizures and a European leader in ecstasy, methamphetamine, captagon and cannabis resin seizures. Turkish agencies dismantled thousands of drug networks over the past five years. Turkey has become an exceedingly risky transit country for international drug trade.

6. Threat to Law and Order: Erosion of the State Authority

Intensive international drug trafficking undermines law and order in many parts of the world. In Mexico, drug cartels are accountable for massacre of between 50,000 and 70,000 people since 2006 (Courtney, 2013). Similar problems appeared in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Nigeria and Afghanistan, the countries that all face massive flow of drugs. Drug trade also created colossal public order problems in the advanced consumption markets. For instance, in the United States, drug traffickers and users often engage in murder, violence, robbery, prostitution and extortion (Bernett & Halloway, 2007).

Even though there are abundant academic works in the West on drug-crime relationship, interest of the Turkish scholars on the subject is relatively new. Turkey has never experienced a militarized organized crime that could create general instability. However, the intensive flow of narcotics generated significant law and order problems in certain locations of Turkey. In southeastern Turkey, smuggling became a profession for thousands of families. As the region was relatively poor, government officials did not enforce the anti-smuggling regime strictly in the pre-2000 period. The state was careful not to alienate smugglers with strong enforcement. It was widely believed that alienated smugglers would either join the PKK cadres. In this context, many terrorists infiltrated Turkish territories under the guise of smugglers. Terror weapons were imported into Turkey by the smuggling networks.

There are also problematic slums in western metropolitan provinces which function as drug distribution centers. For instance, Maslak, Esenyurt, Bagecilar districts of Istanbul, Saraycik district of Ankara, Zeytinköy district of Antalya, Yenidoğan district of Kocaeli and Muratdede district of Denizli function as hotspots of criminal activities (Interview with a narcotic bureau chief, 06 July, 2013, Istanbul). According to the interviewee, residents of these districts are mostly Kurdish immigrants, Romans, Africans or other ethnic minorities. Robbers, murderers, extortionists and street dealers took shelter in these regions. A resident who gets specialized in marihuana dealing switches to robbery when there is no substance available in the market or he gets expelled from the distribution ring. Drug distribution from these regions is mainly carried out by family-based networks that have connections to wholesalers. Recidivism is significantly high among these individuals as they are socialized and professionalized in this criminal environment. Many of the residents in these neighborhoods have over ten criminal records including drug distribution, consumption, extortion, robbery and deadly assaults. These groups are extremely knowledgeable about counter-intelligence and never use cell phones for drug distribution. Even though the ring leaders earn enormous amounts of money from drug distribution, they choose to live in slums where they feel protected against police operations.

Unlike Iran, Afghanistan, Mexico and United States, drug traffickers and distributors rarely engage in armed clashes with the law enforcement officers in Turkey. Unlike Italy, Colombia and Mexico, drug traffickers never gained the courage to assassinate police officers and judges. On some occasions, distribution rings in slums resist police operations by bats and stones but there has been no remarkable incidence of an armed encounter with the detention team. On the other hand, as attorney Edip Önder put it “there are many assassinations among the drug gangs” (TRT, 2010). Yüksel Bulut, a former judge in charge of drug cases explained that the conflicts arise out of depth, law enforcement interdictions, agreement violations, drug stealing, snitching and cheating (TRT, 2010). The sharing of profits and protection of the turfs are the main reason of conflict. Whenever gangs fail to pay the drug money, the supplier recruits collectors. The collector exerts to escalating amount of coercion and violence to get the money. For Bulut, the level of coercion can intensify up to assassination and kidnapping of family members. The most prominent fights were observed between the Baybaşın and Yakut families, which had been the dominant heroin suppliers during the 1990s. More recently, a large-scale cannabis distributor killed two owners of a bar in the heart of Ankara in 2012. The shootings were driven by the resistance of the bar owners against the drug distribution rings.

Several experts claimed that most of the suicide bombers take drugs before launching the terror attacks. According to a research report by Counter-Terrorism Department of Turkish National Police in 2000, PKK operatives use drug addicted female suicide bombers (Zaman, 2000). These female bombers are first taken to an isolation camp where they are made addicted to drugs and undergo intensive indoctrination. Then while intoxicated they are sent to attack crowded places with bombs. This argument has been substantiated by various

recent incidents. For instance, on 19 August 2012, a female suicide bomber was arrested by means of constant electronic and physical surveillance in Diyarbakır (Zaman, 2000). Law enforcement agencies seized a sophisticated explosive mechanism installed on the body of the bomber. According to the government sources, she was heavily intoxicated with drugs (Milliyet, 2012). In another case in 1998, a female suicide bomber was overdosed with drugs before conducting a massive attack in Sivas city center (www.porttakakal.com, 2013). The body of the bomber was wrapped with high-potential explosives.

Drug trafficking increases the number of foreign nationals in problematic districts of metropolitan cities. Only between 2010 and 2012, KOM arrested 1,052 foreign nationals from 92 different countries in relation to drug cases. Many of the foreign nationals are initially brought as mules or street dealers. However, they engage in other types of crimes when they fail to earn sufficient money from drug sales. Iranians take the lead in heroin, cannabis and methamphetamine supply. In the recent years they engage in street distribution of various drugs in Istanbul and central Turkey. Turkish law enforcement agencies arrested 476 Iranians in 266 cases over 2010-2012 period (Ekici & Coban, 2014). A total of 85,000 ecstasy tablets, 2,206 kg of heroin, 1,426 kg of cannabis and 506 kg of methamphetamine were seized from Iranian traffickers. According to Turkish experts, many of these Iranians function as spies along with their smuggling activities (Ekici & Ozbay, 2013).

West Africans constitute the second largest group of foreign nationals. Nigerians are the dominant group which coordinates not just international trafficking but also street distribution in metropolitan cities. Between 2010 and 2012, KOM units arrested 246 African nationals for drug trafficking and distribution (Ekici, 2013b). According to Ekici, a total of 323 kg heroin, 1,230 ecstasy, 77 kg cannabis, 11 kg khat, 319 kg cocaine and 9 kg methamphetamine were seized from African nationals. KOM arrested 112 Nigerians in 58 drug investigations in this period. Nigerians constituted 45% of the Africans arrested for drug related crimes. Nigerians control large number of multi-national courier networks that includes the citizens of United States, European Union, Latin-America, Central Asia and Eastern Europe (Ekici, 2013b).

The number of European drug traffickers also increased dramatically in the recent years. KOM units arrested 293 European nationals in 218 cases between 2010 and 2012. A total of 24 kg opium, 10 tons of acetic anhydride, 1 million ecstasy tablets, 257,000 captagon tablets, 2.3 tons of heroin, 193 kg of cannabis, 1,187 kg of cocaine and 85 kg of methamphetamine were seized from European nationals. Among the Europeans Albanians and Bulgarians took the lead in drug trafficking through Turkey. Citizens of the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands were involved in significant heroin, methamphetamine and ecstasy cases. The Europeans primarily supply the heroin from Turkish and Iranian crime syndicates.

7. Implications for Policy Makers

This paper demonstrated that the threat from drugs in Turkey is much graver than it is commonly perceived by the MGK. The growing narcotics threat has various implications for policy makers. First, currently counter-narcotics tasks are dispersed among various agencies; KOM, Gendarmerie, Customs and Coast Guard. Turkish legislations defined the jurisdictions of these agencies and prevented operational activities in the realms of other agencies. Multi-jurisdictional operations are carried out by joint teams and subject to approval of chief executives and prosecutors. There is no single designated counter-narcotics agency in Turkey. The rapid growth of the narcotics problem urges for creation a strong, centralized and independent national drug enforcement agency.

Second, the existing legislations on narcotics are dispersed and outdated. Legal issues in drugs are formulated in the constitution, Turkish penal code, 2313 numbered law on inspection of drugs, 3298 numbered law on drugs, 5607 numbered law on smuggling and 3713 numbered law on counter-terrorism. The most comprehensive legislation is 2313 numbered law on inspection of drugs, which was first enacted in 1982 and has been constantly amended in line with appearance of new substances on the market. As proclaimed by the TUBIM-TBMM Report, there is an urgent need for a unified counter-narcotics legislation that deals with all aspects of drug production, trafficking, money laundering, consumption, demand reduction, treatment, and rehabilitation (TBMM, 2009). The law should clearly define the roles of national institutions and actors in policy implementation. Main pillars of this legislation should be developed in accordance with the National Counter-narcotics Strategy. Implementation of the strategy should be clearly monitored by a board, which should be created by the new law.

Third, Turkey's official border gates are well-equipped with the latest X-ray technology. However, a significant portion of drugs crosses the border not through the official check points but illegal crossings located on Turkey's borders with Iran and Iraq. Smugglers cross the mountainous border terrains at night to reduce the risk of detection. Military technology used for border security should be transferred to law enforcement agencies. The

number of unmanned aerial vehicles, night-view cameras and advanced radars should be increased to detect smugglers. The current border-surveillance equipment is mostly designed to detect terrorists crossing the borders. The operators of the border-control units are mostly from Turkish Military Forces that have limited understanding of trans-border criminal enterprises. The military border-security equipment should be used for law enforcement purposes.

Fourth, the number of treatment and rehabilitation centers should be increased in line with the rapid growth of drug consumption in Turkey. Currently most of the drug users seeking treatment are turned down due to insufficiency of the treatment facilities. If not corrected, this will increase the number of drug related-deaths as well as exacerbate the problematic drug use. The problem is coupled with non-existence of rehabilitation centers. Even though some part of drug users gets treated, upon completion of the treatment they return back to the same social environment that impels drug use. Thus, many of the former addicts re-apply to treatment facilities within a short period. Unless the government steps in creating a sufficient number of treatment and rehabilitation centers, drug consumption may reach to uncontrollable levels over the next decade.

Fifth, despite the enormous strength in narcotics investigations, Turkish agencies are less experienced in investigating the criminal proceeds of drug trade. In the existing system Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) functions under Ministry of Finance and lacks intelligence power. The board often fails to present evidence on the link between drugs and proceeds. As the state has the burden of proof in money laundering, most of the drug networks avoid confiscation of properties. MASAK should be placed within the KOM's structure to combine financial and criminal intelligence. A financial crime expert should be added to all major narcotics cases. Moreover, the burden of proof should be transferred to the criminals rather than the state in money laundering prosecutions.

Sixth, Turkey's security partnership was based on military strategies throughout the Cold War. The change in the nature of security threats necessitates new alliances and partnerships against the transnational crime. Turkish law enforcement agencies cooperate with over 30 countries in counter-narcotics investigations. Currently there are 29 Turkish security attaches in 25 countries. In addition to narcotics, security attaches deal with all types of transnational criminal activities such as terrorism, cybercrime, human, weapon and nuclear smuggling. A rapidly increasing exchange of international information and intelligence in relation to counter-narcotics necessitates placement of higher numbers of drug liaison officers. Turkish government should send more officers to strategic areas such as the United States, Netherlands, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Iraq, Nigeria and Central Asia.

8. Conclusions

Security paradigms have been shifting over the past three decades. Drug trafficking became a paramount security challenge for the global community. Drug trafficking undermines the fundamental security interests of the states. In many parts of the world, transnational drug networks undermine political stability, territorial integrity and economic development. Drug traffickers operate in a borderless terrain. Even though the states have official border checks, transnational traffickers find different ways of avoiding controls and interdiction of the illicit transshipments. Many of the criminal organizations turn into transnational criminal corporations for a systematic avoidance of state controls.

Turkish security forces have not faced any external attacks since the republic was founded in 1923 on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey has been exposed to an intense flow of illegal substances as it bridges Asia, Middleast and Europe. This paper indicated that transnational organized crime groups are insidious threats that strike the Turkish community and undermine Turkey's power as a nation. This paper presented that drug trafficking has broader national security implications. Almost all interviewed drug enforcement administrators and experts believed that drugs and organized crime present a far more serious threat than the MGK members perceive. Apart from financing terrorism, drug trafficking undermines human capital, economic development, government authority and casts debilitating costs on Turkish community. Even though drug trafficking is often perceived as a "soft" threat, it can undermine the states' ability to fight against "hard" military security challenges. Along with the conventional threats, Turkish National Security Council should place more emphasis on the increasing drug consumption and trafficking. Internal crimefare should be perceived as serious as an external warfare. The MGK's failure to respond the drugs problem will exacerbate the volume of threat to an unprecedented level. Turkish government should develop new partnerships with the relevant states to counter the drug problem.

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Notes

Note 1. FARC is a terrorist group in Colombia that directly confronts the state authority since 1964. The organization has approximately 16,000 armed guerillas. The total death toll is estimated around 40,000. See http://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/colombia-1964-first-combat-deaths/

Note 2. Susurluk was a major scandal in Turkish political history. A police chief, a parliament member and a mafia leader was found dead in the same car after an accident. The incident indicated that a group of state officials was using mafia for intelligence collection and contracted assassinations.

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