Modernising the Constitution-A Crown Act

Given the growth of dictatorships around the world and their intent to undermine democracy including that in the UK it is important that our Constitution be: accessible, transparent, intelligible and robust. Unfortunately, it is none of these things. Indeed, it is little more than a patchwork of common law cases supplemented by legislation.1 Much of this is very antiquated. And, a lot is obsolete.2 Much, also, is scarcely intelligible to lawyers (save for a few constitutional lawyers)3 and most of it is wholly unintelligible to the general public. Finally, there are many gaps and inconsistencies. The purpose of this article is to argue the need for a Crown Act. One which sets out almost all 4 of the Crown’s prerogatives and indicates which should be dispensed with. The purpose of this article is, also, to argue that what is required is not only a Crown Act, but also the following, a:


INTRODUCTION
It is possible to list -in chronological order -all constitutional legislation still extant (see Appendix A). Also, to list all (or almost all) the principal texts on constitutional law (see Appendix B). However, of greater use, generally, to indicate the legal history of the prerogatives of the Crown (the 'Crown prerogatives') are the following: law will apply or whether the sovereign might be able to claim any immunity (including immunity from civil liability). It would seem reasonable that the general law should now apply (i.e. without any prerogative). A Crown Act should state this; 30  Sovereign to Act according to Law. The Act of Settlement 1700 states: 'the laws of England are the birthright of the people thereof and all the kings and queens who shall ascend the throne of this realm [i.e. the sovereign] ought to administer the government of the same according to the said laws and all their officers and ministers ought to serve them respectively according to the same.' 31 This (picturesque) wording ought to be preserved (as modernised) in a Crown Act since it emphasizes that the sovereign must not act arbitrarily but according to law;  Funding. Since 1760, the sovereign has received State funding in the form of a civil list. 32 The present legislation is the Sovereign Grant Act 2011. There are, also, two antiquated sections of the Civil List Act 1837 extant. These do not apply to the sovereign as such but provide for State pensions (of up to £15k pa) to persons who have by their: (a) personal service to the Crown; (b) perfomance of public duties; or (c) useful discoveries in science and attainments in literature and the arts, merited the gracious consideration of the sovereign and the gratitude of the country. 33 These two Acts (with the wording modernised) should be set out in a Crown Act (a schedule would be fine).
In conclusion, a Crown Act should set out the above matters in modern form.

SUCCESSION
Until recently, sucession to the Crown followed the male line under the principal of primogeniture. However, the Succession to the Crown Act 2013 (s 1) provides that the gender of a person born after 28 October 2011 does not give that person (or that person's descendents) precedence over any other person (wherever born).
 Also, ancient legislation -the Status of Children Born Abroad Act 1350-2 -provides that the birth of a child of the sovereign abroad does not affect their right to inherit; 34  The Succession to the Crown Act 2013 also requires the consent of the sovereign to the marriage of one of 6 persons next in line of sucession to the Crown. Without it, they are disqualified from succeeding; 35  Pursuant to the common law, the sovereign cannot alter succession to the Crown in her will. 36 That is, she cannot pass sovereignty to a person of her own choosing.
In conclusion, provision should be made for these matters in a Crown Act.

IMMUNITY & ARREST
There are certain personal immunities accorded to the sovereign, viz.
 Immunity. From early history, the sovereign has been legally held to have criminal and civil immunity. This, in order to perform his/her office. 37 However, the latter is not complete in that there are common law remedies available of: (a) petition of right; (b) suit against the Attorney-General; 38 30 The Act of 1800 (see n 29) and other legislation governing the private estate can, then, be repealed save where specific sections are still required. 31 See also Chitty, n 13, p 7. 32 The hereditary revenues of the sovereign were surrendered by George III in 1760 (1 Geo III c 1) in return for civil list revenues of £800,000. See also M2, p 539. 33 Since pensions are now only given pursuant to (c) nowadays, it may be appropriate to delete (a) and (b). Also, since the role of the sovereign in such matters is now formal, the words 'gracious consideration of their sovereign' can be deleted. 34 : 'the law of the Crown of England is, and always hath been such, that the children of the kings of England, in whatsoever parts they be born, in England or elsewhere, be able and ought to bear the inheritance after the death of their ancestors; which law our….lord the king, the…prelates, earls, barons, and other great men, and all the commons assembled in this Parliament, do approve and affirm for ever…'. See also Chitty, n 13, pp 405-6. See generally, M2, pp 553-4. 35 For the position prior to this Act, see M3, pp 111-6. 36 See Halsbury (5th ed), n 17, vol 29, para 66 'The sovereign cannot grant away the right to the Crown by testament.' Such does not prevent the sovereign (in effect) transferring the right to the Crown by abdicating. 37 Thus, negligence or dishonesty cannot be attributed to the sovereign. Instead, it was attributed to her ministers or her officials (such as by the legal expression of the sovereign being 'deceived' in her grant). See also M1, pp 12-6. 38 See Halsbury (5th ed), n 17, vol 29, para 65. Also, Chitty, n 13, pp 339-52. Halsbury, para 56, states that the sovereign is 'inviolable' . However, such is too wide a proposition today and it is obscure in meaning. So too, to ascribe to the sovereign 'absolute perfection' or that the sovereign can do no 'wrong'. (ibid, para 57). See also Chitty, n 13, p 5. ilr.ccsenet.org International Law Research Vol. 10, No. 1; 2021  Arrest. As part of the the sovereign's immunity, it has been held that the sovereign cannot be arrested. 39 Nor can the sovereign arrest a person. 40 It would seem appropriate to preserve these immunities -save that it would seem reasonable to limit the sovereign's criminal immunity to situations other than where life imprisonment can be imposed (in practice, the latter is (rather) unlikely to happen). Also,  Arrest in a Royal Palace. On the rationale of the pre-eminence of the sovereign, it was said that no arrest can be made in a royal palace. 41 However, the background to this should be noted. From early times, a court exercised jurisdiction over criminal offences within a royal palace and its verge (i.e. its geographical bounds). Further, court servants -as a form of privilege in serving the sovereign and (so as not to disrupt Crown business) -were accorded (it seems from Tudor times) some degree of immunity from arrest for civil matters, save where a senior court official (such as the Lord Chamberlain) gave permission. 42 Today, the court of the verge (the palace court) no longer exists and the prospect of arrest for a civil offence in a royal palace is very rare. Also, privilege from arrest in a royal palace is outdated. 43 For example, if a member of staff is murdering people in a royal palace it would seem best for the police (or citizens making a citizen's arrest) to arrest the same, without needing to contact the Lord Chamberlain for permission. Thus, any Crown preorogative preventing the arrest of a person in a royal palace (whether the sovereign is residing there or not) 44 should be abolished as obsolete.
In conclusion, the criminal and civil immunity of the sovereign should be preserved (albeit, the former should exclude any crime which merits life imprisonment). Any prerogative preventing the arrest of a person in a royal palace should be abolished.

LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS
There are certain legal presumptions relating to the sovereign -and the Crown -which should be modernised or clarified. Thus,  Minor. It is a common law presumption (fiction) that the sovereign cannot be a minor. 45 However, such not only flies in the face of the factual position, it is no longer necessary since legislation provides for a regency, which is predicated on the fact that the sovereign can be a minor. Thus, this legal presumption should be dispensed with as unnecessary and inaccurate;  Negligence. There is a legal presumption that the sovereign (whether in person or in the body politic) cannot be negligent. 46 Rather, the same was always attributed to his/her officials and servants. This presumption should be preserved in respect of the sovereign in person since it is important to shield the sovereign from civil liability, in order to perform his/her office (see 5). However, this presumption was extended from the body natural to the body politic (i.e. not just to the sovereign in person but to the Crown in general). In modern times, caselaw has clarified that the Crown can be held liable for negligence and a Crown Act should confirm this;  Laches. There is a common law maxim that 'time does not run against the sovereign' (nullum tempus occurrit regi). This should be preserved in the case of the sovereign as part of his personal immunity from civil liability 47 as well as in respect of the Crown generally.
In conclusion, the legal fiction that the sovereign cannot be a minor should be dispensed with. Further, the Crown should not have immunity from negligence. However, both should not be liable for laches.

LEGAL LIMITATIONS
There are certain legal limitations relating to the sovereign -and the Crown -which should be modernised. Thus:  Limitation -Trustee or Executor. There is a common law restriction on the sovereign being a trustee or executor (although this was not wholly observed in practice, albeit the sovereign -invariably -ordered others to act in his/her behalf). 48 Such can be abolished; 

Limitation -Joint Tenant & Tenancy in Common with a Subject.
There is a common law presumption that the sovereign cannot be a joint tenant with a subject in the case of real or personal property. 49 The rationale for this is that the sovereign is of such a eminent rank that any joint tenancy is overawed (i.e. wiped out) by the title of the sovereign. Today, such should be abolished (not least, because arbitrarily taking away a person's ownership in property would conflict with human rights). It seems this limitation may also have applied to the sovereign in the body politic. Thus, any limitation should be abolished in respect of both, ex abundante cautela. Also, to avoid uncertainty, the same should apply to any limitation in respect of a tenancy in common (it is unclear whether such a limitation exists). In short, these limitations should be dispensed with and the general law apply;  Limitation -Reserving Rent. It is a common law presumption that the sovereign cannot reserve (i.e. alienate) rent; albeit the reason for this is rather obscure. 50 This would (originally) have applied to the Crown since the sovereign (it was thought) could not hold real property in person. Today, such can be abolished -both in respect of the body politic and personally;  Limitation -Ability to Franchise. Generally, the sovereign franchised (i.e. sold) many of its prerogatives in order to raise money. Common recipients were the duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster. Also, the counties palatine, the City of London, boroughs and lords of the manor. These occurred mainly in medieval times, when the franchise was worth something and where legislation did not otherwise cover the field. For example, the Crown, often, franchised its right to hold a fair (and charge a toll) as well as to operate a ferry etc. However, the common law (for obvious reasons) prohibited the Crown from franchising its right, inter alia, to: (a) summon (or dissolve or prorogue) Parliament; (b) assent to an Act of Parliament; (c) appoint a judge; (d) issue a pardon; 51 (e) naturalise a person. 52 A Crown Act should make provision for this. Further, the intent should be that -in the end -all Crown prerogatives become statutory (of which there are few). And, that no Crown prerogatives should be capable of being franchised; 47 Bacon, n 12, vol 4 (1798), p 562 'From the presumption that the king is daily employed in the weighty and publick affairs of government, it hath become an established rule at common law, that no laches shall be imputed to him, nor is he any way to suffer in his interests, which are certain and permanent; and this his privilege quod nullum tempus occurrit regi, [time does not run against the king] has been confirmed by the statute de praerogativa regis.' 'Laches' (the term is law french) implies idleness or slackness, see JH Baker, Manual of Law French (2nd ed, 1900)(laches). See also Chitty, n 13, p 379 'From the earliest periods of English law, it has…been a maxim that nullum tempus occurrit regi; a maxim grounded on the principle that no laches can be imputed to the sovereign, whose time and attention are supposed to be occupied by the cares of government (ardua regni pro bono publico) '. 48 See generally, M9, pp 304-6. Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, pp 378-9 'The king may…hold as a trustee of lands, though he cannot be compelled to execute the trust…The king may also be appointed an executor; but as it cannot be presumed that he has sufficient time and leisure to engage in a private concern, the law allows him to nominate such persons as he shall think proper to take upon them the execution of the trust, against whom all persons may bring their actions; also, the king may appoint others to take the accounts of such executors.' 49 This, pre-1800, applied to personal property since it was not thought that the sovereign could hold real property personally. See generally, M9, pp 287-92. Chitty, n 13, p 381 'It is …an established principle, that where the king's right and that of a subject meet at one and the same time, the king's shall be preferred. Detur digniori is the rule in the case of a concurrence of titles between the king and subject. This rule has been already explained, as it regards debts and remedies in the case of the king…On the same principle, the king cannot be a joint tenant etc with a subject.' 50 See generally, M9, pp 306-7. 51 Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, p 90 'It is an incommunicable prerogative; except, perhaps, in the colonies, where, by grant from the Crown, it may be exercised by the governor etc. '. 52 Ibid, pp 118-9 'The jura coronae or rights of the Crown, so long as they are attached to the king, are called prerogatives; but when such prerogatives are delegated to a subject, they acquire the appellation of franchise; for all franchises are derived from the king. A franchise is defined to be a royal privilege or branch of the royal prerogative in the hands of a subject, by grant from the king.' See also Halsbury, n 17 (5th ed), vol 20, para 66.
 Limitation -Minister of the Crown/Holding a Crown Office. A distance has always been maintained between the pre-eminent office of the sovereign and Crown offices. Thus, the sovereign cannot act as a minister of the Crown. Nor, hold a Crown office. 53 Nor attend, or sit, in Cabinet. 54 Such limitations should continue to apply;  Limitation -Giving Evidence in his Own Cause. As a mark of his dignity, it has been said that the sovereign cannot give evidence in a court (i.e. oral testimony) in his own cause. 55 However, this would not seem to prevent the sovereign giving written evidence as to facts within his knowledge in a civil case between subjects. 56 In conclusion, limitations on the sovereign being a trustee or executor-as well as in respect of being a joint tenant or a tenant in common or reserving rent -should be abolished. However, the prohibition on the Crown franchising certain prerogatives should be retained. Also, the sovereign should be prohibited from: (i) being a minister of the Crown; (ii) holding a Crown office; (iii) attending (or) sitting in Cabinet; or (iv) giving evidence in court in his (or her) own cause.

CROWN PREROGATIVES
The are a multitude of Crown prerogatives that apply to the Crown (whether to the sovereign in a personal capacity or in a public capacity, or both). A large number of these are obsolete. These are now considered. However, from the outset, it should be noted that Crown prerogatives were limited to the Crown -unless franchised pursuant to a charter. Thus -with exceptions -Crown prerogatives were not given to any of the following at common law:  a consort of the sovereign;  the heir(ess) apparent to the throne (and any consort of the same);  a queen dowager;  a princess royal;  any member of the Royal Family, except the sovereign. 57 The few exceptions related to: (a) a consort of the sovereign; 58 (b) a queen dowager. 59 However, these exceptions are now obsolete or unnecessary. Thus, a Crown Act should abolish any Crown prerogative accorded to (a) or (b). As for Crown prerogatives, since these tend to fall in distinct categories they may be analysed as such:

(a) Military Prerogatives
From early times, the Crown had a prerogative to the following, to:  billet any member of the armed forces on the general public; (obsolete) 60  impose martial law (including the jurisdiction of courts martial) on civilians; Some of these prerogatives were franchised -such as that to impose a toll for murage. However, most (including the more important ones) were not. It is asserted that all of these Crown prerogatives should now be abolished since some are (manifestly) obsolete and others have been superceded by legislation ('L'). As to these prerogatives:  Billet. The common law right to billet army and navy personnel became statutory. Thus, any Crown prerogative is obsolete;  Martial Law. The imposing of martial law (i.e military courts judging civilians according to military law) is now covered by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (which provides for civil courts). Thus, this Crown prerogative is obsolete;  Impressment. The impressment of men for the navy (such became, effectively, limited to mariners aged between 18-55) became obsolete by 1815. The right to impress men for the army (there was no right to impress for the air force) was always contentious and, in World Wars 1 & 2, statutory conscription was employed for the armed forces. Thus, this Crown prerogative is obsolete;  Letters of Marque. The issue of letters of marque (also called letters of marque and reprisal) for privateering (as opposed to piracy) ended in 1856 (the Declaration of Paris 1856 renounced privateering). Thus, letters of marque are obsolete;  Saltpetre. To dig for saltpetre (potassium nitrate, for gunpowder) -and to enter the land of subjects to do sobecame obsolete (in practice) by the 19 th century at the latest;  Erecting Castles (Forts). Castellation is obsolete and planning permission would be needed in any case. Also, permission to retain weapons;  Requisitioning Land. To requisition private land for military purposes is now governed by legislation;  Toll for Murage. To impose a toll for murage (a toll levied to repair city and town walls for defensive purposes) ended (in practice) by the 15 th century at the latest, when the nature of warfare rendered defensive city and town walls obsolete.
In conclusion, these Crown prerogatives of a military nature should be abolished.

(b) Animals & Fish Prerogatives
The sovereign still retains Crown prerogatives in respect of fish and swans. Thus:  Royal Fish. Pursuant to the Act, Prerogativa Regis (c. 1273-4) -which is still extant -the sovereign has a prerogative to 'royal fish', which is generally taken to be a reference to sturgeon and whales (possibly, also, to porpoise, walrus, narwhals etc). 69 However, in 1971, the sovereign indicated that she no longer wished to retain the prerogative to royal fish; 70  Wild Swans. The sovereign also has a prerogative to wild, unmarked, swans on the sea (or the branches thereof). The purpose was for food -young swans (cygnets) being a delicacy. However, in practice, this is now limited to the Thames -of which there are 3 franchises extant -to the (i) Company of Vintners; (ii) Company of Dyers; and (iii) the Ilchester family (for a swan breeding colony at Abbotsbury in Dorset). 71 In conclusion, the Crown prerogative to royal fish should be abolished. So too, in respect of royal swans (or, the latter should be limited to the Thames).

(c) Mining Prerogatives
It has been asserted that the Crown has a prerogative to gold and silver mines ('royal mines') within the sovereign's dominions. This prerogative was, sometimes, franchised. The basis, and rationale, for this prerogative has always been rather flimsy, being founded on a Tudor case, The Case of the Mines (1567) 72 in which counsel argued that the sovereign had such a right since:  gold and silver were excellent and the sovereign was entitled to excellent things;  the sovereign required gold and silver to fund an army, in order to protect the country;  the sovereign required gold and silver for coinage;  if a subject had gold and silver mines he could surpass the sovereign in wealth. 73 These grounds have no merit today (even if they did in 1567). Further, the sovereign in person receives no financial benefit from royal mines. And, any financial benefit to the Crown (i.e. the sovereign in the body politic) is very low. Thus, such a prerogative should be abolished.
In conclusion, any Crown prerogative relating to royal mines (and any franchise) should be abolished.

(d) Commercial Prerogatives
There are a number of Crown prerogatives which are of a commercial nature. These comprise the following, the prerogative of the Crown (and any franchisee, where applicable) to: The rationale for the Crown undertaking all the above was that these were 'money spinners' both for the Crown in general and, more particularly, the sovereign. Such was prior to 1760 when the sovereign was not funded by the State by means of a Civil List. Today, this rationale has long gone. Thus, legislation should now regulate such matters in their entirety.
In conclusion, all Crown prerogatives of a commercial nature should be abolished. Such should now be regulated by legislation.

(e) Border Prerogatives
There are a number of Crown prerogatives which relate to the control by the Crown of the nation's borders. (these were not franchised, being of primary importance to the Crown). These comprise the prerogative of the Crown to:  issue letters of safe conduct; 98  prohibit subjects from leaving the realm (including by means of the writ ne exeat regno); 99  order subjects to return to the realm. 100 All of these prerogatives are now obsolete. In respect of them:  Letters of safe conduct. These were the precursor to the modern passport. They were issued to foreigners (and, in some cases, subjects) to enable them to reside and travel, in safety, in the realm for a limited period of time (usually 40 days or so).  Subjects entering and exiting the Realm. From early times the Crown asserted a prerogative to prevent British subjects from leaving the realm. Also, a prerogative to order a subject to return to the realm. 103 Such prerogatives were a useful device for English sovereigns to deal with their enemies -especially, persons who might depart abroad to raise support to de-throne them (such as in the time of Elizabeth I (1558-1603). However, the ambits of these prerogatives were always uncertain and contentious in nature 104 and -after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 -they appear to have been never (or scarcely) been used. Today, such prerogatives are an encroachment on human rights 105 and specific legislation should be required. In any case, these prerogatives are regarded as obsolete. 106 In conclusion, the above Crown prerogatives are obsolete and should be abolished.

(f) Prison Prerogatives
From early times, 107 the Crown asserted prerogatives relating to the establishment (and operation) of prisons. These comprised the prerogative of the Crown to:  establish a new prison;  operate a prison;  franchise the operation of a prison. 108 The franchising of the operation of a prison, in earlier times, was common as a revenue raising device. However, many abuses were committed by the gaolers starving, extrorting or torturing prisoners, such that franchises by the Crown were no longer granted 109 (albeit, technically, the Crown still retains the power to franchise prisons). Today, prisons in the UK exist and operate under legislation and they are regulated by a specific Government department (the Home Office). These prerogative powers, therefore, are no longer required (nor that to franchise).
In conclusion, all Crown prerogatives relating to prisons should be abolished.

(g) Coinage Prerogatives
There are a number of Crown prerogatives which relate to the control by the Crown of the coin of the realm. Thus, the Crown (and franchisees) has a prerogative to:  issue (that is, mint) coin of the realm and to fix its denomination (i.e. value) and render it current;  legitimate foreign coin;  decry coin of the realm, making it no longer current. 110 From Anglo-Saxon times, sovereigns issued coinage bearing their image and they regulated the locations in England where mints could be established (it was a capital offence to mint coins otherwise). 111 They also franchised the right to mint coins (such franchises died out in later times). Further, given the scarcity of coinage on many occasions, sovereigns permitted the circulation of foreign coins in the realm -with their being treated with the same legitimacy as coins of the realm. 112 Today, legislation governs coinage -which is appropriate since Parliament should oversight, and regulate, such matters.
In conclusion, all Crown prerogatives relating to coinage should be abolished.

(h) Printing Prerogatives
Printing commenced in England c. 1476. The Crown sought to control the same for two reasons. It feared the dissemination of seditious -or religiously inflammable -material. It also saw the potential for making money by taking a monopoly over the publication of certain books. The prerogative of the Crown in the case of the latter was especially asserted in the time of James 105 It may be noted that there was no pre-requisite that a British subject had committed (or been charged with) a crime. In part, this reflected the desire of the Crown to control the sea borders of the realm and, thus, to control the entry -and exitof foreigners. Also, to repel enemies. There was, also, a revenue raising aspect -in that revenue could be gained from controlling the import and export of goods. Further, there was a desire by the Crown to prevent persons (whether British subjects or foreigners) surreptitiously taking (gold and silver) coinage out of the realm, with a result that the treasury was depleted. Finally, the Crown sought to prevent its enemies fleeing abroad (save where it permitted the same) as well as British subjects departing abroad to fight as mercinaries against countries with which it had amicable relations.
 For all these reasons, from early times, the Crown closely regulated ports and harbours -specifying which British subjects and foreigners might arrive and depart, as well as in respect of the entry (and exit) of goods. In the case of the latter, customs officers supervised the same and imposed customs and excise duties;  Today, it is appropriate that legislation should regulate all the above. Thus, from Victorian times, legislation has regulated the establishment of public ports (and harbours) as well as their operation and the imposition of charges (i.e. charges for ships using the port as well as any customs duties).
113 Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, pp 239-40 limited the Crown's prerogative to: (a) 'all Acts of Parliament, proclamations, and orders of council'. Also, (b) 'the publication of all liturgies and books of divine service etc.' Also, Chitty noted that the the Crown was said 'to have a right, by purchase, to the copies of such law books, grammars, and other compositions, as were compiled or translated at the expense of the Crown.' However, this opinion is not observed today. 114 Halsbury (5th ed), n 17, vol 23, paras 507-8 notes that the Crown has a prerogative to exercise a monopoly in the printing of the authorised version of the Bible (i.e. the version approved by the CoE) and the Book of Common Prayer (same). Also, to franchise the same. Acts of Parliament (and Measures of the CoE) are Crown copyright by virtue of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 164. 115 See Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, pp 174-5. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid, p 174 'the right to erect ports and havens is in general exclusively vested in the Crown…[however] a subject may, by charter from the King, or prescription, erect a port…The king has not merely the prerogative power of erecting ports and havens, but he possesses prima facie the propriety or ownership in all the ports and havens within his dominions, though the public have a right to use them; and even though the right to a port or haven be vested by charter or prescription in a subject, yet he holds it charged or affected with the jus regium or royal prerogative, as it relates to ports and havens. The royal right of superintending ports and havens is a necessary consequence of the prerogative ownership in them. Hence the king is entrusted with the care of preventing and reforming public nuisances in ports and havens…But this superintending power does not in general extend so far as to enable the king to open and shut ports and havens for the purpose of prohibiting the importation or exportation of goods. Nor can arbitrary or excessive duties for cranage, wharfage etc be taken from the public; but the duties must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by the king's licence or charter.' 118 Ibid, p 175,'The king being entrusted with the safety of navigation, possesses also by the common law, the prerogative right of erecting beacons and lighthouses in such places as his wisdom may deem most convenient for the preservation of ships and mariners, and the general interests of his subjects. This royal right is considered so important to the public weal, that it will justify his majesty in erecting a beacon on the land of a subject without his consent. The right of erecting beacons and lighthouses is vested by the common law of the land exclusively in the king; and a subject cannot raise them without the king's permission.'  Chester. The county palatine of Chester re-vested in the Crown in 1830 when any jura regalia in respect of the same ended. This did not affect the courtesy title of Earl of Chester, which is reserved to the heir apparent to the throne. However, the same is no longer necessary and should be abolished; 128 119 Any prerogative to erect fortifications on the land of a suject without their consent should be subject to legislative compulsory acquisition. 120 See generally, M5, pp 83-6. It may be noted that creating a county palatine resulted in a divestment of rights in respect of justice which would not be appropriate today, see Halsbury (5th ed), n 17, vol 29, para 66 'palatinate jurisdictions cannot be granted at the present day without the authority of an Act of Parliament.' 121 Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, p 119-20 'The counties palatine, Chester, Durham and Lancaster, the royal franchise of Ely…may be ranked among royal franchises, as they in general arose from the favour of the Crown to those particular districts wherein we find them erected.' 122 Ibid, p 120,'counties corporate; which are certain cities and towns…to which out of special grace and favor, the kings…have granted the privilege to be counties of themselves, and not to be comprized in any other county; but to be governed by their own sheriffs and other magistrates, so that no officers of the county at large have any power to intermeddle in therein. There is no doubt that the Crown possesses the power of granting to any city to have justices of their own within themselves, and may exclude by express words the county justices from intermeddling in the ordinary business of a justice of the peace. There is no need (or purpose) for the Crown having a prerogative to create a county palatine today. Further, it would not do so in practice. Thus, this right should be abolished. The counties palatine of Chester, Durham and Lancaster should, also, be abolished since they now exist in name only.
(ii) Counties, Boroughs, Towns & Cities. Counties, boroughs and towns (as well as the title of a city) are descriptions employed for geographical governmental functions only and the epithet 'royal' (as in royal county, royal borough or royal town) 132 is a courtesy title today since it does not mean -as it did in times past -that the sovereign either owned the same (whether in the body personal or in the body politic) or that such can elect its own sheriffs and magistrates (JP's). 133 Thus, the Crown's prerogative to create a county (or a royal county) -or the status of a city, a town or a borough (or a royal city, town or borough) -by charter should also end, as unnecessary. Perhaps, without prejudice to any royal counties, boroughs and towns still extant. 134 Consideration should also be given to abolishing the term 'borough' since it no longer has meaning (town walls no longer exist for defensive purposes). 135 The application of the term 'City' should, also, not be a Crown prerogative (it confers no specific legal rights in any case). In conclusion, all these geographical descriptions should be matters for the government to determine, pursuant to legislation.
In conclusion, Crown prerogatives to create counties (whether palatine or corporate) should be abolished. Also, the prerogative to grant the status of: a city, a borough (or royal borough) or a town (or royal town) should be abolished.

(k) Prerogatives re Minors, the Mentally Ill & Charities
The Crown has prerogatives to supervise:  137 Ibid. See also Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, pp 161-2. 138 Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, pp 155-6 'The superintending power over infants was originally in the King by the common law, and was by his majesty delegated to the Lord Chancellor, who seems to exercise it as a branch of his general jurisdiction; and no separate commission is necessary to legalise the chancellor's jurisdiction in this respect.' 139 Ibid, p 157 'The superintenance of idiots, who are persons devoid of understanding from their births, and are presumed never likely to attain any, is also vested in the king, not however it seems by the common law, but by statutes for the benefit of the subject on the party being found an idiot by a jury of twelve men on the old common law writ de idiota inquirendo. ' Ibid, p 159 'The king is also guardian of lunatics; and his majesty's authority in this respect generally is and may be delegated to the Lord Chancellor or other person, in the same manner as that relative to idiots is delegated.' 140 Ibid, p 155 'The king is in legal contemplation the guardian of his people; and in that amiable capacity is entitled, (or rather it is his majesty's duty, in return for the allegiance paid him) to take care of such of his subjects, as are legally unable, on account of mental incapacity, whether it proceed from 1st nonage: 2 idiocy: or 3 lunacy: to take proper care of themselves and their property.' such powers passed -in time -to the Lord Chancellor. Now, they are exercised by Government departments pursuant to legislation and by the courts -not by the Crown as such. 141 Thus, any prerogative is otiose and should be abolished, being superceded by legislation;  Charities. The Crown also has a prerogative to supervise charities -the prerogative of visitation (supervision). However, such a proposition has been stated too widely 142 and this prerogative only applies where a relevant Crown charter or legislation or the Court of Chancery or the Charities Commission has no supervisory status. It is asserted the latter two now cover all eventualities. Thus, this Crown prerogative is no longer required. Today, a more appropriate age for the minor is under 16 years. Further, such should not occur if the mother is still alive. Also, the right of disposal should apply to a dying mother as well (but not if the father is alive). In short, this wording should be stated in a Crown Act as modernised, since it reflected the prerogative of the Crown as parens patriae to make provision for the same. Alternatively, it could be placed in family legislation dealing with minors.
In conclusion, these Crown prerogatives should be abolished as unnecessary.

(l) Constitutional Prerogatives -Styles & Titles
Given the pre-eminence of the sovereign -in early times -they (unilaterally) accorded themselves titles as they thought fit.  142 As Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, p 161 pointed out, Blackstone stated the prerogative too widely 'if there be a charter with proper powers, the charity must be regulated in the manner prescribed by the charter, and there is no ground for the controlling interposition of the Court of Chancery.' 143 It continues (this wording is spent) :'in possession or remainder other than popish recusants, and that such disposition of the custody of such child or children made since the [24 Feb 1645] or hereafter to be made shall be good and effectual against all and every person or persons claiming the custody or tuition of such child or children as guardian in socage or otherwise; and that such person or persons to whom the custody of such child or children has been or shall be so disposed or devised as aforesaid shall and may maintaine an action of ravishment of ward or trespass against any person or persons which shall wrongfully take away or detain such child or children for the recovery of such child or children and shall and may recover damages for the same in the said action for the use and benefit of such child or children.' 144 Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, pp 107-8, 'The Crown alone…can create and confer dignities and honours. The king is not only the fountain; but the parent of them.' See also Halsbury (1 st ed), n 17, vol 6, pp 454-8. 145 See Halsbury (5th ed), n 17, vol 29, para 55 'The Crown and its royal prerogative is the legal authority for the granting of all state honours and titles.' 146 Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, p 108 'The titles of nobility now in use are dukes, marquesses, earls, viscounts and barons'. Earls (eorls) and barons probably existed before the conquest.  Lord Mayor. Such a title (the term is Anglo-Norman) came with the Normans and is not to be found in Anglo-Saxon times. London was, probably, one of the first towns to have a lord mayor. 150 These lord mayors were appointed by, and responsible to, the Crown -something not occurring today. Thus, the election of a mayor (and deputy) should be left to town (and city) councillors to determine today, pursuant to legislation;  Right Honourable. The use of this prefix is, as indicated by Whitaker, complex. 151 However, the title is a courtesy one. Not one granted to a specific individual by charter (including letters patent). Consideration should be given to its being dispensed with (the use of the word 'honourable' in Parliament results from Parliamentary custom and not, it seems, as a result of a Crown prerogative);  Esquire. Originally, this prefix referred to one who carried the shield of a knight in battle. Then, it became used as a title of dignity to refer to a person next in degree below a knight. By 1727 the term had expanded to include: (a) all the younger sons of noblemen; (b) the eldest sons of (a) -and their eldest sons -successively; (c) the four esquires of the king's body; (d) those serving the sovereign in any worshipful calling (such as his surgeon, master cook etc); (e) those created esquires by the sovereign with the collar of SS of silver -such as heralds and sarjeants at arms; (f) the heads of some ancient families (this, by prescription); (g) those bearing any superior office -such as that of a high sheriff; (h) JP's; (i) barristers; (j) many wealthy men. Today, the title is used as a courtesy title and indiscriminately. Consideration should be given to its being abolished. 152 Finally, it may be noted that old legislation relating to peerages viz. the 147

(m) Legal Prerogatives -Courts & Commissions
The Crown has asserted prerogatives in respect of the following, a prerogative to create a:  common law court; 154 or a  commission exercising a judicial function. 155 From early times, the Crown has had the prerogative to create courts administering the common law -but not one administering equity. However, since the merger of common law and equity in Victorian times, it is hardly likely that the Crown would seek to set up a common law court only, today. Also, attempts by the Crown to create a new court in the past have, often, provoked widespread dis-satisfaction. Today, it would seem manifest that any court -or commission of a judicial nature -should only be created pursuant to legislation.
In conclusion, the Crown prerogatives to create a common law court -or a commission exercising a judicial function (which is the same thing) -should be abolished as unnecessary and inappropriate.

(n) Legal Prerogatives -Construction of Crown Grants
The Crown has asserted various prerogatives in respect of Crown grants. That is, to: (1) If any person accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, or for any purpose, any gift, money or valuable consideration as an inducement or reward for procuring or assisting or endeavouring to procure the grant of a dignity or title of honour to any person, or otherwise in connection with such a grant, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
(2) If any person gives, or agrees or proposes to give, or offers to any person any gift, money or valuable consideration as an inducement or reward for procuring or assisting or endeavouring to procure the grant of a dignity or title of honour to any person, or otherwise in connection with such a grant, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour. (3) Any person guilty of a misdemeanour under this Act shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding [2] years or to a fine not exceeding [£500], or to both such imprisonment and such fine, or on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding [3] months or to a fine not exceeding [£50], or to both such imprisonment and such fine, and where the person convicted (whether on indictment or summarily) received any such gift, money, or consideration as aforesaid which is capable of forfeiture, he shall in addition to any other punishment be liable to forfeit the same to [HM].' This wording should be modernised.
 be presumed to be deceived (or mistaken) in a Crown grant; 160  be presumed, in a Crown grant, to reserve an advowson -unless the grant expressly provides otherwise; 161  re-enter, on a default under a Crown lease, without having to make any demand (i.e. to give any notice). 162 In respect of these:  Grants construed in Favour of the Crown. The rationale for such a rule of interpretation was that the sovereign must always be presumed to act for the overall public good. However, this is no more than a legal fiction. Further, there were many exceptions to this rule. Today, it is also inappropriate since the royal demesne no longer exists (now being part of the Crown Estate) and the sovereign is no longer involved, in person, in such grants, which are drafted by professional lawyers. Also, today, the modern rules of interpretation are based on the intention of the parties, generally eschewing legal fictions and artificial rules of construction. If this rule is abolished it will have a negligible effect since it was so little relied on in practice down the centuries and the caselaw is old;  Presuming a Lost Crown Grant. Given that many Crown grants (especially, those of a byegone age) may have been lost, the courts have been prepared to presume that the Crown had made a grant in certain instances where there are disputes between subjects -even though no document can be produced. 163 However, today, the courts, generally, eschew presumptions of law (and legal fictions). Instead, they look at the evidence submitted by the parties to see whether a factual conclusion can be arrived at. Further, unlike a presumption, modern judicial interpretation is not weighted -from the outset -in favour of any party such as the Crown. Thus, today, it would seem more appropriate to abolish any such presumption of a Crown grant and, instead, let the courts rely on the evidence submitted in order to reach a conclusion on the facts whether a Crown grant had once been made (one now lost). In any case, if such a presumption of a lost Cown grant is abolished, this will have negligible effect since such a presumption has been little relied on in practice down the centuries (also, so much land in England and Wales is now registered land. And, few 'lost' Crown grants are now asserted -not least since there is little value in them);

 Presumption of Deceit (or Mistake) in a Crown Grant.
Many sovereigns were impecunious and they made grants of Crown land without considering the financial consequences (this changed after 1760 since the royal demesne became part of the Crown Estate and the sovereign received funding from a Civil List instead). 164 o Deception. Given the profligacy of sovereigns, in an effort to redress (i.e. clawback) the situation the courts, sometimes, presumed that the Crown was deceived in its grant (which was then held void) viz: (a) where the Crown granted a greater (or different) estate than it was entitled to; or (b) where the estate (or part of it) had already been granted to another and the prior grant was not recited; or (c) where the Crown had been deceived in the consideration (value) expressed in the grant (i.e. the sum to be paid); o Mistake. The courts presumed that the Crown was mistaken in a grant where: (a) the Crown was prejudiced by a mistake in a material point (either in its tenure or profit); or (b) where a recital for the Crown's benefit turned out to be false. 165 Today, generally, at law a party can allege mistake, misrepresentation (both fraudulent and innocent) and deceit. Thus, if these presumptions were abolished the Crown would be no worse off. Indeed, the latter are wider in scope and they are not based on presumption as such but on the factual position being proved. Also, there is no good reason to distinguish, in such matters, Crown from non-Crown grants. Finally, if such presumptions were abolished the practical effect would be negligible, since such presumptions are little relied on today;  Reserving an Advowson. There was a common law presumption as to the reservation of an advowson in a Crown grant, unless expressly provided otherwise. This became statutory -in the Act of Prerogativa Regis (c. 1272-3) which is still extant. 166 However, this statutory presumption -which would only apply where a church was on the land -would, likely, not apply to the Crown Estate (the Act being prior to the same). Also, given more methods of drafting which looks at the intent of the parties, such a presumption is not appropriate anyway. The Act has been abolished in Northern Ireland and it has had little caselaw throughout its long history. This Act should be repealed (also, in relation to royal fish); 

Re-entry on Default without Demand.
Where a Crown lease contains a provision for re-entry by the Crown on the non-payment of rent, no demand for payment is required (the word 'demand' refers to some form of notice of re-entry being given). However, this rule of law is subject to limitations -such as the grant making provision for a demand. Or, the Crown Lands Act 1623 (still extant) applying. The rationale for such a rule of law was the pre-eminence of the sovereign, when the royal demesne was part of his personal estate. However, since 1760, the royal demesne has been part of the Crown Estate (which employs professional draftsmen and lawyers) and, thus, there is no need for this rule of law. Also, there is no need for such a rule in the case of the Queen's personal property -the likelihood of her leasing her real property may be dismissed as remote. 167 In Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (1998), the House of Lords rejected the old 'intellectual baggage' in interpreting deeds in favour of 'common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life'. 168 Almost all the above would have concerned deeds since these were the primary form for legal documents from 1290. Thus, the same comment can apply to the above. Discarding such presumptions and rules of law will enable the courts to reach a decision on the facts without any bias towards the Crown.
In conclusion, Crown prerogatives in respect of Crown grants should be abolished.

(o) Legal Prerogatives
There are various other Crown prerogatives of a legal nature which may be referred to. These include the prerogative of the Crown to:  exercise certain prerogatives with regard to distress (at common law); 169  not have to give a receipt (an acquittance) acknowledging the payment (or the discharge) of any debt to the Crown; 170  not be bound by an estoppel; 171  not be bound by any legal fictions; 172  compel a person to accept a public office. 173 As to these:  Distress at Common Law. Common law distress has been abolished and distress is now regulated by legislation. Thus, any Crown prerogatives relating to the same are spent;  Not having to give an Acquittance. Where a debt to the Crown was paid (i.e. discharged) by a person, it was said (on the basis of a case in 1487) that the Crown was not bound (compelled) to give an acquittance. i.e. a receipt acknowledging the payment (discharge) of that debt, one given to the debtor. Instead, the same was required to solicit it (i.e. provide evidence of payment and request a confirmation of the same). 174 This was based on the pre-eminence of the sovereign. Today, the Crown (as opposed to the sovereign) does provide evidence of payment as a matter of course (i.e. when a person pays their taxes). And, in the case of the sovereign, it is unlikely that persons would incur debts to her personally. However, if so, there is no good reason that some evidence be provided by the Crown that such has been paid off. Thus, this rule of law may be dispensed with as obsolete;  Not bound by an Estoppel. It is likely this rule of law was restricted to estoppels when the document was in the form of a deed and not in other writings. Halsbury suggests this is the modern interpretation 175 -albeit an old case (Coke's Case (1623) is more expansive. As it is, this rule of law is subject to considerable limitations (the Crown does seem to be bound by equitable estoppels and those in pais -which would apply in the case of a legal document not in the form of a deed). Further, such a rule is little more than an aspect of the Crown being able to plead that it was deceived (mis-led) in its grant (see (n) above). Given the paucity of cases and the questionable nature of this rule, it should be dispensed with as obsolete;  Not bound by Legal Fictions. The statement that the Crown is not bound by fictions of law is a bald one and the meaning of the concept of a legal fiction is different to what it was when reference was made to the same in the case of Lord Sheffield v Ratcliffe (1615) 176 which is generally cited as the source of such a proposition.
In that case the dictum of the court may have been mis-reported. 177 In any case, the court may have intended to limit it to legal fictions seeking to avoid the law on mortmain (now abolished). Further, it seems clear that the Crown is bound by fictions such as the sovereign not being able to be a minor in law or that the Crown can do no wrong. In conclusion, such a prerogative is dubious, (very) rarely relied on and unnecessary in modern times. It should be abolished;  Compel to Accept a Public Office. In early times, public offices -such as serving as an alderman or a parish constable -incurred time and expense (or loss of money) and were not at all popular. Thus, the Crown could force a subject to undertake a public office -albeit fines were often paid instead (or exemptions granted). 178 Further, it was (and still is, technically) a common law criminal offence for a duly qualified person to refuse to serve in a public office to which he has been appointed and in which he is required by law to serve. 179 The offence is punishable by life imprisonment (!) or for a shorter term and by a fine at the discretion of the court. However, the caselaw is old (pre-1832, it seems) and legislation provides that a court cannot generally compel a person to work. 180 Further, the need for compulsion is no longer necessary in the case of a public office since such are now paid and there is rarely an absence of applicants. Thus, such a prerogative -and any criminal offence -is no longer needed. Both should be abolished.
In conclusion, these legal prerogatives should be abolished.

(p) Personal Prerogatives
There are various other Crown prerogatives which relate to the sovereign in a personal capacity which may be referred to. These comprise the prerogative of the sovereign, in person, to: As to these: (a) Sitting as a Judge. From Anglo-Saxon times, the sovereign controlled the administration of justice by establishing courts and appointing judges. Whether he ever sat in person to deliver judgment qua judge is dubious. More likely, the sovereign delivered the judgment of his judges in especially important cases -in order to emphasis the finality of its verdict and his support for it. Or, he sat as a visitor -to accord greater solemnity to the proceedings. The same may have applied in Norman times. 194 As it is, the case Prohibitions del Roy (1607) confirmed that the sovereign could not sit as a judge in the royal courts. Today, it is most unlikely that a sovereign would seek to do so. However, any Crown prerogative to do so should be abolished, in order to clarify the matter;

(b) Order to Withdraw a Court Case.
The sovereign cannot order a case to be withdrawn from submission to a court. This was established in Brownlow v Cox and Michil (1615). Also, in the case, Prohibitions del Roy (1607) which held that the 'king cannot take any cause out of any of his courts, and give judgment upon it himself.' 195 Today, it is most unlikely that a sovereign would seek to do the same. However, any Crown prerogative to do so should be abolished, in order to clarify the matter; (c) Order a Court to Delay Judgment. In the case of Commendans (1616), James I (1603-25), pursuant to an asserted Crown prerogative, directed the Attorney-General (Francis Bacon) to write to Coke CJ requesting (or, rather, commanding) that the judges delay their decision until the king had spoken with them. A joint letter was sent by the judges in reply -indicating their oath forbade them to delay justice. However, after attending an audience with the sovereign, the majority reversed their opinion, with the exception of Coke CJ (which must go to his great credit). 196 Today, it is most unlikely a sovereign would seek to do the same. However, any Crown prerogative to do so should be abolished, to clarify the matter;

(d) Sue in whatever Court the Sovereign Pleases.
It is said that the sovereign retains the prerogative to sue in whatever court she pleases. This was based on a section (chapter) of Magna Carta (chapter 11) which indicated that the sovereign could sue in the king's bench for his debt (albeit, the usual court would have been that of the common pleas). 197 However, this chapter of Magna Carta has been repealed. Further, such a rule of law is obsolete since the whole structure of the High Court is different to that in medieval times (also, there are now courts of appeal -the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court -which did not previously exist). There is no good reason for the sovereign having such a privilege today. Thus, such a rule of law should be abolished; (e) Special Court Procedure. The sovereign in person may still use certain special forms of procedure not available to others, including the Crown in general. Halsbury refers to proceeding by way of: (a) information; (b) inquisitions or inquests of office; (c) extents; (d) scire facias; (e) quo warranto; (f) mandamus. 198 However, the sovereign can waive these. 199 There is no good reason to retain this prerogative and it is unlikely to be invoked in modern times, where the sovereign only exercises a formal role (and her personal role is, now, almost negligible). Thus, this prerogative should be abolished, as unnecessary;

(f) Not Pay or Receive Legal Costs.
A prerogative that the sovereign (or any person acting for her) does not pay (or receive) costs relates, today, only to her acting legally in a personal capacity. There would seem to be no good reason to retain such a rule (not least, since -in civil proceedings -costs are at the discretion of the court). 200 Thus, this prerogative should be abolished; (g) Exemption re Personal Property at Common Law. By reason of the eminence of their office, the sovereign had the prerogative that his/her personal property was exempt in certain situations relating to the common law (it was not intended to cover legislation which depends on the interpretation of the same). Thus, the personal property of the sovereign could not be treated as part of wreck (when wrecked). Nor could their animals be treated as estrays (strays). Nor their property, if stolen, be treated as a waif. Nor, were they subject to customary rates and tolls -that is, tolls and rates arising under the common law. Nor could their animals be treated as subject to distress for rent (at common law).
 Estrays and waifs are obsolete legal concepts now (see 27).
 Distress for rent at common law has been abolished (the position is now statutory).


The prospect of the sovereign's personal property being subject to wreck (and, if such, unclaimed) is remote. In any case, the law is now statutory. Under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, s 241, the Crown is entitled to unclaimed wreck. Thus, it would pass back to the sovereign in any case if not otherwise claimed by her;


There are very few (if any) Crown customary rates and tolls still existing today (the exemption does not include statutory tolls) and most have become contractual to the extent they still exist.
Thus, all of these exemptions may be abolished as theoretical or no longer of relevance. Chitty (in 1820) also argued that the sovereign was exempt from tithes on demesne land. 201 However, demense land is now part of the Crown Estate. And, tithes have been abolished in most instances as well as being statutory. Thus, this prerogative should also be abolished;

(h) Exemption re Pledge, Lien, Execution for Debt.
There is an early case (in 1465) indicating that the sovereign is exempt from the enforcement of a pledge. 202 Thus, the same would, likely, apply to any lien (for example, one incurred on a person repairing her personal property, who remains unpaid). Also, for unpaid debts. However, today, it is asserted that any such exemption (immnuity) should be removed and it is unlikely that, in practice, there will be any problem; 197 Halsbury (4th ed), n 17, vol 8(2), para 391 'The Crown might in general choose its own forum and sue in what court it pleased, and in this respect the monarch in her prívate capacity has the former attributes of the Crown.' 198 For the background to these, see Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, pp 245-339. 199 Halsbury (4th ed), vol 8(2), n 17, para 391. 200 It may also be noted that other members of the royal family -such as the Duke of Cornwall -do not have such a prerogative. 201 Ibid, p 377 'his majesty being persona mixta, is capable of a discharge de non decimando, by prescription, which in effect operates as a general discharge from tithes.' 202 See M1, pp 15-6, including p 16, n 107.

(i) Marriage of a Dowager Queen.
At common law the consent of the sovereign appears to have been required in the case of the marriage of a dowager queen 203 and it is unclear whether the Succession the Crown Act 2013 has superceded this (it applies to those in line to the throne only, it seems). It is asserted that such a prerogative (even if it still exists) is not required and should be abolished;

(j) Exemption from Legislative or Common Law Liability. The Crown had a (limited) Crown prerogative to exempt a person from various legislative or common law liabilities. For example, it could grant an exemption from:
o an obligation to serve in a public office (a common law obligation); o impressment in the navy (and, possibly, the army); o matters relating to trade and taxes, by way of dispensation; o a criminal punishment, by granting a pardon, a conditional pardon or a reprieve (see below).
More notoriously, the sovereign asserted the prerogative to grant, in effect, permission for a person to breach laws with impunity. That is, a suspension or dispensation from the law. 204 This asserted prerogative was much mis-used and bitterly resented. Thus, the Bill of Rights 1688 (extant) provides that: 'no dispensation by non obstante, of or to any statute [i.e. legislation], or any part thereof, shall be allowed, but that the same shall be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statutes.' 205 As Chitty noted, this provision covered the statutory position in respect of dispensations. However, this did not affect dispensations re common law offences that were mala in se. 206 To put the matter beyond doubt it would seem appropriate to abolish the right of the Crown to exempt from legislative or common law liability. Also, to re-state, in a Crown Act, the position in the Bill of Rights 1688 as to dispensations and suspensions; 207

(k) Pardon (or Reprieve) a Person.
The sovereign had the prerogative to pardon and remit the consequences of a violation of the law, where the prosecution was carried out in the name of the sovereign. 208 Today, it would seem appropriate that any pardon by granted pursuant to legislation, as opposed to any Crown prerogative. And, that the same be exercised by the Crown (i.e. the sovereign in the body politic) as opposed to the sovereign in person. Thus, any personal power to pardon (or reprieve) 209 should be abolished;

(l) Visitor to Chartered Corporations.
A visitor is a person appointed by law to inspect the proceedings of corporations, and to secure their adherence to the purposes of their institution. Also, to settle in general, without appeal from his decision, any disputes relating to their management. However, the sovereign -although, by law, visitor of all civil corporations -appointed the King's Bench to exercise this jurisdiction, long ago. 210 Thus, any Crown prerogative for the sovereign to act in person should be abolished.
In conclusion, these personal prerogatives of the sovereign should be abolished, as no longer required.

(q) Perogatives in Connection with the Bill of Rights 1688
The Bill of Rights 1688 refers to various abuses of law committed by James II (1685-8) 211 who later fled the realm and was held by Parliament to have abdicated. Such abuses Parliament -in the Bill of Rights 1688 -declared to be illegal and void (I have inserted numbering and modernised the spelling), stating: 203 See M3, p 115, n 107. 204 Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, p 95 'the ancient supposed right of the king to grant suspensions, or dispensations of the laws, non obstante aliquo statuto in contrarium, before the commission of an offence; or in other words, suffering a person to commit a breach of the laws with impunity, by rendering him dispunishable. This was a prerogative which almost all our antient kings exercised; it was replete with absurdity, and might be converted to the most dangerous purposes.' 205 In the case of suspension, the Bill of Rights 1688 declared 'that the pretended power of suspending of laws or the execution of laws by regal authority without consent of Parliament is illegal.' 206 For mala in se and mala prohibita, see Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, pp 95-6. 207 For the latter, see n 205. 208 Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, p 90 'The king's right to pardon and remit the consequences of a violation of the law, is confined to cases in which the prosecution is carried on in his majesty's name for the commission of some offence affecting the public, and which demands public satisfaction, or for the recovery of a fine or forfeiture, to which his majesty is entitled.' 209 Ibid, p 97 'The term reprieve is derived from reprendre, to keep back, and signifies the withdrawing of the sentence for an interval of time, and operates in delay of execution.' 210

Ecclesiastical Courts illegal. That the commission for erecting the late Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical
Causes and all other commissions and courts of like nature are illegal and pernicious.
4. Levying Money. That levying money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative without grant of Parliament for longer time or in other manner then the same is or shall be granted is illegal.

Right to Petition.
That it is the right of the subjects to petition the king and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.
6. Standing Army. That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace unless it be with consent of Parliament is against law.

Subjects' Arms.
That the subjects which are protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.

Freedom of Election.
That election of members of Parliament ought to be free.

Freedom of Speech.
That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.

Excessive Bail.
That excessive bail ought not to be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Juries.
That jurors ought to be duly impannelled and returned.

Grants of Forfeitures.
That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction are illegal and void.

Frequent Parliaments.
And that for redress of all grievances and for the amending strengthening and preserving of the laws Parliaments ought to be held frequently.
In respect of these, nos 1 & 2 have been considered in (p) above. No 3 has, also, been previously considered (see (m) above). Nos 8, 9 and 13 would be better placed in a Parliament Act. Nos 6 and 7 are obsolete (the matters now being provided for in legislation). 212 As for the remainder, a Crown Act should abolish the following above asserted Crown prerogatives, any prerogative to:  The reason for such is to confirm that the Crown (as in 1688) had -and has -no such prerogative in such matters. Also, nos 1 and 2 above confirmed the illegality of any asserted Crown prerogative to suspend or dispense with laws. This, also, should be reflected in a Crown Act, viz.
(1) Any Crown prerogative to suspend, or dispense, with: (a) legislation (including by way of non obstante); or (b) the common law; or (c) the operation of (a) or (b), is abolished. 213 In conclusion, a Crown Act should confirm that any asserted Crown prerogative in respect of certain matters is abolished.

(r) Perogatives in connection with the Act of Settlement 1700
Impeachment was a means of Parliament punishing -by Parliamentary means -powerful persons who might otherwise prevent the courts trying them. The process of impeachment is now, almost certainly, obsolete. 214 However, the Act of Settlement 1700 (still extant) provides that: 'no pardon under the Great Seal of England be pleadable to an impeachment by the Commons in Parliament.' 215 The reason for this was that the Crown was asserting that it had a prerogative to pardon a person impeached. This, to enable the same to avoid the penalties imposed by Parliament flowing from the impeachment. Thus, it would seem appropriate for a Crown Act to abolish, out of caution, any such prerogative (at least, until the process of impeachment is, itself, abolished).
In conclusion, any Crown prerogative to pardon an impeachment by the House of Commmons should be abolished.

CROWN PREROGATIVES -OTHER MATTERS
In section 8, reference was made to the abolition of various Crown prerogatives. Regard to the abolition of a number of consequential matters that flow from this should be given.

(a) Counties Palatine
The Crown prerogative to create a county palatine should be abolished as unnecessary (see 8(j)). Further, as indicated in that section, counties palatine still existing (those of Chester, Durham and Lancaster) should also be abolished since they exist only in name. Thus, the following should be abolished, the: A Crown Act should also re-state s 2 of the Durham (County Palatine) Act 1858, s 2 (it vests the foreshore of Holy Isle in the Crown). 216 Also, s 4 (rents and proceeds from the foreshores of Durham to be divided equally between the Crown and the Ecclesiastical commissioners) which states: All rents and profits and other monies which may be received by the Crown Estate Commissioners, under the provisions of this Act or otherwise howsoever, from, and the proceeds of any sales or dispositions made by them or either of them of, any part of the bed or shores of any navigable river so far as the tide flows, or of the shores of the sea below high-water mark, or of any inclosures, embankments, and encroachments made therefrom or thereupon respectively within the county of Durham, and after deducting thereout all costs, charges, and expenses in any wise incidental to the sale or management or recovery of such property, shall be divided into moieties; and one moiety of such rent, profits, monies, and proceeds shall be applied by the Crown Estate Commissioners, as part of the hereditary possessions and land revenues of the Crown and the other moiety thereof shall be paid by the same Commissioners to the Church Commissioners; but, notwithstanding this provision for the apportionment of the said rents, profits, monies, and proceeds, the said Church Commissioners shall have no right to interfere with the management or 213 In the case of no 1, reference is made to the contrary consent of Parliament, but not in no 2. In modern times, it would seem better to abolish both, since Parliament, in legislation, may otherwise consent to either (if required). 214 See McBain, n 95. disposition of such property, which shall be managed and disposed of in all respects as part and parcel of the hereditary possessions of the Crown, and as if no such provision as last aforesaid had been made.
Indeed, consideration should be given to the Crown acquiring the portion of the Church Commissioners, to simplify things.

(b) Tenurial Services to the Crown
After the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, William I (1066-87) instituted a system of feudal land tenure. That is, the holding of land from him in return for services rendered to him (or to other landed tenants). These services could be military, ecclesiastical or agricultural. In consequence of receiving land form the sovereign (whether directly or indirectly) the tenant was obliged to pay homage (or fealty) to him.
 Homage created an obligation by the tenant to his lord to render assistance to the latter in return for protection;  Fealty created an obligation by the tenant to his lord to faithfully perform the service he was obliged to perform. 217 These tenurial obligations of homage and fealty were distinct from allegiance owed to the sovereign -which applied whether or not any homage (or fealty) was paid or any oath of homage (or of fealty or allegiance) was given. The Tenures Abolition Act 1660 (the '1660 Act') abolished most of these tenurial obligations. However, it left behind some remnants. These are now obsolete and some should be abolished in a Crown Act viz.
 honorary grand sarjeanty -save in relation any coronation service;  petty serjeanty;  any obligation to pay homage (including any oath);  any obligation to pay fealty (including any oath).
As to these: Also, it is (very) dubious whether the sovereign could (or would) remove a mayor, today -one who is otherwise validly choosen. Thus, the mayor is no longer the Queen's man as such.
Finally, the Tenures Abolition Act 1660, s 4 may also be repealed as spent. 223 In conclusion, the above matters should be dispensed with, including the statutory requirements in respect of homage and fealty referred to above. Abolition of homage and fealty will not affect any obligation of allegiance (which does not require any oath for its existence, anyway).

CROWN JEWELS, ROYAL PALACES & ROYAL COLLECTIONS, OSBOURNE ESTATE
A Crown Act should also clarify 'who owns what' in the case of the sovereign, in order to remove uncertainty. That is, it should be clarified that it is the Crown in the body politic (not the body natural) who owns, inter alia, the following, the: Long ago, it may have been that the Crown jewels were owned by the sovereign in a personal capacity. At least, he sought to treat them as such since they were (quite often) pawned by impecunious sovereigns. For example, Henry VI (1422-61,1470-1) who pledged them. 224 However, it is clear, today, that the Crown jewels belong to the nation and not to the sovereign as such. 225 The same would seem to also, clearly, apply to things such as the Royal Palaces and the Royal Collections which have been maintained by the State for a long time. 226 The Osbourne Estate is also owned by the nation, pursuant to the Osbourne Estate Act 1902 and mention should also be made of it in a Crown Act.
In conclusion, a Crown Act should make provision on the ownership of the Crown jewels, Royal Palaces and Royal Collections.

GREAT SEAL & ROYAL SIGN MANUAL
The common law on the great seal is antiquated (the privy seal and signet have been abolished). 227 Thus, it is unclear as to the circumstances in which it may be required pursuant to the common law. Also, legislation on the use of the great seal is antiquated. 228 Thus, such matters should be set out in a Crown Act, one using modern terminology. So, too in the case of the royal sign manual (signature). 229 In conclusion, a Crown Act should make provision as to the use of the great seal and the royal sign manual.

PROCLAMATIONS
The Crown has a prerogative to enact subordinate legislation called a proclamation (a successor to the medieval Crown ordinance). Proclamations are passed under the great seal. The extent of this prerogative is limited since proclamations are only legally binding on the subject when they do not: (a) contradict the law; or (b) seek to make new law. 230 Historically, the use of proclamations was abused by sovereigns and, today, they are greatly restricted -both in their nature and scope. 231 Technically, a person can be fined and imprisoned for breaching a proclamation. However, when such last occurred is uncertain 223 Section 4 states: (all tenures to be created by the king hereafter to be in free and common socage). 'and that all tenures hereafter to be created by the king's majesty his heirs or successors upon any gifts or grants of any manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments of any estate of inheritance at the common law shall be in free and common socage, and shall be adjudged to be in free and common socage only, and its ambit is uncertain. 232 The use of proclamations should be abolished -save where legislation provides -since Parliament should be in charge of making legislation and not the Crown. Thus, any Crown prerogative should be abolished.
 It may, also, be noted that -in almost all cases where proclamations have been issued in the last 200 years -a Statutory Instrument (SI) would be preferable today;  Further, factual statements issued by the Palace (such as the announcement of a royal event) should not require a proclamation.
In conclusion, any Crown prerogative to issue a proclamation should be abolished and legislation provide for when a proclamation is required.

TAXATION
A Crown Act should abolish: (a) any Crown prerogative to tax without the consent of Parliament; (b) clarify the legal position as to payment of income tax by the sovereign. As to these:

(a) Crown Prerogative to Tax -Consent of Parliament
From early times, English sovereigns sought to tax their subjects, to provide for their upkeep and that of their court. This was resisted by Parliament in medieval times since sovereigns had a large landed estate (the royal demesne) which was designed to provide for their upkeep. As to these early forms of national tax: 233  Danegeld. The first English tax is, generally, taken to be danegeld ('geld' being gold). This was a form of war tax first levied in 991 AD (a tax of 2 shillings on every hide of land). It was imposed to pay off the Vikings in order to dissuade them from invading (basically, it was a form of bribe  Scutage. This was a payment (tax) paid in lieu of military service. It was also called escuage or shield money. It was paid by a tenant-in-chief in respect of the service of knights -the provision of which he owed to the Crown (his own service he could only discharge by way of a fine and not by way of scutage). This tax was imposed by Henry II (1154-89) but it was not assessed after 1315;  Tallage. This took over from the taxes referred to above. It was compulsory. Sometimes, it was a fixed sum (often, in the case of London). Other times it was a tax on movables or rents. It was imposed on the tenants of the royal demesne (that is lands owned by the sovereign) to contribute towards: (a) the discharge of the debts he incurred for his table (i.e. his food and entertainment expenses); (b) maintaining his army during a military campaign; (c) on the occasion of any unusual expense. Tallage was collected from 1168-1312 (it was mainly used -in this period -for the sovereign to engage in foreign wars). It seems to have fallen into dis-use in 1312 (it was levied, but not collected, in 1332). In part, its extinction resulted from the Statute concerning Tallage (Statutum de Tallagio non Concedendo) 1297 (although the date may be 1306) which Act (still extant) prevented the sovereign levying any tallage (or aid, auxilium) 234 without the consent of Parliament, something re-enforced by the Bill of Rights 1688, s 1 (still extant, see below). This State tallage should be distinguished from any manorial tallage;  Aids. As well as tallage (see above), the sovereigns also collected aids (from the latin, auxilium). These were said to be a voluntary form of payment (i.e. a gift) to the sovereign. However, they were (in practice) compulsory. They should be distinguished from manorial aids. Magna Carta 1225 permitted the sovereign to impose 3 types of aid, viz. to: (a) make his eldest son a knight; (b) marry off his eldest daughter; (c) ransom himself from captivity. These forms of tax were of little financial worth after 1350 when the sums for aid that sovereigns could seek was fixed. As it is, (a) and (b) were abolished by the Tenures Abolition Act 1660. Also, anyway, they were (effectively) replaced by another form of tax (subsidies, a Parliamentary tax levied on every subject according to the value of his land and goods) in 1377. As for any other forms of aid, the Statute concerning Tallage 1297 (see above) prohibited them. So did the Confirmation of the Charters 1297, chapter 6 (still extant). 235  Any Crown prerogative to levy: (a) any form of tax or toll; or (b) the same for a longer time (or otherwise as permitted by legislation), without the consent of Parliament, is abolished.

(b) Sovereign -Paying Income Tax
At present, the sovereign pays income tax voluntarily on revenue from the duchy of Lancaster.
 One argument adduced for the lack of an obligation to pay income tax is that the sovereign is the source of taxation. While this may have been the case in Norman times, it is not the case today. Indeed, the Bill of Rights 1688, s 1, expressly indicates that the Crown may not tax without the consent (that is, without the authorisation) of Parliament. Thus, in modern times, it is for Parliament to determine this matter, since Parliament is now the source of taxation;  Further, the Crown was the source of taxation in Norman times, in the body politic (as later Elizabethan jurisprudence would hold) and not in the body personal. Thus, any historical reference to the same is of little use in the case of determining whether the sovereign, today, should pay tax in the body personal.
Also, there is no legal reason why the sovereign should not pay income tax on her other revenues, howsoever earned. Thus, her position should be no different, personally, to that of her subjects. Thus, a Crown Act should, perhaps, state: The following shall pay income tax, the: (a) sovereign (including in right of the duchy of Lancaster); (b) Duke of Cornwall (including in right of the duchy of Cornwall)(for which see 23).
In conclusion, a Crown Act should provide for:(a) the abolition of any Crown prerogative to impose any tax or toll, without the consent of Parliament; (b) the sovereign to pay income tax (if so determined).

ROYAL ARMS, ROYAL STANDARD, UNION JACK
It would be useful for a Crown Act to make provision as to the form of the above and their use, in order to clarify the same. 239 In conclusion, a Crown Act should provide for the form and use of the above.

MILITARY MATTERS
A Crown Act should make provision in respect of the Crown prerogative: (a) for the sovereign to be commander-in-chief of the armed forces; and (b) in respect of Crown prerogatives relating to: embargoes, blockades, the requisition of ships and prize and bounty. In respect of these:

(a) Sovereign -Commander-in Chief
From Anglo-Saxon times, the sovereign was also the commander-in-chief of the military. Indeed, until 1743, he, (often) led his soldiers into battle (George II fought at Dettingen in 1743). 240 Today, although nominally (ex officio) the sovereign is still manner of aids, tasks, nor prises, but by the common assent of the realm, and for the common profit thereof, saving the ancient aids and prises due and accustomed.' 'Task' (also called a mise) was a general word for a tax. the titular head of the armed forces; she has no control over military affairs. This change should be recognised in a Crown Act. It may, also, be appropriate for the sovereign only to hold a military rank and for no other member of the Royal Family to retain the same -if it is thought that the scope of the latter should be reduced (see also 18).

(b) Embargos etc
A Crown Act should also make statutory provision for certain military Crown prerogatives which -albeit rare -may still occur (or in respect of which there is uncertainty) viz: As to these: The word 'embargo' has changed over time. In the 18 th and 19 th centuries, for legal purposes, it was an expression to refer to the prerogative of the Crown to prevent the import, or export, of goods (whether generally or specifically) into (or out of) the realm. An embargo was only legally permitted in war time or in the case of other national emergency. However, whether the Crown had such as power was questioned even in the 18 th century 244 and Hale concluded that, in peace time, an embargo could not be imposed without legislation. 245 More recently, the emphasis has been placed, less on the goods, than the manner of import which was by sea (until commercial aviation commenced in 1919). 246 Today, the term 'embargo' tends to refer more to the arrest (seizure) of civilian ships (and goods) in wartime or other national emergency and it seems appropriate that Parliament should be required to consent to the same, given its draconian nature; Prize and bounty (booty) was to encourage naval personnel to seize ships (and armed forces personnel to seize land military equipment) and to receive a financial reward from their sale (also, the Lord High Admiral -a public office that is now a sinecure -was entitled to a reward (droits) as a perk of the office). Such no longer apply. Further, modern ships are more difficult to board (to seize) and it would be difficult (or not worth) taking them before a prize court. Thus, the law should be updated. If prize and bounty were abolished, statutory provision could be made for captured enemy 241 Ibid, p 21 'The king's right to keep his subjects within the realm…either by laying on an embargo, which, however, can it seems be legally done only in time of enmity, and in case of necessity etc '. Ibid, p 50 (quoting Lord Erskine in 1808) 'The king may lay on a general embargo, and may do various acts growing out of sudden emergencies; but in all these cases the emergency is the avowed cause, and the act done is as temporary as the occasion. The king cannot change by his prerogative of war, either the law of nations or the law of the land, by general and unlimited regulations.' Ibid, p 50 'The king may lay on a general embargo…'. 242 Ibid, p 48 'his majesty may promúlgate blockades…' 243 See generally, M17. Also, Halsbury (5 th ed), n 17, vol 20, para 186. 244 Thus, Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, p 164 refers to a Crown proclamation in 1766 which imposed an embargo of the export of corn in order to prevent famine. An Act of Indemnity (7 Geo III c 7(1766)) asserted that such was illegal and it indemnified the owners of ships and cargoes who suffered economic loss as a result. 245 Thus, Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, pp 164-5 concluded 'embargoes which occasion a suspension of commercial intercourse, are not legal at common law, except when they operate for the public good and safety; being used in time of enmity and threatened hostilities and on an emergency, and not for the private advantage of a particular trader or company. Nor can a civil embargo, that is, an embargo which is employed in the case of allies and subjects, be imposed upon British ships in a foreign port, unless by the concurring authority of the state to which that port belongs; for the king has no right to disturb the peace of other nations, by any seizures, however useful to the interests of his own people.' 246 Thus, for example, JS James, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (4th ed, 1972), vol 2 (embargo)(quoting various authorities) 'An embargo is an arrest laid on ships or merchandise by public authority, or an order prohibiting ships from putting to sea, and sometimes from entering ports. It does not put an end to any subsisting contract relating to the ship affected, but is only a temporary suspension of such contract.'

COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND
There are two Crown prerogatives which should be considered:

(a) Compulsory Acquisition -Military Purposes
The Crown claimed the prerogative to compulsorily acquire (take) the land of subjects for military purposes during war time. However, in Victorian times, detailed legislation superceded this prerogative. 247 Legislation also provides for the compulsory acquisition of land in other circumstances -including in the case of a national emergency. Thus, provision should be made in a Crown Act for the abolition of the Crown prerogative as unnecessary. A Crown Act, therefore, might state something to this effect: Any Crown prerogative to compulsorily acquire (or requisition) real property in the UK or in any BOT, whether in peace time or war time, is abolished.

(b) Compulsory Acquisition -Enemy Territory
The position as to the compulsory acquisition of land in a foreign country which is occupied by a foreign enemy should also be clarified. In particular, whether any compensation should be paid. 248 Thus, a Crown Act might state something to this effect: During war time, the Crown may compulsorily acquire (or requisition) real property in a Foreign Country occupied by the enemy without the payment of compensation where such real property is: (a) occupied by the enemy; or (b) likely to be occupied by the enemy.

BONA VACANTIA
The Crown has the prerogative to bona vacantia.

ROYAL FAMILY & HOUSEHOLD
As to these: 254

(a) Royal Family -His (or Her) Royal Highness
As previously noted, the royal family does not possess any Crown prerogatives, with limited exceptions (see 8). However, certain members are entitled to use the title 'His (or Her) Royal Highness' ('HRH'). A Crown Act should define the 'Royal Family' and, perhaps, restrict the persons to whom it should apply.

(b) Royal Family -Education of Children
The sovereign has a Crown prerogative to regulate the education (and custody) of members of the royal family who are minors. 255 Today, such a prerogative should be limited to those of the royal family (as defined) since such is in derogation of the rights of the parents etc.

(c) Royal Household
In respect of the royal household, a Crown Act could make provision for the modernisation of the titles of certain household offices. Also, the abolition of others thought to be obsolete. 256 In conclusion, a Crown Act should define the concept of 'Royal Family' and who is entitled to use the title 'His (or Her) Royal Highness. Also, the prerogative of the sovereign as to the education and custody of the same. Further, provision should be made as to the modernisation of the royal household.

(a) Decorations & Medals
The Crown, as well as having the prerogative to award titles and honours, has the prerogative to award decorations and medals. Many of these, however, have names that bear reference to the times of the British Empire. Or they apply to long service. However, in the past, this was with reference to persons who spent their entire working life in the employ of the Crown -which is not the same as today. Thus, it may be appropriate to reduce (considerably) a number of these decorations and medals (and, perhaps, end all those relating to long service).

(b) Offices -Sinecures
The Crown also appoints to many offices that are sinecures now. For example, the Crown appoints high sheriffs and lords lieutenants. 257 However, both categories no longer perform any legal or military functions as such. There are many others, some with rather exotic or mysterious titles. In modern times -and bearing in mind all the cost and bureaucracy involvedsome (or all) of these Crown sinecures should be curtailed.

GOVERNORS OF BRITISH OVERSEAS TERRITORIES
For convenience, the Crown delegated certain of its prerogatives to the governors of Crown colonies (now British Overseas Territories). 258 Such as to assent to legislation. 259 Or, to pardon (or reprieve) a person. 260 A Crown Act should make provision for this. It may be noted that -although certain authors such as Chitty called such a delegation a 'franchise' -the word 'delegation' is more appropriate since a franchise, usually, occurred pursuant to the payment of money to the Crown (i.e. it was a revenue exercise) and no payment was made in the case of governors.
In conclusion, a Crown Act should indicate what Crown prerogatives may be delegated to the governors of BOT.

INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION (a) Crown not Bound
There is a rule of law that the Crown is not bound by legislation unless referred to expressly or by implication. Thus, Chitty (writing in 1820) stated: The general rule clearly is, that though the king may avail himself of the provisions of any Acts of Parliament, he is not bound by such as do not particularly and expressly mention him. To this rule…there is a most important exception…that the king is impliedly bound by statutes passed for the public good; the relief of the poor; the general advancement of learning, religion and justice; or to prevent fraud, injury or wrong…But Acts of Parliament which would divest or abridge the king of his prerogatives, his interests or his remedies, in the slightest degree, do not in general extend to, or bind the king, unless there be express words to that effect. 261 Such should be reflected in a Crown Act. However, consideration, today, might be given to the opposite being stated since, in practice, most legislation (including SI's) do apply to the Crown. And, in a modern democractic society this is appropriate.

(b) Successors
Further, it is a rule of law that reference to the sovereign includes her successors, without having to state this same. 262 This, also, should be preserved.

CROWN & THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND
The Church of England (the 'CoE') is a State church, because it is established and regulated by legislation. Not because (as sometimes thought) the sovereign is the head of it. Thus, if the sovereign was no longer the same this would not alter. Over the last 100 years there have been great changes to the CoE (as well as to society) and many UK citizens are no longer religious or are of different faiths to the CoE. Further, the role of the sovereign in the executive management of the CoE over the centuries has given way to its being, in modern times -a formal role. Much like that in connection with the Church of Scotland.
Thus, a Crown Act should make (perhaps) provision in respect of such matters. As to these:

(a) Sovereign as Head of the CoE
The Act of Supremacy 1533, s 1 provided for the sovereign to be the 'only supreme head' of the CoE. 263  Chitty (writing in 1820), n 13, p 24 'The governors of colonies are in general invested with royal authority; they may call, prorogue, (adjourn) and dissolve the colonial assemblies, and exercise other kingly functions: but they still are the servants or representatives of the king. Prima facie however their acts remain good: and though the king may refuse to confirm, and may revoke the governor's assent to an act of the assembly, it appears that, till revoked, such assent is, generally speaking, effective. And there can be no doubt that though the discretion in passing Acts of Parliament in England is an incommunicable prerogative, it is not so as to acts of assembly, but may be legally communicated to the governor of a colony. The same as to pardoning offenders in the colonies…Nor can there be any doubt that the King may enable the governor to grant Crown lands, franchises and possessions in the colonies. The acts of the governor should be under the great seal of the province, unless an usage e contra can be shewn.' 259 Ibid, p 74 'The discretionary power of assenting or dissenting to an Act of Parliament is, in England, a high and incommunicable prerogative; though it may be communicated to the governor of a colony, with respect to acts of the colonial assembly.' 260 Ibid, pp 89-90. 261 Ibid, pp 332-3. 262 This is predicated on the legal presumption that the Crown (in the body politic, as a corporation sole) never dies. See also 1. 263  Hill summarised the role of the sovereign thus: The sovereign acting according to the laws of the realm is the highest power under God in the kingdom and, since the Settlement Act 1701, must be in communion with the [CoE]. The sovereign is not a minister of the word of God nor of the sacraments, but is supreme Ordinary and visitor and exercises certain powers formerly vested in the pope, such as the granting of licences and dispensations under the Ecclesiastical Licences Act 1533. Significant rights of patronage vest in the sovereign, including the appointment of all bishops and archbishops. 270 (italics supplied) However, the title 'supreme governor' is a misnomer since the sovereign does not govern the CoE and the executive head has long been recognised as being the Archbishop of Canterbury (the 'AoC'). Thus, today, the sovereign's role in respect of the CoE is a formal one -acting under advice and not pursuant to a personal exercise of judgment. Further, the sovereign is not exercising her power in the body natural as head of the CoE when, for example, assenting to Measures. Rather, her capacity is that of the Crown in the body politic. Also -in the case of opening and dissolving the General Synod -the role of the sovereign, today, is akin to her position with the Church of Scotland ('CoS'), rather than as head of the CoE. Thus, this -and the other roles stated in (i)-(iv) above -could be assumed by the AoC who has long been recognised as de facto head of the CoE (or in the case of formally appointing archbishops, for example -such power could now be exercised by the General Synod). 271 In conclusion, the role of the sovereign as head of the CoE was important in times past. However, today, the sovereign's role, in general, is a formal and ceremonial one -including in relation to the CoE. Further, the sovereign may have no interest, in person, in the CoE. That is, the sovereign may wish to belong to another religion (or, indeed, to none at all) and it would not seem appropriate -in modern times -for the sovereign to be excluded from this basic human right. 272 Legally, abolishing her role as 'supreme governor' (head of the church) would not be difficult since it would involve little change to (i)-(iv). Further, ending this role would not, per se, end the status of the CoE as a church established (by legislation). Nor as a 'State' church (as some might still like to call it). However, it might help the CoE to adapt to the modern world where society in generaland, possibly, some (or many) in the CoE -would prefer religion to be less closely allied to the State, given its troubled history in Tudor times and around the world presently.
In conclusion, a Crown Act should specify who is head of the CoE -the sovereign or the AoC.

(b) Appointment of Archbishops & Bishops
If the role of the sovereign changed (see (a)), legislation could specifiy who should appoint archbishops and bishops in place of their formal appointment by the sovereign. Such could, then, reflect the current role of the General Synod which is the legislative (and overall,executive) vehicle of the CoE. For example, if a Crown Act were to provide: (1) The appointment of (as well as any resignation or dismissal of) any: (c) other person to any ecclesiastical office shall be made by the diocesan bishop, save where a Measure provides otherwise.

(c) Coronation Oath
Prior articles have analysed this in detail. 273 In particular, the following may be noted. Presently, the sovereign must endorse the CoE (and the CoS, to a lesser extent) in certain respects. These are, in summary, as follows: Since the CoE is an established church -that is, one established by law -it is unsurprising these obligations arise from legislation. However, despite this, they are not actually legally enforceable. That is, the sovereign cannot be sued in respect of such affirmations or oaths -including any failure to perform the same. Not least, since she is not cognisable in her own courts. 275  If the sovereign is no longer head of the CoE (see (a)), it would seem apposite that all the above requirements vis-à-vis the CoE be dispensed with since they are, implicitly, predicated on the sovereign being head. However, even if the sovereign remains as head of the church, consideration should be given whether all (or any) of these oaths and affirmations (including in respect of the CoS) are necessary. Especially, when they are not legally binding. And, when the sovereign has no input in legislation today. Nor, the power to stop it. Also, where (unlike in the past) the General Synod has the power to legislate -and to alter -the legal rights and privileges of the CoE. Further, choice of religion (or not) is a basic human right and -in modern times -it would seem unduly onerous to require the sovereign to be a member of the CoE when, personally, he (or she) has no interest in the same. In conclusion, consideration might be given to the excision of the above (i.e. of the religious content) from the coronation oath. Also, returning to the simpler language of Anglo-Saxon times in respect of the other parts of the coronation oath. Thus, a Crown Act might provide for the following:

(d) Patronage & Powers of Appointment 279
After the Norman Conquest 1066 (if not before) the method of land holding in England tended to be that of manors. That is, large estates owned by the lord (dominus) of the manor. 280 The lord of the manor, often, built -or contributed to the building of -the church and, as such, sought the privilege of appointing the priest. Hence, the rise of laymen advowsons and other rights of patronage. That is, the right to appoint (to 'present') a person to an ecclesiastical position -including to an ecclesiastical benefice. Such rights, as well as being held by laymen, were also held by the Crown. Sweet (in 1882) defined an 'advowson' as follows: Advowson is the right of presenting to a rectory, vicarage or other ecclesiastical benefice whenever it is vacant. It may belong to a private person, or a bishop or other dignitary, or to the Crown. An advowson belonging to the bishop of the diocese is technically the right of collation; some advowsons are called donatives, and a few (such as benefices attached to cathedrals) are elective; an ordinary advowson is sometimes called, by way of distinction, a presentative advowson. An advowson is an incorporeal hereditament, and is either appendant or in gross. 281 (italics supplied) Layman, such as lords of the manor also, sometimes, had powers to appoint to other ecclesiastical offices, such as to appoint the sexton or a churchwarden. As it is, history shows that both lay and Crown appointments tended to (often) be divisive, with appointments being made on partisan grounds as opposed to the appointee being the most suitable person in terms of spirituality and personality. The law on patronage and advowsons was (considerably) simplified by the Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986. 282 Hill noted: Patronage is the right to present a cleric to a benefice and is in itself a form of property which may be transferred from one person to another, although it may not be sold. A definite register of the patrons of every benefice is maintained in each diocesan registry where every transfer of a right of patronage is registered...Rights of patronage may also be transferred by pastoral scheme or order...If the patron is an individual and not a clerk in holy orders, he must make a declaration that he is an actual communicant member of the [CoE] or appoint someone in his place who is a clerk in holy orders, or being a layman, is able to make a declaration of membership... 283 Many lords of the manor are not members of the CoE. Or -even if so -they are dis-interested in any rights of patronage. It may, also, be noted that the title of 'lord of the manor' can be held in gross, today. That is, without acquiring any land holding. Further, such title can be bought -there being a market in such things. Thus consideration may be given to abolishing all lay rights of patronage, including those held by the Crown. 284

(e) Religion of the Sovereign
If a Crown Act abolishes common law Crown prerogatives -especially, those relating to the CoE (in particular), then, consideration may be given to removing any catholic religious limititation on the sovereign. The reason why is clear. In the time in which it was enacted -in the reign of James II (1685-8) who was a catholic -there were deep concerns (whether founded or not) that he was seeking to change the status of the CoE into that of a catholic church, using his influence as sovereign and head of the CoE. Thus, the Bill of Rights 1688 introduced a novel provision in respect of succession to the Crown. It prohibited the sovereign from being a catholic. It stated: whereas it hath been found by experience that it is inconsistent with the safety and welfare of this protestant kingdom to be governed by a popish prince…the said Lords spiritual and temporal and Commons do further pray that it may be enacted that all and every person and persons that is are or shall be reconciled to or shall hold communion with the see or church of Rome or shall profess the popish religion... shall be excluded and be for ever incapable to inherit possess or enjoy the Crown and government of this realm and Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging or any part of the same or to have use or exercise any regal power authority or jurisdiction within the same and in all and every such case or cases the people of these realms shall be and are hereby absolved of their allegiance and the said Crown and government shall from time to time descend to and be enjoyed by such person or persons being protestants as should have inherited and enjoyed the same in case the said person or persons so reconciled holding communion or professing…as aforesaid were naturally dead. (italics supplied) As previously indicated, at the time of its introduction, there were concerns that James II might regain the throne and, later, that his son or grandson might. Such attempts were not to end until after the Battle of Culloden in 1745 when the Stuart challenge to Hanoverian rule ended. Thus, various later pieces of Scots legislation (see below) repeated the provision in the Bill of Rights 1688. However, by 1800, the fear of a Stuart return had ended. Thus, Irish legislation (see below) referred to succession but did not re-state the provision against the sovereign being a catholic in the Bill of Rights 1688 as such. As to these: Today, the prohibition on the sovereign being a catholic would -in the case of a subject -(clearly) seem to breach human rights legislation, being the Human Rights Act 1998 which embodied into law the terms of the EU Convention on Human Rights. Further, it results in rather an anomalous situation in that the sovereign can have no religious belief (that is, be an atheist) or any other religious belief (e.g. be a moslem, jew etc) but not be a catholic. Since the fear engendering the provision in 1688 was that the sovereign might -using his power as head of the CoE -change the same, then, if the sovereign is no longer 'Supreme Governor' of the CoE, the basis of this concern no longer exists (even more so, if all powers of patronage are ilr.ccsenet.org International Law Research Vol. 10, No. 1; 2021 dispensed with). Suffice to say that the prohibition on the sovereign being a catholic could be excised from legislation readily -by excising the reference in the Bill of Rights 1688 and attendant Acts. However, given that -if a simple repeal was effected without more -there may be uncertainly as to the position of the sovereign concerning any other religion, it may be useful to expressly provide that the religion of the sovereign is a private matter for the same.
 Finally, it may be noted that the Succession to the Crown Act 2013 repeals a prohibition on the consort to the sovereign being a catholic. This may be repealed, if the above is effected. Also, s 3 of this Act deals with the consent of the sovereign to certain marriages. This section may be inserted into a Crown Act -enabling the Act of 2013 to be wholly repealed.
In conclusion, a Crown Act might specify that the religion of the sovereign is a private matter for the same -repealing the above legislation.

DUCHY OF CORNWALL
A Crown Act should, also, make provision for the duchy of Cornwall (the 'DOC') since this estate is held by the Crown on behalf of the nation (i.e. the sovereign in its body politic). In respect of this: 286

(a) Charters
The DOC, at present, is governed by much antiquated legislation. This comprises, in particular, 3 charters and a writ viz. a: All of the above charters should be cancelled since they contain obsolete material. Further, in some cases, the wording is uncertain. As for the legislation -which, mainly, deals with the management of the DOC estate -this, also, contains much obsolete material. Further, it is couched in an antiquated Victorian language. Thus, all the above should be placed in a Crown Act (with accounts and management provisions in a Schedule or a SI since they are administrative in nature). This would not be difficult.

(b) Estate & Inheritance
Originally, the DOC comprised some 17 manors which were granted in 1337 to the first duke (the Black Prince, the eldest son of Edward III, when he was seven years old). A number of these manors (6 of them) were, later disposed of and, over the centuries, other land and property has been acquired. A modern Act should clarify these rules of inheritance. Further -since inheritance to the Crown is now gender neutral -so should inheritance of the duchy be.

(c) Prerogatives
The charters of 1337 gave to the Duke various Crown franchises (that is, the right to enjoy certain Crown prerogatives). However, these are of no (or scant) worth today. They comprise a right to:  'royal fish' (whales and sturgeon). This right is no longer availed of today (both are protected species);  treasure trove -although this is somewhat dubious and not often exercised;  wreck (also, flotsam, jetsam and ligan). This is of scant worth and not usually availed of;  bona vacantia and escheat. These sums (which are small) are donated to charity by the duchy;  gold and silver mines. This is not of great value;  appoint a high sheriff in Cornwall (a ceremonial post);  appoint Church of England priests to various churches, abbeys, priories, hospitals and chapels in Cornwall (this right of patronage (the advowson) is not of financial worth).
None of these rights are of much import and all could be relinquished without much economic loss. There are also various other rights, now long obsolete. 287 A Crown Act should abolish the above, so that the general law applies.

(d) Income Tax
At present, the Duke pays income tax voluntarily on his DOC income. Two arguments have been adduced for the his nonpayment of income tax. viz.
 Not a Subject. It is said that the duke is not a subject of the sovereign. This is so when the duke is holding qua sovereign but not otherwise. The duke (when a distinct person) must be the subject of the sovereign since English law only recognised (and recognises) 2 categories of person for the purpose of the legal obligation of allegiance.
That is: (a) British subjects 288 (who owe allegiance -and who commit high treason pursuant to the terms of the Treason Act 1351 if they breach it); and (b) aliens (i.e. foreigners, who have no legal obligation of allegiance but who are treated as enemies, if they conduct war against the sovereign).
The Duke is definitively a subject of the sovereign since he owes allegiance to the same. For example, if the Duke kills (or conspires to kill) the sovereign, he commits high treason (the same as a consort) under the Treason Act 1351 since there are no exceptions provided for. Further, the fact that the first Duke was girt with a sword (and cap) in 1337 in Parliament indicates the nature of the allegiance (knight's service) for which the duke will have done homage -just as he did (and does) qua Prince of Wales (a higher title than duke which the heir to the throne also holds). Knight's service, and the homage done for it, is a classic example of a person being a subject of the sovereign and not an alien;

No mention in Duchy charters.
Another argument adduced is that the duchy charters make no reference to taxation. However, nor do other old charters since income tax was only first levied in 1799. Further, the fact that the Duke may not have paid tallage (an early form of tax by the Crown on its demesnes (estates)) does not mean that the Duke should be exempt from income tax. For example, the citizens of London did not pay tallage after 1314. However, they pay (and have paid) income tax.
As with the income tax position of the sovereign (see 13), the income tax position of the Duke should be clarified in a Crown Act. It should be no different to that of any other person.

(e) Mining
In the case of the duchy there are two anomalies it may be useful to address:  Tin Bounding. The first relates to mining. Since ancient times, tin was worked in Cornwall and there developed certain rights for individuals who worked tin seams (they were also called 'tin bounders'). Over time, certain tin bounding customs developed which modified the general law that the ownership of a mine was vested in the owner of the freehold. Under the customs, if a tin mine within manorial waste (or certain enclosed land) was not worked by the land owner, a tinner could claim a grant (if certain conditions were satisfied) to work the bounds (i.e. to mine the tin in a specified area delineated by stones or turves placed by the tinner). The grant carried an exclusive right to mine all tin ore in that area, subject to paying a royalty (called 'toll tin' or tin toll) to the owner of the land. Laws were made by the miners at convocations (assemblies) to regulate the rights, duties and liabilities of the same. However, all this is now obsolete (and the last convocation met in 1753);  Conventionary Tenants. Further, in medieval times, peasants (villeins) working the land in the 17 manors comprising the original duchy, gradually, acquired a legal right to occupy the land. This was in the form of a perpetually renewable lease, renewable every 7 years. These tenants were called conventionary tenants (similar to copyholders, but holding by way of lease). Since they were leaseholders, the duke could mine on land they occupied without their consent. 6 manors were later sold (in 1797 under the provisions of the Land Tax Redemption Act). The Duchy of Cornwall (No 2) Act 1844 (also, called the Assessionable Manors Act 1844) laid down mining rules. In particular, the duke retained the right to mine in the unsold manors without consent (1844 Act, s 53, the conventionary tenants holding by way of lease only) -subject to certain restrictions.
Since tin mining no longer occurs in Cornwall (the last tin mine closed in 1998) and individuals working tin seams (i.e. tin bounding) ended long ago and the duchy, in practice, has not sought to exercise its rights in respect of the assessionable manors (likely, for economic reasons as well as the environmental impact) it may be a good time to abolish all of this and let the general law on mines apply.

(f) Foreshore
Generally, the Crown owns the foreshore and, as such, has a right to mine the same. In Cornwall, however, an Act -the Cornwall Submarine Mines Act 1858 -(effectively) resulted in the duchy owning 3/5ths of the Cornish foreshore (although some appears to have been, subsequently, disposed of). Also, the fundus (i.e. the bed) of certain rivers. The 1858 Act also provided for certain rights of access to the foreshore by the Crown, for mining the bits it owns. Since the historical position is anomalous -and the likelihood of mining the Cornish foreshore in the future is low (for economic and environmental reasons) -it may be useful to repeal the 1858 Act and to re-transfer the foreshore to the Crown. Perhaps, with the DOC, also, providing by way of contract (not legislation) with the Crown Estate for a royalty, if the latter subsequently mine the transferred part. This would simplify things and enable the general law to apply re mining and access on duchy land (it could, also, be transferred on the basis that no mining be permitted on the transferred foreshore in future for environmental reasons).
In conclusion, a Crown Act should make provision in respect of the DOC.

DUCHY OF LANCASTER
A Crown Act should, also, make provision for the the duchy of Lancaster (the 'DOL') since this estate is held by the Crown on behalf of the nation (i.e. in its body politic). In respect of this: 289

(a) Estate
The DOL is an estate of some 40,000 acres. It was a county palatine in 1267 and its status was augmented into that of a duchy in 1351. In 1399, it was not absorbed into the Crown when the Duke of Lancaster became Henry IV (1399-1413). Instead, it remained separate from the Crown, often, being described as an 'appanage' and this was confirmed in 1485 when an Act of Parliament provided that the duchy would pass to Henry VII (1485-1509) and his heirs for ever. Today, it seems clear that the duchy is held on behalf of the nation. That is, by the sovereign in her body politic (as opposed to her body personal). Thus, it is inalienable -albeit, the title of Duke is not and -unlike the title of Duke of Cornwall -it can be passed separate to the duchy.

(b) County Palatine & Duchy
In respect of the abolition of the title of county palatine, see 8(j). The duchy itself has no substantive privileges (and none are of economic worth). As to these: Thus, consideration should be given to the abolition of the DOL and, perhaps, the transfer of its real and personal property to the Crown Estate -thereby, saving time and money as well as excising much antiquated legislation. 290 In conclusion, a Crown Act should make provision in respect of the DOL. 289 See generally, M12. 290  This provision needs to be modernised. It should not refer to where a person is born or their parentage but whether they are a British citizen (that is, a British subject or naturalised) or not. A privy council member is also required to give an oath. 292 This involves an official oath, an oath of secrecy and an oath of allegiance. It is suggested that only an oath of secrecy should be required today and that the others (which are not legally binding) should be dispensed with (further, allegiance under English law does not depend on a person having given an oath or not). Also, the same should be in the form of a declaration whichto save time -would be easier if signed by each member when they inscribe the privy council's book. Further, a Crown Act should contain section 1 of the Clerk of the Council Act 1859, with the wording using modern terminology.
In conclusion, a Crown Act should make provision in respect of membership of the privy council and any oath (declaration) required to be given.

CHARTERS -CINQUE PORTS, CITY OF LONDON etc
From an early date the Crown franchised a number of its Crown prerogatives to the Cinque Ports 293 and to the City of London. 294 However, these prerogatives are palpably obsolete in most cases. As to these:  Cinque Ports. These ports were granted various Crown prerogatives in charters dating from 1278-1668, in return for ship service (for defense purposes). However, the latter ended by the 1588 (6 ships supplied for the Spanish Armada) and all these charters are long obsolete;  City of London. Like the above, the City of London is governed by c. 64 charters, the last of which was in 1741 (more than 260 years ago). All this material is obsolete (and of no financial benefit to the CoL). There is no indication that the CoL are unaware this material is obsolete and that they would object to the cancellation of all/most of these charters.
Crown prerogatives were also franchised to many boroughs and towns. As to these:  Boroughs. Generally, boroughs were abolished by the Local Government Act 1972 (in Scotland, burghs were abolished in 1975). However, London boroughs still remain and they may be governed by old charters whose provisions are obsolete. Abolishing the concept of a 'borough' would, per se, cancel the same;  Towns. Many towns may also be governed by charters (although the issue of the same after 1688 became more rare). A review of these would, almost certainly, provide for their cancellation -whether in whole or part.
In conclusion, a legal expert should be requested to write a (short) report on the Cinque Ports and City of London charters (if required). 295

 Bodies Corporate & Others.
Finally, all bodies corporate or other persons (legal or individual) who hold Crown charters should be required to submit by a specified date details of any Crown charter granted to them -for a legal expert appointed by the government to determine whether any provisions of the same are worth retaining.

ROYAL FISH, WAIFS & ESTRAYS
There are certain legal concepts which are now obsolete and which should be abolished in a Crown Act. Thus: In conclusion, a Crown Act should abolish the legal concepts of royal fish, waifs and strays.

OBSOLETE CROWN LEGISLATION
There is much legislation relating to the Crown -not to Parliament 298 or to the Government 299 -which is obsolete and which should be repealed. This comprises the following (a number of them have been referred to in prior sections of this article to which reference is made):  Prerogativa Regis c. 1324. In 1971, the sovereign confirmed that she no longer desired any prerogative in respect of whales and sturgeon. Further, the presumption of an implied reservation of an advowson is not required, since such is now a matter of interpretation of the relevant grant; (see 8(n) and 27).

Revocation of the New Ordinances 1322.
Ordinances were the older form of proclamation which were, generally, intended to be temporary. This Act revoked various ordinances (now obsolete) made by Edward II (1307-27) in 1311 who was later deposed. In 1969, the Law Commission recommended repeal of this Act. 300

Status of Children Born Abroad 1350.
This legislation was designed to clarify the common law position that the sovereign's children could inherit land in England, though they might be born abroad (see 4).  Crown Lands Act 1623. At common law, where the sovereign leased land and made it a condition of the lease that it was void for non-payment, the sovereign could re-enter, on default, without demand (though such did not apply to a grantee). This Act clarified that, where a tenant defaulted in payment of rent (or services) but remedied this prior to forfeiture of the lease, the sovereign (or any grantee) could not take advantage (i.e. re-enter without demand  301 It states: 'Edward, by the grace of God, king of England, lord of Ireland, and duke of Guyan, to all those that these present letters shall hear or see, greeting. know ye that we, to the honour of God, and of holy church, and to the profit of our realm, have granted for us and our heirs, that the charter of liberties,.. which were made by common assent of all the realm, in the time of king Henry our father [i.e. Henry III], shall be kept in every point without breach. And we will that…our justices, sheriffs, mayors, and other ministers, which under us have the laws of our land to guide, shall allow the said charters pleaded before them in judgment in all their points; that is to wit, the Great Charter [i.e. Magna Carta] as the common law….' 302 See generally, M7, p 18. 303 It states: 'and that your Majesty would be pleased to remove the said soldiers and mariners and that your people may not be so burdened in time to come. And that the aforesaid comissions for proceeding by martial law may be revoked and annulled. And that hereafter no commissions of like nature may issue forth to any person or persons whatsoever to be executed as aforesaid, lest by colour of them any of your Majesty's subjects be destroyed or put to death contrary to the laws and franchise of the land.' (spelling modernised) 304 See M2, pp 554-6.

Convention Parliament Act 1688, Crown and Parliament Recognition Act 1689.
The Act of 1688 simply confimed that the Parliament which sat after the abdication of James II (1685-9) (it was called the Convention Parliament) was a legitimate Parliament, despite no writs of summons being issued. It is, therefore, historic and spent. The Crown and Parliament Recognition Act 1689 confirmed that Acts passed by the Convention Parliament (in particular, the declaration of the same naming William and Mary as king and queen). It is also historic and spent. 305
 Coronation Oath Act 1688, Act of 6 Anne 1706, s 2. This laid down the statutory form of the coronation oath. However, this has changed over the centuries. If any religious content is removed, the Act of 6 Anne 1706, s 2 is no longer required. 306 Nor, also, wording in the Act of Settlement 1700, s 3 or in the Union with Scotland Act 1706 and the Union with England Act 1707 (see 22(c)).

 Bill of Rights 1688.
Much of the wording is now historic. In particular, it referred to the abdication of James II (1685-9) and the sovereigns becoming William and Mary (1688-1702). It also referred to the Crown passing (in the absence of children) to Queen Anne (which occurred). This wording is historic and it is unnecessary today since it is not doubted that the present sovereign is Elizabeth II (repeal of this legislation would not affect the prohibition on the sovereign being a catholic contained in the Bill of Rights 1688, for which separate provision is required). For reference to taxation see 13. 

Royal Mines Acts 1688 & 1693.
The Crown prerogative should be abolished. Thus, these Acts are not required (see 8(c).
 Act of Settlement 1700. This Act, s 1, dealt with the concern that Queen Anne (1702-14) would die without children (which she did). Thus, it provided for Hanoverian succession through Princess Sophia, her heirs and successors (which occurred, the Crown going to her grandson, George I). This is all historic and not necessary today since it is not doubted that the present sovereign is Elizabeth II, her heirs and successors (repeal of this legislation would not affect the prohibition on the sovereign being a catholic since this is contained in the Bill of Rights 1688, for which separate provision is required). As for the coronation oath, see the Coronation Oath Act 1688 above.   Regency Acts 1937, 1943 and 1945. This should be placed in a Crown Act, see 3.
 Treasure Trove Act 1996, ss 1 & 4. Abolishing the Crown prerogative (and any franchise) to treasure trove will not affect its right to the same under this Act (which was intended to supercede it), see 8(d).

OBSOLETE COURTS
There are a number of obsolete common law (i.e. Crown established) courts which have not sat, in some cases, for more than 100 years. 310 They should be abolished. It may be noted that some -like the Court of Claims -are not 'courts' as such. Rather, they employ the old use of the term, meaning an assembly.

OTHER CROWN PREROGATIVES
This article has discussed many Crown prerogatives. Those suitable for a Crown Act. However, there remain other Crown prerogatives. 311 These would be better inserted in a:

Armed Forces
Control, organisation and disposition of the armed forces (including the commissioning of officers, pay, pensions and the royal navy); 313 Armed Forces -Overseas Deployment and use of the armed forces overseas for military purposes (i.e. armed conflicts) which fall short of war;

Angary
Taking neutral property on UK territory or enemy territory 314

National Emergency
Military power in the case of national emergency; 315

War -Enemy Alien
In wartime, to intern, expel (deport) or otherwise control an enemy alien; Enemy -Trading Trading with the enemy;

Export
Export of weapons and ammunition, contraband of war.
These should be placed in an Armed Forces Act.

(c) Government -Foreign
Treaties Make and ratify treaties;

Passports
Issue, refuse, impound and revoke passports; Territory Acquire (inc. by way of annexation) and cede territory;

Ambassadors & Commissioners
Send and receive ambassadors and high commissioners;

Foreign States
Recognize foreign states; British Overseas Territories Govern BOT;

Channel Island, Isle of Man
Responsibity for the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man;

Diplomatic Protection
Accord diplomatic protection to British citizens abroad.
These relate to the operation of government and they should be placed in a Government Act.

(d) Government -Domestic
Civil Service Government of the civil service;

Public Appoimtments
Appoint persons to public offices; 316 Crown Estate Administer the Crown Estate; 317

Postage Stamps
Permit (and administer) pre-paid postage stamps;

Adoption
Issue certificates of eligibility to prospective inter-country adopters; 318

Public Inquiries
Hold public inquiries (inc. royal commissions);

HM Stationary
Appoint the controller of HM's Stationary Office;

Crown Immunity
The immunity of the Crown in various situations;

Seas, Rivers
Prerogative to the seabed (and river beds). Also, to fishing;

Pirates
Goods seized may be detained by the Crown.
These relate to the operation of government and they should be placed in a Government Act.

Judges
Where the appointment is not otherwise statutory

Attorney-General
Office and role

Solicitor General
Office and role

Mercy
Prerogative to exercise mercy (and reprive)

Insolvency/Bankruptcy
Legal rights of priority of the Crown The first two should be placed in a Courts Act. The second three relate to the operation of government and should be placed in a Government Act. The last should be placed in insolvency (bankruptcy) legislation.

CONCLUSION
It seems widely accepted that something should be done to modernise the Crown prerogatives and legislation relating to the Crown.
 Maitland pointed this out more than a 100 years ago. So has the House of Commons more recently. It is also, manifestly, obvious that many (indeed, very many) Crown prerogatives are obsolete and they should be abolished;  It also seems obvious that any Crown prerogatives still required should be placed in legislation. This is not only to modernise them. It, also, reflects the fact that the role of the sovereign is now a formal one only. More importantly, it confirms that all Crown authority and functions are -and should be -subject to the control, and oversight, of Parliament.
Would any of this be difficult ? One would suggest not. A draft Crown Act is attached in Appendix D. Finally, it is noted that some of the content of such will involve political decisions (e.g. whether the duchy of Lancaster should be abolished). This is a matter for politicians. The draft simply sets out the position at its highest, and to cover the field, and leaves others to decide. As for cases, these tend to be found in the following:

Legal Texts 1567 -1700
References to cases may be found in the abridgments of:  (7) It shall not be necessary to the validity of any document to (or on which) a Wafer Great Seal is attached (or embossed) to prove that the attachment (or embossing) of such wafer seal was authorised and no evidence to the contrary shall be received; (8) Any rule purporting to be made pursuant to (6)(b) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament.

Royal Sign Manual
(1) Execution by the sovereign under the royal sign manual is valid on the subscription of the sovereign's signature save where legislation requires otherwise.

Proclamations
(1) Any Crown prerogative to make, and issue, a proclamation is abolished save where such is: (a) authorized by legislation; (b) to summon or prorogue Parliament. 381 (2) The sovereign may issue factual announcements (which are not required to be made under the Great Seal) in the case of: (a) a Royal Event; (b) the grant of (or a change in) a title of honour or dignity.

Taxation
(1) Any Crown prerogative to levy: (a) any form of tax or toll; or (b) the same for a longer time (or otherwise as permitted by legislation), without the consent of Parliament, is abolished.
(2) The sovereign (including in right of the duchy of Lancaster) shall pay income tax.

Royal Arms, Royal Standard and Union Jack
(1) The royal arms (ensigns armorial) of the UK shall be quarterly. The first and fourth quarters shall be the arms of England, the second quarter shall be the arms of Scotland and the third quarter shall be the arms of Northern Ireland. The Crown may licence the use of the royal arms; (2) The royal standard is the personal flag of the sovereign. It may only be flown with the licence of the same; (3) Save for (2), the union flag (the Union Jack) shall be used in all the sovereign's flags, banners, standards and ensigns. It shall be azure with the crosses saltire of St Andrew and St Patrick quarterly per saltire and countercharged argent and gules. The latter shall be fimbriated of the second quarter (surmounted by the cross of St George) and of the third quarter, fimbriated as to the saltire.

Military Matters
(1) The sovereign shall be, ex officio, ceremonial commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Save as aforesaid, no other person shall hold a ceremonial rank in the armed forces, including any member of the Royal Family.
(2) Any Crown prerogative to impose an:

Compulsory Acquisition or Requisition of Real Property
(1) Any Crown prerogative to compulsorily acquire (or requisition): (a) any real property in the UK (or in any BOT) (b) in peace time or in war time, is abolished.
(2) During war time, the Crown may compulsorily acquire (or requisition) any real property in a Foreign Country occupied by the enemy, without the payment of compensation, where such real property is: (a) occupied by the enemy; or (b) likely to be occupied by the enemy.

Bona Vacantia
(1) Any Crown prerogative to bona vacantia (as well as any franchise of the same) is abolished and title to any bona vacantia shall pass to, and be administered by, HM Treasury.

Royal Family
(1) The title 'His (or her) Royal Highness' ('HRH') is restricted to members of the Royal Family; (2) The control of the sovereign over the education (and custody) of children who are minors is restricted to those of the Royal Family.

Royal Household
(1) The royal household comprises the senior officials, their offices and titles referred to in Schedule 5, Part A.
(2) The offices and titles in (1) shall be modernised to refer to those in Schedule 5, Part B. peerage, is abolished, save that (b) shall not apply in the case of any judge appointed to the Supreme Court or to the Senior Courts, as defined in the Senior Courts Act 1981.
(2) A hereditary peerage may be disclaimed in accordance with Schedule 21. (4) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear any peerage claim in place of the House of Lords.

Decorations and Medals
(1) The decoration and medals awarded by the Crown shall comprise those referred to in Schedule 8, Part A.
(2) The decorations and medals in:

Obsolete Titles and Offices
(1) The titles and offices in Schedule 7, are abolished.
(2) Any legislation, or common law matter: (a) attendant on; or (b) consequential to (1), may be repealed (or amended) by a SI.

Governors of British Overseas Territories
(1) The following powers may be delegated, by a SI, to a governor of a BOT if required; the power to: (a) assent to legislation; (b) pardon, or reprieve, a person.

Legislation
(1) The Crown (including the sovereign in person) is not bound by legislation unless referred to expressly or by implication.
(2) Reference to the sovereign in person in legislation includes her successors.

Head of the Church of England
(1) The Archbishop of Canterbury shall be head of the CoE in place of the sovereign.

Church of England Clerics
(1) The appointment of (as well as any resignation of, or notification of the dismissal of) any:

Patronage
(1) The legal proceeding of jus patronatus is abolished.

Coronation Declaration
(1) The sovereign, in the presence of the people assembled at the sovereign's coronation, shall audibly give (or sign) the declaration in Schedule 8 which shall be administered by the:

Religion of the Sovereign
(1) The religion of the sovereign is a private matter for the sovereign.

Duchy of Cornwall
(1) Nature. The duchy is an estate comprising the manors (and the bed of certain rivers) referred to in Schedule 9 as well as other land and property.
(2) Ownership. The duchy is owned by the nation (that is, held by the sovereign in her body politic) in which the Duke has a life interest.
(4) Legal Nature of the Duke. The Duke is a corporation sole.

Inheritance
(1) Eldest Child of the Sovereign. Subject to (2) and (3), the duchy shall automatically pass: (a) on the birth of the eldest son (or daughter) of the body of the sovereign, to the same; or (b) to the eldest son (or daughter) of the body of the sovereign, when the sovereign becomes such.
(2) Eldest Child Dies. If the eldest child in (1) dies without issue, the duchy shall automatically pass to the second son or daughter of the body of the sovereign, as if the same were the eldest. However, if the eldest child in (1) dies leaving issue, the duchy shall revert to the sovereign.
(3) No Children. Until the sovereign has children, the sovereign shall hold the duchy.

Management
(1) The duchy shall be managed according to the provisions of Schedule 10 [or a SI].

Mines and Foreshore
(1) The general law on mines and mining shall apply in the duchy (including those manors called assessionable manors)[save for Schedule 11].
(2) Any local customs in respect of mines and mining in the duchy (including tin bounding, whether in Cornwall or elsewhere) are abolished.
(3) [Any foreshore in the duchy held by the Duke shall be transferred to the Crown.]

Taxation
(1) The Duke of Cornwall (including in right of the duchy of Cornwall) shall pay income tax.

Abolition of the Duchy of Lancaster
(1) The duchy of Lancaster, and the title Duke of Lancaster, are abolished, including any right to: (a) any jura regalia; (b)  (2) All real and personal property and all rights and obligations in respect of (1) are hereby transferred to the Crown Estate, the details of which shall be set out in a SI.

Membership
(1) To be a member of the privy councillor, a person: (a) must be a British citizen; (b) shall or sign the declaration in Schedule 12.

Absence of Clerk of the Council
(1) Whenever the sovereign, with the advice of the Privy Council, makes provision for the performance of the duties of the clerk of the Council in the event of his absence any person acting under the authority of the Order in Council on his behalf shall: in relation to: (a) the signing, certifying, and issuing of Orders of Her Majesty in Council; or (b) the Orders of the lords and others of the Privy Council, under any Acts of Parliament; or (c) any other duties of that office, have and perform all the powers and functions, and be in the place of, the clerk of the said Council. 383

City of London and Cinque Ports
(1) The charters from the Crown to the City of London (the 'City') and to the Cinque Ports, referred to in Schedule 13, are cancelled.
(2) A SI may: (a) amend the dates of the charters in Schedule 13, if required; (b) add new charters to Schedule 13 if: (i) a report prepared by a legal expert indicates the same are obsolete; or (ii) they comprise charters of inspeximus (confirmation) only.
(3) Any obligation of the mayor of the City to pay homage or fealty to the Crown is abolished and The City of London (Various Powers) Act 1959, s 5(1) is amended to state 'The Corporation of London shall continue to have the right to elect a mayor annually who shall be elected by the liverymen of the City of London assembled in Common Hall in the manner laid down in an Act of Common Council.'

County, Borough and Town Charters
(1) A SI may cancel all, or part, of any charter granted by the Crown to a county, borough or a town if a report prepared by the Law Commission (or a legal expert appointed by the Government) indicates the same is obsolete or spent.

Crown Charters
(1) All counties, boroughs, towns, bodies corporate or other persons (legal or individual) shall, on request, supply details of any Crown charter granted to them, to: (a) the Law Commission; or (b) a legal expert appointed by the Government.
(2) A SI may cancel all, or part, of any charter referred to in (1) if a report prepared by the Law Commission (or a legal expert appointed by the Government) indicates that the same is obsolete or spent.

Private Estate of the Sovereign
(1) Any private estate of the sovereign shall be subject to the provisions of Schedule 22, Part A.
(2) The legislation in Schedule 22, Part B is repealed.

Guardianship of Minors
(1) A dying father (or mother) may, in a document intended to have legal effect (including a will); (a) nominate a person to exercise the care and education of (b) any child (or children) of his under the age of 16 (c) up to that age and any nomination shall be upheld save where the: (d) mother (father) of (b) wishes to undertake the same; or (e) a Family Court determines otherwise. 384

Repeals & Cancellation
(1) Crown Legislation. The legislation in Schedule 14 is repealed, as described.
(2) Church of England related Legislation. The legislation in Schedule 15 is repealed, as described.
(3) Duchy of Cornwall Legislation. The legislation in Schedule 16 is repealed, as described.
(4) Duchy of Cornwall Charters. The charters in Schedule 17 are cancelled, as described.
(5) Duchy of Cornwall Rights. The rights of the duchy (or duke) in Schedule 18 are abolished.

Power to delegate royal functions to Counsellors of State
(1) In the event of illness not amounting to such infirmity of mind or body as is mentioned in section two of this Act, or of absence or intended absence from the UK, the sovereign may, in order to prevent delay or difficulty in the despatch of public business, by letters patent under the great seal, delegate, for the period of that illness or absence, to counsellors of state such of the royal functions as may be specified in the letters patent, and may in like manner revoke or vary any such delegation: provided that no power to grant any rank, title or dignity of the peerage may be delegated.
(2) Subject as hereinafter provided, the counsellors of State shall be the wife or husband of the sovereign (if the sovereign is married), and the four persons who, excluding any persons disqualified under this section, are next in the line of succession to the Crown, of if the number of such persons next in the line of succession is less than four, then all such persons : provided that, if it appears to the sovereign that any person who, in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this subsection, would be required to be included among the counsellors of state to whom royal functions are to be delegated, is absent from the UK or intends to be so absent during the whole or any part of the period of such delegation, the letters patent may make provision for excepting that person from among the number of counsellors of state during the period of such absence.
(2A) The heir apparent or heir presumptive to the throne if not under the age of eighteen years shall not be disqualified from being a counsellor of state by reason only of his not being of full age, but save as aforesaid any person disqualified under this Act from being regent shall be disqualified from being a counsellor of state.
(3) Any functions delegated under this section shall be exercised jointly by the counsellors of state, or by such number of them as may be specified in the letters patent, and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be therein prescribed.
(4) The provisions of this section shall apply in relation to a regent with the substitution for references to the sovereign of references to the regent, so, however, that in relation to a regent subsection (2) of this section shall have effect as if after the word "next," where that word first occurs therein, there were inserted the words "after the regent". The provisions of this section shall apply in relation to a regent with the substitution for references to the sovereign of references to the regent and the omission, in subsection (2) thereof, of the reference to the wife or husband of the sovereign.
(5) Any delegation under this section shall cease on the demise of the Crown or on the occurrence of any events necessitating a regency or a change of regent.

[Interpretation].
(1) In this [Schedule], save as otherwise expressly provided, the expression "royal functions" includes all powers and authorities belonging to the Crown, whether prerogative or statutory, [together with the receiving of any homage required to be done to His Majesty.]

Schedule 2: Civil List
The Civil List shall be administered according to the following sections: 386

The Sovereign Grant
(1) A Sovereign Grant is to be paid by the Treasury to Her Majesty for each financial year.
(2) The purpose of the Sovereign Grant for a financial year is to provide resources for use for that year by the Royal Household in support of Her Majesty's official duties (see section 13).
(3) The amount of the Sovereign Grant for the financial year 2012-13 is £31 million.
(4) The amount of the Sovereign Grant for each subsequent financial year is the amount determined by the Royal Trustees for that year in accordance with section 6.
(5) Section 9 (Duchy of Cornwall income) provides, in the circumstances mentioned there, for the amount of the Sovereign Grant to be reduced.
(6)The Sovereign Grant falls to be paid out of money provided by Parliament.

Accounts of the Royal Household
(1) The Keeper of Her Majesty's Privy Purse (referred to in this Act as "the Keeper") must keep proper accounting records relating to the Royal Household.
(2) As soon as practicable after the end of a financial year ("the financial year"), the Keeper must-(a) prepare a statement of accounts of the Royal Household for that year, and (b) give a copy of the statement to the Comptroller and Auditor General (referred to in this Act as "the Comptroller").
(3) The statement of accounts-(a) must state the amount of net relevant resources used for the financial year, and (b) subject to that, must be prepared in accordance with any directions given by the Treasury to the Keeper.
(4) The directions that may be given include directions as to-(a) the information to be contained in the statement and how it is to be presented, (b) the methods and principles in accordance with which the statement is to be prepared, and (c) any additional information that is to accompany the statement.
(5) As soon as practicable after receiving the statement of accounts, the Comptroller must-(a)examine, certify and report on the statement, and (b)give a copy of the report and statement to the Treasury.
(6) The Treasury must-(a)lay a copy of the report and statement of accounts before Parliament, and (b)give a copy of the report and statement to the Royal Trustees. (8) For the purposes of Part 2 of the National Audit Act 1983 (economy, efficiency and effectiveness examinations) the Royal Household is to be treated as a body within section 6(3)(c) of that Act.

The Reserve Fund
(1) There is to be a Reserve Fund consisting of monies received by the Royal Trustees under this section and anything deriving from those monies.
(2) The Royal Trustees may invest any of the Reserve Fund in any way they consider appropriate. (7) The Royal Trustees may make loans from the Reserve Fund to the Keeper for the purpose of enabling capital expenditure of the Royal Household to be met.
(8) In section 2(7) (b), the reference to income of the Royal Household does not include any payment under this section made to the Keeper.

Accounts of the Reserve Fund
(1) The Royal Trustees must keep proper accounting records of the Reserve Fund.
(2) As soon as practicable after the end of a financial year ("the financial year"), the Royal Trustees must-(a) prepare a statement of accounts of the Reserve Fund for that year, and (b) give a copy of the statement to the Comptroller.
(3)The statement of accounts-(a) must state the value of the Reserve Fund at the end of the financial year, and(b) subject to that, must be prepared in accordance with any directions given by the Treasury to the Royal Trustees.
(4)The directions that may be given include directions as to-(a) the information to be contained in the statement and how it is to be presented,(b) the methods and principles in accordance with which the statement is to be prepared, and (c) any additional information that is to accompany the statement.
(5) As soon as practicable after receiving the statement of accounts, the Comptroller must-(a) examine, certify and report on the statement, and(b)give a copy of the report and statement to the Treasury.
(6) The Treasury must lay a copy of the report and statement of accounts before Parliament.
(7) For the purposes of Part 2 of the National Audit Act 1983 (economy, efficiency and effectiveness examinations)-(a) the Royal Trustees are to be treated as a body within section 6(3)(c) of that Act, and(b) for the purposes of section 6(4) of that Act the functions of the Comptroller in relation to the Royal Trustees are to be regarded as restricted to matters relating to the Reserve Fund.

Annual report as to the amount of Sovereign Grant
(1) In each financial year the Royal Trustees must prepare a report-(a) stating their determination in accordance with section 6 of the amount of the Sovereign Grant for the following financial year, and (b) setting out how that amount has been determined.
(2) The report must be prepared as soon as practicable after the Comptroller has done all of the following-(a) reported under section 2 on the statement of accounts of the Royal Household for the previous financial year, (b)  (3) The Royal Trustees must give a copy of the report to the Treasury.
(4) The Treasury must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.

Determination of the amount of Sovereign Grant
(1) The amount of the Sovereign Grant for a financial year ("the relevant financial year") is to be determined by the Royal Trustees as follows- Step 1 Calculate 125% of the income account net surplus of the Crown Estate (see section 12) for the base year."The base year" means the financial year that begins two years before the beginning of the relevant financial year.
Step 2 Round the amount calculated under Step 1 up to the nearest £100,000.
Step 3 Find the greater of- That amount is "the Step 3 amount".
Step 4 If the adjusted value of the Reserve Fund at the end of the base year (see subsection (2)) exceeds 50% of the audited net relevant resources used for that year, the Royal Trustees may reduce the Step 3 amount by such amount as they consider appropriate (but see subsection (4)).
Step 5  (4) The Royal Trustees must, in exercising their power under Step 4, act in a way they expect will result in the adjusted value of the Reserve Fund at the end of the relevant financial year being about 50% of the audited net relevant resources used for that year.

Review by Royal Trustees of Sovereign Grant
(1) As soon as practicable after the end of a review period, the Royal Trustees must review whether the percentage for the time being specified in Step 1 of section 6(1) is appropriate.
(2)They must prepare a report that-(a)states whether they consider that the percentage is or is not appropriate, (b) if they consider that it is not appropriate, states the percentage that they consider should apply, and (c) gives an explanation of their conclusions.
(3)The Royal Trustees must give a copy of the report to the Treasury.
(4)The Treasury must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(5)The review periods are-(a) the period of 4 years beginning with 1 April 2012, and (b) every period of 5 years beginning at the end of another review period.

Power to change level of Sovereign Grant
(1) This section applies where a report under section 7 states that the Royal Trustees consider that the percentage for the time being specified in Step 1 of section 6(1) is not appropriate.
(2 )The Treasury must by order made by statutory instrument substitute, for that percentage, the percentage specified by the Royal Trustees in the report as the one that should apply.
(3) A statutory instrument containing an order that increases the percentage specified in Step 1 of section 6(1) may be made only if a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of the House of Commons.
(4) Any other statutory instrument under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of the House of Commons.

Duchy of Cornwall income and grant to the heir to the throne
(1)Where the Duke of Cornwall for the time being is under 18 for any period in a financial year-(a) the amount of the Sovereign Grant for that year is reduced by an amount equal to 90% of the income account net surplus of the Duchy of Cornwall for that period, and (b) the income of the Duchy of Cornwall for that year, up to the amount by which the Sovereign Grant is reduced under paragraph (a), is to be at the disposal of Her Majesty.
(2)Where the Duchy of Cornwall is vested in Her Majesty for any period ("the relevant period") in a financial year (and Her Majesty is accordingly entitled to its income) -(a)the amount of the Sovereign Grant for that year is reduced by an amount equal to the income account (3)The amount of the grant paid to any person is-(a) for any period (falling within the relevant period) when the person is the heir and is aged 18 or over, the amount by which the Sovereign Grant is reduced for that period, and (b) for any period (falling within the relevant period) when the person is the heir and is under 18, 10% of the amount by which the Sovereign Grant is reduced for that period.
(4)Where the grant under subsection (2)(b) would (apart from this subsection) be paid to a person who is under 18 at the time of payment, the grant is to be paid to the Royal Trustees and is to be held by them on trust for the person on such terms as the Treasury may direct.
(5)Any reduction in the amount of the Sovereign Grant under this section is to be ignored for the purposes of -(a) section 3 (the Reserve Fund), and (b)Step 3 in section 6(1) (determination of amount of Sovereign Grant).
(6) Where the amount of the Sovereign Grant for a financial year is reduced under this section, references in section 2(7)(b) (income of the Royal Household) and section 11 (maintenance of Royal Palaces) to the Sovereign Grant include income of the Duchy of Cornwall for that year.
(7) For the purpose of determining the income account net surplus of the Duchy of Cornwall for part of a financial year, the income account net surplus of the Duchy for the whole of that year is to be apportioned equally in respect of each day of that year.
(8) For the purpose of determining the amount by which the Sovereign Grant is reduced for part of the relevant period, the reduction under subsection (2)(a) is to be apportioned equally in respect of each day of that period.
(9) For the purpose of making reductions under subsection (1)(a) or (2)(a), and paying grants under subsection (2) (b), in respect of a financial year (or part of a financial year) -(a) until the accounts of the Duchy of Cornwall for that year have been submitted to the Treasury pursuant to section 2 of the Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall (Accounts) Act 1838, the Treasury is to act on the basis of its estimate of the amount of the income account net surplus of the Duchy of Cornwall for that year, and (b) any necessary adjustments (including any payments or repayments) are to be made after those accounts have been submitted.
(10) The grant under subsection (2)(b) falls to be paid out of money provided by Parliament.

Maintenance of Royal Palaces and related land
The Secretary of State has no duties under section 21 of the Crown Lands Act 1851 in relation to the maintenance of Royal Palaces and related land so far as they are maintained by Her Majesty out of the Sovereign Grant.
11. Meaning of "the audited net relevant resources", "the value of the Reserve Fund" and "the income account net surplus of the Crown Estate" (1) For the purposes of this Act-"the audited net relevant resources" used for a financial year are the amount of net relevant resources used for that year stated in the statement of accounts certified by the Comptroller under section 2, "the value of the Reserve Fund" at the end of a financial year is the value of the Reserve Fund at the end of that year stated in the statement of accounts certified by the Comptroller under section 4, and "the income account net surplus of the Crown Estate" for a financial year is the amount of that surplus stated in the statement of accounts certified by the Comptroller under section 2 of the Crown Estate Act 1961; but this is subject to subsection (2).
(2) If a relevant report on a statement of accounts contains a qualification (however expressed) that affects or might affect the amount or value stated in the statement as the amount or value of a relevant figure-(a) the Comptroller must certify in the relevant report the amount or value which the Comptroller considers to be the amount or value of the relevant figure, and (b) for the purposes of this Act the relevant figure is to be taken to be the amount or value certified.

Other interpretative provisions etc
(1) This section applies for the purposes of this Act.
(2)"The Comptroller" has the meaning given by section 2.
(3)"Financial year" means a year beginning with 1 April.
(4)"The financial year 2012-13" means the financial year beginning with 1 April 2012, and similar expressions are to be read accordingly. ilr.ccsenet.org International Law Research Vol. 10, No. 1; 2021 (5)"The Keeper" has the meaning given by section 2.
(6)"The Reserve Fund" means the Reserve Fund established by section 3.
(7)"The Royal Trustees" means the body established by section 10 of the Civil List Act 1952.
(8) Any reference to the support of Her Majesty's official duties includes the maintenance of Royal Palaces and related land.
(9) Any reference to the Royal Household is limited to that Household so far as it is concerned with the support of Her Majesty's official duties.
(10) Any reference to the use of resources is to their expenditure, consumption or reduction in value.
(11) Any direction under this Act may be varied or revoked by another direction.

Duration of Sovereign Grant provisions etc
(1) The Sovereign Grant provisions cease to have effect 6 months after the end of the present reign unless continued under subsection (3).
(3) An Order in Council may provide that, instead of expiring when they would otherwise expire (by virtue of subsection (1) or a previous Order under this subsection), the Sovereign Grant provisions expire 6 months after the end of the reign in which the Order is made.

Pensions 387
(1) The Treasury shall issue out of the Civil List a pension at the rate of £15, 000 a year (or such other sum as may be specified in a SI), to persons who by their: (a) personal service to the Crown; or (b) performance of duties to the public; or (c) useful discoveries in science and attainments in literature and the arts, have merited the gracious consideration of their sovereign and the gratitude of their country. 388 (2) A list of all pensions granted pursuant to sub-section (1) in each year ending on the 31 st March shall be laid before Parliament within 30 days after that date in each year, if Parliament is sitting . If not, within 30 days after the next meeting of Parliament. 389 [Note: Since pensions are now only given pursuant to ss (1)(c), it may be appropriate to delete (a) and (b). Further, since the role of the sovereign in such matters is now formal, the words 'the gracious consideration of their sovereign and' may be deleted. 387 This wording is taken from the Civil List Act 1837, with the wording modernised. 388 The original Civil List Act 1837, s 5 states: (1,200l. a year to be issued to defray the charges of pensions). And whereas it is expedient to make provision, at the rate of £15,000 a year for each and every succeeding year… to defray the charge of such pensions payable under this section as may be granted by [HM]: Be it therefore enacted, that it shall be lawful for the Treasury to charge upon and issue quarterly out of the said consolidated fund... such sums as shall be required to defray the charge of such pensions as may be granted as aforesaid, at the rate of £15,000 a year for every succeeding year. 389 Ibid, s 6 (restrictions on grants of pensions). List of pensions granted to be laid before Parliament yearly. And whereas it was resolved by the Commons House of Parliament, on the [18 Feb 1834] , "that it is the bounden duty of the responsible advisers of the Crown to recommend to [HM] for grants of pensions on the civil list such persons only as have just claims on the royal beneficence, or who by their personal services to the Crown, by the performance of duties to the public, or by their useful discoveries in science and attainments in literature and the arts, have merited the gracious consideration of their sovereign and the gratitude of their country" : And whereas it is expedient that provision should be made by law for carrying into full effect the said resolution, and for giving an assurance to Parliament that the responsible advisers of the Crown have acted in conformity therewith: the pensions which may hereafter be granted as mentioned in section 5 shall be granted to such persons only as have just claims on the royal beneficence, or who by their personal services to the Crown, by the performance of duties to the public, or by their useful discoveries in science and attainments in literature and the arts, have merited the gracious consideration of their Sovereign and the gratitude of their country; and that a list of all such pensions granted in

Schedule 3: Abolished Prerogatives
(a) legislation (including by way of non obstante); or (b) the common law; or (c) the operation of (a) or (b).

Prerogatives in connection with the Act of Settlement 1700
(1) The following are abolished, any prerogative of the Crown to: (a) plead the grant of a pardon under the Great Seal to an impeachment by the Commons in Parliament. 395 (1) The estate described on the deposited plans (the 'Osbourne Estate') is vested in the sovereign in right of the Crown.
(2) The part of the estate, coloured blue on the deposited plans (being Osborne House and grounds adjacent thereto) shall be under the management of the Commissioners of Works and arrangements may at any time be made, with the consent of the Treasury, for placing any part of the Osborne estate under such management, or for withdrawing any part from such management as appears convenient at the time.
(3) As a memorial to Queen Victoria, the Commissioners of Works shall preserve, so far as may be, in its present condition, and keep open to the public, in such manner and on such terms as the Commissioners determine, such part of Osborne House as appears to have been in the personal occupation of Queen Victoria  397 Consideration should be given to repealing these. 398 The civil version of the military cross. 399 The civil version of the military medal. repeal in s 1 from 'that the pretended power of suspending of laws' up to 'for such petitioning are illegal.' repeal in s 1 from 'that excessive bail' up to 'are illegal and void' repeal in s 1, the words from 'to which demand of their rights they are particularly encouraged…' up to the words 'against all persons whatsoever that shall attempt any thing to the contrary…' . Also, the words from 'and that every king and queen of this realm' up to the words 'shall have attained the said age of twelve'. Coronation Oath Act 1688 Convention Parliament Act 1688 Royal Mines Act 1688 Great Seal Act 1688 Crown and Parliament Recognition Act 1689 Royal Mines Act 1693 Act of Settlement 1700 repeal s 1 in section 2 repeal the words 'and that every king and queen of this realm who shall come to and succeed in the imperial Crown of this kingdom by virtue of this Act shall have the Coronation Oath administered to him her or them at their respective coronations according to the Act of Parliament made in the first year of the reign of His Majesty and the said late Queen Mary intituled An Act for establishing the Coronation Oath and shall make subscribe and repeat the declaration in the Act first above recited mentioned or referred to in the manner and form thereby prescribed.' in section 3 repeal the words 'That whosoever shall hereafter come to