Corruption in Brazil: Perceptions, Causes and Consequences

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Abstract

This article conducts a thorough examination of corruption in Brazil, spanning its infiltration into everyday scenarios to its profound impact on the country’s political, economic, and social spheres. It investigates prevalent instances of fraudulent practices in daily life, particularly in dining establishments, underscoring the challenge of combating this deeply ingrained culture of dishonesty due to underreporting. The piece highlights the extensive investigations into alleged criminal activities involving a significant proportion of Brazilian lawmakers and emphasizes the judiciary’s slow response in prosecuting accused officials. Moreover, it delves into the adverse effects of corruption on the economy, citing its deterrent effect on foreign investments, exacerbation of income disparities, and contribution to economic instability. Criticisms of the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic are discussed, including the intervention of the Federal Supreme Court to scrutinize government actions. Proposing a mathematical model to comprehend and prevent crimes, it explores the intricate connections between various crime types, public security policies, and corruption. Finally, the article concludes by advocating empirical testing of this model and suggesting methodologies to construct comprehensive indices for diverse crime categories, offering an exhaustive analysis of corruption’s multifaceted impact on Brazilian society, economy, and political framework.

Keywords: corruption, culture of deceit, criminal behavior, broken windows

JEL Classification: D10; K42; P16.

1. Introduction

Brazil has witnessed a concerning surge in crime rates, steadily escalating over the years. Citizens contend with a spectrum of infractions, ranging from minor to severe, as these incidents become ingrained in societal norms, gradually assimilating into the cultural fabric. This normalization of crime has trivialized its impact on daily life, perpetuating a cycle where criminal behavior is accepted.

This pervasive corruption within the country manifests in two distinct forms: systemic, which is overt and observable, and endemic, existing beneath the surface, subtly woven into the everyday lives of Brazilians. This article aims to explore the relationship between endemic corruption and its contribution to systemic corruption, questioning whether the behavior of politicians merely mirrors the societal values they represent. The fundamental inquiry poses: “If society fosters corruption, do politicians inevitably succumb to its influence?”

The propensity for individuals to engage in criminal acts hinges upon the presence of necessity and opportunity, underscoring the contextual nature of criminal behavior.

Becker (1968) said that “some people become criminals, therefore, not because their basic motivation differs from that of other people, but because their benefits and costs are different.” Becker’s (1968) model describes criminal activity as a rational choice based on the principle of maximizing expected utility, whether to commit a crime. The individual chooses to gain from illegal work over gain from legal work if the expected utility of crime and the cost of punishment are greater than the expected utility of legal work. The probability of being arrested and convicted would reduce the criminal’s expected utility.

Data compiled from the Supreme Federal Court (SFC) in 2017 revealed a troubling reality: approximately 190 deputies and 48 senators, entrusted with legislative responsibilities in Brazil, were under constant suspicion and investigation for alleged criminal activities. This staggering figure accounts for 40% (238 individuals) of the
total 594 parliamentarians being scrutinized by the SFC.

Judicial records paint a concerning picture, indicating that six out of ten senators and three out of ten members of the Chamber of Deputies grapple with legal issues within the justice system. Notably, this figure is subject to further escalation, as the SFC continues to review additional cases shrouded in judicial secrecy.

The considerable delay, averaging 581 days, in the Prosecutor General of Brazil’s (PGB) submission of complaints to the SFC for initiating criminal proceedings has significantly contributed to the expiration of the statute of limitations for numerous crimes. Macedo’s (2017) survey highlights a disconcerting trend: approximately 68% of the 404 criminal cases brought before the SFC, involving individuals with privileged jurisdiction, were either time-barred or referred to lower courts between 2011 and 2018.

Recently, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) conducted an evaluation concerning the country’s potential entry into the group. This assessment uncovered substantial regressions in Brazil’s anti-corruption initiatives. Since the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Law on August 1, 2013, which came into force on January 29, 2014, the Federal Public Ministry (MPF) has managed to recover approximately R$ 4 billion reais, constituting merely 20% of the total, and has successfully convicted nearly 200 individuals over a span of six years.

During the initial years of implementing anti-bribery measures, Brazil received accolades and recognition from the OECD for its efforts. However, starting from July 2019, following the approval of a law in the Brazilian Senate, the OECD Anti-Bribery Working Group detected impediments hindering anti-corruption endeavors. The legislation introduced mechanisms aimed at criminalizing the actions of prosecutors, leading to a perception that the National Congress sought to impede the fight against corruption. These developments have raised “serious concerns” regarding Brazil’s commitment to combatting corruption. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in public administration in the years 2012-2020 during the recession (Note 4). The values of this Corruption Perception Index (CPI) are on a scale of 0 (zero) and 1 (um). When closer to 0, the country is totally corrupt. When closer to 1, it means that there is no corruption in the country. There is an expansion of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in public administration in 2014 and 2019, in part due to the depression itself, which caused the departure of almost 14 million workers from their jobs. Furthermore, the spread of corruption was exacerbated by spending on the World Cup and on parliamentary amendments to contain President Dilma’s impeachment proceedings and the attempt to install President Temer’s impeachment process.

![Figure 1. The CPI measures the perceived level of corruption in the public sector](source: tradingeconomics.com | transparency international)

Data sourced from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Bank (WB) indicate discernible differences in corruption and violence levels between Protestant Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries and countries of Latin origin, predominantly Catholic. The statistics paint a comparative picture, suggesting that countries with Protestant origins exhibit lower levels of corruption and violence.

The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) emphasizes Brazil’s ongoing struggle with endemic corruption within its public sector. Over time, Brazil has marginally improved its position, moving from the 96th to the 94th position, albeit with a decrease in points from 43 in 2012 to 38 in 2020, among 180 surveyed countries. This data unequivocally underscores the severity of corruption in Brazil, marking it as a significant impediment to economic growth. Furthermore, the repercussions of corruption extend to the exacerbation of income inequalities and social injustices within the country.
Evidence points to the growth of corruption driven by politicians who support bills that impede investigations into Operation “Lava-Jato”; preliminary injunctions granted by Federal Courts and the Supreme Federal Court (SFC) (Note 5). The annulments of several convictions of politicians by the Supreme Federal Court (SFC); the appointment of the Prosecutor General of Brazil outside the triple list voted by the members of the Public Federal Ministry (PFM); practically eliminates Operation “Lava-Jato” activities and benefits all convicted politicians (Note 6), which makes it possible for organized crime to advance in the country.

Figure 2 illustrates the Rule of Law in Emerging Markets (MSCI) index by the World Bank, which assesses the level of trust in and adherence to societal rules. It specifically evaluates the efficacy of contract enforcement, protection of property rights, effectiveness of law enforcement agencies, and the prevalence of crime and violence within a given society. For Brazil, the average index value from 1996 to 2019 stood at -0.21 points.

This index is instrumental in comprehending the migration of approximately 15 multinational corporations and smaller enterprises from diverse sectors away from Brazil. These departures were motivated by the pursuit of markets offering greater competitiveness, along with a tax framework aligning with the product’s cost structure.

The prevalence of corruption, government disarray, legal uncertainties, and economic instability has precipitated a decline in foreign investment, a substantial rise in unemployment rates, and a contraction in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated these challenges, leading to a staggering 4.1% reduction in the real growth rate of Brazil’s GDP in 2020.

Figure 3 from 2019 reflects a Project of Law index value of -0.18, positioning the country among the poorest performers within emerging economies. This places Brazil at the ninth position among the twenty worst-performing developing nations. Despite being the world’s 12th largest economy in 2020, Brazil holds the 98th position among 183 countries, highlighting its grave economic challenges on a global scale.

Brazil is currently facing its most severe crisis in history due to the COVID-19 pandemic, marked by a stark lack of state control in pandemic management. As of May 8, 2021, the Ministry of Health (Note 7) reported 421,316 fatalities and 15,145,879 confirmed cases. The crisis has been exacerbated by governmental denial of vaccine use, delayed procurement of Pfizer vaccines in 2020, reluctance towards mask mandates, and the promotion of unproven treatments, all contributing to a surge in infections and overwhelming the public and private healthcare systems.

In response to the unfolding chaos, the Supreme Federal Court (SFC) intervened, mandating the Federal Senate to establish a parliamentary commission of inquiry (CPI). This commission aims to investigate the federal government’s actions and omissions in managing the pandemic and address the healthcare collapse in the state of Amazonas. Notably, the Senate President expanded the scope of this investigation to include Senator Eduardo Girão’s request, broadening the inquiry to scrutinize the allocation of federal resources by states and municipalities in combating the pandemic, thus widening the commission’s purview.

In Brazil, a pervasive “culture of deceit” has taken root over the years, particularly visible in the routine frauds occurring in numerous restaurants and bars during customer transactions. Instances arise where the bill presented to the customer is manipulated, typically inflated. Upon detection of this irregularity, the establishment often rectifies the amount and offers apologies for the purported “error.”
Furthermore, these bills frequently include an illegal service fee of 10%, contravening Article 51, IV of the Consumer Protection Code (CDC). Despite the illegality, many customers, feeling intimidated, acquiesce and pay the bill inclusive of the added service fee. Unfortunately, incidents often go unreported, exacerbating the perpetuation of this culture of deceit and the imposition of illegal charges. The lack of reporting not only fails to prevent such occurrences but also undermines efforts to curb this unethical practice.

Moreover, the absence of penalties for such misconduct further normalizes this behavior, breeding a cycle where such actions become routine. This cycle leads to momentary discomfort for clients, negatively impacting their trust in ethical principles and customary rules. What may seem distressing to some becomes an accepted part of daily life for others. As Wilson (2017) refers, negligent law enforcement can effectively cultivate a culture conducive to criminal behavior, echoing the arguments of Wilson and Kelling (1982) in their exploration of societal response to crime in Shakespeare’s “Measure for Measure.”

Several factors have significantly contributed to the surge in crime rates in the country. Notably, the prescription of crimes, which limits the initiation or continuation of criminal proceedings, stands out as a major contributor. The prevalence of the privileged forum, or functional forum prerogative, creates an environment where individuals committing crimes benefit from legal protections crafted by themselves. This stands in stark contrast to the republican principle advocating equality before the law, mandating that all individuals, regardless of status, face justice impartially in the initial proceedings.

The second significant factor influencing crime rates pertains to the inadequate effectiveness of public security measures, including deficient law enforcement, limitations in maintaining urban social order, inadequacies in crime prevention strategies, investigation (Note 8) mechanisms, trial procedures, and the overall penal system. Governmental actions in curbing corruption have been marked by inefficiency and ineffectiveness, compounded by judicial sluggishness in imposing penalties. This inadequacy often transforms penalties into symbolic gestures rather than deterrents, leading to surreal scenarios.

Additionally, within this context of pervasive violence, the Brazilian prison system stands as a pressing concern, urgently necessitating substantial structural improvements to serve its punitive function effectively.

The third influential factor in crime revolves around the prisoner salary, or reclusion allowance, disbursed by the Government to the family of a prisoner, referencing the individual’s last salary, provided they contributed to Social Security. The decision to engage in criminal activities entails weighing benefits against costs, and financial safeguarding for one’s family in case of incarceration can factor into this choice.

Furthermore, the protection of individuals under 18 years of age creates a strong incentive for involvement in criminal activities.

According to the Comptroller General of the Union (CGU) (Note 9) in 2020, a staggering 680,564 public agents received Covid-19 Emergency Aid improperly. These incidents shed light on a societal tolerance towards illegal activities, reflecting a culture where such behaviors have become ingrained within Brazil’s economic and social fabric.

Brazil stands out as a distinctive nation, possessing its own unique and intricate cultural fabric. Its idiosyncrasies and events, often deviating from rational norms, contribute to its unparalleled character. One such remarkable event occurred in 2017 when a federal deputy, previously sentenced by the Supreme Federal Court (SFC) to seven years and two months in prison for document forgery and bidding waiver in 2002, was authorized by the justice system to work within the Chamber of Deputies during weekdays.

The arrangement dictated the deputy’s presence at the Chamber from 9 am to 12 pm and from 1:30 pm to 6:30 pm or during evening sessions, with the mandate to return to prison after working hours. Additionally, the deputy served time in the penitentiary during weekends and parliamentary recesses while receiving the salary and benefits entitled to a parliamentarian. Remarkably, there were other Members under similar circumstances.

3. Literature Review

The pioneering work of researchers Wilson and Kelling (1982) revealed that addressing minor offenses or misdemeanors is crucial in preventing the escalation of more serious crimes. Their “broken windows” theory elucidates that the lack of state intervention to maintain public order, specifically in neglecting to prevent or control disorder, can significantly catalyze criminal activities. This theory was embraced as a foundational principle for combating fare evasion and preserving urban social order, leading to the revitalization of public spaces in New York City during the early 1990s. The implementation of this policy resulted in reduced crime rates, heightened security, and enhanced satisfaction among inhabitants across various neighborhoods.
Wilson and Kelling (1982) emphasized that “the fundamental role of the police in upholding order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms within the community itself.” Their work sparked extensive academic discourse, raising the debate on whether law enforcement should prioritize “maintaining order” over solely “fighting crime” within the literature.

The extensive work by Kelling and Coles (1996) delves deeper into the practical application and underlying philosophy of the “broken windows” theory. They advocate for a collaborative effort between law enforcement agencies and communities, emphasizing the importance of this partnership even in the most violent urban neighborhoods. This alliance aims to establish new community behavior standards while incorporating mechanisms to identify potential abusive conduct by law enforcement officials.

Kelling and Coles stress the implementation of community policing and crime prevention assessment models and practices. Their approach seeks to safeguard civil rights and ensure the liberties of marginalized groups such as Black communities and those with limited economic means.

The essence of the “broken windows” theory lies in elucidating strategies to curb urban disorder and crime within communities, fostering a culture that discourages criminal behavior by instilling widespread skepticism regarding the efficacy of the justice system.

Researchers Souza and Kelling (2004) underscore the significance of the “broken windows” theory as a foundational element in advocating for urban order maintenance and crime prevention policies. They assert that the conceptual framework encapsulated within the “broken windows” theory extends beyond the realms of criminal justice and criminology. Instead, these ideas permeate into various spheres such as public health, education, parks, and business improvement districts (BIDs). This broader application further fortifies the resilience of these principles within urban order maintenance policies.

This essay by William (2017) explores aspects of crime, criminal justice, and criminology within William Shakespeare’s play “Measure for Measure” (1604). In this early modern English drama, Shakespeare delved into themes of criminology and criminal justice that closely mirrored the concepts later theorized by Americans George Kelling and James Wilson in their renowned essay “Broken Windows” (1982). While this observation suggests the possibility of Shakespeare engaging in a form of criminology long before the formal establishment of the academic discipline, a detailed analysis of “Measure for Measure” reveals flaws in the ideology of broken windows policing. Specifically, Shakespeare’s work highlights the potential for abuses of power when individual law enforcement agents are entrusted with both the responsibility to quell societal disorder and the autonomy to define and address such disorder. Consequently, despite recent scrutiny by social scientific research and public opinion, this policing approach was discredited by William Shakespeare over 400 years ago.

The texts address corruption in distinct contexts. While one focuses on the detailed analysis of corruption in Brazil, spanning its everyday manifestations to its broader implications on society, economy, and the country’s political structure, the other explores how William Shakespeare, through his work ‘Measure for Measure,’ delved into themes related to criminology and criminal justice that parallel ideas developed much later by George Kelling and James Wilson in the renowned essay ‘Broken Windows.’ Both texts discuss the consequences of corruption and police misconduct, albeit in different contexts and periods: one centered on the contemporary Brazilian reality and the other on literary representations and historical reflections from the seventeenth century.

4. Methodology

This article introduces a dynamic model of criminal behavior that extends Becker’s static model, embedding individuals within a dynamic environment. Here, individuals possess legal and criminal human capital and are deemed perfectly replaceable. The model’s core assumptions delineate two distinct criminal categories linked by minor to major criminal activities: the minor crimes, referred to as “pé-de-chinelo” (pc), and the major crimes labeled as “white-collar” (wc).

Additionally, let’s consider two equations that elucidate corruption behavior. Corruption stands as a significant challenge in numerous emerging economies worldwide.

Furthermore, let’s delve into two equations aimed at elucidating corrupt behavior. Corruption poses a significant challenge across numerous emerging economies worldwide.

The function denoted as \( F_1 \) characterizes minor crimes, pertaining to offenses committed by lower-ranked civil servants in the execution of their duties (Note 10) within our country. Assessing the effectiveness of the justice system involves an index that integrates legal activities and measures aimed at combating crimes, defined by \( F \) and \( \epsilon \), assumed to adhere to a normal distribution. This study endeavors to delve into the dynamic interplay among crimes of diverse severity. Notably, an escalation in minor crimes triggers a corresponding increase in
more serious offenses, without the converse relationship being evident.

The function of violent crime

\[ R_{t+1} = \gamma_1 R_t + \gamma_2 F_t + \epsilon_{t+1} \]  

where \( \gamma_1 > 0 \) signifies that higher levels of minor crimes within society correspond to increased incentives for serious violations. Conversely, \( \gamma_2 < 0 \) suggests that amplifying efforts to combat minor crimes leads to reduced incentives for crime, subsequently lowering the incidence of minor crimes. The \( \gamma_2 \) coefficient gauges the responsiveness of crime prevention mechanisms, influencing the efficacy and efficiency of public security policies. A higher \( \gamma_2 > 0 \), indicates an elevated tendency to trivialize crimes. Additional variables influencing the rate of minor crimes are encompassed within the random term \( \epsilon_{t+1} \).

Then there exists the function depicting the strength of justice (combating corruption), where \( L_t \) represents an index of severe crimes involving corruption committed by public officials, magistrates, and parliamentarians in the execution of their duties within (Note 11) our country.

The white color (corruption) function has the following form:

\[ L_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) L_t + \beta R_t + \nu_{t+1} \]  

Where \( L_t \) represents the corruption or severity index, with \( L_t > 0 \). Additionally, \( \nu_{t+1} \) stands as an uncorrelated random term with \( \epsilon_{t+1} \), serving as residual determinants of crime. \( \delta > 0 \) represents an index characterizing the conduct of prosecutors, consolidating the necessary specialized technical elements required for their roles. In cases where \( (1 - \delta) > 0 \), a positive correlation between \( L_t \) and \( L_{t+1} \) is established. This direct association indicates an increase in crimes in the subsequent period \( (t + 1) \). Conversely, crimes will decrease in scenarios where this relationship does not hold.

The \( \beta > 0 \) acts as a connecting instrument between the light crime and corruption crime equations. This result tells us that light crimes are directly related to levels of corruption. When light crimes increase, so does corruption. One of the most possible explanations for this autocorrelation is that there are groups of people susceptible to various types of crimes because of the media effect - that is, they are influenced by behavior of other criminal people in our society.

\[ P_t = (1 - \delta) L_t + \beta R_t \]  

while the control variable is:

\[ \varphi_t = \gamma_1 R_t + \gamma_2 F_t \]  

Equation (4) defines the parameters as \( 0 < \gamma_1 < 1 \) & \( \gamma_2 \) represents the influence of the average in addressing minor crimes, where \( 0 < \gamma_2 < 1 \). The optimal feedback rule [3] is expressed as follows:

\[ \varphi_t = HP_t \]  

Equations (1) and (2) can be reformulated as follows:

\[ R_{t+1} = \varphi_t + \epsilon_t + 1 \]  

and

\[ L_{t+1} = P_t + \nu_t + 1 \]  

Introducing the loss function into the model construction process, the aim is to minimize the police’s loss function, expressed as:

\[ G = \frac{1}{2} E_t \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sigma \left[ \lambda R^2_{t+1} + L^2_{t+1} \right] \]  

The primary objective of the police is to minimize this loss function, constrained by the equation:

\[ P_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) P_t + (1 - \delta) \nu_{t+1} + \beta \varphi_t + \beta \epsilon_{t+1} \]  

This equation is derived by advancing Equation (3) and substituting Equations (6) and (7) into it. Hence, the focus of public security authorities extends beyond minimizing serious crimes; it also encompasses the reduction of misdemeanors.

Let’s establish the value function as follows:

\[ M(P_t) = \min_{\varphi_t} E_t \left[ \frac{1}{2} (\lambda R^2_{t+1} + L^2_{t+1}) + \sigma M(P_{t+1}) \right] \]

After performing algebraic manipulations involving equations (6), (7), and (9) and substituting them into the
preceding equation (10), we arrive at the subsequent equation (11).

\[
M(P_t) = \min_{\phi_t} \frac{1}{2} \lambda E_t(\phi_t + \epsilon_{t+1})^2 + \frac{1}{2} E_t(\phi_t + \nu_{t+1})^2 + \sigma E_tM[(1-\delta)P_t + \beta \phi_t + \beta \epsilon_{t+1} + 
\]

By deriving Equation (11) with respect to \( \phi_t \), we obtain the first-order conditions (FOC).

\[
\lambda \phi_t + \sigma E_t M_{\phi_t}(P_{t+1}) = 0
\]

Upon applying the envelope theorem concerning \( st \):

\[
M_{\phi}(P_t) = P_t + \sigma E_t M_{\phi}(P_{t+1})
\]

Multiplying Equation (13) by \( \beta \), substituting it into Equation (12), advancing this expression, and considering expectations:

\[
E_t M_{\phi}(P_{t+1}) = E_t(P_{t+1}) - \frac{\lambda}{\beta} E_t(\phi_{t+1})
\]

Applying the expectation in Equation (9) and substituting it into Equation (4) yields:

\[
E_t M_{\phi}(P_{t+1}) = (1-\delta)P_t + \beta \phi_t - \frac{\lambda}{\beta} E_t(\phi_{t+1})
\]

Inserting Equation (15) into Equation (12) results in

\[
\frac{\phi_t = - \beta \sigma (1-\delta)}{\lambda + \beta^2 \sigma P_t + \frac{\sigma \lambda}{\lambda + \sigma ^2} E_t(\phi_{t+1})}
\]

When the policy is set at time \( t \), \( s_t \) denotes the state variable, resulting in the optimal policy rule adopting a quadratic form \( \theta_t = Q s_t \). Progressing with the application of expectations to Equation (5), considering \( E_t(s_{t+1}) = (1-\omega)s_t + \gamma \theta_t \), and utilizing the outcome derived from Equation (5)

\[
E_t = Q E_t(P_{t+1}) = Q[(1-\delta) + \beta Q] P_t
\]

Substituting this expression into Equation (15) results in the following quadratic form:

\[
\lambda \sigma \beta Q^2 - (\lambda + \sigma \lambda (1-\delta) + \beta^2 \sigma) Q - \beta \sigma (1-\delta)
\]

Consequently, solving Equation (16) leads to the solution provided in (19):

\[
Q_t = \frac{(\lambda + \sigma \lambda (1-\delta) + \beta^2 \sigma) \pm + \sqrt{\lambda + (1-\delta) \sigma \lambda + \beta^2 \sigma}^2}{2 \sigma \beta \lambda} + \frac{4(\beta^2 \sigma^2 \lambda)(1-\delta) P_t}{2 \sigma \beta \lambda}
\]

One property of quadratic functions stipulates that the product of the roots \( i \)

\[
Q_t Q_2 = \frac{(1-\delta)}{\lambda}
\]

The relevant root to consider is the one that satisfies the stability condition, specifically the negative root \( Q_2 \). In this scenario, \( (1-\delta) \) must be positive. Substituting \( Q_2 \) back into Equation (5) results in

\[
\phi_t = (\lambda + \sigma \lambda (1-\delta) + \beta^2 \sigma) \pm + \frac{\sqrt{\lambda + (1-\delta) \sigma \lambda + \beta^2 \sigma}^2}{2 \sigma \beta \lambda} + \frac{4(\beta^2 \sigma^2 \lambda)(1-\delta) P_t}{2 \sigma \beta \lambda}
\]

The optimal rule for the crime repression rate can be deduced by substituting Equations (3) and (4) into Equation

\[
F_t = \frac{Q_2(1-\delta)}{\gamma_2} c_t + \frac{\beta Q_2 - \gamma_1}{\gamma_2} R_t
\]

In this context, \( (\partial F_t / \partial L_t) > 0 \) if \( (1-\delta) > 0 \), signifying the fulfillment of the stability condition. Consequently, the optimal rule is applicable when the fight against crime is less effective. As a result, an increase in the crime rate corresponds to a rise in the rate of light crimes, indicated by \( (\partial F_t / \partial R_t) > 0 \).
5. Final Considerations

Furthermore, there exists an inverse correlation between the efficacy of combating severe crimes and the necessity for stringent repressive or preventative measures against criminal activities. A static comparison also suggests that an escalation in the incidence rate of criminal activities should, in turn, enhance the need for intensified repressive and preventive measures to counter such criminal practices.

This model offers an opportunity for empirical validation to assess the optimal regulation for curbing and preventing criminal activities. Estimating equations (1) and (2) becomes imperative to derive the parameters $\gamma_1$, $\gamma_2$, $(1 - \omega)$, and $\beta$. Determining $H_2$ from equation (19) necessitates knowledge of the $\lambda$ and $\beta$ parameters, interlinked with equation (10), which denotes the loss function. If prioritizing crime prevention stands as the legislature’s foremost concern, assigning a relative weight of one to the criminal activity lag index in the loss function becomes plausible ($\lambda = 1$). The parameter $\beta$ signifies the intertemporal discount factor, accommodating values within the range of zero to 1.

Moreover, one potential measure to signify the contrast in crime rates is the variance between the crime rate and its established trend. Additionally, an intriguing methodology proposed by Goldstein et al. (2000) involves devising a comprehensive index encompassing various crime categories, serious criminal activities, as well as repressive and preventive measures against

References


Notes

Note 1. such as: piracy; violation of traffic laws; tampered invoices; graffiti; public urination; trash; tariff evasion; frauds; occupation of public parking lots by food trucks; addicts; drunks; trade by electoral vote, etc.

Note 2. The crimes shared by parliamentarians involve almost all types of offences. Most offenses involve crimes against public property, the financial and tax system and conspiracy (crimes against the person, vote buying, slander, etc.)

Note 3. the Associative Front of the Judiciary e do Public Federal Ministry, through a letter with the support of 40,000 professionals, opposes the Abuse of Authority Law that “affects and inhibits the power-duty to investigate, prosecute and prosecute perpetrators of crimes and civil and labor infractions”

Note 4. 1st quarter of 2012; in the three years 2014-2016: 2nd and 4th quarters of 2018; 3rd quarter of 2019; 2020. Real GDP growth rates were negative for these periods marked in the governments of Presidents Dilma, Temer and Bolsonaro.

Note 5. Concerning the injunction of Minister Dias Toffoli, in response to a request from Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, who interrupted (in July 2019) criminal investigations by the Public Ministry with information from the Federal Revenue Service, the Central Bank and the Federal Investigation Unit (formerly COAF).

Note 6. On 03/14/2021, more than a thousand members of the Public Federal Ministry (PFM) launched a manifesto in support of the work of the Operation “Lava-Jato “prosecutors and criticizing what they called “rhetorical improprieties” by two Supreme Court justices Federal

Note 8. Recently, the president of the republic repeals ordinances of the Logistics Command (COLOG No. 46, 60 and 61, of March 2020) which suspend tracking, identification and marking of weapons and minutiae in use by any individual.

Note 9. Comptroller General of the Union, Federal Government agency responsible for the defense of public assets, transparency and combating corruption.

Note 10. Piracy; violation of traffic laws; graffiti; public urination.

Note 11. Tax Evasion, Extortion, Subversion, Political and Judicial Corruption, Gratuities and Benign Corruption.

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