

Sense & Meaning: A Second Order Analysis of Language

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Abstract

What we know through language is whether the way things are or the ways the things are constructed through anthropological tradition and socio cultural shaping. Actually at the very outset, it is not very clear the settling point of this query. However, we can very well understand the point why a critical understanding of *Bio-semanticism* which is in some ways constructed and affected by the anthropological and socio cultural developments. What we are trying in this paper is to develop a notion of language psyche. What we mean by this term is the way a speaker is a communicator, who has a history belonging to a certain kind of anthropological character traits as well as socio cultural upbringing, having a certain kind of psychological mental states. The psychological mental states that naturally develop a linguistic psyche are actually *constructed*. Further when a speaker or a communicator performs a speech act s/he is having a *private linguistic affair* what we call linguistic experience. Language psyche and its natural outcome *linguistic experience* are the two very crucial concepts that need to be critically assessed.

Keywords: linguistic psyche, linguistic experience, communicative competence, logical form, form of life, form of language, language game, speech act

1. Introduction

The field of communication focuses on how people use message to generate meanings within and across various contexts, cultures, channels, and media. There are a number of definitions available but to incorporate the very sense of communication, we have to concentrate on the core of communication i.e. Code. Primarily, it is not the media, context or culture that has a direct significance but message and meaning play a significant role which is further moderated by the other three factors. In verbal communication, encoding is very much moderated by the context and culture, so initially, structural sense of the language is definitely required to have a better sense of encoding. Now the question arises that what are the structure and its subsequent components of a language? Most of language teaching modules identify the structural components i.e. Phonology, Morphology, Semantics & Pragmatics and not the other factors which virtually regulate the form of these components. The structural part is very much identified by the models and methods of language teaching or learning. But the other meta-structure parts (context, culture, background etc.) are generally overlooked when it comes to second language or foreign language teaching. We do have many instances where we witness that a native speaker of a particular language is preferred or is found to be a better choice for the position of Language Instructor. We need to understand what is actually missing in the teaching of a language that a non-native speaker, even if he has degrees, fails to be the first choice for the same position. Now, the teaching methodology as well as the materials developed so as to meet the demands of the meta-structural component. This is how an individual can turn out to be a competent speaker of the language in a real sense.

Schutz (1966) identified three unique interpersonal needs- affection, inclusion, control which further changed the nature of communication as goal-driven (Craig, 1986). The ultimate aim of communicative competence is definitely realized in terms of the rewarding return of the communicative action.

Initially, Spitzberg (1988) defined communication competence as "the ability to interact well with others" (p. 68). He explains, "the term 'well' refers to accuracy, clarity, comprehensibility, coherence, expertise, effectiveness and appropriateness" (p. 68). A much more complete operationalization is provided by Friedrich (1994) when he

suggests that communication competence is best understood as "a situational ability to set realistic and appropriate goals and to maximize their achievement by using knowledge of self, other, context, and communication theory to generate adaptive communication performances."

Canary and Cody (2000) provide six criteria for assessing competence which include, but are not limited to, perceived appropriateness and effectiveness. The criteria include adaptability, conversational involvement, conversational management, empathy, effectiveness, and appropriateness. Adaptability is the ability to change behaviors and goals to meet the needs of interaction. It is comprised of factors like social experience, social composure, social confirmation, appropriate disclosure and so on. Here we can see that an individual is expected to have followed these factors while participating in any exchange. These are definitely required as these are the qualities to be a competent speaker of a native language where an individual share the same social setting and the world view. In terms of second or foreign language learning, one is expected to develop first the world view and perception of the social setting of the native speaker community. The whole idea of an individual about the speech community is shaped by the native speaker like perception; their cultural background and experience of their social setting. The present paper has been arranged in the following order; 1. Introduction to the theme, 2. Discussion starts with a background and further explores Wittgenstein's view on Language (2.1). Here other competing approaches have also been discussed (2.1.1) with a discourse on how anthropology plays a significant role in language learning & teaching (2.2).

2. Discussion

Communicative Competence - the ability to comprehend and produce speech in real situations, in ways those are effective and appropriate in relation to the context (Hymes, 1972), is one of the models developed by applied linguists concerned with second language instruction or assessment. Strategic competence (Note 1) is a constituent in the several models of communicative competence (Bachman, 1990; Canale and Swain, 1980; Celce- Murcia et al., 1995). As we all argue that successful language learning is not only a matter of developing grammatical, sociolinguistic, and semantic competence but also strategic competence, which involves the use of communication strategies and their role in transmitting and comprehending messages successfully. Having the idea of holistic development of an individual with respect to the language learning, Wittgensteinian and the other relevant theoretical models become evident to discuss the formal approaches towards identifying the component along with its behavioral patterns. The objective of the paper will be to address the following issues;

- a) To critically analyze the structuration of language – do the existing structural categories encompass all the essentials of language form?
- b) Further to evaluate the implication of the suggested structure in language learning or teaching models.
- c) It will also try to assess the vital roles of other unacknowledged components to be given due consideration.

Reality of any sort is communicated across the culture and to the society by having recourse to a sense of language; the way language is understood as a system. Ordinary language school of philosophy (Later well established as Analytic School known as Vienna Circle) has analyzed the meaning in the ordinary uses of language in mundane life contexts. Philosophers made attempts to examine language from the different viewpoints, however, aimed to understand the nature of meaning, the relation of language and reality, cognition of language and most importantly the competent use of language. The philosophers explored the sense of language can be traced back to empiricist tradition where they linked the sense of language with the ideas or the mental contents. Words are the basic units of a sentence that makes a sense but the words being basic have a relation to what they refer to, we mean the thought of structure by which we get the sense and meaning. Although all words do not have meaning but most of words like proper names (so closely attached in the sense of reference and reality), natural kinds terms, indexicals, and definite descriptions by referring to a certain sense that is further connected with its logical standing in the ways names and objects are referred and related.

Reference theorists like Frege argued that propositional attitude consisting of referents create a sense of language because referents hold the truth functional values by which they represent the sense. By explaining the sense of language Frege connects structure of thought with the structure of language. This is what Frege calls the Mediated reference theory, i.e. the words having sense of language are composed of referents which mediate it with the structure of reality. However, Bertrand Russell, attempted to make the sense of language confined and precise, advanced the theory of logical atomism and logically proper names. In his view, language has to be precise like mathematics to explain the sense with certainty and without any ambiguity and obscurity. He construes the sense of language by explaining the two important linguistic philosophy concepts: Directly referred proper names, and 2) Definite descriptions. He argues proper names like Usain Bolt are directly sensible like indexicals say I, this, that, now etc... However, descriptions like the man who won three gold medals in racing in

Olympic 2012 are not directly referential like logical proper names. Such descriptions have no definite sense in their own but the way they are logically structured in a propositional sense and what these descriptions refer to is the logical representation of the entities or objects used in a language to make a certain sense. Russell made all attempts to make the sense of language logical, precise and certain. Emphasizing on the truth functional logical characters of language Frege and Russell in their descriptivism explained the sense of language aiming to meet the mathematical certainty in language.

Descriptivism holds the view that in a language when we use a proper name say Barak Obama and connect it with certain other objects and entities then the word Barak Obama carries out a unique description because Barak Obama is a unique name and referred to a unique fact, however, in different times for the same speaker or for the other speaker the description or the content of description may vary for instance, Barak Obama is U.S. President but for Michelle Obama her husband. So, description associated with proper names having definite referent makes a definite description. In other words, the meaning or sense of language underlying the definite descriptions has unique reference in the real world. This Descriptivist account of proper name theory has got an advantage in explain the semantic dynamics of language but a problem that arises in descriptivism or is associated with it is that the possibility of multiple descriptions and that proper names do not explain like semantic in a singular description.

However, in his Direct Reference Theory, Marcus argues contrary to descriptive theory of proper names that proper names are tags; they do not have any linguistic meaning. Proper names are not referred through a mediation of the descriptions they stand for but they stand directly to their bearers. Marcus by emphasizing the uniqueness of proper names separates them from their descriptions in the ways that descriptions are not unique they may change as afterwards Kripke argues from rigidity that proper names are rigid in their reference and meaning however, the description we attach to proper names they cannot be so definite in identifying the proper names. For instance, Barak Obama is a U.S. President, in this sentence 'Barak Obama' is a proper name and 'he is a U.S. President', is a factual description. Frege and Russell would argue from the view point of their descriptivism that both the proper name and description are unique and definite; however, Kripke would say that proper name Barak Obama, unlike to Marcus (Tag), is a rigid affixed reference, however, it is possible that facts associated with Barak Obama may change in other possible world say Obama is not president and Michelle is not his wife. From the view point of logical certainty Kripke is right as in fact, Obama is the president of USA and Michelle is his wife but if somebody asks a question to Obama that you had known beforehand that you will be a president of U.S. and Michelle will be your wife then may be jokingly he would say yes otherwise he must say no because states of affairs or the description could be otherwise and even Obama would logically accept it. One may counter argue to Kripke that if description can change in other possible world then why not the proper names but this objection would give birth to problem of infinite regress and we would never have any sense and meaning of language. We find Kripke's position quite interesting and plausible to the extent the logical certainty in terms of sense and meaning of language is concerned.

The above discussed traditions in the philosophy of language forwarded the Augustinian ostentation theory of meaning by developing reference theory of meaning and the proper names. Frege, Russell and Kripke kept circumspect by limiting the sense of language to logical standings of proper names and descriptions. However, moving ahead Austin defines the sense of language by explaining his seminal concept of speech act; locutionary, illocutionary and prelocutionary. In these three types of performative speech acts Austin tried to explain the utterances, emotions, expressions and their meaning in a language by attaching these linguistic expressions with performance and intentionality of a speaker. Searle moves further to take into account the background and intentionality in a much wider spectrum of a speaker's mental involvement in performing language.

Summarizing the arguments in explaining the structuration of language we can say the philosophers aimed to explain how language inhere the structure of thought and represent the meaning and reality as truth. For philosophers language has been a locus of meaning, and they began explaining by having recourse to different concepts and theories. Frege-Russell-Kripke though viewed language as locus of meaning but they confined the meaning to the certainty and left other uncertain language affairs (emotions, intentions) unexplained. However, Kripke's criticism was worthwhile in understanding the proper names and descriptivism. Indeed, thanks to Austin's speech act theory that he viewed language as not a matter of logical expression but a locus full of varieties of expressional attitudes. This is somewhat going beyond what Frege calls the propositional attitude and again it's going far away from mere logical referents and their standing in, what Russell calls, definite descriptions. Indeed credit goes to Searle's works in philosophy of language the way he researched on the ordinary language and examined the positions like Austin, P.F. Strawson, John Rawls, and H.P. Grice added very important aspects in capturing the sense of language, his seminal idea of background intentionality. In the

view of this back ground intentionality he not only takes into account the sense of language but also the intentional states of a speaker who makes the sense. This is really a significant contribution of Searle in understanding the comprehensiveness of the sense of language. We have intentionally not discussed Wittgenstein's position here in this section because we will analyze his philosophy of language and model in the coming section. In short we can categorize theories on language developed by philosophers as Theories based on mental content and ideas (cognition of language), Reference Theories (language and Reality, Frege, Russell, Kripke), Truth Functional theories (Pre Wittgenstein; Logic and Language; continental philosophy), Speech act theories and Use theories (the competent use of Language, Austin, Later Wittgenstein & Searle). In this paper we will further move to discuss Wittgenstein's model to explain the sense of language and how words refer to what they mean and how the structuration of language is constructed in the light of the criticism of Logo-centrism made by Derrida.

2.1 Wittgenstein: On Language

Maintaining the point that world is consisted of facts and languages of propositions, Wittgenstein endeavored and carried out a project to explain how language is intrinsically intertwined with the structure of reality. Keeping the purpose very clear as to what philosophy of language can offer in explaining that the language depicts the facts of the world. Wittgenstein through his analytical viewpoint explains that there is a parallelism between the language and reality. Revealing this parallelism, Wittgenstein argues that there exist facts on the very superficial level in the frame of word, while there are complex propositions at the very outer surface of language. Further he goes to analyze a parallel structure from surface to core and says that on the side of world when we penetrate the facts we find states of affair. However when we reduce complex prepositions we get elementary propositions. Going further, we find objects at the deeper later to this state of affair and names. In this sort of parallelism, Wittgenstein exhibits a kind of isomorphism in language and reality. What is central in his explanation is that there is one to one correspondence between language and reality in the manner defined above.

What is significant in his theory is that language has got a grammar that belongs to logical structure which is something in common with reality. Wittgenstein calls it *logical form* and argues that language pictures the reality by the virtue of *logical form*. What he means by the *logical form* is the logical structure that is something universal in a way that every language has to have the structure in order to project the reality. In other words, language may vary in other characteristics but when it comes to the basic or the core of language, it is the logical structure that is not changed in either context, be it reality or language. Now it is clear that a logical structure of reality is isomorphic in language and reality. With this kind of parallelism and isomorphism Wittgenstein delineates the theory of meaning and delimits it within the framework of logical structure. Simply summarizing wittgensteinian view in this regard, there is one set structure of both language and world. And the meaning of a word or exposition of a reality is packed within the structure. As a result if a word or a reality that does not underlie in the very structure it loses its meaning. In this way according to Wittgenstein there can be three types of logical structures referring to the language and reality. He explains these three logical forms by three types of statements or propositions;

1. The tautological proposition e. g. 'a cat is cat' or a bachelor is an unmarried man and
2. Contradictory proposition e.g. 'a cat is not cat'
3. Is what he calls the contingent propositions e. g. 'a cat is on the mat'.

Coming to the crucial point from the viewpoint of logical structure or logical form, Wittgenstein so neatly clarifies but tautological propositions in the virtue of their logical structures are always true in all possible worlds and its structure is $T.T = T$. While the logical structure of contradictory proposition is $T.F = F$ that means the proposition of having contradictory nature are forever false in all possible worlds. Interestingly Wittgenstein defines that the meaningful or sensical statements are those that belong to contingent proposition. They can be either true or false depending on the states of affair.

Exposing the limits of language in a very packed manner Wittgenstein through his structured construal of meaning maintains that a word is just a label for an object in this world wherein the word in a language corresponds to an object in a very precise manner i.e. *logically qualified*. What means to say logically qualified is that meaning of a word depends on its occurrence in this reality or its verifiability followed by its contingency in this world. In other words if something is meaningful then it is a part of this world. It happens to be in this world and it lies in the both limits of language and the limits of reality. Wittgenstein says that what is beyond that boundary. Actually it is not the phenomenal or it is not bound with spatial-temporal physical location. In other words what cannot be demonstrated by this or that in this world is something non-sensical or meaningless. Thus Wittgenstein is very certain and precise to this kind of universal grammar referring to the structure and theory of

meaning. However argues the nature of relevant facts and meaningful words are those of contingent nature. Reflecting on his philosophy of language one thing is quite significant i.e. his focus on the contingency of the meaningfulness. Here it seems as though Wittgenstein is diverting himself from the logo-centrism that focuses on the certain facts and ideal meaning. Summarizing Wittgenstein first phase of philosophy of language, we can put forward certain points first the whole project is to understand the philosophy of language in a manner that can solve the historical problems of philosophy which Wittgenstein himself understood as they arose due to misunderstanding of the theory of meaning in language. Second Wittgenstein tried to expose a kind of universal grammar of language in which meaning belongs to those facts which logically occurs in this real world. Third, he talked about certain structure of language and the reality keeping the relevance of facts and meanings of words in a contingent frame of reference. Finally his construal serves a kind of distraction from logocentrism that follows a kind of certitude and idealism about the reality of its meaning.

Losing out his enchantment from his own structured universal grammar or philosophy of language, Wittgenstein moves towards another way of understanding the meaningfulness of the language. In his second phase (*Philosophical Investigation*, hereafter, PI); he revises his thesis that he maintained in the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* (hereafter, TLP). In his PI we find rather mature understanding of language given by Wittgenstein. Finding the ostentation theory (Augustine) improper in order to understand the theory of meaning, he argues that though meaningfulness of a word indeed belongs to state of affair. But it is not always be a spatio-temporally fixed. What he means by spatio-temporal fixation of meaning is something always belonging to the reality that is existing in objective space are physical are bound with space and time. What contended Wittgenstein about the ostentation theory was the limiting nature of meaning which belongs to only objective reality. Wittgenstein neatly observes that language is not so restricted to its referral to the objectivity. Sometime the referendum could be private and subjective, and for which the ostentation theory fails to picture any meaning. Finding this limitation very obvious in language Wittgenstein says that there are possibilities of having many variety of language talks, for instance, public talk, private talk, talk of God, talk about ethics, talk of one's own feelings so and so forth, and the viewpoint TLP exposed which is derived through Augustinian Ostentation Theory is unable to offer a theory of meaning that can generate response to these varieties of talks. Wittgenstein argues that there has to be a structure of language but it has not to be constituted as though there is a single or universal structure or universal grammar to define the structure of language and theory of meaning. Further a structure is not to be always objectively specified structure. There is a possibility of a variety of structures of language. This is a shift from one structure to possibilities of many structures. Seemingly reflection that came in Wittgenstein's mind the way he turned his focus of language from logic to anthropology, sociology and culture.

Now, In PI he talks about rules of language. He categorically maintains that language is not a private affair. It is a rule governed activity. It's a collective social affair. Language affairs are customary in a way their rules are derived through customs of a society and customs are constructed in history through anthropological character traits and socio-cultural upbringing. Further he goes to define the theory of meaning by its use in a context of language. He says meaning is used and practiced and is context bound in nature. For instance, a man is father and God is father of all humans. The term father has been used in both sentences but its context differs as in the first sentence it has a social meaning and has religious meaning in the second. In PI there are several interesting concepts that clarify his philosophy of language and theory of meaning. One of those concepts is the *Language Game*. He says that language is like a game. And what is precise about all games is that they all have certain rules. In a similar fashion a variety of language generate a variety of language games where the meaning of language and the words is so specific to the context in which they are practiced or used. Wittgenstein calls it meaning by use. What is quite distinguishing fact in PI, Wittgenstein says the limits of language are not isomorphic with limits of thought and moreover, we should not go to examine a meaning of word with reference to its occurrence in real world. Rather, we should examine a reality in the very context of language. It is like reversing the order. Thus what is meaningful is not tested in the frame of reality but what is real has to be tested in the frame of language and precisely in the very context where it is practiced. The meaning thus not belong to frame of reality rather it belong to the frame of language or the context of language. Construing the theory of meaning in this manner, Wittgenstein defines language as game, it has certain rules and rules are specific to the context under the game is played. Similarly meaning is also depends on the various socio cultural context in which it is practiced. He talks about family resemblance (in a family all members have something in common features, body language etc.) and says the meaning though differs to various contexts; it has a kind of resemblance. The term father used above in different contexts have different meaning as in the case of man the term father refers to a kind of fatherhood that has biological and social meaning. However, when it is used in religious context it does not refer to biological or social meaning. It refers to those fatherly characteristics that we can meaningfully ascribed and understand with reference to God as father. Resembling features might be care,

concern and fulfillment of desires and responsibilities.

Most interestingly, in his denial of private language affairs Wittgenstein argues that there are many terms belonging to private life but they are not private in a manner they are constructed in history through anthropological developments and socio cultural. In doing so, Wittgenstein not only reject the ostentation theory of meaning but also cut off the private language argument. At the offset of whole discussion, we find three striking concepts namely; first, the variety of language talks and their Loci in the specific context, second, language game as rule governed activity and third is family resemblance. Wittgenstienian second phase reflects a king of paradigmatic shift from dissected logocentrism (contingency in meaning) to anthropological and socio-cultural pluralism. It seems that in PI Wittgenstein deconstruct his universal logical viewpoint of meaning in order to make room for anthropology, sociology and culture as different contexts to understand the meaning of language through various practices (moral, ethical, anthropological, social, cultural, religious etc.) in a very mature sense.

Finishing of the Wittgenstein's point of views on the reality and language, precisely, focused to figure out the theory of meaning at the end we come across his most interesting development in the way he has defined the theory of meaning from an anthropological and socio-cultural viewpoints. Wittgenstein argues for the notion of forms of life. What he simply means by the forms of life is the possible contexts where the language game takes place. Forms of life show a linguistic turn in the Wittgensteinian second phase. The linguistic turn what we are talking about is a sort of decentering the theory of meaning. Logo-centrism that focuses the meaning by a mode of hierarchy that approaches to center. However the idea of forms of life is reverse in order, in a way it belongs to peripheral not the core of language that is actually being practiced in socio cultural context. This is what we mean by the forms of life as pragmatic and peripheral aspects of meaning. What connects the meaning of a word in the context of language with the reality where actually its meaningfulness recognized is the form of life. For example, a child is learning some words of a language through socio cultural practices. Those practices belong to his forms of life. Some practices belong to the practices which he performs in family and some in the school and some other in society. However the meaning of the practices for the child does not directly come from any external source or it is not derived through a center (logical/metaphysical structure of meaning). It naturally occurs within the child as though there is a kind of isomorphism between the forms of life which a child lives and the speech acts which he/she performs in the forms of life. This pragmatic realization of meaning need not require any externalism or centrism for a language or speech acts to be performed in the context where language naturally being performed.

2.1.1 Linguistic Turn

The paradigmatic shift we just talked about in the above section where we defined how language and the theory of meaning are bound with forms of life and explained why we don't need to follow any logo-centric structure. Here from, it seems that the Wittgenstein's framework of understanding the language in the frame of forms of life is a paradigm shift from structural logo-centralism to pragmatic frame of language. The linguistic turn that Wittgenstein took in his second phase was further moved ahead and led in the direction of ex-centrism by Derrida. In his deconstructionist approach Derrida rejects the major trends of western philosophy that tried to encapsulate the theory of meaning by following the metaphysical logo-centrism. What is metaphysical in the logo-centrism is a kind of deductive model of understanding the meaning. In this model meaning is somewhat understood as though it is pre-existing to its occurrence; the contexts where it occurs, the forms of life in which it occurs. The meaning as pre-existing in its nature was *centered* to a kind of idealism. Idealism we are referring to is belonging to a certain or perfect understanding of the meaning. It can also be elaborated as in Fig. 1




Figure 1. (Singh & Mishra, 2012)

The logo-centrism in western philosophy was majorly proliferated and influenced by the platonic understanding of the meaning that reality as meaning exists prior to the word where we have only things partaking into the realities. Understanding the theory of meaning and language in this platonic framework give us a view where the ideal meaning is not in the very context where language occurs but it is pre-existing to the context wherefrom it has to take the sanctioning of the meaning. Derridian critic to this logo-centric understanding of language and meaning is contrary to our disposition of language in the fashion we criticize the constructionist approaches to understand/educate the English language. Now we will critically instigate the constructionist viewpoints from Derridian deconstructionist approach. Alongside we will provide an ethical scrutiny of the constructionists' thought in order to understand how neutralizing the constructionists' approaches through moral qualification. Language understanding and teaching can reach a level where education is a beautiful pursuit of developing the people. Moreover, the parallel two folded criticism aims to understand the natural feature of language as it develops in a person who performs a speech act. First of all, we address to the constructionism by referring to the feminist critic of language and theory of meaning.

In the Christianity we find a metaphysical scheme which defines the hierarchical order in which God is on the top and thereafter comes the man. In the ancient western philosophy, Protagoras maintains that man is the measurement of all things. In this scheme women are placed after and subordinated by men. In the very scheme it is much defined that the well-being of men, women are to be subordinated. A similar trend we find in one of the schools of Indian philosophy namely, *Sankhyadarshan*, where *Purush* refers to soul while *prakriti* refers to body. Soul is that liberates by materializing the *prakriti*. *Purush* is male character while *prakriti* is female. So we find both in Indian as well as western traditions how metaphysics has given a structure, a philosophy that has been followed in the development of language and literature.

2.2 Anthropology of Language

Tracing back the development of language in the history we find how this sort of presence of metaphysics has structured the anthropological character traits and socio-cultural scaffolding. We need to deconstruct this metaphysical logo centrism which maintains a hierarchical order in language and affected by the hierarchical order, the meaning is bifurcated in the shape of logical binarism. The meaning is being understood through logo centrism and logical binarism in a manner it has two different positions; the central and the margin. The central meaning that is up in the hierarchy and the marginal is at the bottom. For instance, the meaning attached to a male centric linguistic behavior occupies the center stage in the language and literature while the female centric linguistic behavior is given the marginal. How this logo centrism affected the meaning can be understood through the literatures that have been developed in different anthropological and socio-cultural communities across the whole world.

Now, we have to understand how religious literature gave importance to the patriarchal approach in its development through ancient to modern times in the history. The point here we would like to make is that the 'Silent Language' plays an important role in everyday communication. Without using the words people do interact. The concept of *time & space* vary from western exactness to eastern elusiveness (Hall 1959). It is not just people 'talk' to each other without the use of words, but there is a complex of behavior that is taken for granted. It operates outside our conscious awareness which has a direct implication on the words we use. In the following except, we can see the selective characteristic is not licensed by the structural feature of the language but the culture which has shaped an individual's worldview.

In English, when a man says, "It rained last night," there is no way of knowing how he arrived at the conclusion, or if he is even telling the truth, whereas a Hopi cannot talk about the rain at all without signifying the nature of his relatedness to the event – firsthand experience, inference, or hearsay. (Hall 1959, p. 87)

There is a vast body of literature available suggesting the cultural bases of communication. It is the medium used in the communication process after all participates in encoding the message which should be properly commanded with all the necessary information, which directly or indirectly, guides the form of communication. Now the structure alone cannot incorporate all the possible requirements to fulfill the desired outcome. It is the cultural training that reinforces and supplements the structural encoding.

3. Conclusion

In all the theoretical models available and the subsequent research carried out in the field of pragmatics indicates the gap created between ESL teaching and the difference in proficiency of the participants. The concept of native speaker and a continuous effort to achieve the near native proficiency in ESL learners points towards the problems either related to the delivery of the content or the quality of the materials designed. Wittgenstein (1953) was interested in the way in which the communities use language, and how far it can be taken. It is also

associated with P. F. Strawson (1957), Searle (1969), Brandom (1994), and others. The primary focus of most of the courses offered in language Skills are highly motivated by the structural components, at least in Indian educational programs (technical or non-technical) but not the other silent components of language which emerge out from the internal structure of socio cultural practices. Thus, from the view point of non-native speaker language performance is not supported through forms of life. Whereas in native speaker case, language performance does not require a support of forms of life because language performance occurs in a well experienced social setting. Therefore, the difference between forms of life and forms of language stands out only with reference to a non-native speaker.

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Note

Note 1. It refers to the individual's ability to use communication strategies such as paraphrase, circumlocution, literal translation, lexical approximation, and mime to get their message across and to compensate for a limited or imperfect knowledge of rules or the interference of such factors as fatigue, distraction, and inattention. (Rababah, Ghaleb Ahmed, 2002)