

Belief & Reliance: *Mythic Ground for an Honor-Dignity Binary*

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Abstract

A structuralist definition might well treat of religion in this way: *A system of myth incorporating explanations of reality that grounds normative metaphysical outlooks as well as affirming conduct in conformity with social integrity, and which is maintained as authoritative both because of and by means of sacrality.* This paper argues that myth directs the social weltanschauung with a stress variously upon honor and dignity. These two terms thus form a parent analytical binary supporting subsidiary cognate pairs termed “dimensions” that describe the means by which social institutions apply mythic content toward (on behalf of) honor or dignity.

It argues further that certain social structures express mythic-derived norms from *biosocial* substrates manifesting via drift potentials that in turn express as dimensional sub-traits of honor or dignity. This is what we refer to as a “belief-reliance system”. *Belief* in myth generates *reliance* in/upon the institutions translating myth into norms.

A sufficient understanding of these elements should enable a vastly improved understanding of local and international culture. The paper is divided between an explanation of core concepts and conclusions, the latter including applications of the concepts in the description of culture, as well as the use of the concepts to engage cultures in conflict resolution.

Keywords: typology, culture, configuration, shame-guilt binary, honor, dignity, belief-reliance, myth, biosocial

1. Introduction

It is widely held that myth, whatever else it may presuppose, certainly invokes (at a minimum) issues of individual and social exposures and other issues touching upon security, even honor and dishonor—in short, the ultimate fears and aspirations of a social group. The interpretations of myth organize the meaning demanded by a society for its preservation and sustenance. Myth is presumed by society to state or imply what “order” and “propriety” are or should be, and perhaps how they can and should be brought about and maintained. If these statements are valid, mythic interpretation suggests the value of institutions by which to effect what myth presupposes. The “belief-reliance system” is the foremost social institution responsible for translating myth into social norms. To examine this institution we rely on analytical “dimensions”.

Several dimensions—utilized as if parent binaries—have come and gone, two having been introduced by anthropologist Ruth Benedict (Apollonian-Dionysian, shame-guilt). (Note 1) Triandis (1995) currently leads a school of thought favoring the individualist-collectivist dimension. The use of the terms “honor” and “dignity” to designate configurations of cultural behavior and outlook is not new, and dates to the early 1970’s if not earlier. (Note 2)

Forerunners to the current actual typology were 1) the anthropological studies specifically of *honor* (Peristian, 1966; Herzfeld, 1980; Miller, 1993; 1997) and 2) the more recent inroads in legal theory specific to human *dignity* (U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; Meyer & Parent, 1992; Kretzmer & Klein, 2002). The first to apply them as a viable typology (as a parent binary) was Kamir (2002, 2006, 2015) and Herrman (2010a, 2010b & 2016). Given that Benedict and Mead neglected the role of myth, and Kamir the relevance of a “jural society”, our purpose will be as much to rectify conceptual shortcomings (Note 3) as to introduce a methodology capable of translating cultural theory into explanative and predictive exposés highlighting normative management of cultural conflict.

2. Belief and Reliance in a Biosocial Context

The formal basis for any belief-reliance system (BRS) is the body of custom and law serving as interlocutors

between mythic content and the dimensions characterizing honor-based (H-B) and dignity-based (D-B) moieties. For any given culture (community, nation, corporation, etc.) the BRS is comprised of the aggregate of paired relationships binding people to one another such that failure of any such relation constitutes a socially and/or legally recognized injury (colloquially, harm or impropriety).

It is a *pair* of relations because there must be 1) a relation of *belief* in something outside of oneself as well as 2) a relation binding the self in *reliance* to parameters in turn dependent on belief. Where reliance is premised entirely on *faith* (in a system of which offices are the constituents)—when, that is, *trust* in the reliable expectation of normative performance is lacking for any reason—we say it partakes of “adverse reliance” (Herrman, 2015, p. 4)—“lawfully undertaken risk of harm in reliance on those wielding power to promise and deliver upon (lawful) objectives.”




Figure 1. Primary dimensions

With respect to Figure 1, modified from Herrman (2016, p. 4), three dimensions (three cognate pairings) are considered “conventions” in the cultural context. Acquired worth is a convention of the honor cognate that expresses via two primary (1°) ornaments, *respect* and *trust*, which in turn enable the honor-based convention of status, in turn expressed through the secondary (2°) ornaments of *spirit* and *prerogative* which in turn depend upon the third H-B convention, participation. The like breakdown applies to the dignity cognate. The actual honor-dignity dimensions are *respect-acceptance*, *trust-faith*, *spirit-principle* and *prerogative -authority*, each pair reflecting honor and dignity respectively.

In somewhat greater detail: in the H-B system *merit* expresses and defines worth; in the D-B, worth (as “substance”) is itself the expression of dignity, worth being *inherent* and expressing outwardly in the form of dimensional cognates each expressing dignity. (Note 4) What we mean by “convention” is derived from Weber (1947, p. 127), namely, an order where deviations from expected behavior are met with disapproval.

In *respecting* belief as credible and *accepting* its reliance as reasonable, we likewise accept it as axiomatic that the believer is vouchsafed the secure reliance upon her lawful audience (Note 5) or avoidance regarding any reliance outcome, in turn implying mechanisms of redress in the event of breach. These are the principal factors by which any jural society (Note 6) procreates the fundamentals of a legal system.

Reagan (U.S. President 1981-89) once compared Americans to the ancient Romans, at which he was preternaturally correct. With far greater insight, and with extraordinary wit for a classicist, Balsdon (1970) conveys the truth via cultural anecdotes. Perhaps the most meaning is found by inserting “conservative” wherever you read “Roman”, and “liberal” where the text indicates “Greek”.

Romans complaisantly judged all other peoples by a single standard, their own exalted opinion of themselves....(162) Roman values were material values; their civilization was a material civilization. In the absence of comparable material wealth, the cultured Greek fell back on the traditional scale of Greek values, which were cultured and spiritual. (167) Even in Republican times, Roman writers were almost

pathologically fascinated by plotting the decline of Roman civic virtue....(177) The Greek states irritated [Rome], pretentiously claiming a part in world affairs which their strength and resources did not warrant; also they stupidly enjoyed baiting Roman commanders, making fools of them in public.... (33-34) A cynical Greek might have said in language more outspoken than Horace's that Rome conquered the East in order to be civilized. (172) [n.b. Each passage followed by its pagination]

That we can recognize ourselves in these remarks is ample evidence of the reliability and staying power inherent to an honor-dignity binary. With the sole exceptions of Rome and early England, the D-B are recent, as of the Enlightenment, with present numbers in the range of one billion, leaving us with an apt metaphor: the D-B are the mere tip of the cultural ice burg.

Shame and guilt, for example, speak to biology equally with social propriety. Trust and faith are likewise if less directly. Even honor and dignity share, at several steps removed, the biosocial; honor owing in part to the pride naturally a part of self-confidence, and dignity harkens back to the maternal bond where acceptance is as fundamental as inherent worth.

These dimensions and others reflect slowly evolving biological tendencies; they are also, therefore, the dimensions reflecting breaches of public rules or etiquette. Meet the "free rider" (Note 7) problematic (Hardin, 1968) with its experts disabusing us of respite from the so-called "tragedy of the commons"—finally relieved, a little, by a Nobel Prize to Elinor Ostrom, (Note 8) whose Nobel Lecture (2009) dealt with "Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems". Two excerpts spell out the gist (pagination follows each).

A core effort is developing a more general theory of individual choice that recognizes the central role of trust in coping with social dilemmas [at p. 409]. These individuals all face the same problem—the overdraft of a commonpool resource—but their behavior differs substantially when they meet monthly in a private water association, when they face each other in a courtroom, and when they go to the legislature and eventually to the citizens to sponsor a Special Replenishment District [at p. 413].

As a whole, the passage should leave little to casuistry, let alone imagination. Ostrom's example describes classic honor-based behavior: each setting is a cauldron forcing all-or-nothing results or at least provoking such extremities; people suddenly must defend, accuse, explain or relent. *Silence is cowardice* (the opposite of honorable). That's critical. If you speak face to face, the choice is to dissemble or not; to do the right thing for the right people or not (as in a "point of honor"). *Respect* and *trust*—or not. *Building* and *testing* respect and trust, or not (the cognates of acceptance and faith would be denounced as "womanish"). Where this process happens at various levels of authority and locale, the system is "polycentric".

Belief and reliance are presumed to reflect just such interactions within a biosocial environment. Ostrom's example also highlights relations between trust and faith and both with *tolerance* (cognate is "intolerance") (Note 9) Here the BRS relates to tolerance in two senses. In the first, the "belief" (B) aspect predominates:

1) tolerance replaces fear and/or loathing upon *exposure-laden* familiarity (a biosocial element), (Note 10) what also goes by the idea of "acceptance". (a top feature in any *D-B moiety*). One *believes* that what is ordinarily unsafe may for present circumstances be taken as, accepted as, safe.

2) in the sense of toleration for the presence of what would otherwise be shunned or discriminated against, "toleration" is permitted under the *H-B notion* of expedience, and frames much of what is denigrated as "political hypocrisy" or worse. One *believes* that the lesser of evils may serve one's purpose.

The *reliance* (R) relation likewise reflects trust in two senses: (Note 11)

1) reliance is allowed for on the condition that "trust" is extended as a "benefit of the doubt", a use we now prefer to call faith, as in Hebrews 11:1, faith as "belief in things unseen" (what is believed is *relied* upon). This is a principal tenet of the *D-B groups*, who in secular affairs modify views only upon evidence of infraction.

2) as in the Missouri state motto, "The show me state", trust is a precondition without which familiarity becomes doubtful where not impossible. In secular affairs this requirement is *profoundly H-B*. *Reliance*, short of being grounded in belief, requires evidence of trustworthiness.

In the first of the examples (above) we observe D-B influence in (B)-1 and (R)-1, with H-B predilections apparent in (B)-2 and (R)-2. Given that Ostrom's findings dictate an H-B perspective, how would a face-to-face interaction actually occur, and how would it reflect typological understanding? Table 1a is a partial answer to that question; a real life example follows (1b). Suppose we are D-B outsiders proposing something to an H-B in-group only to discover that we must earn that pleasure by first hearing grievances long nourished. (Note 12) The burden to show sincerity is on the outsiders to prove they can first listen to the in-group objections, and then

get a hearing for their idea, after which they will patiently await, then hear, the in-group decision. Jean-François Revel, of *How Democracies Perish* fame, authored a work in which he decried mendacity while offering up sincerity as a bulwark (1991, p. 19). Such insights are certainly germane here and are included in Table 1a below.

Table 1a. Patterns for a sample negotiation

Fields	Posture		Medium	Demonstration		Implied		
	Speak	Listen		Action	From text	Attribution	Expression	Attribution
In	X		Question	(R) - 2	Insincerity	Lack trust	Mendacity	“Show me”
Out	X		Equanimity	(R) - 1	Equanimity	Sincerity	Ben. doubt	Respect
In		X	Hear	(B) - 2	Equanimity	Tolerance	Trustworthy	Respect
Out		X	Acceptance	(B) - 1	Tolerance	Respect	Sincerity	Trustworthy

Note. N. B. The in-group question the out-group representatives in as if to attribute *insincerity* and *lack of trust* for the out-group, implying further attribution of *mendacity* replete with “*show me*” skepticism. (R) & (B) are as in text (above).

The next example (1b) comes from Mary Kingsley’s recounting of her West African travels (Birket, 1990; Kingsley, 2000, p. 99f.). At left are excerpts, and at right their translation into the designations from text format. Two statements bringing out the same point are combined (correlated to (R)-1); each of which is out-group directed at in-group. Note that both suggest a nonchalant self-respect, not quite off-putting, but sending a message of independence rather than weakness or obeisance (independence as being not dependent, = not weak). Kingsley, a woman, was not to be off-hand dismissed in a matriarchal society, so the in-group had to watch their step here. Kingsley was wily and well aware of her strengths and weaknesses.

Table 1b. Sample negotiation

“The inhabitants...came—a brown mass of humanity...Things did not look restful, nor were these Fans personally pleasant.”	Set-up	
“[Two of our number] held out their unembarrassed hands and shouted the name of the Fan they were friendly with....”	Out-group	(R) - 1
“The Fans stood still and talked angrily among themselves for some minutes.”	In-group	(R) - 2
“I strolled...to the line of angry faces [saying] “M’boloani” in an unconcerned way, although I well knew it was etiquette for them to salute first.”	Out-group	(R) - 1
“They grunted, but did not commit themselves further.” “They parted to allow a [man] to come forward.”	In-group	(B) - 2
“[Our main man] went for him with a rush...while he said in Fan, “Don’t you know me, my beloved Kiva?””	Out-group	(B) - 1
“And we breathed again...Peace having been proclaimed conversation became general.”		

3. Methodology (Note 13)

We call a “paradigmatic methodology” what others (Chambers et al., 2014) refer to as “hermeneutics”. We have no quarrel with the latter as a label except that here it is secondary to the method itself, which is structuralist, but which in its function takes on hermeneutic qualities. Our method is well within the range of the “scientific method”: It relies on thumbnail sketches of theory applied to analyses with the appropriate methodology, requiring that 1) only nature offer dependent variables; 2) the inductive “method” pertains, and 3) all conclusions and take-always are based on acceptable data as assured by normative experimental design.

Inductivism, says the *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, (Sklar, 2015, p. 820) is the view that “hypotheses can receive evidential support from their predictive success with respect to particular cases falling under them.” This relies on the doctrine of philosophical realism, which is the heart and soul of the methodology used here, a modification of the systems of Peirce (1931, 1955) and Whitehead (1929, 1978).

At root is a four-fold archetype which translates to our typology as follows: H-B, Cult of Honor (C-H), Cult of Dignity (C-D) and D-B. This sequence is also diachronic, indicating the chronology in the development or appearance of each component. Archetypes are re-expressed throughout a cascade of future events that collectively (e.g., via statistical evaluation of the dependent variables) assess the validity of the correlations when comparing archetypes with features of the analysand (culture) under review. (Note 14)

Beyond metaphysics, the methodology relies on the dimensions and the BRS to evaluate, explain and predict patterns of behavior. The advantages become apparent when compared with past and current alternatives in dimensional analysis. Among the most gifted and innovative of any American anthropologist was Ruth Benedict,

whose shame-guilt system ultimately failed the litmus test of academics as a parent binary, but which proved highly beneficial for other uses. (Note 15) She also reprised Nietzsche's (1967) Apollinian-Dionysian binary (his spelling [of Apollonian] for what he himself deemed a failure). But for purposes of methodology we can follow Benedict's application in order to illustrate our method's primary features. She employed (1934) the Apollinian as a parent cognate to label the Zuñi people, a Southwestern U.S. Pueblo tribe.

Each of the following excerpts is followed by the page numbers in the source work; following that, our examination. Excerpts and cognates are boldfaced.

"The Zuñi are a ceremonious people, a people who value sobriety and inoffensiveness above all other virtues." (59)

Benedict's point here was largely one of (unknowingly) contrasting their quiet mode with other groups' loud mode, contrasts that the superficial student sees clearly enough in Nietzsche's description of the binary. Other workers have noted the same dichotomy in societies and labeled them "hot" or "cold" (Lévi-Strauss, 1996, p. 29; de Ventós, 1980, p. 37f.; Lanier, 2000; Montesquieu, 1977, pp. 444-445). All had the same point to make, a valid one. Here are some adjectives quintessentially expressed by a Japanese (Maki, 2009) lay observer remarking on Americans:

- 大らか (おおらか ohraka) - big-hearted, magnanimous, not hung up on little details
- 大声 (おおごえ ohgoe) -loud - loud literally and loud as in opinionated
- 大げさ (おおげさ ohgesa) -exaggerated, exaggerates, over-dramatic.
- 大きい (おおきい ohkii) - big, both in height and weight

This is all well and fine but leaves us again with a common refrain: it applies to all people and societies but differently between them. For the H-B, quiet and loud are as **shame** to *aidōs*; for the D-B, loud corresponds to Greek hubris, quiet to Greek *agathos* (less status implications). (Note 16)

The reality of the ceremonial business is this, namely, the relevance to honor-based societies of **participation**. It takes soft (ceremonial) or hard (war) forms and serves as an ornament of the person's full measure of support—of obedience and conformity to convention.

However disconcerting it seems at first blush, even the innocuous dance fits the bill. Cowan (1990, p. 135), herself of Greek ancestry, reports: "By presenting themselves and the [dance] they have organized as oriented...to the collective good, those in charge attempt to control the process as social ordering and to suppress "illicit" manifestations of competition." More ideologically stated (Giddens, in Cowen, 1990, p. 134), "To analyze the ideological aspects of symbolic orders...is to examine how structures of signification are mobilized to legitimate the sectional interests of hegemonic groups."

"To our sense of what a governing body should be, they are without jurisdiction and without authority." (67)

It is a hallmark of honor-based societies that reverence be accorded to authority but power to those exhibiting executive functions (which are disapproved of). Not only is this valid for the vast majority of Amerindian societies but is the rule for H-B countries everywhere. Consider this title (Haley, 1991): *Authority Without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox*.

"Any man, however, who has not a mask borrows from those who have, at any time, freely and without a return gift." (70)

Marcel Mauss came out with the classic *The Gift* ([1950] 2002), to demonstrate the ubiquitous character of reciprocity, something similar to the Japanese "on" (obligation to owe back). (Note 17) Mary Douglas (2002, p. 19f.), herself no anthropological slouch, unwittingly announced her ignorance of the H-D binary in her forward to Mauss' book: "It is not merely that there are no free gifts in a particular place, Melanesia or Chicago, for instance; it is that the whole idea of a free gift is based on a misunderstanding. There should not be any free gifts." Benedict saw matters differently and Milton Freedman could not have stated the Douglas position any better. The notion of unrequited gifts is in fact well-known for a small minority H-B moieties, the "free gift" a hallmark of the D-B moiety. (Note 18)

"An individual acts in assuming ritual posts as he does in all other affairs of life, as a member of a group." (78)

Here again is a hallmark of the honor-based group as crisply distinguished from the dignity-based, at least as a good generality. Again, it goes to **participation** as an ornamental evidence of conformity, whence of **trust** **worthiness** and **respectability**, in contradistinction to the D-B stress on individuality. Note also that when

expressed this way the **group-centered** is obvious vis-à-vis the **person-centered**.

4. Discussion

Our object thus far has been to offer an overview of the honor-dignity binary while explicating the belief-reliance system in the context of a biosocial environment. It is worthwhile to extend this to include a discussion of the *differentiae* as between behavioral modalities and its manners, recalling as always that the BRS must presuppose a mythic ground. This section treats in some detail the dimensions of moral-ethical, trust-faith (with adjunct of acceptance-respect) and tolerance-intolerance (with optimism-pessimism as an adjunct).

For a side-door approach to the moral-ethical dimension we refer to Parsons, who is often better understood from secondary sources, at least when explaining him with short excerpts. Here is a helpful piece from Burger (1977, p. 321):

Parsons ... thinks that normative consensus founded on the feelings of solidarity and moral obligation is the ultimate basis, or main aspect, of the integration of society, whereas physical sanctions and calculations of self-interest are only secondary, although empirically never totally absent. (Note 19)

Honor-based societies view the spiritual and moral as normative in addressing the issue of “ought”. The dignity-based, on the other hand, apply principle and ethics to the same issues, and they see both with respect to individual motivations. Parson’s view exemplifies this dichotomy. As do most observers, he unwittingly sees only the H-B, and in noting the less prominent cognates fails to see that these are actually descriptive of the other major cognate system, that of dignity. It is the same error made by Mary Douglas above.

A discussion of solidarity and moral obligation is the surest reliable prefigurement to the jihadist psychology of the last section below. Here we show them as formative in the BRS. Solidarity comes from universal aspirations, they in turn taking content from spirituality and religious faith. *Moral* obligation, in contradistinction to matters of *ethics* (D-B) is globally actionable both within a locality as well as throughout the world of H-B peoples. As such, it meshes with universal solidarity of destiny and collective pride and greatness.

When faith is sufficiently important, law or custom assures its prominence, obviating any “separation” doctrine. Where theocracy is achieved the groundwork is laid for supreme nationalistic urges. Mythic values for the honor-based peoples of the world always lean on greatness, supernal origin, and moral universals that are rendered **in, as and through** the *law*—the H-B equivalent of the D-B “**of, by and for** the *people*”. Said a little differently, the H-B contingent sees morality as law and law as morality. The D-B folks see law as what relates principles to motivations with the individual’s perspective foremost in the application of ethics.

To be more specific with regards to law itself: the expression of the jural society (via people and their public law) versus the Monarch (via absolutist or peremptory law) is an ancient land mine. It distinguishes, for example, between natural law and legal positivism, respectively. For Muslims, Lewis (1966, p. 43) put it quite succinctly: “Muhammad...functioned for those who were truly converted, not by a conditional and consensual authority, grudgingly granted...and always revocable [of, by and for people], but by an absolute religious prerogative [in, as and through law].”

Another instance: “English laws are rather popular than peremptory, rather accepted than exacted.” This is from an early turn-of-the-seventeenth-century law book, at a time when King Charles entertained a very much more honor-based authoritarian notion (Wedgwood, 1955, p. 135). Note that popular law (of, by and for the people) is *accepted* (D-B ornament). Perhaps this is not coincidental.

All faith is ultimately grounded in some rationale, else there could not be reliance in something believed. Thus behavioral *differentiae* are necessarily married to any rationale distinguishing faith from trust. In **faith**, the rationale is inductive: from the occurrences and patterns attributed to inherency and order, we are more inclined to impute authority and its legal backing as reasonable sources of faith—barring evidence to the contrary. **Trust**, on the other hand, employs a deductive rationale; we accept a piece of evidence as an accurate witness to past or present character, along with the presumption that, other things being equal, it will manifest into the present or future respectively.

None of this is to say that H-B have no conception of dignity, for in fact dignity is the very backbone of honor. Likewise, we cannot ever suggest that the H-B is without the concept of acceptance. The distinction is every instance will reside in vantage and stress. Honor-based **acceptance** of anything is predicated upon a **respect** of what its referent depends upon; thus acceptance of family and especially of children is premised as much on the respect of the family role and status as it is on strictly bio-social grounds. (Note 20)

There exists an interesting relation of acceptance with exposure (introduced above at page 3), most clearly

evidenced in the old English “King’s Peace”. As the center of authority both for his kingdom and the Church, he could claim a twofold rationale for involving himself in the affairs of what would otherwise be private (either because local or religious [Wedgwood, 1955; Kantorowicz, 1985]). His “peace” defined the boundary between acts done privately and those done publicly, that is, in the King’s Peace (Downer, 1972, p. 117).

c. 13 Pleas which place a man in the king’s mercy

13, 1 The following place a man in the king’s mercy: breach of his peace which he gives to anyone by his own hand; contempt of his writs and anything which slanders injuriously his own person or his commands....

The violation of this Peace is an *exposure* for all involved. Crucially, however, the sovereign *accepts* the stewardship of public safety, whereby the public takes it on *faith* that he will carefully apply his prerogatives. One’s respect of the sovereign’s presence and person was grounded on a prior *acceptance* of the concepts of his Peace, meaning in particular the expectation of *trust* that went along with reliable (because centralized) courts of law at the head of which stood the king. Again, *faith in system, trust in specific performance*.

Schopenhauer’s (1906, p. 41) memorable turn of phrase, “*veritas aeterna...an unconditioned validity before, outside of, and above the world,*” (Note 21) speaks volumes. It is faith that grounds and backs acceptance, and it is trust that backs respect. For H-B and D-B alike, *trust is expressed through thought and deed as a witness to widely accepted authority having proven reliability (via its law)*. Further, what the H-B refer in “trust from perceived supernal reliability”, the D-B refer to “faith in systems of empirical data” comprising our phenomenal world.

Perhaps all this word-splitting seems just so much casuistry. To help illustrate otherwise, here is an example (Arvanitakis, 2010, p. 10) of what regularly occurs in practice. It comes from his summary of British sociologist Anthony Giddens “structurism” in the latter’s *The Consequences of Modernity*:

Trust here [H-B] is vested in abstract capacities (or [reliable supernal] systems) rather than individuals. For example, when we use monetary tokens, we do so on the presumption that people will honour their *value*. We have faith [D-B] in the architect *system* that designs building. For the system, it is a public confidence in the government or faith that the house I am sitting in will not collapse [my emphasis].

The issue for us is not whether trust relates to what is abstract or not. If it *is* abstract, such as in a system in which we posit authority acting under law, *we still choose trust based on the regularly observed expectations of that system*, appreciating that the trust reposes not in the system but in the consistently correct application to individual events by individual people. Having *faith* in the system, however, assuredly predisposes to trust in otherwise unknown data.

John Calvin approached the matter in roughly the same way; though he phrased the argument differently than we might have, nonetheless there is good reason to believe that he clearly understood, and tried to express, the distinctions we should hold between faith and trust. Calvin (1992, p. 28) gives every appearance of wanting the believer to allow for the knowledge of a certain sort as being adequate to justify *trust*, whereat faith (in god, heaven, system, etc.) becomes more reasonable into the bargain. “Faith rests not on ignorance, but on knowledge...not only of God but of the divine will.” (Note 22)

Doctrinally, this amounts to saying that we must place *faith* in the Lord’s Grace, by which we may better *trust* the coming of our personal salvation and the fruits of “acceptance”. Stated this way it is easy to see that we and Calvin are on the same page. And note that word *acceptance*. It means that we have *inherent worthiness* to become, merely for the asking, a member of the *office* (which is really what *Christos* signifies). (Note 23) Christianity is thus the world’s first scaled dignity-based religion, for with such worthiness we need no intermediary to receive the office or the salvation or anything else. That inherent worth of each human being is as dignity-based as it gets.

If one can trust that the experience of God is real and valid; if, as mentioned several times in Proverbs, “fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom”, then the *experience* (read *exposure*) of that fear is alone a basis for sufficient “trust” that may in turn defend faith as rational. “Calvin is trying to guard against the error that the knowledge of God can be abstract, that faith is possible without knowledge... (Hesselink, op. cit., 152).” Where we have rational faith in a consistent system, trust is easier at the level of individual phenomenal reaction to reality. *Trust and faith are two sides of a rational coin looking to win the coin toss as against the irrational*.

The dignity-based moiety is widely recognized for its stress on tolerance and optimism. These occupy center stage because they recapitulate the criteria by which one freely, of one’s own choice and will, freely pursues her dreams. Voltaire (2004) is, of course, the figure we turn to on such matters, but he is hardly the only

Enlightenment figure we can learn from.

Kant lived at a time when women were still looked upon as somehow inferior, and the masses were referred to as the “herd”, or as “mean” (one of our own Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton, was not above using the same language). (Note 24) Kant became one of few (with not insignificant prompting from a friend) to ultimately realize the devastation of such views. More transparent and honest than any politician then or since, he calmly reported this (in Cassirer, 1979, p. 58):

There was a time when I believed that all this [philosophical work] could effect the glory of humanity and I despised the mob, which knows nothing. Rousseau has set me right. This deluded superiority is disappearing; I am learning to respect human beings, and would find myself more useless than the common worker if I did not believe that this observation is able to give a value to all others in establishing the rights of humanity.

To be optimistic and tolerant, a society must presuppose reliance upon the acceptance of its estimate of the individual. Most societies are honor-based, however, and expect of the citizen/subject a respect for group authority, social order and hence conformity. They are too often found living their day to day existence attempting to *command* the respect of others, knowing that it is a game of give and take, but a game nonetheless to be followed according to Hoyle.

Honor-based groups employ memberships, initiations and marks of prowess and manhood to assure that social values are upheld. In each instance the reliance is strictly upon the elements of respectability, notably of status—how it is earned and kept. It has justifiably been said by wags and scholars alike that civilization is carried on the back of morals displacing earlier crudities of our inner nature. As Bergson (1963, p. 281) with perspicuity remarked, the democratic society of the Western nations is “the furthest removed from nature.” In short, inherent worth is far more important to us as the myth it actually is, for from it we find a faith that can influence the disposition to trust the unobvious concrete existence among us.

5. In Context

We now venture a full cultural overview, from the honor-based vantage, using the notes of a highly regarded anthropologist who happened also to be an expert in psychological assessment. The following are excerpts from two of Anthony F. C. Wallace’s reports (1951, p. 555ff.; 1952, p. 86ff.) on the Tuscarora Indians (of the Iroquois Federation). Where I include additional remarks, they will follow the excerpts or paraphrases in boldface:

Indifference to time or punctuality (Symposium, at p. 68). Recall also the Mexican siesta, and its variants. In many instances this can become “vicarious control”, an aspect of demanding respect. In other cases it is a socially approved method of enforcing temperance—when you expect folks to saunter in at all hours, you lose the intemperance that often accompanies the demand for punctuality.

Lack of concern over property (Symposium, at p. 68). Wealth, however measured, will, when obvious and great, suggest that one is permitting himself to appear more respectable than others by means not normally associated with true esteem and honor. Either this person will be “brought down” or the society has built-in mechanisms to enable him to reduce his wealth without loss of status: “The potlatch [is] a competitive display...culminating even in the destruction of highly valued property in order to achieve the maximum social effect” (Notes: 172).

Lack of concern with money earned or savings (Symposium, at p. 68). Again, whether in “quiet” or “loud” societies, the premium is generally on keeping a low profile unless expected to do otherwise. The Japanese have a saying: “Hammer down the nail sticking up.” Further, ostentation will frequently appear confrontational as suggesting parity with those of higher status like a chief or shaman.

Indiscriminant use of money (Symposium, at p. 69). Numbers (4), (5) and (6) deal with the motive behind wealth, and the attitudes towards acquired wealth. In each case there exists a moral issue attached to wealth creation and maintenance: compare the possible motive in light of the Potlatch.

Tendency to leaves things incomplete or unrepaired (Symposium, p. 69). Disapproval of striving, whether for money or other symbols of “success”: “An Iroquois Horatio Alger hero would find it harder sledding after he succeeded than before” (Symposium, at p. 69). This has also been said of the Russians (Miller, 1961, p. 90), and generally of severe bipolars (Da Vinci, for one; see Noto, 2013). In sum, with success comes the responsibility to continue meriting esteem and the honor bestowed.

Craving, in the sense of “demanding-ness” (Symposium, at p. 70, 71). Another vicarious way of enjoining respect from others, but without seeming to be arrogant.

Translating potential shame into accusations intended to inspire guilt and thus a backing down from the charge of shameful conduct (Symposium, at p. 71). This is likewise the technique of the legendary “Hungarian Liar”—and, having personally had acquaintance with one such, I can also personally vouch for its truth.

A “state of vengefulness” (Quoting Fenichel, Symposium, p. 74). The point is that quarrels, especially in small societies lacking third-party mediation—and occasionally despite it where it exists—tend to be private affairs settled by means appropriate to this emotion (Monograph, at p. 87). If the matter is serious and agreements are not reached, it will not be uncommon for one of the parties to the dispute to leave the group or commit suicide (Monograph, at p. 89).

A not infrequent evidence of “strangled emotional development” (Monograph, at p. 72, 73). This is a touchy area where a great deal more research needs to be done. Nonetheless I am firm in saying this much, even without citing such-and-so articles: when children are brought up “raising themselves”, as it were, both at home and in the community, and when parents encourage manliness and expect a level of performance in subtle but very effective ways—which is a reasonable generality for honor-based groups—the male children will, absent added social forces to the contrary, develop an insecurity which shows up in everything from possible over-competitiveness to whining, aggressiveness, and more. Consider this title from Gulik, 1976, p. 137): *The Ethos of Insecurity in Middle Eastern Culture*.

“Decisions on group action are expected to be unanimous; when there is no agreement, there is no mechanism for corporate action” (Monograph, at p. 87). The more “primitive” one goes, the honor-based notions are more and more associated with direct democracy. It should not, however, be thought that they view the matter of speaking their mind as do we. Their votes are public, and everyone compares their understanding of the voter with reference to the vote. The odd man out may well pay a steep price for this down the road. Modern civil law splits the difference, private voting but unanimity of decision (Merryman, 1985, p. 121).

Quarrelsomeness, upon investigation, tends to be endemic (Monograph, at p. 33). Any social cleavage, intra- or extra-familial, can be the occasion. The mere fact of being brothers or cousins need not qualify as better than a poor excuse.

“The symbolic world...is the world of fantasy and ritual; and it is in this symbolic world that many of the emotions, which are so meagerly expressed by the Indian when he is in the clearing among other people, can find vent” (Monograph, at p. 34). “Meagerness of emotional expression” is not a specifically honor-based characteristic; rather, the dependence on symbolism to express relevant issues definitely is an honor-based phenomenon relative to dignity-based groups. Research indicates as well that in language there is more symbolism employed, meaning that the expression transcends religion and ritual.

Touchiness is common, has varied causes and is handled in various ways (Monograph, at p. 35). This is perhaps the single most commonly observed trait by Western dignity-based people after living among honor-based folk. It is a naturally occurring product of respect-mongering in connection with rearing techniques. Here is an example from Eric Hoffer (1951, p. 143) “The majority of the Palestinian Jews...are thin-skinned to a fault....”

There you have it, characteristics which, together, should give you a reasonable idea of the “type” we have in mind. I will not put you through a similar exercise for the dignity-based. Suffice it to say that your own experience should guide you with the assistance of a tip or two: first, expect the dignity-based characteristics to be either the opposite of the honor-based, or whatever it is that the honor-based is not; second, place these within the context of our great myths—look to the “Pledge of Allegiance”, the Declaration of Independence and Preamble, the Bill of Rights, and so on. I believe you will discover that there is a definable dignity-based “type” not only of societies but of individuals, yourself not excepted.

Jefferson was lucky to escape academic silos, being taught the old fashioned way, at the knees of a worthy practitioner. In the following excerpts Jefferson relies on his own lights and illumines marvelously.

Jefferson’s typology (1955, p. 387) of North and South, to Chastellux

NORTH: Cool, Sober, Laborious, Persevering, Independent [in freedom], Jealous of their own liberties, and just to those of others; interested [accepting of one another’s dignity], Chicaning [recall all business/finance is H-B], Superstitious and hypocritical in their religion [as with the Romans]

SOUTH: Fiery [thin-skinned and impulsive], Voluptuary, Indolent [except to insults to their culture], Unsteady [uneven temper], Independent [fear of dependence], Zealous for their own liberties, but trampling on those of others], Generous [magnanimous, as was Jefferson himself, a Virginian Southerner], Candid [unaffected, plainspoken], Without attachment or pretensions to any religion but that of the heart.

No H-B person would be found dead “airing dirty laundry”. Yet it is a mark of pride to the D-B insofar as it reflects honestly on a desire for transparency and honesty. The next portrayal (Kokoye, 2009) is from a dignity-tending member of an H-B society.

The following “15 Things I Hate about My Culture”

- 1). Bride price—kinda like buying a spouse.
- 2). When you get a public position, churches, communities, schools etc. start inviting you for functions and expect donations—even when they know you really cannot afford it.
- 3). You are not allowed to disagree or argue with your elder / lecturer even when you both know the elder is wrong.
- 4). You must honor a party invitation and pay for the “uniform” or else you’ll have a lifetime enemy.
- 5). You cannot call out a family member who is doing wrong—you’ll be called a bastard.
- 6). When visiting, you have to take gifts to your hosts even if you cannot afford it—or you will be called stingy.
- 7). When you are the host, you have to give a parting gift (mostly cash) to your visitor—or you will be called stingy.
- 8). Spraying at parties [Custom in which money is thrown at or folded in the clothes of a celebrant, e.g., a bride.]
- 9). You cannot rejoice publicly for a well deserved accomplishment—some people will hate you for it.
- 10). The man must be the breadwinner. When people / family members realize the wife makes more money, rumors start flying.
- 11). The husband does not have to help in cleaning the house or cooking.
- 12). A woman has to suspend her life for 40 days or more when she loses her husband.
- 13). You cannot go home until after your boss has left work—it’s not like you are getting paid for the overtime. BANKS!
- 14). You have to eat some wacky nasty after child birth—oro ile.
- 15). You cannot complain about an uncompleted project because it is been handled by someone who once helped your grandfather—I’m sure this is some of what our president is going through.

6. Terrorism and Jihadism (See References for Other International Conflicts)

Some thought they had found a basis for dialogue: “Such cross-cultural contact, they believed, would necessarily result in greater reflexivity regarding the cultural roots of U.S. psychology. But this promise has not been fulfilled” (Chambers et al., 2014, p. 645). It is apparent that the West has increasingly isolated itself from cultural awareness, whether of ourselves at home or others abroad. Huntington (1993, 1996), speaking from a geopolitical vantage, clearly saw culture as the backdrop for the hotbeds and fault-lines, whence the “Clash of Civilizations” verbiage. His fundamental thesis was and remains correct, but not for the reasons he supposed. Culture theory holds out higher and better promises for it also accounts for those problems in terms of mechanisms that can heal as well as sow discord. But in the meantime...

We have, for example, largely lost the use of the word “honor” with two exceptions: certain awards (few at that: “honor roll”, “honor society”, “honors classes”, “honoraria” and “honorable mention”), second, either of those whose careers of protecting us are lost in the line of duty, or those whose good deeds are lost to fate for having saved others. Honor does not benefit from any synonyms pervading and structuring our language such as dignity now does (acceptance, faith, inherent worth, justice, due process) with the present methodology. One of those words was shame, another word we have lost to the winds but for occurrences of flagrante delicto, and then only with special circumstances attached. Nowadays, if shame ever there was, its cause has rarely if ever been punished (Alexis & Pressman, 2010). As with laws, words not used are typically words not thought useful. (Note 25)

It doesn’t take a genius to divine that we are now more than ever isolated from peoples for whom these lost words represent the very pride of their existence—or bane. To glean a sense of the problem if not the magnitude, consider Laslett (1965, p. 121): “It takes a complete transformation of attitude to recognize what a death-rate might be...only a handful of people ever developed anything like that attitude in the world we have lost.... Or, closer to the subject, Adkins (1960, pp. 2-3) “That there should exist a society so different from our own as to render impossible to translate “duty”...into its ethical terminology at all...is, despite the evidence, a very difficult idea to accept.” He wrote the book to illustrate that exception, the honor-based ancient Greek society of

Homeric times.

It isn't difficult to get some synonyms for honor (Note 26). One with 33 examples failed to mention the most sentient and useful by far, one that even so-called experts would not likely mention: status. One reason for that is that honor-based people do not see status as do we. They have it as a synonym for honor. One reason is that honor comes via merit, esteem, respect and status, in roughly that order. Honor does not go to those recognized as of low status unless their merit can erase that deficit. What we call "status incongruity" is not an issue because status it is too important to be vague, much like the honor that follows from it.

In the rare instance when we might use honor and status in a single sentence, the reverse holds: status comes from honor, meaning that we see honor as the H-B see esteem. Context does play an important role, however. All honor-based people have the "status" to merit food, and other necessities. We live in a world where our basic respectability hinges on working a job. The H-B are more serious about jobs than we, but the jobs add nothing to the status just introduced. But such status would be seriously degraded were one to refuse to work without sufficient reason.

In the most "classic" of H-B societies the same word, or similar words, could be used to denote both honor and dignity. Note that these were the "loud", not the "quiet" societies. Thus Hebrew has the exact same word for both (Kamir (Note 27), 2006: 2002). Dignity refers to "backbone", strength of mind, deportment, and the like. Honor confirms status gained through dignity. The English treated the words "dignity" and "office" as synonyms for much the same reason. It is very possibly a reason why "dignity" appears in none of our founding documents as a basis for legal issues. The people we fought had sold, thus tarnished, their offices giving dignity a foul odor.

Ideally, the office carried the status; the dignity filled the office and honor applied to both. Greek ostracism punished the one who tarnished his dignity, lost the honor, whence the office and was banished. In one act of voting on a shard, honor and dignity (owing to the status of the office bestowed whether he liked it or not) were thus married if they hadn't been long before.

Many Mediterranean nations are Muslim. Honor is inherent to the extent that any man can hang a shingle as an Imam. Umma is the body politic, the community of the faithful. While all traditional H-B groups are democratic in theory, the Muslim Umma is so in fact. Status and dignity rise as followers accrue. Since religion is inherently good, preaching right religion is meritorious and brings esteem and followers, bringing dignity and status in tow, which magnifies the effect—and the resultant honor. I know of nothing in any modern democracy to rival this level of democracy in so important an activity. Why on earth are we fighting one another?

The Near East has a deserved reputation for being the most honor-based group of countries in the world (Crook, 2009, p. 591), at least of those that retain the pretense to a place on the world stage. In these societies we see at its height precisely what it is that we have lost the words to comprehend. Were we to understand what they have gone through and in particular the way they have gone through it, we would be able to help them rather than ignore or kill them—before they reached the point of killing us. That chance evidently was lost some time ago. But understanding can always repair old wounds, and it is high time we got on with the program. One does not change people, one makes people amenable, through persuasion and inducement, to behave less that way, more of this way. Here is what we really must grapple with—

Devoted actors of the global jihadi archipelago militate within such a novel transcultural niche, which is socially tight, ideationally narrow, and globe spanning. Nevertheless, its evolutionary maintenance depends on costly commitments to transcendental values, rituals and sacrifices, and parochial altruism, which may have deep roots even in the earliest and most traditional human societies.

This is from the latest (Atran, Supplement 13, 2016) issue of *Current Anthropology*. Atran is head of a consortium of sociologists who have arrived at a framework they call "The Devoted Actor". Apart from sounding suitably "sociological", it sounds superficially like a reprise of a very old popular classic, *The True Believer* (Hoffer, 1951). I frankly do not know how to improve on this:

It is part of the formidableness of a genuine mass movement that the self-sacrifice it promotes includes also a sacrifice of some of the moral sense which cramps and restrains our nature. "Our zeal works wonders when it seconds our propensity to hatred, cruelty, ambition, avarice, detraction, rebellion."

Hoffer was quoting Montaigne. (Note 28) So none of this is precisely the brainchild of twenty-first century academics. If fanaticism is anything, it is an infatuation with self-justified superiority, coupled with a self-satisfied willfulness far exceeding the norm, far exceeding expectations, but which will be graciously rewarded by some object of veneration.

Our country is poor; the West bathes us in contempt after suckering us to their products and horrific culture

of spiritless materialism. We were once great, yet one must be blind to the world not to see that Westerners have lost any sense of history, and possesses no couth whatsoever. As honor-based folk we live history and retain long memories; we respect to the skies the obligation to work and provide; but today what jobs are available are spoiled, ruined for lack of any pride translating to a life worthy of our past and our values.

As a “loud” honor-based culture we have the right to lower those who contemn us; a right to speak force to arrogant words; a right to deny loyalty to those of our brothers who recognize the great Satan and refuse in addition to care for their own flocks. We rebel against them; at length their intransigence compels resort to the ultimate source, the “nuclear” option, figurative today but tomorrow hopefully real. As honor-based folk we use whatever works and do whatever scarifies; queasiness on the other side only wets our appetite. They deserve to suffer.

Avenging wrongs is sweet indeed. Life can become an impending suicide where we can live calmly; carefree in breathing our glorious religion, we worship identification with the eternal bliss to which we mystically unite upon accomplishing our mission.

Cardinal Wolsey can be allowed a brief cameo appearance, with a biographer’s apt remark (Ferguson, 1958, p. 496):

Grieved though he was by the King’s hounding him on his deathbed for the last remnant of his borrowed wealth... Wolsey accepted rejection. His fatal illness gave him a kind of franchise and privilege he could not enjoy in good health. If his hours were numbered, it did not greatly matter what the king thought or sought; there might even be a grim and malicious justification in holding out against Henry’s last request.

The last words...

“We are respected in this by the one figure who counts the most, Allah himself. Carefree while we meticulously plot, we declare jihad. Because we are an honor-based communitarian society, we are all in it together; we are brothers to a fault. We take pride and glory in one another, for nothing can deter us. We are not afraid to die. In that is our reward of self-respect, something the weakling Westerners have far too little of. Being so weak with so large a military truly shows what they are made of.”

Here, then, as lessons considered available from the text and from those experiences that give life to words, the following are the recommendations we deem appropriate for this brand of discontent.

- 1). One doesn’t argue with militants as described above
- 2). One generates dialogue and offers to demonstrate a worthiness to be an honest broker, which cannot be done except by placing strictures of some sort on Israel. Do not be so timid about approaching former President Carter’s (2007, 2009) written work on the topic. A relatively painless and all but innocuous way to prove our mettle is to work with Israel to eliminate her own war-level nuclear capability. Much of Iran’s ground is to cut a figure in the region, and Israel’s nuclear stockpile abruptly obviates that ideal. This is not a case of “we are right” and “they are wrong”. It is the case that we have had stewardship responsibilities in that arena that we have failed to live up to. Israel gave up on her stewardship quite early in the going.
- 3). The one sect (Shia) is so often at the mercy of the other (Sunni) especially in the Near and Middle East. We of all nations could understand why this is a problem were we merely to remove our fashionista blinders. We are supposed to be for, not against, democracy; against, not for, majority tyranny against minorities. What on earth is our chip that our shoulders ask for still more?
- 4). Yes, they act sometimes like adult brats. Welcome to the H-B world. That is no excuse not to work with them and earn their respect. Giving in to tough-guy venting is not more mature than tenfold their (H-B) posturing or the fanatics of their militant minorities. We are the ones who should be ashamed for not only not setting the proper example but for wantonly denying need of it.
- 5). None of this is Pollyannaish; none of this is pie in the sky; none of this is proposed with eyes closed to the realities that we know far better even than some of our august politicians. One comes to the table with a strong, just and fair hand in dealing with objectionable honor-based folks. We come with knowledge of their culture; above all, we don’t berate them or leave them to suffer when under our suzerainty.
- 6). One demonstrates mettle for working in the world community by outwardly acknowledging the need for changes at the U. N. The world bullies are not supposed to be on the Security Council except as provisional members. Let the General assembly vote up or down the rational amendments and place all member-states on a contribution ledger than is agreed to by each in turn. That means, for the time being, China, Russia and the U. S. have some introspecting to do. Arguments to the contrary are nonsense because presupposing a

might-makes-right attitude toward world affairs. Generate a resolution to reorganize the Near East on the basis that it has suffered a long war and an armistice resolution is called for.

These are the ways we ensure our credibility and prove ourselves the honest broker we were always intended to be. These are the ways by which one leads large coalitions to handle the hard jobs. We bring to the table the carrot-stick approach which is more than usually the way at first to handle the honor-based contingents. After that their respect allows us the luxury of sleeping with our camp doors open. That is the test of diplomatic intelligence. The Romans failed it. They failed.

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Notes

Note 1. In *Patterns of Culture* (1934) she reprised Friedrich Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* (1967) in which his *Appolinian-Dionysian* binary (his spelling) arrived stillborn: realizing that his Dionysic idea could not, should not, presuppose faithful reflection of the full character of a referent (Wagner's anti-Semitism struck Nietzsche to the core) resulted in a maudlin preface to the second edition where he disavowed the entire project. Yet he never gave up; in a few aphorisms (*The Gay Science*, 1974) he actually saw through his earlier error. In 1946 Benedict formally introduced the shame-guilt binary in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946), later elaborated with the help of Margaret Mead (1937).

Note 2. Peter Berger *et al.* employed these terms in *The Homeless Mind* and elsewhere but never to designate a typology, let alone a methodology. Said Kamir (2006, p. 205), "Based on this distinction, he defines honor cultures as pre-modern, and cultures based on human dignity as modern ones (183, p. 177). Philosopher Charles Taylor similarly perceives cultures based on human dignity as more modern in spirit than honor cultures. He argues that: "With the move from honor to dignity has come a politics of universalism, emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens and the content of this politics has been the equalization of rights and entitlements" (1994, p. 37)." Viewing both honor and dignity as at once relevant and also inextricably intertwined within social units (and individuals, be it noted), theirs was a unique contribution for which they were never accorded adequate recognition.

Note 3. The work of Benedict and Mead was torpedoed mainly on methodological grounds but no doubt also political correctness weighed heavily (how can we publish what offends whole cultures?). It also received harsh criticism from well-regarded scholars, especially the classicist Douglas Cairns (1993, p. 46): "I feel there is little to be gained by the continued application of the shame-culture versus guilt-culture antithesis, and would prefer to see it abandoned...." His pride of scholarship swallowed whole his sense of perspective and sound methodology, to say nothing of the heuristic vacuum that would be, and was, left behind. But see also Dodds (1973, Chs. 1-2) who was profoundly impressed at the thesis and used it to great effect.

Note 4. I use "ornament" in much the manner as Herbert Read, *Art & Industry* (Indiana U. Press, 1961), esp. Part 3. Rules: "ornament should emphasize form," and "appropriate ornament arises naturally and inevitably from the

physical nature of a material and the process of working that material.” Ornament in a behavioral context is a reasonably direct metaphor.

Note 5. “Adience—an urge to accept or approach a situation or an object.” (*vocabulary.com*—the antonym is “abience”). According to Edwin B. Holt, the philosopher who put the word on the map (1931), he got it from another professor, one H. C. Warren (Holt, 1935, p. 184). Charles Valentine (1963), in what should have been an article serving as a rude wake-up call for psychiatric (regular and forensic) nosology, cited Holt’s avoidance-adience binary in reviewing the Lakalai tribe in the journal *Ethnography*. Valentine’s article examines “loud” v. “quiet” H-B sub-culture(s)—not a D-B conception anywhere to be found. But *all* people as well as their cultures possess these loud/quiet traits, just in different ways.

Note 6. The jural society is the “legal conscience” of a society. As to fundamental law in other than direct democracy, legislators and jurors constitute by default the “jural society”. Otherwise, it amounts ideally to the cumulative “out of mind” legal conscience (somewhere Maitland considered it 500 years). Legal positivists do not recognize the concept so it is rare to see it taught in law schools. This leads to an all-or-nothing approach: the literal word or nothing at all. Equity jurisprudence is quashed to lesser or greater degrees, suitable to the wealthy who believe it hurts their cause. Thus the “just and necessary respect [for law and its authorities], if not informed by a due measure of intelligent criticism, tends to degenerate into mechanical slavery” (Pollock, 1967, p. 113f.). We are nipping at the straps of an explosive container.

Note 7. One who aggrandizes opportunities in which pushing the envelope may feel right today but over time and with many others doing likewise, spells ultimate catastrophe for limited resources. Regarding such “tragedies”, Pliny the Younger warned his legal peers against “pushing the envelope”. That didn’t take too well to judge from recent standards.

Note 8. “The concept is based upon an essay written in 1833 by the Victorian economist William Forster Lloyd, who used a hypothetical example of the effects of unregulated grazing on common land in the British Isles. This became widely-known over a century later due to an article written by the ecologist Garrett Hardin in 1968.” From *Wikipedia* under “Garret Hardin”.

Note 9. For purposes of first and second tier cognates these do not rank independently because they constitute a subset under others such as trust-mistrust, in turn a subset of us-them in intergroup political contexts.

Note 10. That is, a factor relating or leading genetic dispositions in the direction of one or another of the cognates of a dimension. Exposure itself indicates a situation of risk with respect to damage or harm.

Note 11. For these please make reference to Figure 1.

Note 12. One should not omit additional background relevant to H-B feelings (Fried, 1976, p. 49) Chinese government control of local affairs risks confrontation with “cellular” elements “composed of ...local population units that are essentially self-sufficient, inward-oriented and hostile to the outside.” This applies to both examples to follow.

Note 13. Throughout this paper the reader will duly note a common theme of law, language and culture paralleling one another, in each case a formal constituent holding back or rounding edges of the labile aspect, relations effectively elaborated upon especially by Auerbach (1961).

Note 14. There are a couple of related explanations that may prove helpful; see Herrman (2016b): 1) additional background and depth into dimensions, as well as 2) the structure of the theory, which, besides H-B and D-B also includes “cults” of both honor and dignity.

Note 15. See for example Dodds (1973, Chs. 1-2) who was profoundly impressed at the thesis and used it to great effect.

Note 16. Cairns (1993, pp. 455-458) offer a nice glossary. Here are the ones we are most interested in: *aidōs*: shame [state of mind, not condition as in Western use], respect, sense of honor, modesty [Aristotle’s “golden mean”]; *agathos*: good, noble; *aischunē*: disgrace, shame [the condition]; *anaidēs*: shameless, ruthless, impudent; *aretē*: excellence [in virtue and deed]; *charis*: grace gratitude, reciprocity; *dikaiosunē*: justice; *enkrateia*: self-control; *ethos*: habit; *ethos*: character; *hamartia*: error, offence [sin]; *hubris*: insolence, arrogance [usu. taken personally]; *kakotēs*: badness, base; *kalos*: beautiful, noble, fine; *kudos*: glory; *nemesis*: righteous indignation; *nomos*: law, custom; *philotimia*: love of honor, ambition.

The following two are adj., n., respectively and demonstrate that this “loud H-B society” recognized “pressing the envelope” as dangerously close to negating the good—*semnos*: reverend, august, awesome, haughty; *semnotēs*: dignity, haughtiness, self-importance. One last word not in Cairn’s list: *atē*, describing what the gods

are allowed to get away with but which men are to avoid lest they suffer the disgrace of hubris. The last two terms would be examples of *atē*: fit for gods, not mankind. Please keep these in mind while reading.

Note 17. See Benedict (1946, p. 116), for her “Schematic Table of Japanese Obligations and their Reciprocals.”

Note 18. “A reciprocal relationship...is not necessarily a calculating or materialistic one; there may be an intrinsic pleasure in giving....” In Cairns (1993, p. 174).

Note 19. As for Parson’s reputation for clarity, C. Wright Mills (1967) is the classic naysayer, see Chapt 2.

Note 20. The form that acceptance may take need not abide by the D-B notions of rearing, however.

Note 21. It might be noted for the record that Schopenhauer was *rejecting* this statement as a description of his principle of sufficient reason. I employ it for offering a wonderful sensibility of what the mind can do in order to firm up faith into a phenomenal concreteness of belief.

Note 22. In paradigmatics, “will” in the religious context, especially of the Christian faith, is tantamount with Father, as in “Father, Son and Holy Ghost”. See Herrman (2008) for the metaphysics and the implications for Christ’s teachings.

Note 23. The *Wycliffe Bible Commentary (The New Testament, 1971, p. 3)*, for example, says that *Jesus* is the historical name; *Christ*... is the title of his office.

Note 24. Nor was historian Charles Beard the first to suggest that the top echelons, the elites, might have intended to use their power to preserve their position and status in society, and not merely on account of a healthy skepticism of the public’s ability to weather the waves of democracy. Henri Bergson (1963, p. 181) had Marx in his veins when writing that it was “against the privilege of wealth” that the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 were fought.

Note 25. Americans have long had an allergy to keeping anything or anybody accountable except lower rungs of management and the blue collar class. After Harding’s scandals, of which worse is a hard adjective to accommodate, the results were predictable and are related by Allen (1931, pp. 102-131).

Note 26. For example, this web site: <https://www.powerthesaurus.org/honor/synonyms/approbation/2>

Note 27. “The Hebrew, biblical word for glory, kavod, is the same and only one denoting dignity. (Interestingly, kavod is also the only Hebrew word denoting honor).”

Note 28. *Essays*, Modern Library edition, New York, NY: Random House, 1946, p. 374.

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