

The New Battlefield: The Hidden History of U.S Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan

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Abstract

The United States foreign policy has been characterized as a long and zigzag history since the beginning of America in the late eighteenth century. This vital study is a part of this long history. During 1979 Soviets invaded Afghanistan and a Soviet-Afghan War was born, American's major influence was to be towards this region and reforms in their foreign policy to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. It took place between 1979 and 1989 about a decade. This study seeks to answer the following questions: "Which were the U.S key foreign policy in the context of Afghan-Soviet War during 1979 and 1989 under Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan Presidencies and how these Administrations provoked hard decisions against Soviet Union and established their own doctrines?" "How the U.S got the Afghan Mujahedeen's confidence and funneled the billions of dollars and global dangerous weapons to them chest through Pakistani ISI to punish the Soviets in Afghanistan?" "How the U.S hidden actor's played the key role in this war?" Results based on U.S recently declassified material regarding this war from 1979-89 and found that soon after the Soviets intervention of Afghanistan, U.S begun hidden supply to Afghan Mujahedeen chest through Pakistani ISI and both the U.S Presidents, Carter and Reagan, took hard decisions including established their doctrines to protect the Persian Gulf Region and its interests. In this game, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Charlie Wilson, William Casey, Howard Hart and Stansfield M Turner played the hidden role and finally expelled out the Soviets from Afghanistan.

Keywords: Soviet-Afghan War, U.S policy, Mujahedeen, aid, dangerous weapons

1. Introduction

The Soviet Union's occupation of their southern neighbor Afghanistan during the last month in 1979 caught the global attention and instantly became the crucial point of international relations between Americans and Soviet Union. Soon after the Soviets' troops interred into Afghanistan, the American Administration, policy makers including U.S nation rejected the Soviet Red Army's invasion of Afghanistan. As response to Soviets in Afghanistan, the U.S Administration reforms their foreign policy towards Afghanistan to push the Soviets back to their home from Afghanistan.

In doing so, the main purpose of this study is to examine and get the better understanding of the U.S key foreign policy in the context of Afghan-Soviet whole war during 1979-1989 under the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan Presidencies and how these Administrations took the hard decisions and established their doctrines including funneling of billions of dollars and worlds dangerous weapons to Afghan Mujahedeen for playing their key role in this game.

2. Washington's Initiating Steps

Once the invasion of Afghanistan occurred, a new and more ominous threat to American interests in the region became clear. When USSR (Soviet Union) forces began the incursion on Afghanistan, policy makers of U.S understood that Moscow's forces were near the Persian Gulf region. According to a commentary in U.S intelligence cited in '*Afghanistan: The Making of U.S Policy, 1973-1990*' which display this inception: 'The prime motivation that drive the USSR's move was to get its basic objectives within reach. Afghanistan's control would be a prime step to assess the dominations over the Asian Sub-Continent and Indian Ocean. (Note 1)

The Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser, wrote a memo to President Carter during 1980's and

indicated the U.S interests towards Persian Gulf region and mentioned that we, U.S, should defend its interests in the region (Note 2). Therefore, it was now key objective of U.S to defend the Afghanistan to safe their objective in this region.

Initially, to respond the Soviets in Afghanistan, U.S high ranking officials hold a meeting on March 30, 1979, David Newsom, stated during a meeting of mini-Special Coordination Committee (SCC) that it was America's key policy to respond Soviet's involvement in Afghanistan to protect our interests towards this region, also stop their further steps towards third world countries. On April 6, 1979, SSC thoroughly discuss on number of options regarding covert support to Afghan Mujahedeen. The meeting also considered propaganda game through media about the Soviet's tactics within Afghanistan. The meeting considered the number of options such as indirect financial aid to Afghan Mujahedeen, direct support to anti-Afghan government and anti-Soviet movements, non-lethal aid, arms supply and Mujahedeen training and other assistance. The meeting finally recommended the non-lethal support with active role and ordered to CIA for early coordination with stake holders in Afghan Mujahedeen and put the final paperwork for approval (Gates, 2006, pp. 144-146).

Further, President Carter wrote a memorandum to Soviet leader Brezhnev and affirmed:

"We expect that the principle of non-interference will be respected by all parties in the area, including the Soviet Union. No useful purpose is served by false and provocative reports about outside interference – especially when they occur at the same time as increased Soviet activity in Afghanistan. We can only wonder at their intent. We would regard external involvement in Afghanistan's internal problems as a serious matter with the potential of heightening tensions and destabilizing the situation in the entire region (Hilali, 2005, p. 144)."

On December 15, 1979, Department of State telegram to U.S Embassy in Soviet Union and mentioned that U.S Embassy should ask to Soviet's about their military developments in Afghanistan and also ask to explain the reasons of interference in Afghanistan. The telegram further asked that embassy leader should met with Andrei A Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, or any high ranking official of foreign department and inform them that U.S Administration is very concern regarding Afghanistan and under the Soviet-U.S agreement of 1972, Soviet should explain reasons of their forces in Afghanistan so that the misunderstandings between both countries and international tense situation can be controlled. The similar telegram was written to Soviet embassy in U.S for explanation regarding Afghanistan situation. (Note 3)

On December 27, 1979, U.S embassy in Soviet Union replied to State Department through telegram and mentioned the meeting with V.F. Mal'stsev, first duty minister of Soviet Union regarding Soviet's military buildup in Afghanistan. The telegram explains that Mal'stsev met with U.S embassy and conveyed the message from Soviet Union leadership for U.S Government and particularly for President Carter. The Mal'stsev affirmed that as the Afghanistan's political situation gone worst and external interference damaged Afghanistan's internal affairs, so government of Afghanistan requested to Soviet's leadership for their help against the resistance. He further mentioned that Soviet Union and Afghanistan's interests are common towards this region and cemented agreement to protect these interests. Eventually, after deliberately discussion on Afghan request, Soviet leadership sent its troops to Afghanistan to assist the Afghanistan government. The Deputy further affirmed that:

"limited" Soviet forces have gone into Afghanistan at Afghan Government request to repel "external" aggression in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Soviet forces would be withdrawn when the reasons for their being sent no longer exist." (Note 4)

Another telegram was written from State Department to Soviet leadership on December 28, 1979 with titled *"Ramifications of the Soviet Move into Afghanistan"*. The U.S President Carter warned to Soviet leadership regarding their military buildup in Afghanistan and said although both nations' interests are common so before doing any such kind of decisions, we should consult with each other. Furthermore, the President indicated that one sided decisions can distrust the other party and can damage USSR-U.S friendship agreement, which was cemented in 1972. Finally, President Carter affirmed that Soviet should withdraw their troops from Afghanistan for continuing the strong relations between both the nations. (Note 5) The Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev replied through memorandum to U.S President and rejected U.S assessments. The Brezhnev reminded U.S Government that Soviet leadership already explained the actual situation of Afghanistan through U.S Embassy in Soviet Union. He again said, Soviet troops sent to Afghanistan on the request of Afghanistan Government and should be expelled after getting the objectives. The Brezhnev further compelled that *"it is not import that everyone should agree with us about our troops in Afghanistan"*. He finally explained that:

"The Government of Afghanistan during the course of nearly two years has numerous times turned to us with this request. In point of fact one of these requests was sent to us on 26 December of this year. This is

equally known by us and by the Afghanistan and Government which sent us these requests. "I must further clearly state to you that the Soviet military contingents did not take any military action against Afghanistan and we clearly do not intend to do so. "You have reproached us in your message that we did not consult with the USA Government in reference to the Afghani matter before introducing our military contingents into Afghanistan. Permit us to ask you—did you consult with us prior to beginning the massive concentration of naval forces near Iran and in the region of the Persian Gulf, as well as in many other cases, about which it would have been necessary as a minimum to notify us? "There is, of course, no basis for your assertion that our actions in Afghanistan allegedly threaten the peace. (Note 6)

On December 31, 1979, the President Carter stated, during an interview to *New York Time*, that his policy has now completely changed towards Soviet's intervention of Afghan because Soviet leadership not truly informing the international community about their troops in Afghanistan. (Note 7) After all, the President Carter gave the historical statement during his address to nation and said "*The U.S. will meet its responsibilities.*" (Note 8)

3. The Blame Game

The President Carter and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev began direct approaches to each other and criticized each other policies. On December 30, 1979, President Carter hotline message to Brezhnev and showed seriousness about Soviets direct military buildup in Afghanistan without consulting with U.S. The President again reminded the U.S-Soviet friendship agreement which was signed in 1972 and advised to hesitate the direct confrontation between two superpowers. The President further urged that neither a powerful country direct invaded the other country, such an action should be dangerous for international community and breakup of international norms. To continue the productive and strong relationship between our two nations, the President advised, Soviets should back from their actions in Afghanistan. The Carter warned that productive relations should be undermined, if Soviets not go back from Afghanistan. Finally, he said:

"I want to insure that you have fully weighed the ramifications of the Soviet actions in Afghanistan, which we regard as a clear threat to the peace. You should understand that these actions could mark a fundamental and long-lasting turning point in our relations. Taken without any previous discussions with us, they constitute in our view a clear violation of the Basic Principles on Relations, which you signed in 1972". (Note 9)

In response to the President Carter's hotline message, the Brezhnev replied on December 29, 1979, and said:

"It is impossible to agree with your evaluation of what is occurring in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. We have sent through your Ambassador to Moscow in a confidential manner to the American side and to you personally a clarification based on facts of what is actually occurring there, as well as the reasons which caused us to respond favorably to the request of the Government of Afghanistan for the introduction of limited Soviet military contingents." (Note 10)

The Brezhnev further said that it is certainly not important to anyone's agree or disagree with us regarding Afghan situation and Soviet sent their troops after a special request on December 26 by Afghanistan government, as already informed U.S, to repulsing the external hands in Afghan affairs. Finally, the Brezhnev intensively replied on U.S consulting option and said that why Soviet consult with U.S or permit from you. Ever, U.S consult with "us" regarding their naval buildup near Iran borders. (Note 11)

Eventually, these efforts failed and a proxy war begun between U.S and Soviet Union and U.S reforms their hard foreign policies towards this war. Besides, U.S-Soviet Union this war was not a new conflict but had already looped with Vietnam War therefore the conflict of Soviet-Afghanistan was a gigantic chance for U.S to revenge the Soviet Union so that U.S reformed their policies as 'Hurt Them' and did not miss the chance. Also Gulf Oil and revenge to Soviets were the prime objectives for the U.S foreign policies towards this proxy war (Imran & Xiaochuan, 2015). Although the U.S warnings were ignored by Soviet leadership so U.S Administration took hard decisions against the Soviets.

4. President Carter's Hard Decisions

The Carter Administration was much worried about the Soviet's influence in Afghanistan. Therefore, soon after the Soviet interred into Afghanistan, the President Carter, Brzezinski, and U.S policy makers decided to supply the financial aid to Afghan Mujahedeen in the form of propaganda operation and medical assistance. The President ordered his team to reform foreign policy towards Afghanistan and began assistance to Soviets-Afghan Government oppositions (Charles, 1993).

On January 1980 during State of Union address, President Carter accepted the Soviet's challenge in Afghanistan and announced the changes in U.S foreign policies. The President declared that any external influence over

Persian Gulf region would be key challenge for U.S and should be considered the threats to U.S interests towards this region. He further added, the Soviets moves towards this region should be considered the same threats to U.S interests, hence, the U.S should repel all these aggressive steps by all means including the U.S military force. (Note 12)

The SALT-II treaty was also under consideration between U.S-Soviet for control the mass weapons but soon after the Soviets military buildup in Afghanistan, the President declared that it is impossible now to continue this treaty and should be delayed. (Note 13) Soon after these initiative decisions, one step forwards, President Carter declared his doctrine to protect the Persian Gulf region.

5. The Carter's Doctrine

The President Carter's speech to U.S nation touched number of issues and President finally concluded his speech with the security of Afghan region particularly Persian Gulf Regional Security Framework, which later known as "Carter Doctrine". The President put a wording map during his speech and explained the different incoming challenges due to Soviet presence in Afghanistan; the emerging of oil problems in Western countries supplies from Middle Eastern states; and, the number of changes in developing countries such as Iranian revolution. The Carter then explained in detail all these issues and pointed out the big challenges for U.S, the President then asserted that "the Soviet's presence in Afghanistan emerged as the biggest challenge for U.S in this region. (Note 14) The President Carter also added that Soviet's powerful force is going to destroy the defenseless nation of Afghanistan which can be considers a radical action and can destroy the regional peace. The President then stated:

"The vast majority of nations on Earth have condemned this latest Soviet attempt to extend its colonial domination of others and have demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Muslim world is especially and justifiably outraged by this aggression against an Islamic people. No action of a world power has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned. But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression." (Note 15)

The international community praised the President's these decisions and soon after his address to nation, the President firmly established his new foreign policy towards Afghan region particularly to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan and protect the Persian Gulf region. In the end of his speech, as answering of a question, the President very clearly and openly stated that "Now U.S position is very clear regarding Afghanistan issue that all external involvement that assault the American interests in Persian Gulf region, should be repelled by U.S through all means including military force. (Note 16) After all, Carter issued his doctrine, in written, as following.

6. National Security Council (NSC)-63

The important issues discussed during President's addresses on January 4 and January 23 recorded as National Security Council secret document, which later known as NSC-63. After necessary amendment by Brzezinski, this important document in the form of Presidential Directive-63, presented to Carter and other U.S policy makers on January 15, 1981. (Note 17) Through NSC-63 document, the President ordered, same his Union address, about the security and protection of Gulf region from Soviet's in Afghanistan and the President affirmed that:

"An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including military force." (Note 18)

Subsequently, the President ordered to strengthen U.S allies in this region to protect the Strait of Hormuz. It is also our key policy to defend the U.S interests around the globe so U.S should meets it responsibilities. Hence, the President affirmed the military components and directed that U.S should takes the number of actions such as; deploy its own troops in the Gulf region with full power to maintain its credibility in the region, military pressure on Soviets and to response their troops in any further movements towards this region; the USSR should pay the diplomatic and economic costs if they influence in the Gulf region; U.S should assist the regional states to deter the Soviet threats to them; Arab-Israeli conflict also be settled to enhance the peace in the region; great relations should be improved with regional states and also approached them to protect the U.S interests in this region. (Note 19)

The President further affirmed that since U.S had developed his security in the Gulf region, it is also important to continue this trend under NSC-63 regarding Persian Gulf Security Framework. The Carter directed to Defense Department to collaborate with State Department and meets its responsibilities to protect the Gulf region. The

Carter also directed that American troops should present in the Gulf region also continue exercises, training and other activities. Regional defense should also be improved through jointly programs, financial assistance and combined training with regional allies. The President also ordered that U.S also allocates full American resources to his NATO, European and Asian allies to protect the Gulf region. (Note 20)



Figure 1. President Jimmy Carter presents his State of the Union Speech to Congress, 1980s
<http://www.newsmax.com/FastFeatures/jimmy-carter-state-of-the-union-president/2015/03/22/id/631735/>

The President further moves towards the foreign policy components and directed to State Department for carrying out their responsibilities towards Gulf region. He particularly focused on Middle East peace process; developing of greater relations with Pakistani and Turkish Governments; assistance to Arab Peninsula states to counter the Soviet's control over them; developing of alliance with African states such as Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti; developing the alliance with Asian and European states to protect the U.S interests towards Persian Gulf, the good relations with these regional states are urgent needs for U.S to stay, overflying, and better establishment in Persian Gulf region. (Note 21)

After policy components, the President discussed economic issues and directed stake holders to share their responsibilities. He particularly focused on Oil availability on reasonable prices and reduction of dependence on Middle Eastern states; solving the regional problems through West assistance policy; developing the ties with Saudis to improve the regional security; and to ensure economic stability for better security and political stabilities in the region. Finally, the President tasked to the Director of CIA for productive intelligence collaboration with regional intelligences to better reporting and cast to Soviets on the bad decision of Afghanistan. (Note 22)

On the same way, after entered into Presidential office, the President Ronald Reagan reforms his strict foreign policy to counter the communism. The President Reagan openly declared the assistance of Afghan Mujahedeen.

7. President Reagan's Critical Decisions

The Reagan entered into presidential office with policy to counter the communism and during his initial tenure, the Soviet-Afghan War was at peak. The President Reagan declared the Soviets as "evil empire" due to their communist and rebel policies. (Note 23) Same as the Carter, the Reagan also took the hard steps against Soviets presence in Afghanistan. The President Reagan declared his foreign policy during his Union address, which later known as Reagan Doctrine, and began support very strongly to "freedom fighter" worldwide particularly Afghan freedom fighters against the Soviets troops in Afghanistan. (Note 24)

In the beginning, Reagan denounced the arms control accord and detent policy with Soviet Union and announced that Soviets had used this policy to get their objectives in the globe. He established the strong policy towards Moscow's communism decisions and took number of anti-communist actions in the global issues. One step forward, the President proposed his doctrine and started financial aid to the freedom fighters around the globe including the states under control of Moscow. The Reagan believed that Soviets were going to expand their communism actions so it was important to stop their steps as soon as possible (Reagan, 1990, p. 548). Through these initiating hard decisions, the President sent strong message to Moscow against their communism and expansionism.

The President Reagan also began full intervention in Afghan matter and supplied most powerful arms and financial aid to Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviets, without concerning about its future. The President authorized to William Casey, the Director of CIA and the biggest anti-communist, for supplying assistance to

Afghan Mujahedeen to punish the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan. The Muhammad Yousaf, ISI Chief, affirmed in his account that America wants revenge of Vietnam War from Soviets. He added that Casey comments that “bastards should pay through their bleed in Afghanistan and paid the high cost here” (Yousaf et al, 1992, p. 79).

The President Reagan further announced that freedom is not a choice; it’s a God given opportunity. It was the America’s key policy to defend the democratic and free nations. He specifically declared that U.S should stand with our democratic partners and never leaves them alone, including expelling the Soviet’s aggression from Afghanistan and other democratic states. Finally the President affirmed that “help of freedom fighters is also U.S own defense”. (Note 25)

This was another key turning point for U.S influence in Afghanistan, when Reagan announced to increase the bounty of financial aid for Afghan freedom fighters. The intelligence was also ordered to supply the more aid, arms, satellite maps and other facilities to Mujahedeen against the Soviets troops in Afghanistan. (Note 26) Under U.S assistance policy, Afghan Mujahedeen became the much strong against the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan.

President Reagan first time publically admitted the support of freedom fighters particularly the help of Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviet communists and pro-communist Afghan government. (Note 27) Through these hard decisions of supporting of Islamic movements in Afghanistan, Reagan gave hard message to Moscow and other communist nations. The Reagan’s straight forward policy against the communism became clear when he stated during T.V interview that, if Afghan Mujahedeen asked to U.S for their support against the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan, we should support them (Bonosky, 1981, p. 210).

During 1983, the Reagan Administration approved National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-77 for military and humanitarian support of Afghan freedom fighters. Under this directive, it was also decided to increase the intelligence collaboration with Afghan Mujahedeen, media coverage of Afghan war and counter the anti-U.S propaganda through media and diplomatic ways. (Note 28) The first time Reagan Administration authorized to CIA for provision of satellite opportunities to Afghan freedom fighters so CIA sent the photos of Soviet troops’ deployment in Afghanistan, which supported the Mujahedeen for attacking on Soviet installments (Yousaf et al, 1992, p. 93). On the same page, CIA also provided the upgraded communication technology such as radio and wireless sets to Mujahedeen for best communication with each other during attacks on Soviets in Afghanistan (Coll, 2004, pp. 127-128).

In the year of 1984, Reagan addressed to American public on December 26, the day of Soviets invasion of Afghanistan five years ago, and publicized the number of important previous and current issues. The President explained the five years ago history about Soviet Red Army’s invasion of Afghanistan and installing of pro-communist government in Afghanistan and the emerging of Afghan Mujahedeen against them. (Note 29) He concluded that the Soviets attempt to control with power but the freedom fighters opposed them and still opposing. The President finally stated that if Mujahedeen hold out against the Soviet Red Army so:

“The Afghan Freedom Fighters – the mujahideen – remind us daily that the human spirit is resilient and tenacious, and that liberty is not easily stolen from a people determined to defend it. The Afghan people are writing a new chapter in the history of freedom. We Americans salute their magnificent courage.” (Note 30)




Figure 2. President Ronald Announcing Increasing of Anti-Communist Assistance

<http://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/ronald-reagan/pictures/ronald-reagan/president-reagan-speaking-at-brandenburg-gate>

The President finally affirmed that Soviet's should pay the high costs until the Afghan freedom fighters should achieve their objectives. (Note 31) Then, during 1985, the Reagan increased their approaches towards Afghan War and re-established the policy to bleed more Soviets in Afghanistan through support of Mujahedeen and get them out from here. To get these goals, number of debates held in State Department, finally, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-166, approved by President and Congress and funneled the billions of dollars to Afghan Mujahedeen against Soviets in Afghanistan (Gates, 2006, p. 348). Soon after this, a big decision was also taken by Reagan Administration as provision of more sensitive and sophisticated arms to Afghan Mujahedeen to punish the Soviets in Afghanistan. (Note 32) After all these actions by Reagan Administration and its policy makers, now the American believe was going to change from Moscow's pay to expel them out from Afghanistan (Cogan, 1993, p. 76).

8. Washington's Hard Decisions

Along with other actions, the American Administrations also took the more aggressive steps against the Soviet Union and imposed the number of sanctions against them at national and international levels. Both the Carter and Reagan Administration pursued economic war against Moscow and initially banes the number of imports/exports to Soviet Union. The President Carter took the strict actions and considered to ban the agriculture and industrial items to Moscow (Gates, 2006, p. 537).

The Peter Tarnoff, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State, wrote a memorandum, *U.S. Soviet Relations and Afghanistan*, to Brzezinski on December 31, 1979 and mentioned the number of initial actions by U.S against the Soviets. The Tarnoff affirmed that U.S Administration has decided to take unilateral actions such as withdrawing of SALT-II from Senate; reviewing of arms control agreements; reducing of official and social relations with Soviets; media statements by President about America-Soviet relationship; recall Thomas Watson from Moscow; reducing of Soviet diplomatic officials in U.S; expelling of Moscow's intelligence officials in U.S; criticizing of Moscow on human rights abuses; publicizing of Moscow's actions in Afghanistan; reducing of relations with Karmal regime; canceling of consular review meeting; traveling ban on Soviet NY advance group; visa banning for Moscow's officials to U.S; reducing of Soviet's media staff in U.S; postpone Exchange Agreement Negotiations (EAN) and cancel the American representation in EAN and selected Exchanges; re-consideration on Olympic games; and Harassment. (Note 33)

The Tarnoff further mentioned the military, economic, multilateral, and other regional actions such as increasing and alert U.S troops in Gulf region; postponing of business, joint commercial convention and civil aviation negotiations with Moscow; reducing of exporting / importing from Soviet; suspension of fishing trade with Moscow; increasing of broadcasting in Muslim states and particularly in Soviet Union; regularly updating to United Nation (UN) about Soviet actions in Afghanistan; urging other nations to condemn Soviet's actions in Afghanistan; approaching UN for security council resolution; urging to other nations for support of U.S actions against Soviets; approach to Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) for restraints on Soviet; increasing of economic aid for regional states; approach to Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), and chemical weapons (CW) organizations for control of arms sale to Soviet Union; closing of U.S embassy in Afghanistan and urge others to do same; increasing of financial aid for Afghan Mujahedeen; developing of American troops in Gulf region on war basis; increasing of American arms supply to Moscow's periphery; coordination with Romanian, Turkish and Yugoslavian Government for cooperation against Soviets; and finally increasing of political and military relations with Chinese Government for punishing the Soviets in Afghanistan. (Note 34)

A National Security Council (NSC) meeting hold on January 2, 1980, under Brzezinski regarding Soviets actions in Afghanistan and the results of this meeting were sent to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and Secretary of Defense Brown through memorandum. Brzezinski mentioned the number of actions in this memo and said that U.S should take number of actions against the Soviet such as State Department reduced the Soviet diplomatic official in U.S, same as Soviet's reduced the U.S officials in Moscow; to publicize the Moscow's actions in Afghanistan, U.S will stepped up the broadcasting of Voice of America, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe; U.S embassy officials in Afghanistan will be reduced to ten; banning of business with Afghan government and stop the assistance to Babrak government; U.S will cancelled the visas of Soviet officials on case-by-case basis; Moscow's media representatives in U.S will be reduced same level as Moscow reduced Americans; shipment of Magneto Hydro Dynamic (MHD) channel will be stopped until further order; and General Exchange Agreement meeting with Moscow will be stopped. (Note 35)

The NSC meeting further recommended the cancelation of Soviet-U.S Agriculture Joint Committee Meeting, Joint Commercial Committee Meeting, Business Facilitation negotiation, Civil Aviation meeting, Health Joint Committee Meeting, Congressional Delegation visit to the Soviet Union; and high profile meetings will be reviewed same as Moscow treat with us; consulting with U.S allies about the participation in Olympic games; Moscow's officials traveling will be control same level of Soviet's treat us; tightening of exporting/importing with Soviet more than U.S partners actions against Soviet; restrictions on fishing trade; circulation with UN and publicizing the Moscow's actions in Afghanistan; letter to Security Council for mentioned the Soviets action in Afghanistan as major agenda and urging to other nations for standing against Soviets in General Assembly; preferring to Chinese in compare to Moscow for exporting; and finally mentioned that U.S should reform the policy of Foreign Assistance Bill and put the restrictions on Soviet Union. (Note 36)

Brzezinski wrote another memo to President Carter on January 9, 1980 and suggested a long-term policy against the Soviet's actions in Afghanistan. He explained that it is important for U.S to respond the Soviets on their actions in Afghanistan so U.S needs to generate the great domestic consent behind the budget and legislative issues. He further distributed the U.S interests in major three zones; Gulf, Western Europe and Far East. U.S already has strong possession in two regions except Gulf region. Hence, we should need to develop the alliance with Gulf countries. (Note 37)

Brzezinski further added that U.S should response to Soviet through regional security, unilateral actions, and multilateral actions. He explained the U.S actions and said that U.S already increased the covert program for Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan and further will be updated after the recommendations of reviewing committee; military aid for Pakistan has been recommended; deploying of U.S brigade to maintain the effective military power in the Gulf region; cooperation with Saudis to deploy the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) in the region; and consultation with Turkish, Iranian and Indian Governments about the Afghan situation. (Note 38)



Figure 3. President Carter, National Security Adviser Brzezinski, and Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance (U.S Policy Makers during Soviet-Afghan War)

<http://bhavanajagat.com/2013/02/24/special-frontier-force-establishment-number-22-the-future-of-us-tibet-relations/>

Brzezinski further moves towards the multilateral actions and explained that U.S should consult with his European partners and Chinese Government for their assistance to Afghan Mujahedeen, also refugee's assistance will be increased through Pakistan, also reorganizing the old Berlin Task Force for the security of the Gulf region. U.S will also approach to European states and India to play their positive role in the region and concluded with soon implementation on Carter Doctrine for getting U.S objective towards this region. (Note 39)

One step forward, the Carter Administration also took a hard decision regarding Olympic Games participation in Moscow and telegram on January 20, 1980 to all diplomatic posts and the Embassies in Libya and Pakistan. The State Department conveyed the Presidential message and affirmed that:

"I am sending the attached letter to the President of the United States Olympic Committee informing him that I cannot support United States participation in the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow, the capital city of a nation whose invading military forces are occupying Afghanistan. I am requesting that the committee work with other National Olympic Committees to seek the transfer or cancellation of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games unless the Soviet Union withdraws its troops from Afghanistan within the next month. If the Soviets do not withdraw and the Games are not transferred or cancelled, I am asking that the United States

Olympic Committee not participate in the Games in Moscow, and, instead, work with other nations to organize alternative Games.” (Note 40)

The President further advised, according to telegram, to United States Olympic Committee (USOC) to coordinate with other national Olympic Committees and International Olympic Committee for withdrawing of Olympic Games in Moscow until the Soviet troops expelled from Afghanistan. If doing so not possible, then USOC propose for transfer these games any other country. If International Olympic Committee not agreed with USOC proposal, then U.S and its allies will not participate in Moscow Olympic Games and conduct alternative games, in which U.S Government will support them. (Note 41)

9. Dirty Game

Along with other critical decisions, U.S also had begun assistance to Soviet oppositions in Afghanistan such as Afghan freedom fighters. More than six months before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S Administration and its policy makers had begun supporting to Afghan Mujahedeen in the form of non-lethal supply. As both Carter and Brzezinski observed the Soviets increasing influence in Afghanistan and decided to backing of Afghan freedom fighters. Soon after the Soviets troops’ invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S changed their policy from non-lethal supply to openly assistance and arms to Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviet troops and pro-Soviet Afghan government. U.S alliance with Saudis and Pakistani Administrations for supplying to Mujahedeen and CIA played the key role in the field (Gates, 2006, p. 149).

In the first months of 1979, the CIA requested State Department for hidden aid to Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviets, soon after the insurgency emerging in Heart (province of Afghanistan). This proposal further sent to SCC and President Carter for approval. The proposal also reported that Moscow-controlled Afghan media had begun propaganda against U.S, Pakistan and its other allies regarding supporting of Afghan Mujahedeen, in fact, it is wrong. But it is good time, the proposal further urged, to supply the Soviet oppositions (Ibid, p. 144). On March 6, 1979, Carter’s decision making body asked again to CIA for new proposal for supply to Afghan Mujahedeen (Coll, 2004, pp. 4-5). Brzezinski recommended that Carter endorsed non-military assistance to Soviet oppositions because no more opportunities for U.S to punish the Soviets in Afghanistan. Brzezinski urged to SCC for approval of CIA’s proposal for non-lethal supply to Afghan Mujahedeen (Ibid, p. 46). Eventually, on July 3, 1979, President Carter signed the first finding for the covert support of Afghan freedom fighters. The finding authorized to supply the cash, establishing the radio access, and other non-military items chest through third world states to Afghan Mujahedeen. Initially, the amount was just five million dollars which was very small amount and drawn within one month (Gates, 2006, p. 146). In the last days of July, 1979, the Carter Administration dramatically increased the covert program and authorized the arms supply to Afghan insurgents. On July 23, 1979, the Carter was briefed Afghan Mujahedeen depending on Pakistani Government and they need more and more arms supply (Ibid, pp. 148-149).



Figure 4. Mujahedeen with U.S provided communication receiver
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ad/Muja_on_radio_in_Munda_Dir.jpg

During 1981, Casey began support to Afghan covert program. In the first month of 1982, CIA telegram to Casey for more supply to Afghan Mujahedeen for more pressure on Soviets in Afghanistan. Hence, on February 26, 1982, Casey and Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, decided to funnel an additional 20 million dollars for Afghan Mujahedeen. In the last months of 1982, the Afghan covert program reached 60 million dollars per year (Ibid, p. 251). With the more efforts of Casey for pump up the Afghan covert program, Congress authorized additional ten million dollars from Pentagon’s massive treasury account, which never used before. Even various Congress members were not agreed with in option but Casey got his objective (Coll, 2004,

pp. 101-102). The American policy makers believed that CIA's policy towards covert assistance to Afghan Mujahedeen was critical step for bleeding of Soviets and pro-Soviet Afghans. They began more supply in the form of anti-aircraft arms to Soviet oppositions (Gates, 2006, p. 320).

A number of conservative Congress members were not agreed with government for over support to Afghan Mujahedeen including the John McMahon, the CIA's Deputy Director, who warned U.S Administration that over supply for Afghan cause can harm for Pakistan or U.S own interests in the region including emerging of corruption in stake holders. But everyone in Congress was pushing for more support. (Note 42) Hence, U.S policy makers were agreed to supply more and more to Afghan freedom fighters to the last Afghan. They decided to supply them more but not over as explained Democratic Congressmen Charlie Wilson; *"It would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance the cause of freedom* (Coll, 2004, pp. 91-92 & 599)."

Most of U.S decision makers believed that they were going right way. Fascal Congressman, the Chairman of the CSCE Commission, put the details of Afghan covert operations in front of committee during a conference. Wilson appreciated the \$40 million, which were allocated for Afghan cause and \$17 million, out of them, especial for buying the anti-aircraft for Afghan Mujahedeen. He further explained that *"This is the only place in the world where the forces of freedom are actually fighting and killing the Russians* (Crile, 2003, pp. 204-209 & pp. 214-215)."

Now the Casey deeply involved in this game day-by-day, during the first month of 1984, Casey briefed President and cabinet about the Mujahedeen's achievements in Afghanistan. He explained that after supplying the Lee Enfield rifles to Afghan Mujahedeen through ISI, more than seventeen thousand Soviets have been killed in Afghanistan and this amount was supplied by CIA and GID (Saudi Arabian Intelligence). He further added that this operation would be costly for Soviets ever seen (Coll, 2004, p. 89).

Gates mentioned in his book, *From the Shadows*, that Casey convinced his team for more aid to Afghan Mujahedeen, hence, in the end of 1984, U.S Administration planned to funnel the more assistance to Afghan Mujahedeen for punishing the Soviets in Afghanistan. To increase the more funding for Afghan cause, the Casey travelled to Middle East states and commitment with Saudi Arabia for increasing the covert support \$75 million for 1984 and \$100 million dollars for 1985. Under this agreement, U.S also increased their part of contribution in sum of \$50 million during 1984. Casey also proposed Saudis as \$250 million for next year for more pressure on Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan. Later Casey message to Saudis and Pakistani Governments that U.S is going to issue the \$250 million in FY 1985 and releasing \$175 million on immediate basis. Eventually, Reagan Administration issued \$300 million for 1985 (Gates, 2006, pp. 320-321). In sum, President Reagan dramatically changed U.S foreign policy towards Afghan cause during 1984 with determined that U.S should win this war now. He increased the Afghan Mujahedeen's support several time over as compare previous years under the Presidential Directive. Casey and Wilson were the main character to done this job and CIA and ISI played the key role as bridge. There were also initiating retaliations by Soviet Air force bombing across the Pakistani border (Ibid, pp. 319-320).

In the FY 1986, Reagan Administration issued \$470 million for the support of Afghan Mujahedeen and this amount reached up to \$630 million in the mid of 1987, not counting the Saudis share. Now Afghan jihad was swimming in dollars and CIA began direct contacts with Afghan Mujahedeen commanders without the involvement of ISI. The CIA offered payroll money direct to commander for collaboration with CIA and improving the war tactics. CIA offered packages such as, a regional commander can receive more than \$2000, more influence can receive more than \$50000 and provincial commander can earn more than \$100000 per month (Coll, 2004, pp. 148-151). By the end of 1987, the U.S funneled more than \$700 million in the form of military aid and Pakistan was at key allies who received more money out of this package. (Note 43) U.S not only funneled the billions of dollars but also supplied the world's dangerous weapons to Afghan freedom fighters.

10. The Wonder Weapons

U.S Administrations and its policy makers also took critical decisions as provision of dangerous weapons to Afghan Mujahedeen to punish the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and CIA done this job chest through ISI. In the begging of war, no any American believe that Soviets troops can expelled by little movements of Mujahedeen. Same as other hard decisions, Carter Administration decided to supply the arms shipments to Afghan Mujahedeen, hence, in the last months of 1979, Carter signed a proposal for provision of arms to Afghan freedom fighters and Reagan re-authorized in 1981 (Gates, 2006, p. 58). On the same time, CIA's logistical officer purchased thousands of Lee Enfield 303 Soviet made rifles and rocket launchers from Indian, Greece, Chinese and Egyptian Governments and further shipped them to Pakistani ISI for handing over to Afghan

Mujahedeen. The numbers of stake holders in Washington were now going to more and more involve in Afghan cause (Ibid). Steve Coll affirmed in his account "*Ghost Wars*" that sniper rifles showed the big results in Soviet-Afghan War and were known as "*Buffalo Guns*". He further added that U.S Administration decided to supply these rifles under the idea of Vaughan Forrest, Special Forces enthusiast in U.S. Forrest also wrote a report how using these rifles and killing the Soviets in Afghanistan. Forrest further mentioned that "*It doesn't take a genius to figure out that you need to hit them hard, you need to hit them deep, and you need to hit his heart and brains,*". During a meeting regarding provision of arms supply to Afghan Mujahedeen, a participant said "*The phrase 'shooting ducks in a barrel' was used* s(Coll, 2004, pp. 136-137)."

After reaching in Pakistan as CIA Chief Station in Islamabad, Howard Hart felt the more requirements of arms for Afghan Mujahedeen then during a meeting in Bangkok in 1981, after giving presentation about Afghan situation, he demanded more effective weapons for Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Soon after this, during 1982, he telegram's to CIA headquarter, describing the Soviet's damaging of helicopters, tanks, convey and other equipment. He further explained that Mujahedeen were achieving big achievements with the help of CIA, hence, they needed more and effective arms (Ibid, p. 59).

During the last sitting of Carter Administration's officials between Brzezinski and Stansfield M Turner, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, regarding Afghan cause, decided to "*over and over*" even CIA was already supplying enough arms and other non-lethal support chest through Pakistani ISI (Gates, 2006, p. 149).

In 1984, soon after the Reagan interred into Presidential office with the major cause of anti-communist, Wilson began pushing more for more and effective arms for Mujahedeen. The anti-communist lobby in Reagan team planned to supply until the last Afghan alive. The Wilson explained to congressional committee during voting regarding Afghan cause that Afghans are ready to fight and die even with stones. He further put a resolution to Congress mentioned that:

"It would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance their cause of freedom (Coll, 2004, pp. 91-92)."

In the same era of 1984, Wilson pushed to supply additional \$50 million for purchasing more sophisticated weapons, Swiss-made Oerlikon anti-aircraft missiles, which can destroy the Soviet Mi-24 helicopters. In 1985, CIA further purchased the Blowpipe anti-aircraft missiles which were assembled by Britain. (Note 44)

To punish Soviets more and more, CIA purchased the variety of arms such as 12.7 mm machine guns, mortars, bicycle bombs, medical kits, 122 mm rocket (these rockets were used by Soviets in WW-II), and some more effective weapons for Afghan Mujahedeen (Crile, 2003, pp. 158-161 & 300-342). But a researcher on Afghan war, Dr- Alex Alexiev, mentioned in his research that the quality of weapons supplied to Afghan Mujahedeen was very poor, even Mujahedeen never win this war with these weapons. He further added that Western not still provided them with modern anti-aircraft missile which can harm the Soviets. (Note 45) In the same era, pressure from Congress and anti-communists grew day-by-day on President Reagan for provision of most effective and upgraded anti-aircraft weapons to Afghan Mujahedeen (Gates, 2006, p. 320). Finally, U.S policy changed from Afghans fight and die, to, fight and win. In 1986, Reagan Government and its policy makers authorized to supply the Stingers to Afghan Mujahedeen. (Note 46)



Figure 5. An Afghan Fighter with U.S Made Stinger Missile, February 1988
<http://history.howstuffworks.com/history-vs-myth/who-won-cold-war.htm>

The decision was made against the CIA's initial warnings. On first day of Stinger use, the Mujahedeen hit three Soviet aircrafts out of four, soon they were mounted on Soviets and Afghan air power. Later, Soviet pilots began flying high to avoid the Stingers, thus Soviets loss their air power that beneficial for Afghan Mujahedeen. Soon the Stinger's story spread around the Afghan war and every Afghan fighter wants this missile, these were also known as "*magic amulet*" (Gates, 2006, p. 350).

The use of Stinger was very expensive for both the States such as U.S used Stinger for a cost of \$70000 and destroyed the \$20 million aircraft of Soviets (Crile, 2003, p. 437). The CIA estimated that Mujahedeen hit the Soviet aircraft seven times, out of ten fires and U.S every dollar destroyed Soviets \$200 (Ibid). U.S intelligence reported expressed the Soviets damage and affirmed that:

"Before the Stingers were employed in his area, Soviet helicopters flew wherever they wanted with impunity. They would hover anywhere they desired and fire into villages. Soviet crewmen would chase villagers and shoot them at will. But now when the helicopters approach villages at low altitude, they land quickly to discharge troops.. Also, the transports that are used to fly up and down the valleys at low altitude now fly so high they can hardly be seen with the naked eye. The guerrillas have found it a little safer to live in their villages because the high-flying planes cannot bomb with the same accuracy as they once did. (Note 47)

Gates mentioned in his book "*From the Shadows*" that a report was received on January 6, 1987 from U.S senior officer in war region that Afghan freedom fighters were increasingly victorious against the Soviets in Afghan war and they began counter-measures tactics. He added that "*most significant battlefield development during the last six months was the introduction of the Stingers* (Gates, 2006, p. 430)."

All in all, U.S Stingers changed the Afghan war scenario and Mujahedeen were now going to winning the war and Americans were going to achieve their goals towards this region including revenge from Soviets on Vietnam War.

11. Conclusion

The work presented in this article provides new knowledge and understanding about U.S foreign policy during Soviet-Afghan War between 1979-89. In doing so, this vital study shed light on Soviets intervention of Afghanistan, which caused American influence with its strong foreign policy towards this region during Soviet-Afghan War 1979-89. It has been found that soon after initial warnings by U.S to Soviet Union about their intervention in Afghanistan, U.S President Jimmy Carter and his policy makers began financial aid, non-lethal and military support including dangerous arms to Afghan Mujahedeen under supervision of CIA chest through Pakistani ISI, which later changed into largest covert operation in CIA history. Carter also publically declared his 'doctrine' that if Soviets not cooperate with U.S and international community regarding Afghanistan matter, U.S would use all available means including military force to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan to protect the Persian Gulf region. The Carter's Administration established strong foreign policy against Soviet communism and led to supply the Afghan Mujahedeen to 'bleed' Soviets until last Afghan and revenge on Vietnam War. However, U.S policy dramatically changed soon after the President Ronald Reagan interred into Presidential office, because of his strict policy towards communism, he called Soviets as 'Evil Empire'. President Reagan also took more aggressive steps against Soviets on their presence in Afghanistan and first time President Reagan openly announced the support of Afghan freedom fighters and approved new directive (NSDD-166) in 1985 to supply the billions of dollars to Afghan freedom fighters for punishing Soviets in Afghanistan. The President Reagan was more interested in this war against communists' invasion of Afghanistan, hence, he reforms the U.S foreign policy and took more aggressive decisions such as U.S banning of grain sale to Moscow, cancellation of participation in Olympic Games, economic warfare and reduced diplomatic relations and number of other hard actions against Soviet Union, also approached to other nations for doing same. In the last years of war, America's policy changed from 'bleed' to 'kill' the Soviets and Reagan Administration supplied Stingers Missiles to Afghan Mujahedeen to punish the Soviets in Afghanistan, which changed the whole war scenario. An important actors and their key roles belonging this war, those were ignored by even researchers, historian, journalists and everyone those written on this topic, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Charlie Wilson, William Casey, Howard Hart and Stansfield M Turner, those were at front line during whole the war. These actors also used their power to influence over U.S foreign policy and led to others for more and more support to Afghan Mujahedeen. U.S also purchased Soviets' made weapons from number of countries and further supplied to Afghan Mujahedeen through CIA and ISI. U.S and Saudi Arabia were key external actors those funneled billions of dollars, world's dangerous arms and training to Afghan freedom fighter's chest through Pakistani ISI and eventually expelled out the Soviets from Afghanistan and took revenge on Vietnam War.

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