

The Relation between Religion and State in Indonesia

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Abstract

This article elaborates the relation between religion and state in the case study on the existence of based-religion social organization (NGO) in Indonesia. The analytical methodology used is qualitative method, by extracting data based on in-depth interview and participant observation. The object of this study is the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Institute (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia-LDII) in Indonesia. The result showed that the relationship between the religious organization LDII and the state is an effective strategy for keeping its existence. Through a good relationship with the state, LDII hopes to get a symbolic capital from the country to gain recognition and protection of the state.

Keywords: relationship, religion, state

1. Introduction

Since the beginning of Indonesia's independence, the religion-state relationship raises never lasting problems until today. On the one hand, Indonesia is a country that guarantees freedom of its citizens to embrace the belief that they believe. However, on the other hand the country has a strong intervention to determine what is feasible religion embraced by its citizens. That's why Julia D. Howell (2005) refers to the type of freedom that is practiced in Indonesia as a limited pluralism. Not only specify several religions officially recognized to be embraced its citizens, instead, the state also arranged for the religious schools and communities not to deviate from the mainstream community of recognized religions.

Since Islam developed in the archipelago after the arrival of clerical group that identifies themselves as the Wali Songo, appear various studies on Islam and the problems of the society locality, particularly in Java. Various studies on the relation between religion and the state has been carried out by experts from various perspectives, ranging from the approach of theology, sociology, politics, to anthropology. In the perspective of anthropology, the study can be categorized into two groups. The first group is done by the anthropologists themselves. The second group is done by experts who are not anthropologists but using anthropological approach.

One study on the relation between religion and state, in particular that takes Indonesian setting, is a research conducted by Robert W. Hefner (2000) in *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Hefner viewed democratization struggle in the Muslim-majority country in fact has a big challenge, because the relation between religion-in this case Islam with democracy always antagonistic. On the one hand, this study actually showed a positive relationship between religion and democracy. On the other hand, the state should have a major role in the development of, or acting as what is called Hefner with civilized state. This means that civil society is not possible without any civilized state. Hefner's cases in Indonesia discussed in this book show very clearly how the state during the New Order regime used various means to suppress the democratization process undertaken by civil society, especially by those who believe. To emulate the civilian Islamist group New Order to form a bloc-which by Hefner called Islam rezimis-which are so-called the religious groups supporters of government. In addition to the highly viscous anthropological approach, this book also utilize various approaches from other disciplines, such as history, political science, and sociology in order to assess the relation between religion, democracy, and pluralism in Indonesia.

Moreover, in another study that took place in Tengger Geger Mountain, Hefner revealed the social changes that occurred in Tengger society where state intervention is very dominant. Results of this study later he presents in the book *The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History*. Countries applying political and cultural penetration from the outside for the sake of modernization. The process of ideological conflicts arise a

serious effect on the social fabric of local communities. In addition, it is also a process of change in the search for social identity by simple nonhierarki, classless, and open mountain community.

Another researcher examining the relation between religion and state is Snouck (1985) who took the study in Aceh. One of the conclusions in his book, *The Acehnese*, is that the disharmonious relation between religion to the state can lead to cracks between religious leaders and authority figures. According to these two men looked at each other jealous and suspicious, although on the surface it seems there is a process of mutual respect. However, in a fight between the two groups there is always a group that is in the middle position, ie the religious and secular figures whose voices accommodate to please the authorities interests.

Robert R. Bellah (1992) in his book, *Religion Tokugawa: The roots of Japanese Culture*, said that in the history of Japan religion has a close relationship with the rationalization of political relations. Big religions in Japan, such as Bushido, Tokugawa, and Mito, are closely linked to the political world. In the early days of Japanese history, there was a presence of a religious cult of primitive tribal country at that time. At the beginning of the entry of Christianity in Japan Yamato people strive to strengthen their hegemony and political efforts to create versions of their mythology, making the sun goddess and ancestor gods of the leaders of the Yamato to be more important than the other gods.

Similarly, the early history of Buddhism whose presence was very closely to political considerations. The early presence of Buddhism is closely linked to the power struggle among the influential families around the throne. When the position of Buddhism in the palace has been secured, he then integrated strong enough with the political aspirations of the ruling family. The effort of political legitimacy with the religious justifications is a great strength to support the position of the monarchy. Among the first silks getting a lot of attention in the ancient documents are silks relating to national defense. It is clear that a variety of magic powers applied around the palace so difficult to be penetrated by the priests of the cult indigenous anywhere. Later, metaphysical formulations of some Buddhist sects used to strengthen the position of emperor more broadly.

The upcoming literature entitled 'Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia', written by Lutfi Assyaukanie (2009). This study looks at the response of Muslim groups in facing the interests of state power in Indonesia. Assyaukanie divided pattern of the relationship between religion and the country into three forms. First, Islamic Democratic State (IDS), which was pioneered by Muhammad Natsir. This relationship is not a form of theocracy and secular, but remained as a democratic state. That's why Islam is called as a democratic state. Model of the relation between religion and state is intermediate between the two extremes: a theocracy and the secular state. In this case the state is still based on the teachings of Islam in which democracy does not contradict Islam.

The second model is a Democratic Religious State (RDS). This form is a response from the previous pattern, with the consideration that the Indonesian state is built on the basis of pluralistic state. This model began to emerge with a strong political force in Soeharto's era. With political power, Suharto control the power of Islam that undermines the stability of the power to introduce a religious view of Pancasila. Therefore, Muslim groups will inevitably have to seek new strategies to adapt to the government's policy by seeking justification for the use of Pancasila. If Pancasila does not stand against Islam, then there is no reason for Muslims to reject it.

The third model is the Liberal Democratic State (LDS) who think that political issues should be cleansed from the issue of religion. Theologically, belief is based on the fact that since the beginning, Islam is a religion that is concerned with morality. Meanwhile, worldly affairs quite settled with their respective capabilities. Among the supporters of this LDS models are Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid.

In addition to the above literature, there are also the result of ethnographic researches of several experts who discussed the religious and local beliefs in Indonesia in facing state power. A collection of the books are *Kisah dari Kampung Halaman, Masyarakat Suku, Agama Resmi dan Pembangunan*. Broadly speaking, the results of this study demonstrate the existence of control mechanisms by the state towards religions and beliefs that do not fit with the mainstream. The struggle to get recognition from is one of the important struggle, how religion and beliefs dealing with the state. Non official religion or belief outside the mainstream directly or indirectly faced two attacks at once. First, discrimination by the state, both in terms of recognition and the rights of citizenship. Second, the attack of the official religion, either in the form of *pengafiran* and dissemination of religion. There are several local religions studied, for example, religion Dayak (Borneo), Amungme (Irian Jaya), and Toraja tradition.

Meanwhile, Talal Asad (1983) argues that religion and state or power is not necessarily seen as two separate entities. Asad sees religion and power as a single entity that can be distinguished but not separated. The concept of a separate religion from the state domain, according to Asad is a product of Christian theologians in the Middle Ages universalized by Geertz using his research in Indonesia.

Another study is a research from Moeslim Abdurrahman (2009) in the book *Bersujud di Baitullah*. This book is an ethnographic study in the pilgrimage of the middle class in Indonesia. In this study, Abdurrahman tried to give an idea that there is a new current in religious life in Indonesia, where the middle class in large cities seek to demonstrate their existence as a pious one to perform Hajj. Therefore, in practice they are doing what Abdurrahman called as Haj-plus elite class that is costly but promising compensation of interesting touristic trip. In this case, there is a symbolic activity expenditures in the form of Islamic symbols displayed in the home. Their journey is recorded by the camera. Even the Hajj agent complete pre- and post-trip with a variety of packages, including salvation, religious lectures, as well as entertainment musician and comedian.

This research resulted in a theory that the formation of identity and social class not only through relational ties in social interaction, but also strengthened by consumption patterns. Hajj is a journey of the consumer to show their social class prestige. The middle class as a new social identity is different from the traditional middle class. After performing the Haj, pilgrimage-plus members is attempting to form a new middle class, for example by holding the middle class Haj as well as their own religious gathering in places like in a luxury hotel with special speakers.

This research has an exciting points to be reviewed because in addition to theoretical studies, there is also the intersection of religion and state raised in it. The middle class people are portrayed in this study is a new cultural class entity with ownership of cultural capital and social sciences that have emerged since the New Order. By utilizing the concept of Bourdieu's habitus to read the formation of this new middle class, I found the middle class is a social space based lifestyle that distinguishes the process of its distinction with the other social classes. The class establishment, for example with the consumption pattern, residential dwellings and trips abroad, including a touristic trip pilgrimage. The middle-class tries to shape a new culture of Islam in cities that was previously not visible.

The establishment of Islam urban middle class has been moving in the consumption and production. It also displays the pattern formation of a new interpretation of the concept of Islam. The emergence of new religious gatherings, publishers and bookstores becomes the hallmark of Islamic new culture at the time the New Order government's tendency to learn to accommodate the interests of religion. On the one hand, this is a process of transition from clerical influence and kiai to the publication works of Muslim scholars. On the other hand, there is a process in which Islam begins to be developed in the public domain after so long suppressed by the New Order policies into domestic spaces. In the midst of the current government's policy of accommodation toward Islamic forces, the middle class is also able to maintain its political independence from state power. This happens when the state began to play the exploitation process of Islamic symbols as a venue for legitimacy, and at the same time the Muslim middle class plays a contestation with the state.

This article elaborates the relation between religion and state as a case study on the existence of based-religion civil society organization (NGO) LDII in Indonesia.

2. Method

This study uses a qualitative method in form of in-depth interviews and participant observation. In-depth interview was conducted with key informants, ie people who understood the history of LDII since its establishment as an islamic Jamaat and felt directly the condition of the Islamic Jamaat and the following generation who joined since its change to LDII. In-depth interview was also conducted with religious leaders, community, and government. Participant observation was conducted with a holistic look at the settings, this method directs researcher to make full observation toward LDII, in which researcher acted as a participant, an observer participant, and a full participant. Participant observation is a foundation for the study of cultural antropologi that researcher did. This method is a pattern of research data collection as the source of ethnography process.

3. Results

The relation between religion and state in the history of Indonesia is a classic discourse that not only can be referred to the time of colonialism. It can even be referred to the golden era of the kingdoms of the archipelago in the past. Religion and state are two different entities with affinity in the Indonesian social-format pattern symbiotic relationship in which religion and state were intertwined in the process of legitimation of power each. Some great empires that once adorned the history of this nation showed a close relationship between religion and state. According to Ghazali (1992), the Mataram kingdom is known as Hindu kingdom, Srivijaya kingdom as Buddhist, Majapahit kingdom as Hindu Siwa, and the second Mataram as Islamic kingdom. The pattern of the relation between religion and state in the time was in the mutualistic relation, without any confirmation as the

state religion. Nonetheless, the state has an important role in producing regularity, including arrangements in the field of religion.

The mutual relationship was continued during the colonial period, when the dynamics of the relationship between religion and the state shew a different look. The Government has played an inconsistency attitude in addressing the relationship between religion and state. In the beginning, through the Holland Constitution paragraph 119 in 1855, the government asserted state neutrality towards religion. However, in practice of the state neutrality towards the religious issue has never been found. At first the Dutch government did not interfere directly in the private affairs of religious. However, gradually there was a drastic change in attitude on the part of the Dutch government through the issuance of Ordinance 1859 which regulates the issue of worship. This regulation is seen to the government worry toward Islamic forces. Hajj at the time was seen as a Muslim contact and communication with other Islamist networks in the Middle East. It seems that religious politics that the Dutch government played is between two points: neutrality and order stability. Even in the next period the state played a bigger role in religion affairs. According to Suminto (1985), some areas of the state intervention at that time, for example the establishment of the Religious Courts, the appointment of the prince, supervision of marriage and divorce, oversight of religious education, cash control mosques, and supervision of the pilgrimage.

In the post-independence development, religious and state turbulence anthropologically can be seen from the Islamic students struggle against the state policies, or the upheaval of Islamic forces in an effort to construct religious discourses in the power area. The students movement at the beginning of independence represents a dynamic social movement. In the 1950s and 1960s most religious groups affiliated to the Islamic parties. At that time nearly all groups of students were on the block the establishment of a religious state or Islamic state. Meanwhile, the gentry and abangan groups were affiliated to parties that support the secular-nationalist establishment of a secular state. However, it can be seen that in the 1970s and 1980s there was a new dynamic in which a group of Islamic students also took part in criticism of Islamic state compared with abangan group.

The dramatic changes can not be separated from the big role of the state in a repression policy against the Islamic forces. As known, the New Order regime that does not have a consistent attitude towards religion. Their consistency is only on the stability of power. Having been born from the womb of Old Order turbulence, New Order regime plaid the politics of fear and threat of communism through the Islamic movement. However, government's attitude towards Islam gradually changed and saw Islam as a potential force group that threatened his power. Changes in the government's attitude to impose Islamic depoliticization was strong traps that diverted Islamic groups turbulence. However, Assyaukani (2009) saw the change in one side because of external factors of secularisation transmitted by government policies, as well as other internal factors, namely the process of secularization departed from students themselves. Hot debate on the relation between religion and the state emerged among Muslim scholars as a new socio-cultural group was very influential in providing critical notes on the concept of the Islamic state.

Started since the founding of the state by the founding fathers, the debate about the relation between religion and the state continued to roll, coincided with the arrival of a wave of Western ideas about the nation state. Indonesian students who studied in Dutch, like Sjahrir and Muhammad Hatta, equally developed their ideas in managing the modern Indonesian state. According to Effendy (1998), Soekarno is who came up with the idea of introducing a country that tends towards the separation of state and religion. While on the other hand there are some groups, especially those are driven by Natsir, determined and persisted to make Islam as the state foundation. For them Islam and the state are the two entities together. In general, there are at least three paradigms of Islamic political thought in viewing the relation between religion and the state, namely the integralistic, mutualistic, secularistic paradigm. First, integrative paradigm which proposed the concept of merging of religion and state. Religion (Islam) and the state can not be separated (integrated). Islam is *din waal-Dawla*. What is the area of religion is also automatically a political region. A state is a political and religious institution as well. Between the two is a whole totality that can not be separated. According to integralistic approach, Islam is already in the completeness of the whole round. In other words, Islam has had a complete concepts for each area of life. This view has encouraged its followers to believe that Islam covers a comprehensive way of life. In fact, some people go further than that; they emphasize that Islam is a coherent totality that offers solutions to all the problems of life.

In this point, some Muslim groups mainly fundamentalists Muslim believe that Islam should be the basis of the state; that Islamic law should be accepted as the state constitution; that political sovereignty is in the hands of the Lord; that the idea of the nation state (nation-state) is contrary to the concept of ummah (Islamic community) that knows no political boundaries and territorial. In short, this first model that reflects the trend to emphasize the

formal legal aspects of Islamic ideals. The consequences of this paradigm is the modern political system is put in a position vis a vis with the teachings of Islam.

The first model of thinking has several implications. One of them, this view has led to the birth of a tendency to understand Islam in a literal sense, which only emphasizes the dimensions of the exterior. Literalist tendency has been developed in many ways that led to the neglect of the contextual dimensions and interior of the Islamic principles.

Second, the paradigm argues that religion and state have mutualistic relationship, they are related in reciprocity and mutual need, mutual benefit. In this regard, the religion needs the state. Therefore, through a state religion can develop well. Religious laws can also be enforced through state power. Likewise, the state requires the presence of religion because only with religion, state can walk in the light of the ethical-moral.

The second paradigm considers that Islam does not lay down a standard pattern on the theory that the state should be run by the ummah. Although there are various expressions in the Qur'an that seems to refer to the political power and authority, these phrases only incidental and have no bearing on political theory. For them, it is clear that the Quran is not a book about politics. According to this school of thought, the term *dawlah* which means the country is not found in the Qur'an. The term *dawla* does exist, but does not mean state. This term is used figuratively to describe the circulation or the turn of a hand of wealth. Only in the course of time, this literal meaning has evolved to state political power, because power always changes from one hand to another. It is important to note that this second opinion recognizes that the Quran contains the values and teachings that are ethical which later became the basis for social and political activity of human being. These teachings include principles of justice (*al-adâlah*), similarity (*al-musâwah*), fraternity (*al-ukhuwwah*), and freedom (*al-Hurriyah*). In this regard, for those who think so, all countries adhering to the mentioned principles apply the mechanisms in accordance with the teachings of Islam.

With such as argument, according to the second view, the establishment of an Islamic state in the formal and ideological sense is not so important. As it is contrary to the first model of thought, the second one is stressing on substance rather than legal form of state-formal. For this opinion, the important thing is the state-because the position can be instrumental in realizing the teachings of religion-can ensure the growth of such basic values.

Third, secularistic paradigm that rejects both the previous paradigm (integralistic and substantive paradigms). Instead, the concept is referred separation between religion and state. In the Islamic context, the secularistic paradigm refused Islamic foundation for the state, or reject Islam determination against certain forms of state. According to Marzuki Wahid and Moqsih Ghazali in the 10th Annual Conference on Islamic Studies (ACIS) in New York City, November 1 to 4, 2010, that religion is not the basis of the state, but religion is a merely individual issue. In other words, this paradigm sees Islam as a religion in the Western sense that is not related to the affairs of state.

The above paradigm is seen in the history of Indonesia, where the debate on religion and the state did not stop at the completion of the formation of the Indonesian state. The emergence of various parties based on religion, such as Masjumi and NU, in parliament hearings still shows the fierce struggle when the Constituent Assembly tried to formulate new fundamentals of the state during the years 1957-1959. The debate took place between those who come from the nationalist-secular groups, represented by the PNI and PKI, with Islamic groups, represented Masjumi and NU. Nationalist-secular groups approved the 1945 Constitution, while the Islamic group proposed to restore the Jakarta Charter. The hot debate led to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the President through political decree that affected the dissolution of Masjumi party in Indonesia's political history (Ricklef, 1991, pp. 401-402).

The discourse on religion and state did not only occur at the level of parliament. In practice, the two camps opponents and supporters of the Islamic state can easily be found, from the level of the student movement to a disintegrative political movement. This can be traced in the historical struggle that dreamed at founding the Islamic state, for example Darul Islam in West Java pioneered by Kartosuwirjo and which then spread in various regions in the country, such as in Aceh, Central Java, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi.

Based on the above theoretical review, on a practical level it is seen that the social and cultural life in Indonesia can not be separated from the value that refers to religion. Indonesian society also has a tendency to bring the value of religion in all matters related to the state. Even certain community put religious values as something that blends with state politics (Dalacaoura, 2003, p. 42). It automatically, in the context of public life has lasted tidal relation between religion and state.

Presenting the value of religion in the state life in Indonesia at practical level can manifest in a variety of products. In the Dutch colonial period the relation between religion and the state can be seen from the birth of several associations of religious figures that accommodated by the Dutch. Nahdlatul Ulama, for example, which was founded in 1926 and getting the legality of the Netherlands in 1930. Muhammadiyah was born in 1912 and received official permission as an organization in 1914. The relation between religion and state in the colonial period was dominated by social issues, culture, and economy. Political problems existed, but it was presented with a humanist-sociological approach.

Some state political movement during the pre-Indonesia's independence looked to maximize its social aspect. NU, during the 11th Conference held in Banjarmasin on June 9, 1935, decided that this state is a "*dar Islam*", although it was still controlled by the Dutch. According to KH Muchit Muzadi, the NU kiai then selected the term *dar Islam*, instead of *Darul Islam*, to distinguish the concept of dar Islam NU version with DI/TII. *Dar Islam* offered by NU is the duty of Muslim society in Indonesia to be active and responsible for solving the problems of society in order to realize a return system of national and state that upholds Islamic values.

Religion and state have a relationship, even if it was up and down. The dynamics of the relation between religion and state in Indonesian history to works quite positive in building civilization, as long as in the socio-cultural sphere. I see four possible patterns of the relation between religion and state.

First, socio-cultural oriented state related to religion in the context of socio-cultural as well. Some cases that can be mentioned here such as the enactment of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage. Marriage is an instrument to serve the needs of the state in religious communities to practice their faith. This country accommodation automatically locates the mating process as a socio-cultural issues that need to be facilitated. It can be found in the content of article 7:

Paragraph 1: Marriage is only permitted if the man has reached the age of 19 (nineteen) years and the woman has reached the age of 16 (sixteen) years.

Paragraph 2: In the term of deviation from article (1) this Article may request a dispensation to the Court or other official designated by both parents the male and the female.

Paragraph 3: The provisions concerning the state of one or both parents in Article 6, paragraphs (3) and (4), this Act applies also in the case of the dispensation request of paragraph (2) of this article, without prejudice to that referred to in Article 6, paragraph (6).

Paragraph (1) confirms that a rule-oriented social order and does not provide opportunities for civil disobedience. Paragraph (2) and (3) are solutif paragraphs for a culture that develops in the community that made possible the potential to collide with the Act. In other words, the principle of law that normally regulate and impose sanctions, in case of Marriage Act is seen as the laws that govern and provide solutions. Social theory that civil disobedience will experience social exclusion more visible than the theory of positive law of a state.

Martin van Bruinessen (1994) describes the intensity of Muslim leaders in guarding Marriage Bill to pass as legislation. For this regard, the Marriage Act is appreciated by religious communities because it is considered as a form of state recognition for their beliefs. Kiai Bisri Syansuri, chairman of the Advisory Council of PPP and Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), used the instrument of the United Development Party (PPP) is an example of religious communities who welcomed the Marriage Act. Kiai Bisri escorted Marriage Act without the political instinct provision instead he followed his traditional jurisprudence provision. He solved any arising issues by fiqh reason than political expediency. Therefore, when the Marriage Bill was brought to Parliament in 1973 Kiai Bisri was confrontational because some of the provisions in the draft bill is considered contrary to family law in jurisprudence.

Van Bruinessen does not explain in detail the articles which rise the resistance from Muslim society. However, at least there are 11 chapters in the draft of the bill as opposed to the munakahat fiqh (Islamic law), namely Article 2, paragraph (1), Article 3, paragraph (2), Article 7, paragraph (1), Article 8 (c), article 10 paragraph (2), Article 11 paragraph (2), Article 12, Article 13 paragraph (1) and (2), Article 37, Article 46 (c) and (d), Article 62 paragraph (2) and (6). Marriage Bill was successfully validated after accommodate the PPP leader Kiai Bisri, although in the current parliament including minority voice. Suddenly the religious community felt happy on legalization of Marriage.

Marriage Act legalization by government can resolve the socio-cultural and religious beliefs problems only by the law. It is pleasing when Marriage Law is not only initiated by the Government on July 31, 1973 under No.02/PU/VII/1973. On the contrary, this law started since the end of 1950 with the release of the Decree of the Minister of Religion affairs No. B/2/4299 dated October 1, 1950 on the establishment of the Committee of

Inquiry Regulation and Law of Marriage, Divorce and referred to Muslims. The steadiness of the religious community are voiced through PPP solved by compromise through measures that accommodate Islamic values and eliminate the clause which is contrary to Islamic values. The relation between religion and state form this model put politics as the realm of the ideal for the attainment of socio-cultural order.

Second, socio-cultural oriented religion relation to the state will bring culture, although the state is politically oriented in the relationship. As an example, cultural resistance done by Hasyim Asyari, a national figure and founder of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Hasyim Asyari refused Japan order to do seikerei, namely the obligation to line up and bow in the direction of Tokyo each at 07.00 am, as a symbol of respect to the emperor Hirohito and obedience to the god of the sun (Amaterasu Omikami). This activity shall also be carried by all citizens in Japanese occupation, whenever passing in front of the Japanese army to the Emperor of Japan.

Japan regarded cultural resistance by Hasyim as a political dissidence that he was arrested along with a number of sons and relatives. They were detained migrants, ranging from prison Jombang, Mojokerto later, and finally to the prison Bubutan, Surabaya. During the custody Hasyim experienced many physical tortures to one of his fingers was broken. After four months in prison, on August 18, 1942 Japanese freed Hasyim after protests from kiyais and students. In addition, the exemption of Hasyim was also due to the efforts of Kiai Wahid Hasyim and Kiai Wahab Hasbullah who contacted the authorities of Japan in Jakarta, especially Saikoo Sikikan in Jakarta. Cultural resistance of Hasyim Asyari inspired independence, self-reliance, and consistency.

Third, politically oriented religion will also bear cultural relationship when the state socio-cultural oriented. In this case, I am interested in putting the case of Muslim politicians' failure to carry Islam as the ideology of the party. Actually, this problem started to emerge since Sukarno formed Constituent Assembly on 10 November 1956. The task of the Constituent institute is designing the RI Constitution to replace the temporary 1950 Constitution. However, after working for 2 years, 5 months and 12 days, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved by the President Soekarno. Indonesia went back to 1945.

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly is the government's decision to respond the prolonged conflict between the communist party of Indonesia and the secular nationalist versus Islamic groups. The struggle for Islamic principles appear also on speech of M. Natsir from Masjumi Party who considered Pancasila as the victory of the Hindu religion. According to Natsir, Indonesia comprises 99% of the Muslim population so that Islam must be highlighted in the Jakarta Charter. Not only M. Natsir, almost all the leaders of the Islamic party at that time were against Pancasila.

Islamic political struggle continued until the 1970s. There came party simplification in 1973 where Islamic politicians were forced by the state to belong to a based-Pancasila party. Suharto's New Order strengthen his grip on power by relying on three main forces: the military, the bureaucracy, and Golkar party. Fusion of Islamic parties into the United Development Party (PPP) tied with Pancasila. PPP formation Charter was signed by KH Idham (NU), Mintaredja (MI), Anwar Tjokroaminoto (PSII), and Rush Halil (Perti).

Resistance against Pancasila appear everywhere, especially from Islamic groups that had been carrying the formal Islamic themes. Fusion of Islamic parties and Pancasila regarded as deislamization process. PPP remained just a symbol (Kabah) and ultimately a symbol of the Kaaba was replaced with the image of a star as a form of adjustment to Law No. 8/1985.

Meanwhile the relationship between civil society and the state in the development of civilization is marked by National Congress of Nahdlatul Ulama in 1983 in Situbondo. At the forum, NU accepted Pancasila and decided to go back to *Khittah* 1926. The decision of National congress was strengthened by NU National Conference 1984 in Situbondo. Many people beyond NU were disappointed because they wanted NU not accept Pancasila. However, social facts indicated that mainstream of Indonesian Muslims were not concerned whether Pancasila as the sole foundation of state. NU step was followed by other Islamic organizations. Practically until the end of the 1980s a process of Indonesian public awareness on the urgency of religious values, not a religious symbol.

Fourth, the relation between religion and the state can not build up culture if both of them are politically oriented. The relation between religion and state model can destroy human civilization because of its shape can be harsh, extreme, radical, and oriented to "muzzle". The existence of Hizbut-Tahrir movement in Indonesia (HTI) since the 2000s is a form of the relation between religion and the state are out of the socio-cultural sphere. Hizbut-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam. Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia moves to re-establish the caliphate system. The goal is to continue the life of Islam and carry the Islamic da'wah to the world, invites the Muslims back the Islamic way of life in the Darul Islam (Islamic state) and the Islamic community under the auspices of the Khilafah. Unlike the case with the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which moves in the practical level of socio-cultural problems and often lead to excesses of violence, Hizbut-Tahrir is engaged in an

ideological level that directly deal with the state. Therefore, it is probable that Hizb would fail to build relationships with the cultured and civilized countries.

Some Islamic groups emerged later were carrying religious formalism. The groups were previously known as religious organizations conducting the simple rituals, but it seems these rituals can evoke their religious emotions. Moreover it touches the basic ideology, in which the country is confronted with religious ideology, the movement is more intense and massive. In order to demonstrate their existence, they often do a demonstration with the theme of religious formalism, the themes of anti-Western, including issues of Israel and Palestine, hatred against US President Barrack Obama, and others.

The Mainstream of Islam in Indonesia put the state as an instrument that can accommodate and facilitate the freedom of religion. It can be seen from the formation of legislation (the Act) which explicitly adopt religious values, such as the Marriage Law, the Law on Islamic Banking, Law Shariah Securities, or through the establishment of laws that implicitly adopt religious values, such as the Law on Citizenship, Law on Combating Corruption, and others. The Constitutional Court, in its Decision No. 19/PUU/VI/2008 regarding Testing Religious Courts Act against the Constitution, the view that Indonesia is a state that believe in God Almighty and protect every religious believer to implement the teachings of their respective religions. Lukman Saifuddin, "Indonesia adalah Negara Agamis," the paper presented at the Congress of Pancasila in Denpasar, May 31 to June 1, 2010.

The tendency to place the state as a facilitator and religion as a value related to the philosophy of Islam which is understood as a religion that focuses on promoting the improvement of people's lives. Religion is placed as the value and the state as an instrument to realize the improvement of people's lives. The state is associated with the religious communities in the context of growing interest of participation so that the improvement formulation not monopolized by the state. Thus, there is no monopoly on the concept of "improvement"

4. Discussion

The rise and fall of Religion and State relations can be seen in LDII community. LDII Community was originally called as Darul Hadith and is based in East Java. Since it is considered to disturb the public affairs, the Monitoring team of community belief East Java prohibited the teaching, so that Regional Military Commander of East Java VIII Brawijaya Mayjen Jasin published Decree signed in 1967 banning the teaching of Darul Hadith. The ban responded by renaming cottage Darul Hadith Jamaat Islamic Education Foundation. In various areas there emerged diverse names with the same teaching load. Followers of Nur Hasan al-Ubaidah in Jakarta named their group *Yayasan Pondok Pendidikan Nasional* (Yappenas); in Tanjung Karang *Jamaah Darul Hadits*; in Bogor *Gerakan Darul Hadits*; in Yogyakarta dan Lamongan *Lembaga Pendidikan Ahlus Sunah Wal Jamaah*; in Gunung Kidul *Jamaah Islam Murni*; in Bantul *Jamaah Islam Manqul*; and so on.

The movement of Nur Hasan al-Ubaidah followers of by various names in the area lasted until the publication of a government ban. Islam Jama'ah/ Darul Hadith were banned by the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia in 1971 (by decree of the Attorney General No. Kep-089/DA/10/1971 dated October 29, 1971) because it was seen as a deviant group of mainstream Muslim groups. Some religious doctrines followers of Nur Hasan al-Ubaidah and practice considered controversial.

Prohibition of government led the followers of Nur Hasan al-Ubaidah to have difficulty in carrying out thier activities. They took several step approaches and cooperative attitudes to all religious groups, including approaches to the authorities at all levels. Golkar subordinated followers of Nur Hasan al-Ubaidah so that they canged thier names *Pondok Golkar*. The New Order regime designed *Islam Jamaah* through active participation of VIII Brawijaya Regional Military Commander Major General Wijoyo Suyono. On January 3, 1972 Islamic Jamaat alumni community agreed to form a new oranization so-called Lembaga Karyawan Islam (LEMKARI) for East Java; Karyawan Dakwah Islam (KADIM) for Jakarta region; and Lembaga Karyawan Dakwah Islam (LKDI) for west Java region. Some students of Nur Hasan al-Ubaidah in East Java, among them Nur Hasyim, R. Eddi Masiadi, Bahroni Hartanto, Soetjowirjoatmodjo, and Wijono, initiated the idea of forming an organization Lembaga Karyawan Islam (LEMKARI) an effort to intensify the activity of teaching is more open to the public. They then went to a notary who lived in Surabaya, Mudiomo, to create and sign the Deed of Establishment LEMKARI on January 3, 1972.

The various names of the institution in different areas are pursed into LEMKARI Foundation based on decisions made at a meeting of alumni of Pesantren LDII Burengan Kediri dated February 9 to 10, 1975. The structure of the organization was refined a year later through consultation work in Kediri on 2 to 3 February 1976. Unification of LEMKARI name and organizational improvement cannot be separated from the active role of Golkar Chairman, Amir Murtono, SH LEMKARI intimate relationship with Golkar continue in Election 1977,

1982, and 1987. However, the activists of LEMKARI denied their organization to be a continuation of *Islam Jamaah*.

LEMKARI existence raises a new strategy to approach the state-in this case the ruler who was then dominated by Golkar-to declare itself in Golkar. With a new name LEMKARI and sheltered under Golkar, the group was able to build an extensive network and freely to all corners of the archipelago. However, the challenge that must be faced is not yet over. LEMKARI again confronted with dissolution made by Governor of East Java, Soelarlo, by Decree No. 618 Year 1988. The dissolution was on December 25, 1988 due to the insistence of East Java MUI because LEMKARI was considered to disturb the public affairs.

The change of this movement name occurred again in 1990, the Great Council forum VI LEMKARI in Jakarta decided LEMKARI name turned into LDII. Rudini, the interior minister at the time, had a major role in the process of changing this name. Government intervention is based on several things. In addition to the similarity between the name of the Institute of Karatedo LEMKARI Indonesia is also due to people's anxiety factor was taken into account. MUI considered LEMKARI has similar ideology with Islam Jamaat. Prof. Dr. Ir. H. Abdullah Syam, M.Sc., Chairman of LDII this time, argued that the change of name LEMKARI to LDII also driven by the motivation to develop the message nationwide. LEMKARI seemed not to reflect national proselytizing activities but it was confined to certain groups. In article 8 of the LDII Articles of Association, stated that the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Institute in charge of proselytizing Islam based on the Quran and the Sunnah with all aspects of its practice and appreciation of religion in order to provide wisdom and encouragement to achieve organizational goals.

The change of LDII name is beneficial. Islamic groups who voice rejection began to subside. LDII also was getting closer to the government. Another development is the widespread dissemination LDII to have representation in 26 provinces in Indonesia. LDII also establish intensive communication with other religious organizations, such as NU, MUI, Muhammadiyah, Persis, and others. LDII structural consolidation is in line with the ideology of the update process. In this context, LDII positions Burengan boarding school as a base ideology and the ideology of the organization cadres' nursery center.

LDII organization was faced with the state and society that considers them as heresy group. This phenomenon encourages LDII to search for adaptation strategies that allow them to survive. This strategy is mainly done by changing into a more open organization under the auspices of the state while maintaining the various doctrines controversial although many assaults from other parties. Such options are considered sufficiently effective, given the country's position as a provider of the most authoritative legislation among other social area of social sectors that have meta-capital.

LDII game in power area is an effective strategy. Flows of capital exchanges with the state itself can be profitable for LDII, both materially and symbolically. In this case, LDII is able to play the religious and cultural capital in the form of organized religion and followers' fanaticism to be exchanged and converted into a collection of material and symbolic interest. As like other religious organizations, LDII in this case is a voluntary association as social capital that has a mass solidarity. The difference, in LDII social resources are managed well with bureaucracy and effective administration which in turn produces a quality of social capital and effective anyway.

Social capital is then supported by cultural capital. LDII has network management that can be reproduced through the cultures developed by LDII, such as cultural regeneration, the chain of command, and cultural observance of the charismatic leader. A system of cultural knowledge in the form of the community principle, loyalty, and the leader is a precious cultural capital. In addition, all the social networks of LDII are faith-based expansive networks spreading nationwide, for example, by sending preachers all over the country. Social and cultural capital is indeed valuable; it also has its own exchange rate and charges. Golkar is interested in the culture of command and obedience which is owned by LDII, in which culture was born from the typical LDII doctrine. In that condition, the state and LDII have an equally interest when the play exchange capital owned by each party. The conclusion has attracted the close relationship between the state and LDII that runs through the exchange of capital flows which are owned respectively. From the pattern of that research, it can be seen the strategies and dynamics in the body LDII as a result of the relational ties.

Under state protection, LDII even appeared much more expansive and capable of spreading its influence throughout Indonesia. In addition, as mentioned earlier, LDII repeatedly to change the outside look organizational identity without changing the substance of the motion and teachings. The strategy was also considered quite effective because it can get out of any bondage claims astray by bureaucracy and administration.

Strategies have been given the protection of the country at that time can also be influenced by other dominant groups which fight prompted the government to judge LDII.

LDII has been transformed into a religious organization in Indonesia, through penetration of the government that was played by Golkar. The state has indeed been “force” LDII to change so that LDII formulated its ideology from exclusive to inclusive. LDII is also able to care for their tradition of learning so that it becomes social capital to negotiate with the state.

In the Reformation era, when the political context changed, the old government and Golkar is no longer regarded as an effective security umbrella. Conditions that encourage LDII to untied with authorities and play a new strategy, namely by promoting a “new paradigm of LDII”. This strategy can be classed as a strategy called Bourdieu with succession, by way accommodates the dominant group in the hope it can be accepted to be part of the orthodox group. In this case, there is an interrelationship between the recognition of a group with the position of the community at large. If individuals or groups adopt a community position, then call it community recognition of collective values. Instead the community will give reward to the action by giving the advantage universalization or symbolic recognition. That’s where what is called the strategy of mutually reinforcing (mutual reinforcement strategy) (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 88).

After seeing the state as an arena of contestation or power arena that is always up for grabs, the state is no longer placed as one direction hegemonic bureaucratic nature. The state does have a legitimate monopoly of power, but the pattern of the relationship does not go in one direction. Similarly, the relation between religion and state, the relationship cannot be read as a process of domination and hegemony in one direction, in this case the dominance and hegemony of the religious state.

In relation to the state as the highest power arena, LDII is able to play a strategic role in approaching the state to escape from the confines and hegemony in the religious arena dominated by orthodox religious institutions. By taking refuge in the broader field of power, LDII hopes to get the symbolic capital of the country, in the form of recognition and protection. According to Bourdieu Capital is not only material issues such as money and wealth, but also educational, social networks, as well as cultural knowledge which has the same legal basis with the economy-in a sense can be accumulated, inherited, exchanged, and have an influence on other forms of material capital (Verter, 2003). In particular arena in which the field is where the production and distribution of capital, the state not only plays as a fighting arena, but also the arena of the transaction or exchange relationships between sellers and buyers of capital.

Dynamics and strategy played by LDII, with the state or with other religious groups, is a tangle of relationships that have an interest to position itself as a parallel group as orthodox. Good relations with the state done with the intention that LDII no longer seen as a splinter flow of Islam, but as part of the mainstream as big as NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, and others. Although these options do not go get the results, especially because of the ruler (New Order) who boarded has lost political and social legitimacy. LDII was then penetrated sweet relationship with religious groups. What was done by LDII by wearing “clothes of new paradigm” is actually still read as a strategic effort to raise social recognition of the breakaway group into groups aligned with other groups as orthodox religious institutions.

LDII now has been accepted by many, although still no impression and suspicion that still associate LDII with his past. LDII participation in important moments in the government and its role in relationships across religious organizations has a solid position where they are no longer as a community or a stream whose followers stoned or mosque torn down by the people. It is inconceivable that an organization that was born from a small study in Kediri community has been transformed into a new religious organization that has branches in almost all corners of the archipelago. LDII has changed its position from a community study which countrified, splinter flow, heterodox groups, become orthodox religious organizations that align with other orthodox groups.

Looking at the phenomenon of LDII community, describes the relationship between religion (read: komunitas agama) and the state experiencing ups and downs, when the country experienced a shift of power where power is no longer monopolized by the state, but spread to other institutions in the community. Religious communities also keep a distance from the state, but nevertheless the country with all the devices should provide protection against religious communities and give responsible freedom to express their beliefs.

5. Conclusion

The relationship between based-religious community organizations, LDII, and the state is a relation of two social entities who are conducting the exchange of social-cultural capital. This relationship has implications for the internal dynamics of LDII which is a part of the community adaptation strategy. LDII was associated with the

state as protector of its existence. The interest of the state or regime is utilizing social capital and cultural capital owned by LDII, as well as the ideology of members' obedience and network that are valuable to the country.

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