

Rent Seeking, Nonprofits and Criminal Hubs: The Case of Calabria

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Abstract

The study concerns rent seeking in the allocation of the Structural Funds for cultural development in the region of Calabria. The Regional planning following the European guidelines was very complex. Own cultural axis, officially oriented to promote tourism, consisted of three measures, each oriented to four goals, with five strategies for each goal and seven specific actions, each articulate in a number of sub-actions, without any clear priority. In the statistical analysis the variables relating to the most important cultural sites had no significance. Rent seeking relating to no profits, to criminal hubs, to construction interests, to employment of people was significant. It may explain the fragmentation of the projects. On the other hand, the presence of the best cultural sites was not important in the disbursement of funds for the criminal hubs. The anomalous discrepancy between allocation of funds and payments also could be explained as a rent seeking phenomenon. The centre-right Government spent funds for investment projects, the centre-left Government devoted funds to service projects and the employment of unskilled labor and intellectual labor.

Keywords: Rent seeking, Cultural goods, Tourism, Southern Italy

JEL Classification: H4; R1; Z1

1. Introduction

The study examines the rent seeking phenomena arising in the execution of the European Program 2000-2006 for the less developed European regions (so called Objective 1) (Note 1) focusing on the Operational Regional program (POR) of the Region of Calabria, Italy, as for the sector of cultural goods as tourism attractors. (Note 2). The focus on this Program is of particular interest because it was managed by a center-right regional government from 2000 until spring 2005 and by central-left regional government from spring 2005 to the end, so that one also may try to see if the change of Government from the centre right to the centre left has had an effect on the rent seeking. Calabria, (a 2 million inhabitants Region), in Southern Italy, is rich of cultural sites, dating from the archeological epoch, that are not enhanced and cultural tourism could be an important factor for economic growth. On the other hand Calabria is the headquarter of the most powerful Italian criminal organization of mafia type, i.e. n'drangheta. (Note 3) Independent variables were constructed to capture the main observable sources of rent seeking in the various municipalities: i.e. their voting weight, the presence of no profits and criminal hubs, the presence of members of the Regional junta ruling Calabria. To these variables, was added, the presence in the municipality of important cultural sites, that could have actually justified the allocation of funds. The variable “cultural sites” was crossed with the variable criminal hubs to observe if the allocation of funds of municipalities, hosting these hubs, could be justified by their nature. The variable “type of government” was tested at regional level and observes whether it made difference about project types approved, distinguishing them in investment projects and service projects: the first most popular was about pro business Governments, and the second most popular with Governments interested to sustain employment. It resulted that the most important rent seeking variables (voting weight), no profits, criminal hubs, type of government were relevant, while the variable “cultural sites” was not relevant, both and as a per se variable and in association with the variable criminal hubs.

The study is divided in seven sections. Section 2 provides a brief survey of economic literature on the issues dealt with in the study. Section 3 provides a brief survey of the European Regional Funds Policy, and a detailed exam of

Calabria 's Regional program 2000-2006 for objective 1, as for the section regarding the culture. It also presents the major cultural sites of Calabria. Section 4 presents information on the statistical methodology adopted. Section 5 provides empirical results documenting the nature and extension of the rent seeking. Section 6 presents the final remarks, policy implications. Section 7 gives some suggestions for future researches.

2. Survey of literature

On the EU Structural funds for the regional policies, see Cini (2003) (2007) (2010). The European Community is optimistic about the results of these regional policies, particularly for the less developed Objective 1 regions. See the Commission Staff Working Document 2009. But academic literature on the argument tends to demonstrate disappointing results. Some experts argue that the results are poor in case of regions with weak institutions but in other cases are better than them. A research of Basile, De Nardis, and Berardi of 2001 of ISAE, the Official Economic Research Centre of the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance, demonstrated that in spite of the huge amount of public aid to the poor regions of EU, the distribution of income, labour productivity and employment rates didn't show a positive relation with the allocation of the EU structural regional funds, in particular in the nineties. Boldrin and Canova (2001) argue that these policies operated mostly as transfer with redistributive and assistance purposes rather than serving as agents to simulate a genuine growth. Puga (2002) observed that, in spite of the large expenditures on European regional policies, economic disparities remained or even widened, mainly because of factors connected with Location Theory. Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2003), showed that the results of the investments in infrastructures and business support were not significant and that just investment in education and human capital had medium term positive and significant returns. Bjorvatn and Coniglio (2006) and Bjorvatn and Coniglio (2007) maintain that (not only in Europe) the policies to promote regional development very often had disappointing results generally, and they connect them with the weakness of the institutions. In many cases, targeted policies create rents that attract rent seekers, so that broad base policies would be more appropriate. More targeted plans should be adopted for regions with strong institutions. A less drastic point of view is that of Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, and Verspagen (2003) Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, Verspagen have a less drastic point of view, who sustain that EU regional policies had significant positive impact on the growth of less developed European regions, and that the effects are much better in more developed environment. Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) argue that structural regional funds of the EU have had a positive effect in case of less rich European countries), like Greece, and they add that the most corrupted countries didn't gain less economic growth from the structural funds. They say that many of those who receive the structural funds are not really eligible and, therefore, they use these funds inefficiently. Loddo (2006), with a simplified econometric analysis, argues that the poorer regions in Italy in the 1994-2004 period caught up with the richer regions and that the European structural funds had a role in this convergence. However, agricultural funds had only a transitory positive effect, while the resources allocated had dubious effects for the support of employment, education and human capital in order to the distributional point-of-view. Since the nineties, there has been extensive literature in Italy on the disappointing results of the policies to promote the economic growth of Southern Italy.

On this theme see: Giannola and Imbriani (eds., 2003), Lo Cicero and Reganati (2003), Viesti (2003), Viesti (2009), Viesti and Protta (2009).

V&V-LSE (2007) shows that, in the period 2000-2001, the Objective 1 regions of Southern Italy grew at the rate of 1.23% per year while those of the Centre North grew at a rate of 1.24% and the EU-15 grew at the rate of 1.96%. According to SVIMEZ (2009) and SVIMEZ (2010), the European and Italian public interventions for the development of Southern Italy, in a large part have failed to reduce the disparities between the Northern and Southern regions, and the regional funds haven't met their objectives. Cancelo, Faina, and Lopez-Rodriguez (2009) sustain that EU regional funds have been effective to promote growth in case of Galicia, a Spanish peripheral region of Objective 1. Borbala-Szabo (2007), on the other hand (on the opposite), maintains that in Hungary the EU regional policies impact on economic growth has been disappointing. Ederveen and Gorter (2002), Ederveen, Gortyer and De Mooji (2002) and Ederveen, De Groot and Nahuis (2006) extensive econometric analysis show mixed results from distributive and the growth points-of-view, and they add that impact of these policies on the national policies to reduce regional disparities has been negative. Tugores (2008), considering the EU-15 global macroeconomic results, concludes that the contribution of EU regional policy to the convergence among states is unquestionable in case of Spain, and that they have been a factor of the high growth of Ireland. However, he notices that there hasn't been a convergence among regions inside the states, and he underlines the risk of the resources placed at service of cohesion may wind up in the hands of specific interests through rent seeking.

This point leads to the consideration of rent seeking. Krueger (1974) notices that for less developed economies, rent seeking is the substitute for the missing stimulus of profit seeking. About rent seeking practices in EU regional policies see Bjorvatn and Coniglio (2006) and Bjorvatn and Coniglio (2007), who argue that regional focused policies are fertile ground for rent seeking. Outside the EU, rent seeking in regional policies has been analyzed from

the point of view of its creation. Zaoostrovseva (2003) viewed it as a negative phenomenon for Russia considering the St. Petersburg region. Golley (2007), regarding Chinese regional policies, argues that rent seeking may be a positive phenomenon, by the economic growth point of view, when there is a “market enhancement” policy with strategies to concentrate public intervention in favour of market in specific areas, but it is negative when there is by-product of extensive and capillary dirigisme. Fisher (2006) connects the perverse effects of rent seeking to growth policies in Africa with institutional weaknesses. On the rich literature on rent seeking after the seminal works of J.M. Buchanan, G. Tullock, and Niskanen see Cogleton, Hillman and Konrad (eds., 2008). According to SVIMEZ (2009) and SVIMEZ (20019), the poor results of the European regional funds come from that a part of them, due to the complexity of the procedures, were not expended before time limit and were diverted to other end and on the opposite because the part was spent with these complex procedures, was not allocated properly.

In the specialized economic literature on cultural goods and tourism there are several contributions that emphasize the importance of the cultural goods as tourism flows attractors. See, for example, Goldoni, Rispoli, and Troncon (eds., 2006), Colbert (2000), Kotler and Scott (1998), Nantel and Colbert (1992), Grossi and Debbia (eds., 1998), Diggles (1986) and Hirshmann (1983). More generally, see Forte and Mantovani (2004). On the specific theme of this research, regional fund policies in the area of cultural goods and tourism development in Southern Italy, the literature is not equally developed. However, see V&V and LSE (2007), Mantovani (2010) and Ferrari and Cariola (2001).

A more recent analysis on touristic flows, public expenditure on cultural heritages, and Italian regional public policies is in Forte, Magazzino, and Mantovani (2010).

3. Calabria’s POR for cultural goods as attractors of tourism and as endowment of cultural treasuries of Calabria

The program presented in “Axis II “ of Calabria’s POR, is divided in three ”measures”. Measure 2.1 was devoted to interventions for the preservation and enhancement of cultural heritage the most part of the investments, measure 2.2 to public services for the enhancement of cultural heritage, and measure 2.3 was reserved to entrepreneurial initiatives in the field of cultural heritage. Measure 1 and 3, were both administered by the Regional Department of Tourism because the projects, formally, had to be judged from the point of view of the enhancement of tourism. Cultural tourism is very important for the Italian national economy, but up to this point it has had a very limited role in Calabria. Yet, its main archeological sites, museums and monuments are extremely important at the international level. It has got seven important archaeological parks: Sybaris, Capo Colonna, Solacium, Locri and Monasterace and a major Archeological Museum in Reggio Calabria. In addition, it has got an extremely interesting “defensive system”, consisting of castles and towers built by the Normans and others from the ninth century B.C. (consisting of castles and towers, some of them built by the Normans while many others from the ninth century B.C.) Project funds for the development of entrepreneurial initiatives are granted within the limits of the *de minimis* rule. So that they must be small and the dispersion of the funds is inherent to this part of the program.

The program has been organized by four goals, five programmatic strategies for each goal and seven specific actions, each of them articulate in a number of sub-actions. The sum allocated on the European was 231 million Euro, to which a similar amount was allocated by the Italian Central and Regional Government, a large amount of money for the Calabrian cultural sites, but per se could hardly justify the complex articulation plan. On the other hand, from this construct did not emerged clearly defined priorities. And, due to the complexity of the program, only about one-half of the public funds was actually assigned to projects at the end of 2007.

The four goals are described in an emphatic and vague language as follows.

- a) Construction of networks for the enjoyment of cultural and historical heritage, in accordance with already planned network initiatives, and to identify meaningful property at the regional level where to focus project resources in order to conserve, protect, and enhance them.
- b) Generate managerial services of both public institutions and private entrepreneurs to meet the demand of residents and tourists for cultural heritage resources.
- c) Qualify and support the training of technical and scientific figures tied to the heritage and cultural tourism sector, primarily (especially) for cultural management (organization of cultural institutions and utility companies) and management services for the dissemination of local knowledge (tour services).
- d) Develop companies and organizations (public and private, profit and no-profit cultural foundations) relating to the conservation, enhancement, and management of the development of services that combine the benefits of tourism with cultural resources.

Each of the four goals has to be implemented by the following five program strategies:

- a) Concentrating resources around cultural emergencies, identified as key exploitable resources, while preserving and restoring of heritage buildings, archeological site, and geographical landscapes.
- b) Enhance regional cultural identities through the wide range of arts, entertainment, and culture for social and economic development.
- c) Provide the region with infrastructure resources, such as physical resources, techniques, methods of intervention, advanced services, and other “horizontal” factors such as knowledge and training of cultural heritage.
- d) Create an interconnected function system to strengthen the cultural whole (the network of archeological areas, coastal castles, regional libraries, *a.s.o.*.
- e) Fostering entrepreneurship in innovated private management services that specialize in the integration between tourism and cultural heritage.

The four program objectives are articulated in five program strategies and they must be realized by seven types of actions.

- a) Enhancement of the archeological heritage of Ancient Greece.
- b) Establish a network of archeology of the Magna Graecia region for the management, enhancement and protection of archaeological sites and archaeological museums. In particular, the enhancement of the archaeological site of Sybaris is of primary importance.
- c) Create theme parks related to archaeological sites through the construction of adequate facilities for their use (Note 4).
- d) Recovery, development, and reutilization of the most valuable elements of architectural and landscape heritage (both public and private) for the purpose of establishing infrastructure and equipment aimed at improving and promoting architectural heritage for culture, tourism, local craft, and publishing.
- e) Redevelopment of historic centers through the recycling of abandoned buildings for the purpose of cultural tourism, and promoting news business activities in the sector of cultural heritage.
- f) Construction of multipurpose centers for the integration of cultural activities and entertainment. These centers must be located in buildings restored as part of the architectural heritage priority.
- g) Protection of the landscape through projects aimed at recovery and enhancement of the landscape in both areas of high valued cultural heritage and in areas with projects planned by the regional ecological network (Note 5)

Each action must take into consideration the following six sub-actions.

1. Promotion and implementation of innovative initiatives that enhance the cultural heritage and local identities.
2. Events of significant cultural and anthropological value.
3. Preserving ethnic minorities who have maintained important features of the cultures of origin
4. Activities related to the ancient tradition of craft production, music, the production of pastoral farmers cultural objects, and local foods.
5. Preserving oral traditions.
6. Promotion and creation of cultural networks.

Such kind of program, the rent seeking could find justification in referring to some of the paragraphs of the “economic plan”. And (So) the finely targeted economic plan could overlook its true priorities.

The endowment of cultural goods of Calabria, above-mentioned, is very important both in the area of archaeological sites which (that) begin with the pre-Greek era and in that of the ancient castles some of them dating from the 900 a.C. The list of the most important cultural goods that we are going to use here, for the variable cultural sites, consists of a list made by the Italian Ministry of Arts and Cultural Goods (MIBAC) integrated with other cultural sites of notable importance selected by a team of experts of the University of Reggio Calabria. It consists of, among others, old castles still preserved not included in the MIBAC’s list, an important Opera Theatre and a cultural centre dedicated to Leonida Repaci a famous Italian writer, who was born in the region, active in the XX century. We have adopted this extended list rather than the MIBAC’s list to avoid the possible critics for having considered an *ad hoc* overly restrictive notion of cultural sites.

4. Statistical methodology

This section will employ statistical analysis in order to shed light on the rent seeking variables and the cultural variables that may have determined the allocation of Calabria’s POR 2000-2006 Axis II funds devoted to cultural goods as tourism attractors. The dependent variables considered are the number of projects and the amount of Euro

allocated. The primary (basic) independent variables considered are no-profit institutions, criminal hubs, major cultural sites, and municipalities with a regional government member connection.

Testing was conducted through statistical analysis, including independent sample t-tests and binomial correlations. Independent variables were constructed to capture the main observable sources of rent seeking in the various municipalities. The main considered sources were the municipalities' voting weight, the connection of members of the regional government ruling in Calabria by specific municipalities, and the presence of no-profit organizations and of criminal hubs (Note 6). The presence of important cultural sites was also considered, as an allocation of funds to important cultural sites can be considered justifiable. In qualitative testing, the variable "type of government" was tested to see whether one government favored a type of project instead of others. Projects were distinguished as either construction or service-based: the first that was more popular with pro-business governments and the second that was more popular with governments interests in sustaining employment. The Results showed that the majority of considered rent seeking variables no-profits, criminal hubs, type of government were relevant, while the variable "cultural sites" was not relevant, both in general terms and when they were tested with specific focus on criminal hubs.

Tested projects funded from the POR 2000-2006 Axis 2 and were considered "non continuous" projects, that means they had a specific deadline. This specification allowed for simplified testing and analysis. Testing was comprised of bivariate correlations and two independent simple t-tests, which compares variable means of two data categories. All statistical significances were taken at a 95% confidence level.

In order to attain a thorough statistical depiction of the fund allocation correlations and t-tests were organized into two primary levels of analysis. The first is the municipal level. Each case corresponded with one of the 409 Calabria's municipalities that were able to receive funds. (Note 7) This type of research allows us to know why some municipalities got projects and others did not. The second is the project level. Here we also test which variables influenced the kind of project, which were construction-related investment projects and service projects.

The variables considered were population (Note 8), the number of major cultural sites in cultural hubs, which were municipalities with at least one major cultural sites (see Table A), the number of no-profit institutions (Note 9), project imports, project payments, the number of projects (Table D), the percent vote to the winning presidential party in the 2000 and 2005 regional elections (in the Regional Election 2000 and 2005) (Note 10), criminal hubs (see Table G), Chiaravalloti (centre-right party) regional government connection and Loiero (centre-left party) regional government connection (Note 11). The municipality "government connection" variable was attributed to any municipality that was the hometown of a member of the regional government. The dependent variables of the analysis were imports, payments, and projects. It is important to distinguish "imports" (the initially planned amount of euro allocation to a single projects), and "payments" (the final amount actually disbursed to a project because many projects failed to move past their initial stage and therefore received only a share of the planned import as its final payment).

5. Empirical Results

The tests (see Table B) showed that imports, payments, projects, and no-profit institutions were positively correlated with population. So, in order to eliminate the Bias caused by the size of the population of the various municipalities, while the remaining tests were conducted in *per capita* terms.

Statistical analysis showed that cultural sites were not major influencers of fund allocation. Table B-C tests 5-6 tested for correlations between imports, payments, and projects *per capita* and number of cultural sites. There was no correlation between these variables. The lack of connection between cultural sites and fund allocation was further established with tests 7-11, which were a series of t-tests at both the municipal and project levels. The tests found that cultural hubs did not receive significantly higher projects *per capita*, and that projects within cultural hubs did not receive significantly higher imports or payments than those in non cultural hubs. The only variable that was statistically significant was imports at the project level for construction-related investment projects, but payments at the same level and for the same type of projects, on the other hand, were not statistically significant. This means that while it was originally planned for cultural hubs to receive significantly more euro for investment projects more than for non cultural hubs, in the end, the planned construction-related investment projects in cultural hubs had a higher chance of remaining incomplete. On average, in fact, non cultural hubs municipalities received 68% of the initial imports in payment while cultural hubs received only 45%. This may have been due to errors in the conceptions of the projects, mismanagement or lack of initiative in pursuing the given objectives. Morally hazardous behavior to get the first project payment may also provide an explanation because the project's private counterpart had to participate in a pre-groundbreaking feasibility study and provide preliminary services.

Rent seeking by no-profit institutions proved to be important to the allocation POR funds. Tests 12-14 in Table C show that imports, payments, and projects *per capita* were all highly correlated with the no-profit *per capita*. In

other words, in the municipalities with the higher number of no-profit *per capita*, there was a higher amount of funds allocated and disbursed. The number of projects was also correlated with the number of no-profits that is should be a logical result if the competition among no-profits reaches its end with a dispersion of the funds in many small projects in favor of an high number of rent seekers in the attempt by the politicians and the bureaucrats to minimize any discontent. This result is confirmed by the regression of the municipalities that received funds that shows a negative relation between the presence of no-profits and the amount *per capita*

At first sight, it appears that criminal hubs did not impact decisions for POR funding. The test, *for the municipalities that obtained projects*, did not show a preference for criminal hubs in comparison with the municipalities without criminal that obtain hubs, as for the imports and payments *per capita* (see Table D in Appendix, in the section on “Municipalities that obtained projects. But, looking at the data in Table D, in the “All Municipalities” section it is evident that criminal hubs *as a whole* received *per capita* more imports and payments *per capita* on average than all the other Calabria’s municipalities. *Per capita*, the amount obtained by the subset of “all municipalities” with criminal hubs, was 113.64 euro instead of the subset of “all municipalities” without criminal hubs that was about 83.73 euro. The results are similar for the amount actually spent. And an analogous result there was for the share of the 409 Calabria’s municipalities that received funds on Axis II for Culture, of the Calabria’s POR of the 72 Calabria’s municipalities with criminal hubs, those who obtained funds were 54 i.e. 75%. Of the 337 Calabria’s municipalities without criminal hubs, 156 i.e. a mere 46,29% obtained projects (see Table D in the section on “Municipalities that obtained projects”).). Also as for the assignment of the 539 projects, the municipalities with criminal hubs were preferred. Indeed 259 projects i.e. 48,05 % were assigned to municipalities with criminal hubs representing 17,6% of the total while 287 i.e. 51,09% were assigned to the municipalities without criminal hubs representing 82,40% of the total.

Considering, now, the municipalities that obtained projects in Table D, one of them is struck by the huge difference between the criminal hubs and the other municipalities, both of them for the total amounts committed and paid to them and for the amounts *per project*. As we can see, Criminal hubs obtained an amount of funds 4 times greater than the other municipalities. And the payments to them were 3,86 % greater. The average amount committed for the 539 projects approved on this Axis II for Culture was about 365,490 euro. However for the 259 projects assigned to municipalities with criminal hubs it was about 444,000 euro (122% higher than the average). For the municipalities without criminal hubs was only 290,290(79% of the average) As for the payments received, the average amount *per project* was 291,280 euro. For the municipalities with criminal hubs it was 357,143 euro (119% higher than the average), while for the other municipalities it was 233.445 euro (about 82% of the average). The greater difference between the ratio of the amounts committed and the amounts paid in the municipalities with criminal hubs as compared with the other municipalities, is due to the grater relevance of unfinished projects. One way of profiting from the European funds consisted of minimizing the co-financing component, which was possible through leaving incomplete the investment projects.

Considering now the section of Table D on the Criminal Hubs-Municipalities with or without cultural sites, we can see that out of the 259 projects assigned to these municipalities only 39 were given to municipalities with cultural sites. On the other hand the amount committed to them was 62 million as against the 53 to all the other projects in these municipalities. So that the share for the cultural sites was about 54%. However this partial readjustment in favor of the cultural sites disappears when we consider the amounts actually spent: 38 million for the municipalities with cultural sites and 52 for the other municipalities. So that we can conclude that the cultural sites in the municipalities with criminal hubs were damaged rather than helped by this Por, because many of the projects for them remained unfinished.

Tests 19-32 (Tables E) all concluded with negative results, which suggests that there are no statistically significant differences between Loiero and Chiaravalloti government connected municipalities compared to other municipalities. These results applied from import, payment, projects, and no-profits *per capita* at the municipal level to imports and payments for construction-related investments and service projects at the project level.

However, it was found that the Chiravalloti’s government allocated all of the funds dedicated to Measure 2.1 projects and that the Loiero government allocated at least 76% of Measure 2.2 projects. (Note 11) So, this strongly suggests that the Chiaravalloti had an agenda for investment projects over service projects. Loiero government (Table F) had an agenda for service projects.

Regarding construction-related investment projects, only 58.4% of the initial import was ultimately awarded. Service projects, where there was no co-financing by the beneficiaries, experienced an higher final payment percentage of the initial imports (81.3%). The fact that the entire amount was not disbursed probably means that many of these projects did not appear serious enough to be financed until their completion.

6. Concluding remarks and policy implications

As the empirical analysis showed, there is a significant statistical relation between the presence of no-profits in the different municipalities and the allocation of the projects both as for their imports and payments. But, in considering the municipalities that received funds, the regression shows a negative relation between the presence of no-profits and the amount *per capita*. Likely the competition among these rent seekers has reduced the *per capita* amounts of the funds received in their municipalities, in the attempt of public authorities of accommodating most of them to the table of the beneficiaries. Thus one may argue that rent seeking of the local pressure groups has been an important factor in the dispersion of funds, which also results in the deviation from their proper objectives to promote the important cultural sites and to employ them in cultural projects that may function as attractor of tourism.

Criminal hubs seem to have been relevant as for the distribution of the funds as the municipalities while criminal hubs have received a greater amount of funds and projects than the other municipalities. There has been a large spread between allocation and payments. In this way, the beneficiaries of the projects extracted a greater benefit from their rent seeking activity, because minimized their co-financing. On the other hand there wasn't a predominance for the expenditure for the cultural sites in the criminal hubs. And the Region has not promoted a policy for the enhancement of the cultural level of the criminal hubs.

While there is no significant statistical relation between the municipalities of residence of the members of the centre right or the centre left juntas, rent seeking appears to emerge as for the significant difference in the allocation of funds by the two Regional Governments. The centre-right Government spent the funds mostly for investment projects in construction. This kind of industry is one of the most important in a region as Calabria and it is likely to exert a particular influence on a centre-right political coalition. The centre-left Government devoted the funds to service projects and the unemployment of both unskilled labor and intellectual labor is another characteristic of the region. And employment policy is a priority for governments leaning to the left. It should be noted that this increase of employment is only temporary and that the investment policies in cultural projects were to a large extent wasted because a share of them remained unfinished and because no priority had been observed on the allocation of the funds. Indeed, as noted, no statistical relation has been found between the allocation of the funds and the major cultural sites and there has not been a preferential allocation of the funds as for the important cultural sites present in the criminal hubs.

7. Suggestions for future research

There is a strong need for further research on rent seeking practices in the allocation of European Structural Funds in general, and in Italy in particular. Indeed, as the literature shows, these ambitious programs failed their convergence objective to a large extent, particularly in the underdeveloped regions of developed countries like Italy. One of the most important reasons of this failure is that this type of planning might give rise to rent seeking and other related anomalies in research management.

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Notes

Note 1. under the Community Support Framework (CSF)

Note 2. Axis II of Calabria's POR 2000-2006

Note 3. The name *ndrangheta* is a corruption of the ancient Greek expression *Andros Agathos*, which means men of honor. Actually the original stronghold of *ndrangheta* is in an area of Calabria where the ancient Greek dialect is still spoken.

Note 4. These three actions must be accomplished through:

1. Feasibility studies and implementation projects.
2. Rehabilitation of archeological sites and the restoration of museums and artifacts.
3. Assistance for the construction of infrastructure and facilities.
4. Architectural Heritage and Landscape.

Note 5. This measure supports the implementation of initiatives of national importance and visibility, realized by partnerships of public and private agencies that promote cultural heritage regional and local identities, to attract flows of cultural tourism.

Note 6. Criminal hubs were considered any municipality that is known as stronghold for organized criminal activity. The list official comes from the Nicola Gratteri study Fratelli di Sangue.

Note 7. The data set available in the web site of the Calabria's Region .

Note 8. ISTAT DAWINCI Database.

Note 9. ISTAT DWGIS Database..

Note 10. Ministero dell'Interno Election Archives.

Note 11. Region of Calabria Website. Giunta Page.

Table A. Cultural Sites of Calabria by Municipality and Province

Cultural Site	Municipality	Province
1. Archeological park of Scolacium	BORGIA	CATANZARO
2. Archeological Museum of Lamezia (Neolithic)	LAMEZIA TERME	
3. Norman Castle	SQUILLACE	
4. State Archeological Museum	AMENDOLARA	COSENZA
5. Archeological Park of Sibari	CASSANO ALL'IONIO	
6. Sibarite's National Archeological Museum	CASSANO ALL'IONIO	
7. Cosenza's National Gallery	COSENZA	
8. Norman Swew Castle	COSENZA	
9. Antiquarium of Scalea - Torre Cimalonga	SCALEA	
10. Norman Castle	CORIGLIANO	
11. Maritime Aragon Castle	BELVEDERE	
12. Swew Castle	ROSETO	
13. Pathirion	ROSSANO	
14. Nao Tower	CROTONE	
15. National Archeological Museum	CROTONE	
16. Le Castella	ISOLA DI CAPO RIZZUTO	
17. Norman Castle	SANTA SEVERINA	
18. Church of Saint Francis of Assisi	GERACE	
19. Church of Saint Giovannello	GERACE	
20. "Centocamere" Archeological area	LOCRI	REGGIO DI CALABRIA
21. Greek Roman Theater	LOCRI	
22. National Archeological Museum	LOCRI	
23. Archeological area	MONASTERACE	
24. Leonida Repaci's Cultural house	PALMI	
25. Aragon Castle	REGGIO DI CALABRIA	
26. Cilea's Municipal Theater	REGGIO DI CALABRIA	
27. National Archeological Museum	REGGIO DI CALABRIA	
28. The Catholic ((La Cattolica)	STILO	
29. Ruffo' Castle	SCILLA	
30. State Museum	MILETO	VIBO VALENTIA
31. National Archeological Museum	VIBO VALENTIA	
32. Norman Swew Castle	VIBO VALENTIA	
33. Murat's Museum	PIZZO	
34. Murat Castle	PIZZO	
35. Cistercensis Convent	SERRA SAN BRUNO	

Source: University of Reggio Calabria: Department of Law, Economics and History

Table B. Test Details for Variables Requiring Controlled Testing at the municipal Level

Test #	Level	Focus	Test	Variables Tested	Mean	Standard Deviation	Conditions	Significance
1	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	Import	263652.8773	829885.251	r(407)=.649, p<.001	Yes
				Population	4918.00978	12191.92501		
2	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	Payment	168793.3095	578977.2679	r(407)=.644, p<.001	Yes
				Population	4918.00978	12191.92501		
3	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	Nonprofits	15.84596577	53.43984376	r(407)=.947, p<.001	Yes
				Population	4918.00978	12191.92501		
4	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	Projects	0.750611247	1.834154683	r(407)=.773, p<.001	Yes
				Population	4918.00978	12191.92501		

Source: our calculations

Table C. Test Details for Cultural Sites and Nonprofit Institutions

Test #	Level	Focus	Test	Groups	Variables Tested	Mean	Standard Deviation	Conditions	Significance
5	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Import per capita	76.65711571	349.0121898	r(407)=.051, p=.301	No
					Cultural Sites	0.083129584	0.361008915		
6	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Payment per capita	50.17762088	169.7859754	r(407)=.023, p=.638	No
					Cultural Sites	0.083129584	0.361008915		
7	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Projects per capita	0.000239162	0.000842168	r(407)=.012, p=.805	No
					Cultural Sites	0.083129584	0.361008915		
8	MUNICIPAL	Overall	T-Test	Cultural Hubs vs Non Cultural Hubs	Import per capita	181.914281	285.7447027	t(407)=1.559, p=.120	No
						69.80443568	351.9571151		
					Payment per capita	82.26193164	175.3676609	t(407)=.975, p=.330	No
						48.08879856	169.4410029		
					Projects per capita	0.000322192	0.000416972	t(407)=.508, p=.612	No
						0.000233756	0.000862651		
Nonprofit per capita	0.003271259	0.001499017	t(407)=1.448, p=.149	No					
	0.002803625	0.001569126							
9	PROJECT	Overall	T-Test	Cultural Hubs vs Non Cultural Hubs	Import	398116.772	571078.8585	t(132.16)=.849, p=.397	No
						337670.958	503184.6204		
					Payment	224841.5001	349274.6561	t(304)=-.036, p=.971	No
						226596.0204	384277.9269		
10	PROJECT	Construction Projects	T-Test	Cultural Hubs vs Non Cultural Hubs	Import	746905.1822	687336.0564	t(161)=2.268, p=.025	Yes
						459017.2351	584667.2318		
					Payment	294799.0252	342191.7584	t(161)=-.015, p=.988	No
						296150.6287	458249.1707		
11	PROJECT	Service Projects	T-Test	Cultural Hubs vs Non Cultural Hubs	Import	229950.9314	417595.6796	t(78.483)=1.335, p=.186	No
						147980.2261	239387.1805		
					Payment	191111.9791	350663.8797	t(73.615)=1.447, p=.152	No
						117866.9775	178729.7751		
12	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Import per capita	76.65711571	349.0121898	r(407)=.298, p<.001	Yes
					Nonprofits per capita	0.002832209	0.001567179		
13	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Payment per Capita	50.17762088	169.7859754	r(407)=.238, p<.001	Yes
					Nonprofits per capita	0.002832209	0.001567179		
14	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Projects per capita	0.000239162	0.000842168	r(407)=.280, p<.001	Yes
					Nonprofits per capita	0.002832209	0.001567179		

Source: our calculations

Table D. The place of the criminal hubs in the projects

ALL MUNICIPALITIES			
	CRIMINAL HUBS	OTHERS	TOTAL
NUMBER	72	337	409
%	17.60	82.40	100
POPULATION Amount	1,019,235	989,765	2,009,000
PROJECTS Number	259	280	539
%	48.05	51.09	100
AMOUNT COMMITTED millions	115.8	81.2	197
%	58.78	41.22	100
AMOUNT PAID millions	90.0	67.0	157
%	57.32	42.68	100
AMOUNT PER CAPITA COMMITTED	113.64	82.10	98.05
%	115.90	83.73	100
AMOUNT PER CAPITA PAID	88.32	67.74	78.15
%	113.01	86.67	100
MUNICIPALITIES THAT OBTAINED PROJECTS			
	CRIMINAL HUBS	OTHERS	TOTAL
NUMBER	54	156	210
% of the same municipalities	75.00	46.29	51.34
POPULATION Amount	918,000	637,000	1,565
%	63.70%	44.30	100
PROJECTS			
Number per municipality	4.79	1.82	2.56
%	1.87	0.71	100
AMOUNT COMMITTED per project	447,000	290,290	365,491
%	122.30	79.42	100
Per municipality	2,144,570	523,041	940,005
%	228.085	55.63	100
AMOUNT PAID Per project	347,490	238,285	291,280
%	119.30	81.78	100
Per municipality	1,666,666	429,487	747,619
%	222.92	57.42	100
AMOUNT PER CAPITA COMMITTED	113.62	127.44	125.87
%	83.11	101.24	100.00
AMOUNT PER CAPITA PAID	88.80	104.00	100.31
%	88.52	103.67	100.00
CRIMINAL HUBS WITH AND WITHOUT CULTURAL SITES			
	WITH CULTURAL	WITHOUT CULTURAL	TOTAL
NUMBER	12	42	54
PROJECTS number	21	238	259
AMOUNT COMMITTED millions	62	53	115
%	53.91	46.08	100
AMOUNT PAID millions	38	52	90
%	44.23	57.77	100

Source Our Calculation on Por (2009) and Gratteri an Nicaso (2007)

Table E. Test Details for Chiravalloti Municipalities

Test #	Level	Focus	Test	Groups	Variables Tested	Mean	Standard Deviation	Conditions	Significance																																																																																																																														
19	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Import per capita	76.65711571	349.0121898	r(407)=.000, p=.996	No																																																																																																																														
					2000 Winning Party Vote	13.31384714	13.31384714			20	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Payment per capita	50.17762088	169.7859754	r(407)=-.005, p=.912	No	2000 Winning Party Vote	13.31384714	13.31384714	21	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Projects per capita	0.000239162	0.000842168	r(407)=-.032, p=.516	No	2000 Winning Party Vote	13.31384714	13.31384714	22	MUNICIPAL	Overall	T-Test	2000 Government vs Non 2000 Government Municipalities	Import per capita	167.8396359	320.6699529	t(407)=.836, p=.404	No	Payment per capita	96.32637494	259.5348482	t(407)=.870, p=.385	No	Projects per capita	0.000249823	0.000376421	t(407)=.040, p=.968	No	Nonprofits per capita	0.000238895	0.000850799	t(407)=.975, p=.330	No	23	PROJECT	Overall	T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	443840.68	693836.001	t(46.385)=.992, p=.361	No		340176.78	490574.373	t(304)=-.095, p=.924	No	Payment	226923.74	362442.18				220925.98	450132.405			24	PROJECT	Construction Projects	T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	893725.96	1001117.65	t(13.75)=1.56, p=.141	No		470339.73	551257.75	t(161)=.17, p=.865	No	Payment	294124.62	413018.89				315106.46	687320.38			25	PROJECT	Service Projects	T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	210566.83	272061.58	t(141)=.544, p=.587	No		172984.72	333533.2	t(141)=.563, p=.575	No	Payment	172091.65	261274.78				140605.37	262040.23		
20	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Payment per capita	50.17762088	169.7859754	r(407)=-.005, p=.912	No																																																																																																																														
					2000 Winning Party Vote	13.31384714	13.31384714			21	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Projects per capita	0.000239162	0.000842168	r(407)=-.032, p=.516	No	2000 Winning Party Vote	13.31384714	13.31384714	22	MUNICIPAL	Overall	T-Test	2000 Government vs Non 2000 Government Municipalities	Import per capita	167.8396359	320.6699529	t(407)=.836, p=.404	No	Payment per capita	96.32637494	259.5348482						t(407)=.870, p=.385	No	Projects per capita	0.000249823	0.000376421	t(407)=.040, p=.968	No	Nonprofits per capita	0.000238895	0.000850799	t(407)=.975, p=.330	No	23	PROJECT	Overall	T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	443840.68	693836.001						t(46.385)=.992, p=.361	No		340176.78	490574.373	t(304)=-.095, p=.924	No	Payment	226923.74	362442.18				220925.98	450132.405			24	PROJECT	Construction Projects						T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	893725.96	1001117.65	t(13.75)=1.56, p=.141	No		470339.73	551257.75	t(161)=.17, p=.865	No	Payment	294124.62	413018.89				315106.46	687320.38								25	PROJECT	Service Projects	T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	210566.83	272061.58	t(141)=.544, p=.587	No		172984.72	333533.2	t(141)=.563, p=.575	No	Payment	172091.65	261274.78
21	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Projects per capita	0.000239162	0.000842168	r(407)=-.032, p=.516	No																																																																																																																														
					2000 Winning Party Vote	13.31384714	13.31384714			22	MUNICIPAL	Overall	T-Test	2000 Government vs Non 2000 Government Municipalities	Import per capita	167.8396359	320.6699529	t(407)=.836, p=.404	No	Payment per capita	96.32637494	259.5348482						t(407)=.870, p=.385	No	Projects per capita	0.000249823	0.000376421	t(407)=.040, p=.968	No	Nonprofits per capita	0.000238895	0.000850799	t(407)=.975, p=.330	No	23	PROJECT	Overall	T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	443840.68	693836.001	t(46.385)=.992, p=.361	No		340176.78	490574.373						t(304)=-.095, p=.924	No	Payment	226923.74	362442.18				220925.98	450132.405			24	PROJECT	Construction Projects	T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	893725.96	1001117.65	t(13.75)=1.56, p=.141	No		470339.73	551257.75				t(161)=.17, p=.865	No	Payment	294124.62	413018.89						315106.46	687320.38			25	PROJECT	Service Projects	T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	210566.83	272061.58	t(141)=.544, p=.587	No		172984.72	333533.2	t(141)=.563, p=.575	No	Payment	172091.65	261274.78									140605.37	262040.23								
22	MUNICIPAL	Overall	T-Test	2000 Government vs Non 2000 Government Municipalities	Import per capita	167.8396359	320.6699529	t(407)=.836, p=.404	No																																																																																																																														
					Payment per capita	96.32637494	259.5348482								t(407)=.870, p=.385	No																																																																																																																							
					Projects per capita	0.000249823	0.000376421	t(407)=.040, p=.968	No																																																																																																																														
					Nonprofits per capita	0.000238895	0.000850799			t(407)=.975, p=.330	No																																																																																																																												
23	PROJECT	Overall	T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	443840.68	693836.001	t(46.385)=.992, p=.361	No																																																																																																																														
						340176.78	490574.373			t(304)=-.095, p=.924	No																																																																																																																												
					Payment	226923.74	362442.18																																																																																																																																
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24	PROJECT	Construction Projects	T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	893725.96	1001117.65	t(13.75)=1.56, p=.141	No																																																																																																																														
						470339.73	551257.75			t(161)=.17, p=.865	No																																																																																																																												
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25	PROJECT	Service Projects	T-Test	2000 Government vs Not 2000 Government Municipalities	Import	210566.83	272061.58	t(141)=.544, p=.587	No																																																																																																																														
						172984.72	333533.2			t(141)=.563, p=.575	No																																																																																																																												
					Payment	172091.65	261274.78																																																																																																																																
						140605.37	262040.23																																																																																																																																

Source: our calculations

Table F. Test Details for Loiero Municipalities

Test #	Level	Focus	Test	Groups	Variables Tested	Mean	Standard Deviation	Conditions	Significance?																																																																																																																																				
26	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Import per capita	76.65711571	349.0121898	r(407)=.057, p=.253	No																																																																																																																																				
					2005 Winning Vote	10.42941996	46.66447433			27	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Payment per capita	50.17762088	169.7859754	r(407)=.026, p=.597	No	2005 Winning Vote	10.42941996	46.66447433	28	MINICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Projects per capita	0.000239162	0.000842168	r(407)=.027, p=.590	No	2005 Winning Vote	10.42941996	46.66447433	29	MUNICIPAL	Overall	T-Test	2005 Government vs Non 2005 Government Municipalities	Import per capita	62.72266221	61.86693222	t(407)=-.128, p=.898	No	Payment per capita	43.96373551	56.5475456	t(407)=-.117, p=.907	No	50.33335735	171.6923945			Projects per capita	0.000220236	0.000264138	t(407)=-.072, p=.943	No	Nonprofits per capita	0.000239636	0.000851751			0.00339345	0.001566828	t(407)=1.147, p=.252	No	0.002818143	0.001566567								30	PROJECT	Overall	T-Test	2005 Government vs Not 2005 Government Municipalities	Import	352020.5176	519751.9532	t(304)=-.027, p=.978	No	354391.8711	523577.0347			Payment	197861.4785	299529.4749			230615.8142	385423.1785	t(304)=-.526, p=.599	No	31	PROJECT	Construction Projects	T-Test	2005 Government vs Not 2005 Government Municipalities	Import	626591.95	766339.108	t(161)=.768, p=.444	No	495439.5744	595270.7453			Payment	234569.73	381277.2516	t(161)=-.544, p=.587	No	301691.8319	446048.5593			32	PROJECT	Service Projects	T-Test	2005 Government vs Not 2005 Government Municipalities	Import	214734.8014	262330.2794	t(141)=.663, p=.528	No	171643.1077	335718.9155			Payment	179507.3529	255335.3941	t(141)=.743, p=.459
27	MUNICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Payment per capita	50.17762088	169.7859754	r(407)=.026, p=.597	No																																																																																																																																				
					2005 Winning Vote	10.42941996	46.66447433			28	MINICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Projects per capita	0.000239162	0.000842168	r(407)=.027, p=.590	No	2005 Winning Vote	10.42941996	46.66447433	29	MUNICIPAL	Overall	T-Test	2005 Government vs Non 2005 Government Municipalities	Import per capita	62.72266221	61.86693222	t(407)=-.128, p=.898	No	Payment per capita	43.96373551	56.5475456						t(407)=-.117, p=.907	No	50.33335735	171.6923945			Projects per capita	0.000220236	0.000264138	t(407)=-.072, p=.943	No	Nonprofits per capita	0.000239636	0.000851751			0.00339345	0.001566828	t(407)=1.147, p=.252	No	0.002818143	0.001566567								30	PROJECT	Overall	T-Test	2005 Government vs Not 2005 Government Municipalities	Import	352020.5176	519751.9532	t(304)=-.027, p=.978	No	354391.8711	523577.0347			Payment	197861.4785	299529.4749			230615.8142	385423.1785	t(304)=-.526, p=.599	No	31	PROJECT	Construction Projects	T-Test	2005 Government vs Not 2005 Government Municipalities	Import	626591.95	766339.108						t(161)=.768, p=.444	No	495439.5744	595270.7453			Payment	234569.73	381277.2516	t(161)=-.544, p=.587	No	301691.8319	446048.5593			32	PROJECT	Service Projects						T-Test	2005 Government vs Not 2005 Government Municipalities	Import	214734.8014	262330.2794	t(141)=.663, p=.528	No	171643.1077	335718.9155			Payment	179507.3529
28	MINICIPAL	Overall	Correlation	N/A	Projects per capita	0.000239162	0.000842168	r(407)=.027, p=.590	No																																																																																																																																				
					2005 Winning Vote	10.42941996	46.66447433			29	MUNICIPAL	Overall	T-Test	2005 Government vs Non 2005 Government Municipalities	Import per capita	62.72266221	61.86693222	t(407)=-.128, p=.898	No	Payment per capita	43.96373551	56.5475456						t(407)=-.117, p=.907	No	50.33335735	171.6923945			Projects per capita	0.000220236	0.000264138	t(407)=-.072, p=.943	No	Nonprofits per capita	0.000239636	0.000851751			0.00339345	0.001566828	t(407)=1.147, p=.252	No	0.002818143	0.001566567								30	PROJECT	Overall	T-Test	2005 Government vs Not 2005 Government Municipalities	Import	352020.5176	519751.9532	t(304)=-.027, p=.978	No	354391.8711	523577.0347			Payment	197861.4785	299529.4749			230615.8142	385423.1785	t(304)=-.526, p=.599	No	31	PROJECT	Construction Projects	T-Test	2005 Government vs Not 2005 Government Municipalities	Import	626591.95	766339.108	t(161)=.768, p=.444	No	495439.5744	595270.7453								Payment	234569.73	381277.2516	t(161)=-.544, p=.587	No	301691.8319	446048.5593			32	PROJECT	Service Projects	T-Test	2005 Government vs Not 2005 Government Municipalities	Import	214734.8014	262330.2794	t(141)=.663, p=.528	No	171643.1077	335718.9155						Payment	179507.3529	255335.3941	t(141)=.743, p=.459			No	138526.0173	263161.6432								
29	MUNICIPAL	Overall	T-Test	2005 Government vs Non 2005 Government Municipalities	Import per capita	62.72266221	61.86693222	t(407)=-.128, p=.898	No																																																																																																																																				
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30	PROJECT	Overall	T-Test	2005 Government vs Not 2005 Government Municipalities	Import	352020.5176	519751.9532	t(304)=-.027, p=.978	No																																																																																																																																				
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						138526.0173	263161.6432																																																																																																																																						

Source: our calculations

Table G. Criminal Hubs

Municipality	Populations	Cultural sites	Non-profit	Projects	Payments	Commitment
Africo (RC)	3,465	0	18	0	0	0
Amantea (CS)	13,268	0	30	3	516,377.36	814,370.28
Bagnara Calabra (RC)	11,230	0	34	1	95,220.11	95,220.11
Bianco (RC)	4,047	0	16	0	0	0
Botricello (CZ)	4,586	0	7	0	0	0
Bova Marina (RC)	3,967	0	23	6	3,676,273.3	5,273,978.4
Bova (RC)	474	0	6	9	2,817,149.8	4,720,996.4
Bovalino (RC)	8,358	0	39	4	465,166.55	1,099,912.5
Bruzzano Zeffirio (RC)	1,401	0	3	0	0	0
Careri (RC)	2,443	0	4	0	0	0
Casignana (RC)	775	0	3	2	2,710,353.5	2,710,353.5
Cassano allo Ionio (CS)	17,565	2	37	8	4,130,568.3	4,505,924.3
Castrovillari (CS)	22,389	0	78	3	169,995.97	190,975.97
Catanzaro (CZ)	95,251	0	535	35	10,128,753	12,005,666
Cetraro (CS)	10,333	0	19	1	14,999.59	14,999.59
Cirò Marina (KR)	13,987	0	26	0	0	0
Cittanova (RC)	10,675	0	27	0	0	0
Condofuri (RC)	5,055	0	6	4	174,792.94	761,156.57
Corigliano Calabro (CS)	38,241	1	71	6	954,893.58	1,258,881.3
Cosenza (CS)	72,998	2	477	18	10,858,300	15,067,260

Crotone (KR)	60,010	2	384	14	10,998,600	11,095,193
Cutro (KR)	10,829	0	11	1	10,000	10,000
Filadelfia (VV)	6,283	0	15	1	10,000	10,000
Fuscaldo (CS)	8,323	0	25	2	639,647.39	681,497.48
Galatro (RC)	2,307	0	2	0	0	0
Gioia Tauro (RC)	17,762	0	55	3	879,815.33	1,117,466.6
Gioiosa Ionica (RC)	7,044	0	21	3	205,452.7	205,452.71
Guardavalle (CZ)	5,315	0	7	1	495,102.38	495,102.38
Lamezia Terme (CZ)	70,501	1	228	12	6,854,918.8	7,299,960.3
Laureana di Borrello (RC)	5,709	0	13	0	0	0
Limbadi (VV)	3,630	0	4	0	0	0
Locri (RC)	12,997	3	65	8	3,465,832.6	4,476,272.1
Mammola (RC)	3,389	0	8	2	651,763.48	707,760.02
Marina di Gioiosa Ionica (RC)	6,440	0	19	1	6,000	6,000
Melicucco (RC)	4,996	0	13	0	0	0
Melito di Porto Salvo (RC)	10,506	0	39	5	1,001,660.8	1,603,608.3
Mesoraca (KR)	7,125	0	20	2	51,666.67	93,333.33
Mileto (VV)	7,157	1	33	2	324,767.58	339,501.24
Monasterace (RC)	3,426	1	16	1	282,436.79	300,000
Montebello Ionico (RC)	6,922	0	16	0	0	0
Oppido Mamertina (RC)	5,559	0	23	4	2,091,343.2	3,613,740.6
Palizzi (RC)	2,709	0	12	1	474,225.96	610,000
Palmi (RC)	19,435	1	45	5	2,356,504.3	3,847,090.1
Paola (CS)	17,195	0	51	4	177,080.93	338,300.98
Petilia Policastro (KR)	9,594	0	28	1	20,000	20,000
Petronà (CZ)	3,010	0	5	0	0	0
Plati (RC)	3,823	0	15	0	0	0
Polistena (RC)	11,591	0	30	4	277,664.95	747,215.03
Reggio di Calabria (RC)	180,353	3	656	28	6,757,632.4	7,950,883.4
Rizziconi (RC)	7,650	0	25	0	0	0
Rocca di Neto (KR)	5,614	0	13	0	0	0
Roccella Ionica (RC)	6,762	0	33	4	5,988,575.9	6,066,275.9
Roghudi (RC)	1,365	0	0	1	220,414.71	494,000
Rosarno (RC)	15,051	0	15	3	485,869.57	1,253,928
San Ferdinando (RC)	4,339	0	11	1	90,000	90,000
San Gregorio d'Ippona (VV)	2,338	0	4	2	373,780.09	373,780.09
San Lorenzo (RC)	3,357	0	8	2	518,201.77	908,805.1
San Luca (RC)	4,106	0	7	1	416,165.48	416,165.48
San Lucido (CS)	5,906	0	16	1	14,997.28	15,000
Seminara (RC)	3,352	0	12	1	452,021.35	463,480
Serra San Bruno (VV)	7,068	1	18	4	371,409.61	1,759,943.8
Siderno (RC)	1,6734	0	34	2	0	55,000
Sinopoli (RC)	2,329	0	3	1	134,797.34	22,5000
Soriano Calabro (VV)	3,068	0	14	2	319,896.86	319,896.86
Staiti (RC)	395	0	3	1	254,919.87	377,000
Stignano (RC)	1,373	0	1	0	0	0
Stilo (RC)	2,816	1	7	1	49,724.21	1,250,000
Strongoli (KR)	6,107	0	9	3	424,873.16	1,676,234.4
Taurianova (RC)	15,799	0	30	0	0	0
Vibo Valentia (VV)	33,957	2	155	12	5,292,731.9	5,526,586.2
Villa San Giovanni (RC)	13,119	0	53	3	136,841.17	136,841.17
Zungri (VV)	2,182	0	5	2	216,402.33	310,744.11
Total	1,019,235	21	3,794	252	90,506,584	115,806,753

Source: Gratteri and Nicaso (2007) for the list of criminal hubs and POR (2009) for the data