



## The 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT: The Role and the Problem of Coordination on Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia

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### Abstract

This paper has two purposes. First, it discusses the role of Anti Terror of the 88<sup>th</sup> Special Detachment of Indonesia's Police Force in the war against terrorism. The role of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT on counter terrorism in Indonesia is now a role of single institution nationwide, so that other institutions with similar anti terrorist units feel that they do not get a portion of state power. In Indonesia, all armed forces institutions and police, including the State Intelligence Agency have anti terrorist unit in their structure. There is Anti-Terror Detachment (*Detasemen Penanggulangan Terror, Dengultor TNI AD*) in the Indonesia Army with a call sign of Group 5 Anti Terror unit, and also the 81<sup>st</sup> Detachment (*Detasemen 81, Den 81*) inside the Elite Force of Indonesia Army (Kopassus). There is *Jalamangkara* Detachment (*Detasemen Jalamangkara, Denjaka, TNI AL*) of the Indonesia Navy, which has merged into the Marine Corps. There is also Bravo Detachment (*Detasemen Bravo, Denbravo TNI AU*) which has merged into an elite team of the Indonesia Air Force. The State Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN*), also has an anti-terror desk. Second, this paper also discusses of the problem of coordination between those various agencies.

**Keywords:** The 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT, Anti-terrorism, The police, Role, Coordination

### I. Introduction

An Anti Terror The 88<sup>th</sup> Special Detachment of Indonesia's Police Force (hereafter, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT) was founded as a response to the expanding threat of terrorism, namely, *Jema'ah Islamiyah* (JI), which is part of Al Qaeda network. Before the founding of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT, Indonesian Police Force (hereafter, the Police) has its own anti-terror unit in Unit Police Paramilitary, Mobile Brigade (Brimob), namely the 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana. However, the existence of the 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana was considered less effective to response various threats of terrorist organization post-9/11 era. The Police responded to the situation, where the Indonesian Armed Forces was assumed to be inappropriate to develop an anti terror unit due to Human Right issue. Since 1994, the Indonesia Armed Forces was facing an embargo in weapons and military trainings by Western Countries. So, it was difficult to develop combat ability, especially against terrorist threats. It was not various aid and support, in form of weapon and training, were received by anti-terror team of the Police from Western Countries like the United States, which has lost thousands of persons in terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, moreover, Indonesia also received assistance from Australia, which also lost many citizen during the first and the second Bali Bombing as well as the attack against the Australia Embassy in Jakarta, other Europe Union countries joined the anti-terrorism effort.

The condition presumably raised disparity among the Indonesia Armed Forces, the State Intelligence Agency, and the Indonesia Police Force, especially those related to the legal status of the institution in fighting against terrorism in Indonesia as stipulated in Presidential Decree No. 15/2001 and Law No. 15/2003 on Anti-Terrorism.

The purpose of the paper is to describe and analyse the role of the 88th Densus AT on counter terrorism in Indonesia and problem of coordination among anti-terror units such as in the Indonesia Armed Forces and the State Intelligence Agency.

### II. The 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT and Counter-terrorism in Indonesia

The 9/11 tragedy has altered the security enforcers in government in fighting against terrorism. This matter was consolidated and focused in pattern of developing special organization against terrorism in various type and level, starting from separatism until terrorist group in communal conflict. During that time, the anti terror unit was spread over in the police, the armed forces, and also the intelligence agency. Unfortunately, the developing process was blocked by "competition" and "sentiment" among all units. It was not strange that after Habibie Presidency was over, Abdurrahman Wahid and his Vice President Megawati established an anti-terror desk in the State Intelligence Agency, since the institution was believed to hold important role to coordinate the armed forces, the police, and the civilian units. Still, it

only brought internal competition in the State Coordination Intelligence Agency (*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara--BAKIN*), which then became the State Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Negara--BIN*). The new institution started an open conflict, at the moment when Hendropriyono led the State Intelligence Agency, since a number of members of the State Intelligence Agency rose from military officer instead from police unit and civil.

The global campaign against terrorism became a turning point for reinforcement and development of reliable and professional anti-terror institutions. The reinforcement of anti terror units, in the end, was carried out by the Police. This was a strategy to gain support and aid from Western countries in terms of war campaign against terrorist. The military, since year of 1994, faced embargo on weapons and education cooperation for military officers from Western countries due to human rights abuses in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua. Besides that, the Police was considered capable to develop an anti terror unit in the future. The pursuit of perpetrators and terrorists on the field may emerge indisposed acts. For example The State Intelligence Agency arrested key person of JI network, Omar Farouk in Indonesia and directly delivered the person to the United States without any coordination with The Indonesia Police Force.

The Global war campaign against terrorism was responded by the Government of Indonesia by publishing the Presidential Decree No. 4/2002 on Anti Terror, which was then improved by the National Policy on counter-terrorism in form of a Secondary Law (*Peraturan Pengganti Undang-undang--Perpu*) No. 1 and 2 in same year. The responsibility of the Presidential Decree and the Secondary Law lies at the Coordinating Ministry of Politics and Security in form of the Coordinating-Desk of Counter-terrorism. The desk had full legitimacy based on the Minister Decree of the Coordinating Ministry, which was signed by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Number 26/Menko/Polkam/11/2002. The Coordinating-Desk unified anti-terror unit in the Police, known as the 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana of Brimob and other anti-terror units from the Armed Forces and the State Intelligence Agency. Those institutions were then developed into the Anti-terror Taskforce under coordination of the Ministry of Defense. However, the initiative taken by Matori Abdul Djilil, The Minister of Defence, was absurd since each anti-terror unit was under the structure of each official armed organization. In practice, Anti-Terror taskforce did not run in an effective way, because of the escalation of terror since 1<sup>st</sup> Bali Bombing and communal conflicts. The Ministry of Defense's initiative did not receive a good response from the security institutions. Finally each anti-terror unit move to carry out their own task.

However, the escalation of terrorism grew so quickly and the Police faced major problem in their anti terror unit since they had to set specialized tasks and finally the Police formed the Bomb Squad. Their first duty was to deal with Christmas Eve Bombing in 2001 and continued with other relevant duties. The Bomb Squad became famous after dealing with cases of suicide bombings, for example the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Bali Bombing, the Marriot Bombing, and the Australian Embassy Bombing. The taskforce was under supervision of the Crime Investigation Unit of the Police, and led by a Brigadier General. The first Head of the Bomb Squad in Indonesia Police was Brigadier General Gories Mere (now he is Major General Police), and then replaced by Brigadier General Bekto Suprpto, and the third was Brigadier General Surya Dharma Salim Nasution. Bekto and Surya Dharma were successively also Head of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT.

Beside the Bomb Squad, it has another anti terror units namely the 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana of Brimob and the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate of Anti Terror under supervision of the Crime Investigation Unit. The existence of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate of Anti Terror crumple and hold similar duties and function as the 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana of Brimob beside to handle the dynamic of terrorism activity as threat. The Police finally reorganized the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate Anti Terror when General Police Da'i Bachtiar led the Police. He issued a Decree No. 30/VI/2003 on 20 June 2003 to form the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT. The Decree was based on the Law No. 15/2003 on Anti Terror. The Law assured the authority of the Police as special unit on counter-terrorism in Indonesia, while the Armed Forces and the State Intelligence Agency became supplementary units. The condition was in line with the presence of the Presidential Decree and the Secondary Law published by the government before it was ratified. There was question in society was why does the authority on counter terrorism lie only with the Police? Is it true that the joint anti-terror units from the military are more reliable and experienced? The question was also asked in the Armed Forces around the authority given to the Police on counter of terrorism in Indonesia. There are three reasons why the Police has the authority in counter terrorism. *First*, special authorization of counter terrorism was a government strategy to participate in the global action against terrorism. One of them was to push the reinforcement of special reliable units against terrorist with sophisticated equipments support and human resource. The formulation of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT was based on additional fund of Rp. 15 billion (more than US\$ 13 million), including the weapon, equipments, transportation of the team, operation, and training. Most of them derive from aid from Western countries especially Australia and the United States. When the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT was formed, the Military was still facing weapon and education embargo from Western countries, especially United States. So that one strategy to found anti terror unit without disruption over poor historical cases of the Military is by developing it inside the Police.

*Second*, the cruel terrorism act has the character of borderless and entangles many factors in society. Related to that, the terrorism in Indonesia context is considered to be crime domain, because separatism in terrorism context shall no longer become main issue, but replaced by terror action against order, security, and also safety of the society.

*Third*, it is important to avoid resistance from the society and international community if the counter terrorism is carried out by the Military and the State Intelligence Agency. Ever since the fall of the Soeharto regime, the Military and the State Intelligence Agency were accused of supporting institutions of Soeharto's New Order Regime. So, the option to develop an anti-terror unit resides in the Police, based on straightening of law enforcement, maintaining security and order of society, and looking after of internal security, as stipulated in Law No.2/2002 of the Indonesia Police Forces, especially Section of 2, 4, and 5.

Based on the above reasons, the existence of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT has to become a professional unit capable to run better role according to its duty and function. Referring to the Decree of Head of Indonesian Police Force No. 30/VI/2003 dated 30 June 2003 on the duty and function of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT, the Police was specifically ordered to overcome the increasing terrorism in Indonesia, especially with modus of suicide bombings. It means, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT is an executor to overcome domestic terror, as decanted in Law of Anti-Terror.

Meanwhile, the organization of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT is in Headquarter of the National Police and the Provincial Police. In Headquarter, it is under supervision of the Crime Investigation Unit led by a Brigadier General Police. At the provincial police level, The 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT is under supervision of the Crime Investigation Directorate led by middle rank police officers, depending on the type of the provincial Police. The 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT in A-type provincial police is led by a Chief Commissioner Police, while in Type-B and preparation stage of provincial police; it is led by a Adjutant Chief Commissioner. There are only three Head of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT so far. The first one was Brigadier General Bekto Suprpto who is re-assigned as Head of the North Sulawesi Provincial Police. The second one Brigadier General Surya Dharma Salim Nasution, former 1<sup>st</sup> Director of the Transnational Crime Investigation Unit of Headquarter of Indonesia Police Force. Now, the current of the Head of Densus 88 AT is Brigadier General Police Saud Usman Nasution, before he is in that position, he was a vice of Head of Densus 88 AT.

Insert Table 1, Table 2 Here

The organizational chart of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT was based on four supporting pillars of operation named as sub-Detachment. They are Sub-Detachment Intelligence, Sub-Detachment Affirmative Action, Sub-Detachment Investigation, and Sub-detachment Support. Every Sub-detachment leads some supporting units for the operation of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT. Sub-Detachment intelligence consists of Analysing Unit, Detection, and Contra-Intelligence Unit. Sub-Detachment Affirmative Action consists of Negotiation Unit, Reconnaissance Unit, Penetration Unit, and Bomb Unit. Sub-Detachment investigation consists of Crime Scene Unit, Investigation Unit, and Technical Support Unit. Sub-Detachment Support consists of Operation Support Unit and Administration Support Unit.

One of prerequisites to recruit members and personnel of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT for the development and formulation of special anti-terror unit are personnel should have never been assigned to Aceh, Papua, and East Timor, to prevent any collision of human right. However, it was rather difficult, since many personnel of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT are from the Brimob, specially the 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana. So, the level of prerequisite was reduced and should be supported by competent skill as special unit. Beside from the Brimob and the 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana, other unit as supporting pillars of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT was the Security and Crime Intelligence Agency of the Indonesia Police Force (Baintelkam). The recruitment of personnel of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT is also from the Police Academy, the Female Police School, and the special unit from the Indonesia Police College (PTIK).

Now the number of personnel of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT is not more than 500 personnel with best qualification of anti-terror, while in Provincial Police are around 50 and 75 personnel. Before the police was recruited and become part of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT, the personnel should be trained in the Education Center for Investigator of Indonesia Police Force in, Puncak, West Java, and also at the National Anti-Terror Education Center in Police Academy Campus, Semarang, Central Java. All instructors, in addition to the Police, are from CIA, FBI, the Australia National Service, the Australian Police Federal, the Secret Service and intelligence network in Western countries. Besides theories and methodologies training, both education centres also supported by simulators.

Meanwhile, weapons, equipments, and other supporting devices are very sophisticated. For example, assault rifle of Colt M4 5.56 mm and the latest Steyr-AUG, or sharpshooter rifle, Armalite AR-10, and also Remington 870 shotgun. Most of them are supplied by the United States. Beside weapons, every personnel of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT are provided with personal and team equipments; communication tools, GPS, night camera, eavesdropping appliances, micro recorder, plane interceptor, signal assembling machine, and others. To support the operation of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT, the unit also cooperates with operator cellular phone and internet provider to detect movement of terrorist groups. For a while, each unit has bomb tamer with supporting equipments, for example metal detector, special gauntlet and mask, anti land mine vests and shoes, and also tactical vehicle of bomb silencer. It is also issued that the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT has its own C-130 airplane Hercules to deploy personnel. However it is difficult to be proved since the Headquarter of Police have formed the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT in Provincial level. It means the unit answers the mislead information.

The budget support to form the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT was from the United States, precisely through US Diplomatic Security, State Department. In early forming of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT, there was around Rp. 150 billion (more than US\$ 130 million)

at 2003, while the next year of operation of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT there was only Rp. 1.5 billions (more than US\$ 1.3 million). The low budget was because the allocated budget was already covered in mid 2003. In 2005, they spent up to Rp. 15 billion (more than US\$ 13 million), and 2006 the budget was Rp. 43 billion (more than US\$ 40 million). The annual fund of 2006 was not yet for the formulation of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT in provinces, because practically Heads of Provincial Police do not have resources to find budget aid for the development of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT. An example was Inspector General Firman Gani, when he was Head of Jakarta Police, as he built the building for the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT from self-supporting aid. It was actually prohibited as stipulated in Law No. 2/2002 on the Indonesia Police Forces, but with limited State budget, the process become a justification for other Provincial Police to follow an example made by the Jakarta Police. Around year 2007-2008 almost 29th of the Provincial Police have The 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT Unit on their structures, some of them used self-supporting aid, because the budget support from abroad was reduced and the national budget was not enough to allocate for developed the new units on the Provincial Police.

Based on the description, it is not out of the ordinary if the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT was expected by the Police and the government to be a reliable anti-terror unit. Since 2003 until now, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT has played a role on counter-terrorism, as Law No.2/2002 on Indonesia Police Forces and Law of Anti-Terror mentioned. Two months after this unit was formed, the unit had to directly deal with the car bomb at J.W. Marriot Hotel, a United States network hotel, killing 13 people. In a week time, the network of bombers were detected and arrested.

Following the arrest of terrorist network of Marriot bombing, at 9 September 2004, Jakarta was surprised once again with a car bomb in front of the Australian Embassy. This bomb killed ten people and did not hit the inside part of the Embassy. Within a month, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT and Australian Federal Police (AFP) succeed to solve the case, and caught the perpetrators. They were sentenced years in prison and some were even sentenced with death pinalty.

One year after the explosion in front of the Australian Embassy, Bali, was shocked again by a bomb. Although it was not equal to the 1<sup>st</sup> Bali Bombing. The explosion killed 23 people and hurt hundreds of others. Again, in three months, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT could solve and arrest perpetrators. the 2<sup>nd</sup> Bali bombing also brought them close to a terrorist Kingpin in Indonesia; Dr. Azahari. A months after the 2<sup>nd</sup> Bali Bombing, they invaded a house of terrorist fugitive, Dr. Azahari, in Batu Malang, East Java. This attacked caused the death of him, and lob the name of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT as a notable anti-terror unit in Asia. During at the same time, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT succeeded to catch perpetrators of bombing in traditional market, Palu, Central Sulawesi. The perpetrator was one of the conflicting groups in Poso.

In 2006, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT almost caught another terrorist kingpin, Noordin M. Top, in a raid at Dusun Binangun, Wonosobo, Central Java. Noordin got away from the pursuit of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT. The attack was a gunfight between the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT and terrorist group and police succeed to catch two people and pick two others. A year later, precisely on 22 March 2007, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT raid the terror group in Central Java and succeeded to discover the biggest bomb and weapons network since the last 30 years in Sleman, Yogyakarta, and catch seven accused owners of the weapons, depositor, and assemblers. In the attack, two perpetrators were killed when trying to run away.

Following the success to discover the network of Central Java group, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT also succeeded to arrest and paralyse Abu Dujana alias Ainul Bahri, Commander of Military Wing *Jema'ah Islamiyah* (JI), and Zarkasih, the new Spiritual Leader of JI. The arrest lobs the name of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT and prove that Indonesia have reliable and professional anti-terror unit.

The coherent role of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT in fact assures the commitment of Indonesia Police Forces and government in active global war against terrorism. Six years after its formulation, the role and function of Densus 88 AT has received high reputation by the international community. The 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT has brought the Police to a distinctive level where it becomes commitment of the Indonesia Police Force in fighting against the terrorism. Even on the way, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT is not only focused at identifying and pursuit of terrorists, but also assists other units in the Indonesia Police Force on other arsonist like illegal logging, narcotic, and others. The 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT even assists to identify regional problems as happened at the case of Republic of Southern Moluccas (RMS), the separatist group's flag at a national political event in Ambon when Indonesia's President was also attended.

The 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT is even focused on counter terrorism, besides that it also has three other coherent functions and role. *First*, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT resides in the Crime Investigation Unit of Indonesia Police Force, and the Investigator Directorate of Provincial Police. Therefore, the personnel are also reliable qualification as detective. So that, it is not strange if every police officer activity in the Crime Investigation Unit and the Investigator Directorate, always brings in personnel of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT on field, especially related to special crime like; illicit drug, illegal logging, illegal fishing, people smuggling, and others.

*Second*, personnel of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT are also member the Indonesia Police Force with qualification in security intelligence such as in doing detection, analysis, and contra-intelligence. In few cases involving personnel of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT in police intelligence also improve the performance of the Headquarter of Indonesia Police Force and local police, as implemented by provincial police during direct regional election and other conflict areas.

*Third*, the personnel of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT are good negotiators. The negotiator skills are required not only by the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT but also by police personnel in general. It means a negotiator is required to reduce the fall of larger victims, for example, in cases of terrorism; various steps should be taken to reduce risks regarding the law, as special pillar of police duty. Difficult negotiation processes were carried out done on the siege of Dr. Azahari and Noordin M. Top hideout. Even both of them could not be caught, since Dr. Azahari chose to detonate himself and Noordin M. Top succeeded to get away. However, steps and procedures by the negotiator from the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT was relatively succeed, because it did not hurt or cause negative effect at the society.

### III. Coordination of All Anti Terror Units

The efficacy of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT in reducing the movement of terrorist groups in Indonesia gives big consequences for the detachment and relation between other security officer in the government. The attack on Dr. Azahari and the capture of numbers of high leaders of JI in Indonesia, makes the pattern of counter terrorism now is focused at Noordin M. Top only. The consequence of efficacy of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT affects the relation on the unity of anti terror units in Indonesia which are less harmonious. The duty and function of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT is limited only at the counter of bomb terrorism and other terrorist action. There are two the consequences following the efficacy of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT. Firstly, there are internal consequences. The different treatment among units of anti terror in the Police may cause internal conflict. It is based on the moment of attack against Dr. Azahari hideout in Batu, Malang, East Java. As known, inside of the Indonesia Police Forces, there are four units with qualification of anti terror: the 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana of Brimob, the Bomb Squad of Indonesia Police Force, the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate of Anti Terror, and the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT.

The piquancy is even worse when the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT have been formed. The existence of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate of Anti-Terror, Bomb Squad, and also the existence of 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana Brimob are at stake. The early assumption was that each unit could support each other and do integrated works. However, the existences of three units in the Police were likely to repeat the mistaken process of Anti-terror Taskforce made by Matori Abdul Djilil, Former Minister of Defence, with minimum coordination and many unnecessary activities among one another. Even former Head of Crime Investigation Unit, the late Bambang Hendarso Danuri (now he is Chief of Indonesian Police Force) disbanded the Bomb Squad and the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate of Anti Terror then cope them into the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT and directly under his supervision. It has to be confessed that the existence of two anti terror units; The 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT and 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana of the Brimob in the Police become unfavourable for the organisation, at least there should be coherent role and function. Until now, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT, and 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana of the Brimob have almost the same role and functions. There are not yet any escalating problems so far, but unlikely problems may emerge and become problems in the future.

Secondly, the external consequences. The efficacy of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT has made high rank officers in the Military and the State Intelligence Agency dubious concerning the ability of the Police in developing anti-terror unit with best qualification. This condition opened conflict among anti-terror units on field, especially related in handling separatism in Aceh and Papua and also communal conflict in Poso and Maluccas, related to the role of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT. Since it was under the Investigator Directorate of Provincial Police, entangled also mentioned operation cases. Referring to Law No. 2/2002 on the Indonesian Police Force and Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesia Armed Forces, separatism is the conflict of interest between the Military and the Police, where the military are considered as the main element and the Police is the supporting element for the condition. On the other side, the assignation of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT is related to act of terrorism and separatism dealt by Police Paramilitary Unit, Brimob.

The two consequences above have to be faced with approaches based on nationalism, threat of terrorism, and institution. An institution was required for effective coordination, so that each unit can play role and function effectively. In this context, there should be an affirmative policy for coordination. For example, the *Dengultor* and the *Group 5* of the Indonesian Army on focus at terrorism at the state border, separatism with high intensity, and also threats related to sovereignty of the state, with specialization in city war, piracy of plane, and contra-intelligence. Meanwhile, the *Denbravo* of the Indonesia Air Force is focused at security of aerospace weaponry system, anti piracy of plane, and contra-intelligence. The *Denjaka* of the Indonesia Navy has specialization of anti piracy of sea, all kind of sea terror, sabotage, and contra-intelligence. Then, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT and also the 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana of the Brimob should be more focus on all kind of terrors using bombs against public security and order and home security affairs.

Looking at all anti terror units, in fact, the constraints are very clear, namely each unit has its own role and function. There are some parallel duties and roles among four units like intelligence qualification and contra-intelligence. Besides that, each unity has an equal role, like between *Dengultor*, *Group 5* of the Army and *Denbravo* of the Air Force, where both have the have same qualification of anti hijackings of airplanes.

Terrorism's threats in the future are stipulated in the Indonesia's Defence White Paper 2008. At least there are four threats against the State: Separatism, terrorism, communal conflict, and transnational crimes. In threat of separatism, all of units of anti terror could be assigned at the same time based on their own qualification. As in broader terrorism definition, separatism is classified as one of type of terrorism, because it tends to use violence and terror. The possibility of the increasing act of terrorism is based on failure agreement of peace in Aceh and also Special autonomy in Papua.

Against threat of terrorism, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT and also the 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana have larger portion than other anti terror units. This is caused by level of terrorism with specialized ability should faced by the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT and the 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana. Whereas other anti terror units should be assigned to assist when the specific level related to the requirement for joint taskforce is required. For example, hijackings of airplane might possibly be handled by Dengultor, Group 5, and Denbravo with coordination to the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT.

On the other hand, related to threat of communal conflict, the solution is carried out by other external unit of anti terror, like the 1<sup>st</sup> of Gegana and unit in the Armed Forces, just like how to solve conflicts at Borneo's Indonesia and Timor's Indonesia. However, in handling communal conflict in Poso and Maluccas, the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT was involved, because the conflict was presumably exploited by terrorist network with various intensions on both places.

Last but not least, all units should be highly involved in dealing with transnational crimes. It is caused by of transnational level in exploiting various medium for the action whether on land, sea, and air. Developing effective coordination is not only limited on meeting among staffs of the armed forces and heads of police, but also internal obligatory mechanism.

There are two prerequisites to improve coordination. *First*, revising the Law of Anti Terror so that it should be more comprehensive, not simply describing terrorism as an act of injustice related to the international network like Al Qaeda and *Jema'ah Islamiyah*. It should also consider the effects of separatism, communal conflict, and transnational crime.

*Second*, there should be Coordinating-Desk of Anti-Terror once issued by the Coordinating Ministry of Politic and Security. It means all anti-terror taskforces as developed by the former Minister of Defence, Matori Abdul Djilil, will be refused by the Indonesia Police Forces, because the Ministry of Defence is considered as a representation of military institution. Therefore, there should be a neutral institution, one of them is the Coordinating Ministry of Politic and Security.

Finally, with effective coordination among all anti-terror units, it will give warranty for effective counter terrorism in Indonesia. The presence of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT, has to be comprehended as part of effort to tighten the unity of all anti terror units in Indonesia in fighting against terrorism.

#### IV. Conclusion

Based on above explanation, the existence of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT as one of anti terror units may provide effective and measured evidences. The role of the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT is limited at counter bombing terrorism, should become one of the specialties of the Police. At least when measured with achievement, image, stimulation, and effectiveness of developing human resources, and also improvement of facilities.

Aside of the efficacy reached by the 88<sup>th</sup> Densus AT, it still leaves problems related to duty constraints and function inside the Indonesia Police Force, especially with Brimob, more specific at 1<sup>st</sup> Squad of Gegana. There should be assurance against constraints and coordination in practice among all special units owned by the Indonesia Police Force. Problems of coordination and division of authority with other anti terror units from the armed forces should be coherent with the existence of legal umbrella to reduce constraints in coordination and function, threat of terrorism will expand with various models and actions. If we expect one anti terror unit to fighting against terrorism, it is not a good policy for Indonesia. As we know, the characteristic of terrorism has many various types and patterns. So that, there should be requirements to co-ordinate with detailed steps and give the bigger picture for the importance of state sovereignty and the society against threat of terrorism.

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Table 1. The Rank Structure of the Indonesia Police Force

(Based on the Decree of the Chief of the Indonesian Police Force, Skep No: 1259/X/2000, dated November 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2000)

No.	The Rank Structure
<b>I</b>	<b>General Grade</b>
1	Jenderal Polisi (Police General)
2	Komisaris Jenderal Polisi/Komjen Pol. (Commissioner General)
3	Inspektur Jenderal Polisi/Irjen Pol. (Inspector General)
4	Brigadir Jenderal Polisi/Brigjen Pol. (Brigadier General)
<b>II</b>	<b>Commissioner Grade</b>
1	Komisaris Besar Polisi/KBP (Chief Commissioner)
2	Ajun Komisaris Besar Polisi/AKBP (Adjutant Chief Commissioner)
3	Komisaris Polisi/Kompol (Commissioner)
<b>III</b>	<b>Inspector Grade</b>
1	Ajun Komisaris Polisi/AKP (Adjutant Commissioner)
2	Inspektur Satu Polisi/Iptu (Inspector 1 <sup>st</sup> Grade)
3	Inspektur Dua Polisi/Ipda (Inspector 2 <sup>nd</sup> Grade)
<b>IV</b>	<b>Senior NCO Grade</b>
1	Ajun Inspektur Satu Polisi/AIPTU (Adjutant Inspector 1 <sup>st</sup> Grade)
2	Ajun Inspektur Dua Polisi/AIPDA (Adjutant Inspector 2 <sup>nd</sup> Grade)
3	Brigadir Polisi/Brigpol (Brigadier)
4	Brigadir Kepala Polisi/Bripka (Chief Brigadier)
5	Brigadir Satu Polisi/Briptu (Brigadier 1 <sup>st</sup> Grade)
6	Brigadir Dua Polisi/Bripda (Brigadier 2 <sup>nd</sup> Grade)
<b>V</b>	<b>NCO Grade</b>
1	Ajun Brigadir Kepala Polisi/Abripka (Adjutant Chief Brigadier)
2	Ajun Brigadir Satu Polisi/Abriptu (Adjutant Brigadier 1 <sup>st</sup> Grade)
3	Ajun Brigadir Dua Polisi/Abrida (Adjutant Brigadier 2 <sup>nd</sup> Grade)
4	Bhayangkara Kepala/Baraka (Chief Patrolman)
5	Bhayangkara Satu Polisi/Baratu (Patrolman 1 <sup>st</sup> Grade)
6	Bhayangkara Dua Polisi/Barada (Patrolman 2 <sup>nd</sup> Grade)

Tabel 2. Lists of Indonesia's Provincial Police

TYPE A	TYPE B	TYPE C
NAD	Jambi	West Sulawesi
North Sumatera	Bengkulu	West Irian Jaya
South Sumatera	Riau	
DKI Jakarta	West Sumatera	
West Java	Lampung	
Central Java	Riau Archipelago	
East Java	Bangka-Belitung	
East Kalimantan	D.I. Yogyakarta	
Bali	South Kalimantan	
South Sulawesi	Central Kalimantan	
Papua	West Kalimantan	
	West Nusa Tenggara	
	East Nusa Tenggara	
	North Sulawesi	
	Central Sulawesi	
	South-East Sulawesi	
	Gorontalo	
	Maluku	
	North Maluku	
	Banten	

Source: The Decree of the Chief of the Indonesian Police Force, Pol. KP/05/X/2000.

Appendix

**ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL DETHACEMENT OF 88 ANTI TERROR OF  
INDONESIA NATIONAL POLICE**

