

The Turkish Strategic Restrictions towards the Arab Revolts (2011 – 2012)

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Abstract

Turkey is distinguished with property of elements of enough power, which makes it a regional power: the location, the area, the population, and the strong economy. The creed, identity, skills and natural resources, all these factors assist Turkey to prove its domination and power in a rising shape, but its strategic concept did not appear before the present Turkish government comes in 2002 and may be, because of the dispersion of power elements in the state. The Turkish policies at that stage could be described in confronting internal, regional and international issues. It is a policy of running the variety, or (management of diversity) and from the other side, (policy of crises management).

Turkey witnesses ever since discussions about the significance of the concealed true power of Turkey in the field of its international relations, and to which extent it invests them in its diplomatic relations. These discussions amount between two trends; one attempts to found legitimacy of the concept of Turkey to remain mortgaged to the connected policies with centers of powers formed outside. That is by showing Turkey's level of concealed power less than level, which it should be on, through frozen operations of evaluation connected with stage situations. The second is a trend presenting excessive optimistic estimations, mortgaging that Turkey can explode its power strictly, without new analysis and dynamic to the elements of the changing and static power which Turkey owns in the shadow of the new international situation. Ankara stucked to neutrality at the beginning of the Arab incidents towards the Tunisian Revolt in December 2010. But with the hastening of incidents in Egypt after one month from that date Ardoghan initiated by calling former president Husni Mubarak to withdraw, and Abdullah Ghoul was the first president to visit Egypt after the collapse of Mubarak, the thing that duplicated the popularity that Turkey obtains on the Egyptian sphere, and it is what was reflected in receiving Ardoghan at his visit to Egypt in September, 2011. He paid a visit heading a big delegation of businessmen. This assured Turkey's desire to enlarge its economic relation with the biggest Arab state.

At the start of the Libyan Revolt in February 2011, Turkey hesitated to act. Turkey had big investments with Al-Quaddafi's regime. Therefore, it assured this significance to reach a political settlement of the Libyan crisis, at the beginning of incidents, fore-warning from seriousness of fighting like that which happened in Iraq before, the thing that harmed Turkey's picture inside Libya. But after passing the resolution of the Security Council 1973, which allowed forcing an area of air-navigation prohibition over Libya, Ankara's stand was changed by sending sea-forces to participate in the NATO operations there, beside the participation in the human aid efforts.

Also, the break- out of Bahrain Revolt in February 2011 placed Turkey among numerous accounts. Turkey had large economic interests with states of the Gulf Cooperative Council, and had to respect the security specialty of Gulf region, and it did not wish to encourage Iran to interfere in the Gulf affairs. Though, Ankara wanted to rise its diplomatic role in an attempt to quiet the Shia't–Sunni tensions in the region, that harm its special interests. Ankara presented mediation.

1. Introduction

Turkey is distinguished with property of elements of enough power, that makes it a regional power: the location, the area (783.562 square kilometers), the population (77 million persons) and strong economy (911 billion Dollars). The creed, identity, skills and natural resources, all these factors, assist Turkey to prove its domination

and power in a rising shape, but its strategic concept did not appear before the present Turkish government comes in 2002, and may be, because of the dispersion of power elements in the state. The Turkish policies at that stage could be described in confronting internal, regional and international issues. It is a policy of running the variety, or (management of diversity) and from the other side, (the policy of crises management).

A strategic conception, special for Turkey, is established since the Party of Justice and Development caught power, so as not to remain a marginal state in the European system, margin-state in the Arab system or in the Middle East. So, it started to form a power demanding to solve all its conflicts with the neighboring states, or what is called 'decreasing problems' and strengthening its relations with the surroundings, because it is Turkey's affair to find a strategy to support its opportunity in entering the European Union.

Turkey had acquired strategic and cultural felt possibilities at its understanding the significance of activating its geographic, and historic elements, condensing the cultural reactions, and surviving its original civilization. For the communities that can transform their special cultural standards into a worldly value of the twenty first century, they will not only achieve an international consideration of themselves, but possibilities to the important strategic openness too. Then Turkey has to get benefit of what it enjoys of situation, made it carry in its structure the most important elements of ancient human accumulation, and the civilized Islamic heritage, which is considered the purest cultural heritage, and of being representing a reaction area in between the Western and Eastern civilizations. These factors are considered invariables in its civilized openness. These numerous elements express a coordinated group at time of looking at them in an integrated form.

The Arab Turkish relations transformed from the state of tension into a state of mutual approach, suggesting the possibility of strategic participation between Arabs and the Turks at the last decade. There are numerous elements that can be depended to build the Arab Turkish strategic relations, and other elements can break down those relations. That suggests the issue of required bases to transform the positive elements into constituents that avoid the negative effect of the negative elements. The first basis to build the Arab Turkish strategic relations is to establish them on the basis of a net of mutual interests, for there are important Turkish interests in the field of European Union membership, provisions of energy, the Cyprus and Kurd issue, also there are Arab interests in the field of solving the Arab Israeli conflict, and the security of the Arab Gulf. There are mutual interests of the development issue. It is important to specify the issues that can be agreed upon to work altogether and the limits of this work. The priorities and issues disagreed upon, and to keep discrepancy at its lowest limit. The issue of energy is one of the most important issues that we can start with.

Improvement of the Turkish Arab relations at the last decade refers to factors connected with the internal and external polices. The Party of Justice and Development reaching power in 2002, is considered one of the most important factors, that formed a basic entry into improving the Turkish relations with the adjacent Arab states. But the external factors were connected with the tumble of the Turkey's acceptance in the European Union, the thing that made Turkey review and evaluate its relations with many parts, especially Arabs and Moslems; for the stage in which the Party of Justice and Development reached power in Turkey witnessed strategic transformations in the Arab Turkish relations, as a result of the Party's understanding of the importance of developing relations between both sides in the light of Islamic ideologies adopted by the Party. And as Oghlo indicated, Turkey has to hardly work to transform the point of view concerning the geopolitical reality as a static strategic instrument of the Arab openness to the world including the Arab World. (Oghlo, 2011)

1.1 Problem of Study

The Arab Turkish relations started to witness a clear development in different fields as a result of a group of variables that shared in redirecting the Turkish external policy, especially relations with the Arab world. There is also a consecutive rising of the Turkish regional role, especially in Asia region, Caucasus and the Middle East in particular. From here the enquiring stirred by this rising: what are the variables that illustrate the stands taken by the Turkish state towards the Arab Revolts?

- To which extent did the Turkish stands share in influencing the Arab public opinion and its stands from Turkey?
- Did the role of existence of the Party of Justice and Development affect the influence of the Turkish stands from the Arab Revolts?
- The problematic this study attempts to answer is: what is the effect of trends of the Party of Justice and Development on the Turkish stands from the Arab Revolts?

This question branches the following subsidiary enquiries:

- What are the restrictions of the Turkish stands from the Arab Revolts in the period (2011-2012)?

- What is the role of the Party of Justice and Development in influencing the Turkish stands from the Arab Revolts?

1.2 Objectives of Study

- This study aimed at clarifying the external trends of the Party of Justice and Development towards the states of the Arab World, and the stands of the Party towards the Arab Revolts after the year 2011.
- Study and analysis of the level of the economic and political factor of the Arab Revolts.
- Prediction of the future of the Arab Turkish relations in light of the political interactions in the region, or what is called the Arab Spring, or the Arab Revolts.

1.3 Significance of Study

The study of the Arab Turkish relations acquires a great significance after the Party of Justice and Development reaching power and the appearance of a political elite, with Islamic trends, after it had been indicating many enquiries and discussions through long decades. They all concentrated on a main question with abundant branches, and the significance of it concentrates on the causes that led to the retreat of the Turkish Arab relations in the last decades of the Twentieth Century. But since the Party of Justice and Development reaching to power in 2002, Turkey started to reformulate its external relations, especially with the states of the region, for it became representing a center of power in the region, an effective political practioner in the Middle East. From this point, the significance of this study rises, for its attempt to stand at the political role of the Party of Justice and Development in rebuilding the Arab Turkish relations, from an outlook performed on the basis of the geographic neighborhood, and mutual interests, in addition to the religious and historical dimensions.

1.4 Questions of Study

They seek to answer the following questions:

- What are the most rising trends of the Arab Revolts in shadow of the Party of Justice and Development?
- What is the effect of the religious dimension on the Arab Revolts in shadow of the Party of Justice and Development?

1.5 Hypotheses of Study

The study starts from the following primary hypotheses:

The Arab Revolts shared in affecting the Party of Justice and Development in 2011, and from this hypothesis branches, the following subsidiary hypotheses:

The first subsidiary hypothesis:

Effect of the religious factor on the Arab Revolts in shadow of the Party of Justice and Development.

The second subsidiary hypothesis:

The Turkish positive stands shared in activating the Turkish role in the Arab Region and their issues.

1.6 Limits of Study

1. Time limits: the study is confined to analyzing the reformulations in the Arab relations, because of the occurring revolts. The year 2011 is considered a strong start of these revolts and outbreak confirming the pivots sharing in reformulation of the Arab world.
2. Place limits: the study is confined to studying Turkey and the Arab World.

2. Turkey's Stand from the Arab Revolts

The last decade witnessed increasing of the Turkish concern of the Middle East region and its issues, especially after of the Party of Justice and Development reaching power in Turkey in 2002, and desire of leaders of the new government to assure their adoption of a different vision of Turkey's type of policy and its external relations with different departments of the Middle East in particular. This concern was supported by what the elements of power in Turkey witnessed of positive developments during this period, especially in its economic dimensions, for Turkey succeeded in occupying the first position among the economies of the region (and the sixteenth at the worldly level) from the part of the total of the local product. And accompanied that the increase of presence of the Turkish role and activity in many of the axial issues in the region, either what concerns the Iraqi issue, or the Arab Israeli conflict with all its numerous tracks, or the crisis of the Irani nuclear programme, or nominating Turkey as a sample of reformation in the region with all dimensions. (Aras, 2010).

This Turkish active role of numerous dimensions stirred argument about its nature and truth of motives. There were trends illustrating this policy with the pragmatic nature of the Turkish politics and its concentration on

achieving the national interests, in accordance with short run accounts, and others assuring the transformation of the external policy towards the east in the frame of Turkey's restoring itself to the Islamic civilization under the leadership of a party with Islamic reference. A third assures the continuation of the western trend of Turkey and its roles as agent of the region in connection with Turkey's activity seeking to increase its strategic importance and strengthen opportunities of joining the European Union. And in corresponding that the area of supporters of the Turkish official speech of the Justice government gradually increased direction of the Turkish policy in a new vision and numerous dimensions, and thinks that there is integration and not opposition among identities and trends. Abundant for the Turkish policy and its basic elements are represented in:

- Necessity of activating the Turkish role in the region exceeding its direct borders.
- Mastering the political dialogue and diplomatic initiatives in treating crises, rejecting the policies of siege and seclusion, and encouraging the policies of positive joining.
- Concern about the economic entrance to deal with discrepancies, and support mutual dependence among economies of the region.
- Necessity of keeping the unity of the acting entities and numerous natures in from of supporting the cultural coexistence.
- Significance of security coordination, rejecting the axial policies and assuring the concept of security for all, with the possibility of using military power, but in frame of shrewd employment of elements of the Turkish power.

This vision had personified one side of the effective Turkish roles towards issues of the region, and the attempt of the Justice government to commitment with balance agreement method on all internal, regional, and international levels. Concentration on the national Turkish interests (the security, economic, and political) from one side, and reformulation and presentation of them in a frame agreeing interests of numerous regional powers from the other. And seeking to increase the independence of the Turkish vision, as a regional state has its personal interests, independent from belonging, because of its western connections. from one side, and avoiding direct collision with the visions, interests and arrangements of USA and Great Powers in the region from the other.

But the Turkish role faced numerous difficulties, the most important of which limits self-abilities, difficulty of keeping the formulations and the balance equations on all levels; the internal, regional and international simultaneously, and the dependence of numerous of these agreeing formulations on effective doers cooperation on all levels. The Arab Revolts resembled a new occasion returning presence of these problematic and surrounding argumentations of the Turkish role, the Turkish stands from the Arab Revolts varied and amounted between contradiction and ambiguity inspiring its double-ness and blurred vision. But these stands are justified, because they are pending locations replaced due to interests. Turkey had balanced between the accounts of profit and loss in its national interests before taking its terminal stands from the Arab Revolts. (Aa'ssaf, 2011).

The Turkish Minister of Foreign affairs, Ahmad Daoud Oghlo thinks that the Arab Revolts are considered "a natural flow of history" and they are "spontaneous and necessary" calling the Arab leaders not to stand in front of "the winds of change" rejecting the claim that these revolts are from the foreign conspiracy making and says: "the region witnesses a reign of change" like what had happened in Eastern Europe in late Nineties... "he believes that the Arab youth generations "wanted more" of dignity, economic welfare, and democracy..." and that leaders have "to lead this operation and not attempt to prevent it..."

This principle is derived form the principles of the Turkish foreign policy laid by Oghlo himself in specifying Turkey's stand from the Arab Revolts. From these principles: (Aa'ssaf, 2011):

- Respecting the peoples' will in change, democracy and freedom.
- Keeping the national unity in the concerned states.
- Rejecting the foreign military intervention.
- Keeping the Turkish interests in each of the concerned states, especially the economic interests.
- Disarticulation in war operations, or fighting operations and making the Turkish role confined to human services and helping deeds.
- Keeping each state concerned and never to interfere in internal affairs of states of the region, with the wish to see stability spread and common in the region and achieve democracy with peaceful means.
- Relying on the international legitimacy and the United Nations' resolutions.

These principles had drowned the Turkish road-map in dealing with the Arab Revolts. From these milestones are the following:

Offering pieces of advice amounting between the call to shelving (Egypt) and call to execute the reformation programmes (support remaining of president Bashar Al-Asad in power and urging him to hasten in executing the

reformation programme, advising him with reformation, "before it is too late", sending to him, his foreign minister and head of his intelligence department, but in the last period the stand develops into a negative direction, Ardoghan expressed it in his speech about more than a thousand martyrs and about a "Syrian Halbajization", this is an evidence of not standing beside the regime forever if did not achieve the required reformations.

- Performing the role of mediator (Libya in the beginning of the revolt, Bahrain due to a desire from the reference Assistance).
- Offering human services (Libya).

Standing erect facing the foreign interventions (Ardoghan directed a caution to the government of the Zionist entity not to interfere in the affairs of Egypt at the beginning of the Revolt, seeking to decrease the size of the Iraqi intervention in Bahrain confronting the French role in Libya, and announcing an opposing stand against the international calls to force an air-prohibition area on Libya, "and considered it unbeneficial and implies dangers", and thought that the French intervention in Libya is an attempt to restore its sovereignty in North Africa, and it is what Turkey considered a threat to its interests and role in that region, and this is what Ogholo expressed in November 24th, 2010 saying 'I have given my commands to Turkish foreign ministry for Sarkozy to find, anytime he raises his head in Africa, a Turkish embassy bears the Turkish Flag on it...' since the beginning of the revolt the Turkish stand was misshaped with disorder and contradiction in declarations: rejection of the NATO intervention, participation of war ships, and call for the Quaddafi to deliver power to his son, Saifel Islam to execute the required reformations, then participation in the meeting of the communication group concerning Libya in Doha, which unanimously agreed that Quaddafi lost his legitimacy, and recognized "the Transitional National Council a legitimate representative of the Libyan people), communication with the governments resulted from the revolts and calling them to get benefit from the Turkish attempt in the Reformational Democratic developmental Islam (Tunisia, and Egypt... supporting and welcoming after the departure of both presidents, Zeinel Abideen Bin Ali, and Mohammad Husni Mobarak).

3. Motives of the Turkish Movement

The Turkish officials look at the revolts (intifadat) as a supporter of sites of power in Turkey as described a pattern of democracy in a Moslem country. This Turkish promotion to their policies comes to achieve a number of objectives, some of them are: (Attamimi, 2011).

- Serving Turkey's national interests, considering the Arab region a market for the Turkish goods, and an important source of energy for which the Turkish demand increases. And no means the positive Turkish stands will positively affect presenting political, administrative, and great investing facilities, especially in the shadow of the Arab popular admiration and the official appreciation for its stands, which encourages promotion and marketing the Turkish products in the Arab markets. And the Turks know very well that developing their relations with the Arab states will not be perfect, except for enlarging the field of profits exchange, for they are concerned basically about the economic dimension.
- Supporting the Turkish security interests as it may be able of participation in specifying the regional security agenda, and building new strategic alliances.
- Seeking to create a regional role to Turkey in return for the decrease of opportunities of the last in joining the European Union, and supporting its position in the region in shadow of the noticed retreat of the Arab role. This Turkish active political motion is considered, at the outlook of on-lookers, a message to the Europeans that Turkey has other replacements, and it is necessary for them in the Middle East, and any stability Europe searches in the region is impossible without Turkey's assistance, the proficient more than any state else, to communicate with the Islamic Sunni depth, especially with the growing of the Islamic movements roles and the escalation of the Arab Revolts.

The research in the indications of the Turkish movement in the Arab region at this timing, leads us to a number of points, the important of which: (Attamimi, 2011).

Firstly: the follower of the incidents and the tracks of the last developments in the Arab region can notice the Turkish movements in the Arab region past two basic stages: the first was at the beginning of the Arab risings (intifadat), and the Turkish stand in this stage was announcing the stand of the Turkish officials beside the peoples wishing in reformation, and the Turkish stand developed afterwards to call the governments of those states to reformation and listen to their peoples demands. And in the context of this development, comes the second stage, and it is the frankly announcing about Turkey's stand and support of the Arab Revolts, and it is what means that the Turkish foreign policy moves in accordance with integrated strategies to build a regional role, relying on before hand assisting machineries due to priorities of the stage. These policies were concized by the Prime Minister Ardoghan when he was asked about "doubleness" in the Turkish stands towards the Arab Revolts, for Ankara

abstained from asking the Libyan leader, Alquaddafi to depart since the beginning of incidents in Libya, meanwhile demanded the Egyptian president, Husni Mubarak with shelving, he answered saying: "Turkish policy is not dictated by instructions, but by the national interests".

And in case of the Syrian Revolution the Turkish movement is distinguished with a special sensitivity, for we find the Turkish Syrian relations, the geographic adjacency and the Syrian internal reality and specialty had formed a state of disorder to the Turkish stands, so, Ankara advised the Syrian regime to response to reformations, demanding the regime of president Bashar Al-Asad to stop killing civilians, without reaching to demand Al-Asad to depart from power frankly, and the whole Turkish movement towards the wave of the Arab Revolts depends on the theory of the strategic depth" of the Turkish foreign minister, Ahmad Daoud Oghlo, who considers Turkey's location and its position force it to move in all directions to keep its security and achieve its strategic interests.

Secondly: the Turkish movement in the region in the frame of the Turkish prime minister's visit to the states of "the Arab Spring" headed by Egypt, some people connects that with the happening of deterioration in the Turkish –Israeli relations, because of Tel Aviv's rejection of presenting regret for nine Turkish citizens killed on board of "Marmarah" ship. This movement was accompanied by parallel deterioration in the Egyptian Israeli relations, and reached the climax after breaking into the Israeli Embassy in Cairo, and pushed the Turkish trend towards the region the desire to make use of its positive picture among a large Arab category, who finds Turkey a sample that can be followed, either from the political side, or the economic side. And it is upon which the Turkish government depends in the frame of its swift seeking to play a regional role suites its rising position in the region, and through it can practice an axial role in the regional balances and contradictions within a modern diplomatic policy, with high proficiency distinguished with accuracy in reading incidents and effective influencing in its practices, and it is the dependable thing in paving the road in front of Ardoghan's government to enter the gate of the Middle East, considering it a strategic replacement from the closed European gate, and opening the road to move in the Arab region in shadow of deterioration catching the regional Arab regime.

And from other side, the Turkish visits to the states of the "Arab Spring", especially Egypt to formulate a strategic partnership to enter a new strategic balance and reformulate it at a form affects the balance, in which Israel and Iran were two basic factors in it, especially after the retreat of the Turkish-Irani relations because of the Turkish stands from Syria, and because of its agreement on spreading the rocket armature on its land. All of this means that Turkey needs an alliance form with other regional powers. Turks became aware of the "Revolutionary Extension" that devastates the region. It is really an indication of replacing the patterns of classical regional alliances, connected with the acting international changes, that pave the road to the worldly changing scenery (Attamimi, 2011).

Thirdly: "Turkey seeks a regional role by its stand from the siege of Ghaza Strip, which saves it a good regional reputation among the Arab peoples who aspire for change and freedom, in spite of its stand towards the siege does not come from its historical or characterable commitments, but comes within the frame of competition, or regional, conflict on a role with more presence, and with what finally achieves the Turkish interests, simultaneously exploiting the retreat of the Egyptian role, and the state of instability from which the Egyptian revolution suffers at present. And at all circumstances the Turkish movement towards the issue of the siege of Ghaza Strip specifically cannot surpass the Egyptian role. And Ankara confessed that the Turkish role will never be assistant, or a complement, but does not replace the Egyptian role". Though Turkey may exploit this role in a decade of strategic alliances in the coming period, especially with the existence of power, or rising currents in Egypt and Syria.

The Turkish foreign policy moves due to counted and accurate balances guarantee its foreign policy success with what serves its objectives and achieves its national interests, and simultaneously works to restore Turkey's position at a larger geographic frame in both Arab and Islamic worlds, and with what serves its economic, political, and security interests on both long and short extents.

Turkey adopted entrances appeared a little bit different in dealing with the Arab Revolts. At the beginning, Turkey committed the cautious follow up entrance of situations in Tunisia. Then the Turkish stand was more clear in case of Egypt in calling the acting regime to make reforms and response to people's demands, then changed to criticize the regime frankly and asking it to depart, in Ardoghan's speech in the Turkish Parliament at the beginning of February 2011. It was considered a qualitative transformation in the Turkish policy towards the direct intervention in the internal affairs of other states, unconnected directly with the national security of Turkey, and a priority in relations among the main powers in the region. (Moawwad, 2011).

But the Turkish policy came more conservative in general towards the external interventions in Libya, for Turkey opposed forcing penalties and plans of military intervention led by France then the NATO, and Turkey appeared

more near to adopt sharing in the human efforts of aid, with leaving open canals with both parties of conflict to perform the role of a mediator. And the Turkish stand came more cautious in case of Bahrain.

And in spite of the diplomatic efforts and the Turkish contacts with leaders of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Turkish stand found it enough to call all parties to control one self, and call for reform in general without direct criticism to the Bahraini regime, and demanding the protestors to response to the reformation initiatives at the same time, with cautions of the dangers of Shia't–Sunni partition in the region. And the like, the Turkish role rising retreated in the Yemeni case, for it avoided direct intervention and confined to general appeals to improve the future of Yemen through the democratic transformation, and expressed its support of the Gulf initiative to transfer power to deal with the Yemeni crisis. Finally, Turkey adopted a doubled approach in dealing with developments of situations in Syria, collected between protecting the regime, the friend of Turkey and supporting him from a part, and sympathy with the rebels and implied support of them and their demands from the other part, with activating the role of the civil Turkish community to have their brother Syrians as guests on the Turkish lands (Noorel Deen, 2011).

The commentaries were abundant and the granted indications of these Turkish stands and differences in between them. There are persons who see that an indication to the pragmatic nature and overwhelming the economic interests of Turkey in particular. And there are who see in an indication to disorder of the Turkish foreign policy as a result of its fall in the track of its balancing policy and its unbiased-ness clearly to the people's demands of change. Others see it an indicator of disorder and giving up the balancing bases to vision the strategic depth by its intervention in the internal affairs of the states of the region and biasing to parties without others.

The last trend meets with commentaries concentrate on the Islamic reference of the Party of Justice and Development and its connection with Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria. And there are other trends that illustrate the Turkish stands as considered following, to a great extent the Western capitals' stands, and it is what contradicts commentaries rise the rejection of the external military intervention in the states of the region as one of the basic restrictions of the Turkish stand, for this intervention may be called after-words against Turkey itself.

And in return, the official commentary appears more comprehensive and elastic, for it assures the agreement of the Turkish stands with the leading vision of its foreign policy in general and continuity of its seeking to achieve its nations interests and the interest of all parties in form of giving the priority to stability in the region, with the understanding that achieving stability at the present circumstances is impossible, except through supporting the democratic reforms, and the official speech illustrates the difference of the Turkish machineries from a state to another, according to Turkey's estimations of the nature of every state, and the requirements of balance between freedom and security/stability in it, in light of the nature of the ethnic constituent of the different communities, and the degree of the concerned regimes leaderships response, and the motives of the external parties from intervention, and estimation of the limits of Turkey's possibilities and abilities at each state (Moa'wwad, 2011).

4. Effect of Developments Witnessed in the Region in the Turkish Role Politically, Economically and Militarily Through

1. From the political side: the Arab Revolts led to call the Turkish role as a pattern, with renewal of dialectic about how and the extent of making use of the Turkish experience. This dialectic appears particularly in what concerns organizing the relationship between the religious and the political, for it can be distinguished among numerous trends, first of them concentrates on machineries of controlling movements of political Islam and guaranteeing secularism civil of the state, through the role of the army, constitutional arrangements, associational arrangements, and the external parties pressures and incentives. The second of them concentrates on the indications of the success of the Turkish political Islam that reflects development in the vision of the Party of Justice and its success in reaching agreeable formulations internally and externally. There is a third trend thinks that states of some Arab states like Egypt had become in a better state than Turkey, and surpassing it from the part of non- existence of the extremist secularism, and the nature of the civil and military relationships, the retreat of incoming restrictions of the political Islam currents, and abilities of expressing the vision of this current and applying it in a clearer form.

And beside the Turkish role as a pattern, the revolts saved to Turkey a field to present its role as a third party and a mediator in treating the internal Arab discrepancies, and attempting to decrease its regional extensions and international interventions in them, with the Turkey's concentration on the political and diplomatic entrances at a basic form, either in the form of political pressure at variant degrees on the governments, or by guesting conferences to some opposing powers (as in case of Syria and Libya at a fewer degree) and suggesting balance initiatives between the considerations of freedom and keeping security and stability, through stopping violence and

starting operations of reform, may reach to arrangements of transferring power. This Turkish method clearly appeared in what Ardوغان announced on April 7th, 2011 about a "roadmap" to treat the situation in Libya through three axes, they are: Instant seas-fire and withdrawal of the government forces from cities and return of ration supplies to it, and forming safe human ranges to save the flow of human aids for all, and instant release of a comprehensive operation for the democratic transformation absorbs all parties (Hurriyet Daily News, 2011).

But the appearance of the Turkish political activity was accompanied by dialectic about its motives and the extent of its balance, and enquiry about the extent of its effectiveness as well. The increase of polarization acuteness among the parties of the acting conflicts and using arms, all of them are factors decreasing the effectiveness of the Turkish role in a achieving the required results and displayed their limits, either from the ability perspective on treating the crises of the region successfully, or even employing the Turkish political and diplomatic activity in supporting Turkey's position.

2. From the economic side: Turkey suffers, at present, from economic losses in its relations with the states that witness revolts, so Turkey's exports in the first three months of the year 2011 retreated into (24%) to Egypt and Yemen, and (20%) to Tunisia, (43%) to Libya, and (5%) to Syria, in addition to losses of the contracting parties and the Turkish building companies in Libya. It forms the second market to the Turkish contracting parties abroad after Russia, with the existence of (120) Turkish companies working in Libya due to estimations of the year 2009 (Attamimi, 2011).

But it is necessary not to exaggerate in negative effects on the Turkish economy. From one part, these situations opened the field to present the Turkish role to share in rescuing the economy of these states in the talk about projects that reflect Turkey's seeking to activate its commercial and investing relations with them. Also most of the basic commercial partners of Turkey are out of the region, and the rate that the Turkish exports form not more than (1%) to (1.5%) to each of Egypt, Libya and Syria. The decrease in size of Turkish exports to some states of the region was compensated by the increase of exports to other states like Iran, Iraq, and (UAE) Emirates. At the same context, the congregation of the Turkish exporters announced their insistence to support the Turkish exports towards the east, to India, Indonesia, and China to increase the variety of the Turkish exports trends. One of the attracting indicators is that the Turkish exports amounted to (55.5) billion dollars at the first five months of the year 2011, with an increase amounts to (20%) at the same period of the year. (Moa'wwad, 2011).

That does not prevent the rise in prices of petroleum, because of the developments of situations in the region, which shared in rising supplies in Turkey and the increase of trade balance deficit, especially at looking at Turkey's dependence on importation to fulfill more than (90%) of its needs from petroleum, gas, and coal. The comparison between the size of exports and Turkish imports revealed the duplication of deficit in the size of external trade balance, from (5.5) billion dollars in April, 2010 to (9) billion dollars in April, 2011.

3. From the security side: the crises that states of the region witness led to rising Turkish military security roles like what appeared in Libya in particular, in from of the Turkish participation in the NATO campaign to force disarmament and carrying human aids.

Some analyses stirred the existence of Turkish plans to intervene and perform safe area inside the Syrian lands, in case of deterioration, to stop the negative effects extension and the flow of refugees inside the Turkish lands. In spite of the Turks denial of those news, the indications of its stirring remains attracting, where it represents in a form or another, the return of calling the Turkish security roles in the state before the Party of Justice and Development. Also disclosed the extents of Turkey's ability to decrease the foreign military interventions in the region, and to be forced to participate in these arrangements in a form or another, and it is what appeared in the case of Libya, and may force himself in Syria, in case of escalation.

5. Restrictions of Turkish Stands from "The Arab Spring Revolts"

The Turkish stands shown in a different form between every now and then varies, because of the oscillation of the Arab situation in the happening revolts in a form pushed some trends to talk about the "Turkish Michavillism" in dealing with the going on incidents in the region, considering that the changing Turkish interests led to variant stands. Though the investigation of nature of the Turkish approach towards the revolts of the Arab spring reveals that they were established on two basic hypotheses connected with each other. In this respect, the Turkish stands can control the most distinguished restrictions of the revolts of the "Arab Spring", as follows:

After the Party of Justice and Development reaching power in 2002 Ankara sought to terminate its invented separation from the Middle East region. And the Turkish foreign policy worked within a general and comprehensive frame and enlisted within it to glorifying the Turkish existence and strengthening the relations with the Arab states, through a number of machineries that guarantee existence to Turkey in the center of the region and

in the inflaming "fields of ancients" which the Arab region witnessed and led to dethrone Zeinel Aabideen Bin Ali after (23) years of ruling Tunisia, "withdrawal" of Husni Mobarak after ruling Egypt (30) years, collapse of Al-Quaddafi regime after (42) years of ruling Libya and Ali Abdullah Saleh's signing the document of withdrawal after (33) years of ruling Yemen.

These situations were represented through the Turkish foreign policy principles in understanding these Arab revolts, so it was personified in:

- A. Respecting the will of peoples and their wish in change, democracy and freedom.
- B. Keeping stability and security of states and necessity of executing change peacefully, for security and freedom are not replacements, and they both should be altogether.
- C. Rejection of foreign military intervention in the Arab states, to avoid repeating the tragedy of Iraq and Afghanistan, and exposure of the Arab countries to danger of occupation and division.
- D. Offering aid and support to internal transformations due to special internal circumstances of each state.
- E. Patronage of the higher national Turkish interests, headed by the investment, economic interests and protecting souls and properties of the Turkish people.
- F. Depending on the international legitimacy and movement in the frame of international rules, and the United Nations Resolutions.
- G. Never to direct the Turkish arms to any Arab people, and confine the Turkish role to human duties and non-fighting duties and performing aid deeds.
- H. Taking in consideration the specialty of each state, its internal situation, its circumstances, its external relations, and Turkey's interweaved interests with them.

Broad trends in some Turkish literatures considered the "Arab Spring" shares in supporting the Turkish ability to put the "New Ottomanism" strategy at an application state, in a case Turkey integrates with Arab states in a big and deep form. It formerly subdued to the sovereignty and power of the "Ottoman Empire". The "New Ottomanism" is being performed in a stage after "the Arab Spring" on two basic pillars:

1. Turkey never seeks to exploit the incidents of the region to attempt to dominate the communities, and the new Arab political regimes, but seeks to support the operation of democratic transformation in the Arab states and deepen the Arab under-standing of the secular conception.
2. Concentration on diplomacy to deepen the economic and diplomatic cooperation and complication of the cultural sovereignty of Turkey with what guarantees its interests to transform into a great regional power.

The effects of "the Arab Spring Revolts" on the Turkish variant investments founded three levels:

1. Exploiting the incident to strengthen Turkey's international relations, with attempt of returning assurance of Turkey's axial role for USA and the European Union.
2. Support relations with the new regimes: Turkey sought to terminate the state of tension which misshaped its relations with the former Egyptian regime, through the stand beside the Egyptian demonstrators. And through strengthening relations with Egypt, reaching to the military and security cooperation. There is also a Turkish vision and an Egyptian – Turkish approach that will return arrangements of the regional security and return reformation of the regional alliances map in the region.
3. Deepening the relationships with the Islamic currents: it was clear from controlling the Turkish movements in the region, during the stage after the revolts, that there was a Turkish concentration on supporting the movement of the Moslem Brotherhood and the rest of Islamic currents, activated by the political sphere after the Arab Revolts, that was through encouraging them for political work in accordance with a method characterized with pragmatism, at a rate through benefiting from consultations and political meeting Turkey held together with many of these currents. In this respect the Party of Justice and Development invited some of these Islamic leaders of the currents to make use of the trial in the Islamic field.

6. The Economic Restriction

The happenings in the Arab countries are considered from the basic elements that caused Turkey's fear that its investment with great amounts may be affected, reflected by the political and security problems in the region, that may turn into economic problems that decrease the size of the Turkish exports to states of the region. This results in heavy financial burdens which may affect negatively on averages of growth in the Turkish economy. Turkey also feared from economic precarious nesses of the Arab Revolts, and concerns the agreements of free trade concluded with a number of Arab states one of which the signed agreement with Egypt and Libya, and also the agreement of establishing a mutual area among Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Turkey. It is the agreement which was suspended afterwards, because of the Turkish stand from the incidents in Syria.

7. The Security Restrictions

The security restrictions played a basic role in forming the milestones of the Turkish foreign policy in reaching the Party of Justice and Development, but the leaders of the Party formulated a different conception of the Turkish security. It sets forth from that the states of the regional adjacency are not necessarily a source of threatening to the Turkish national security, but mutual cooperation with the states of adjacency may become the paved road to deal with all threats, that may affect the safety of security and Turkish stability.

The security factors performed a basic role in specifying the Turkish approach towards the Arab revolts, for Turkey set out from a conviction implying that continuation of protests and revolts may affect the future of its political and economic investments in the region, with what may serve the Israeli interests and policies and exceed the security costs to penetrate Turkey in the interactions of the Middle East. This conviction was implied from the Turkish experience acquired by the Iraqi war in (1990-1991), where it had lost huge economic losses, and security precariousness, that disturbed the Turks and still, because of the reformation of the region of North Iraq and the increase of the Kurdistan labour Party attacks against Turkey from the Iraqi lands.

8. Conclusion

Turkey witnesses since the beginning of discussions about the significance of concealed true power in the field of international relations, and to which extent it invests them in the diplomatic relations. They discussions amount between two trends; one attempts to found legitimacy of the concept that Turkey remains mortgaged to the connected policies with centers of powers formed outside. That is by showing Turkey's level of concealed power less than required level, through frozen operations of evaluation connected with situations of the stage. The second is a trend presenting excessive optimistic estimations, mortgaging that Turkey can explode its power strictly, without new analysis and dynamic to the elements of the changing and static power which Turkey owes in shadow of the new international situation.

Ankara stucked to neutrality at the beginning of the Arab incidents towards the Tunisian Revolt in December 2010. but with hastening the of incidents in Egypt after one month, Ardoghan initiated by calling former president Husni Mubarak to withdraw, and Abdullah Ghoul was the first president to visit Egypt after the collapse of Mubarak, the thing that duplicated the popularity that Turkey obtains on the Egyptian sphere, and it is what was reflected in receiving Ardoghan at his visit to Egypt in September, 2011, for he paid a visit heading a big delegation of businessmen. This assured Turkey's desire to enlarge its economic relation with the biggest Arab state.

But with the start of the Libyan Revolt (intifada) in February 2011, Turkey appeared hesitant, because it had big investments with Al-Quaddafi's regime. Therefore, it assured the significance of reaching a political settlement at the beginning of incidents, forewarning from seriousness of fighting like that which happened in Iraq before, the thing that harmed Turkey's picture inside Libya. But after passing the resolution of the Security Council 1973 which allowed forcing an area of air-navigation prohibition over Libya, Ankara's stand was changed by sending sea forces to participate in the NATO operations there, beside the participation in the human aid efforts.

Also, the break out of Bahrain Revolt in February 2011 placed Turkey among numerous accounts, for it has large economic interests with all states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and it had to respect the security specialty of the Gulf, and it did not wish to encourage Iran to interfere in the Gulf affairs. Though, Ankara wanted to raise its diplomatic role in an attempt to quiet the Shia't –Sunni tensions in the region, which will harm its special interests. Therefore, Ankara presented mediation to solve the crisis, recommending the Bahraini authorities to self-control. But the Gulf states ignored Ardoghn's initiatives and started the military solution of the crisis by sending forces of "Al-Jazeera Armour" to Bahrain.

Turkey, though suffered from great economic loss resulting from the sudden changes in the Middle East, it viewed at the Arab Spring Revolts as considered a good development towards confirming the values of the democratic government performed on transparency and enquiry, optimistic with the escalation of political Islam role, which is very near of its ideology and concepts, the thing that assists to support cooperation with Ankara, so as Turkey appears to be one of the first regional powers making benefit from the acting developments in the region.

9. Deductions

This study is performed on the following main hypothesis:

The Islamic trends of the Party of Justice and Development shared in supporting the Turkish –Arab relations after the year 2002. The study came to assure the correctness of the hypothesis, where of the Party of Justice and Development reaching power had a main effect in causing transformation in the Turkish –Arab relations, and the Turkish stands expressed towards Arab issues, especially the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict and the development of Arab relations at the political and economic level, that was assured through the following:

Firstly: The Turkish Degolism appears in Turkey's concern with protecting and glorifying its national interests. And abundantly the minister of foreign affairs, Dauwd Ogholo, assures that all steps taken by Turkey towards Syria, surely spring from its national and security interests, without any pressure, or instructions from part of the USA.

Secondly: Turkey expertly seeking to promote its role and influence in Syria and the whole region, by Oghlo's declaration in front of the Great Turkish National Society in April 2012, that Turkey will continue its efforts and calls to liberate the region from tyranny, and to be the inspirer leader of the Arab democracies, in a speech in which the reflections of a new Ottomanism in the Turkish policy came into sight, and also the influence of the Degouli, trend of Turkey.

Thirdly: The policy of the government of Justice and Development does not introspect a project to dominate the Arab region, and does not have certain ideological trends come into to force, and no ethnic or sectic motives, all what it aspires for is to support the regional Turkish interests and save the replacements of the policy of former waging west. The Turks understand that such ambitions cannot be achieved without integration.

Fourthly: The popular risings and revolts, some region states witnessed, put Turkey in front of the incidents, and formed a difficult experimentation and a big challenge to the Turkish foreign policy, because of the condensed Turkish investments in the Middle East area, that is, on the political, economic, and cultural levels, for Turkey transformed, because of the favor of dynamic movements, and mechanisms of its interactions towards the Arab issues, a main party and a central doer on the stage of the region incidents, which as favored with a marginal status within the Turkish foreign policy during past decades.

10. Results and Recommendations

In light of results of the study, it recommends the following:

Firstly: it is important to understand that the Turkish classical foreign policy will not change in a substantial form, even the revision of sixties did not lead to rupture or radical coup in this policy. What the Turkish foreign policy witnesses is a reinstruction and not an reticular transformation.

Secondly: fears stirred in the active Turkish foreign policy at some Arab national departments, or the official departments are exaggerated fears. So, the policy of the government of Justice and Development does not have a project of domination, and does not have certain ideological trends seeking to force them, and neither ethnic nor sectic motives. What this policy aspires for is supporting the regional Turkish interests, and saving replacements of the former policy trend to the west, and the Turks understand that such ambitions cannot be achieved without integration, either at the level of political interests or economic or security interests.

Thirdly: It is a must to see the new Turkish foreign policy as considered a historical opportunity of a coming danger that is to glorify the Arab benefits from this policy. For the Turkish trends of economic and commercial cooperation, that it should be faced by identical trends, and the Turkish tourist coronation in the Arab adjacency should be faced with promotion and confirming the Turkish ties with the Arab adjacency. So, Turkey as a state and people became more sensitive towards what may touch these ties and negatively affect them.

Fourthly: The Arab states have to avoid looking at Turkey from the corner of the Arab axes. So, the Turkish large openness on the Arab states, from the Gulf to North Africa, clearly indicates that Ankara does not want, or wish to lead the policy of axes. The best methods are to escape Arabs from the policy of axes and deal with the states of adjacency, allies, and friends with a united Arab policy.

Fifthly: The Arab states are not one united in solidarity but mostly conflicting and fighting directly or by a means, so it cannot be talked about an official Arab stand. This is one of the basic handicaps in front of pushing the Arab Turkish relations bigger steps ahead.

Sixthly: Some of the main Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in spite of their excellent relations with Turkey, their political agendas with their foreign dimensions (relations with the United States) make the possibility of coordinating stands with Turkey, with its contradicting policies with Washington in more than one lively file, is impossible at all, in spite of the shape of external courtesy.

Seventhly: The Turkish role, especially the Palestinian problem and supporting Hamas Movement is un-welcomed by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, but it was very embarrassing, especially to Egypt. But the Arab States League reflects the weakness of the Arab Regime and its divisions, so this is not hoped of anything that supports the mutual Arab work, though how to support the relations with Turkey? It had been a scandal to leave the sphere of discrepancy between Syria and Iraq about explosions of Baghdad, to both states Iran and Turkey, extremely painful and a pattern of their dead reality. The two meetings of Cairo and Istanbul the four fold meeting among the

foreign ministers of Syria, Iraq and Turkey together with the participation of Aamero Mousa could not conceal the superficial role of the League of Arab States.

- Though Arabs can be demanded together with the Arab League in the following:
- Laying a cooperation strategy between the Arab League and Turkey in all fields with what achieves all interests of both parties.
- Calling the Arab states to support its economic cooperation with Turkey preparing to perform mutual trade zone similar to the European Union out of the customs barriers.
- Calling the Arab states to form a mutual cooperation council through the Arab League, meets twice a year to coordinate and push the bilateral relations to a stage of associations.
- Exploiting the clear Turkish trends in performing better relations with the Arabs for the sake of transforming these relations into associative relations contacting the policies of the state secluding from the nature of the acting political power, which changes due to the ruling party changing.
- Calling Turkey to follow up its present method and present facilities to the movement of economy and investing exchanges with the Arabs.
- Security and military coordination between Arabs and Turkey, especially in the mutual issues and specifically in Iraq and in the shadow of the confirmed and announced Turkish policy in keeping the unity of the Iraqi lands and opposing any form of division.

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