Equivalent Bilevel Programming Form for the Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem

Lianju Sun


Generalized Nash Equilibrium problem is widely applied but hard to solve. In this paper, we transform the generalized
Nash game into a special bilevel programming with one leader and multi-followers by supposing a suppositional
leader, that is an upper decision maker. The relations between their solutions are discussed. We also discuss the further
simplification of the bilevel programming. Many conclusions and the further research are drawn at last.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5539/jmr.v2n1p8

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Journal of Mathematics Research   ISSN 1916-9795 (Print)   ISSN 1916-9809 (Online)

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