Attack on ``Strong Diffie-Hellman-DSA KE" and Improvement

Demba Sow, Mamadou Ghouraissiou Camara, Djiby Sow

Abstract


In this paper, we do a cryptanalyse of  the so called ``Strong Diffie-Hellman-DSA Key Exchange (briefly: SDH-DSA-KE)" and after we propose ``Strong Diffie-Hellman-Exponential-Schnnor Key Exchange  (briefly: SDH-XS-KE)"  which is an improvement for efficiency and security. SDH-XS-KE protocol is secure against Session State Reveal (SSR) attacks, Key independency attacks, Unknown-key share (UKS) attacks and Key-Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attacks. Furthermore, SDH-XS-KE has Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) property and a key confirmation step. The new proposition is not vulnerable to Disclosure to ephemeral or long-term Diffie-Hellman exponents. We design our protocol in finite groups therefore this protocol can be implemented in elliptic curves.

Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.5539/jmr.v6n1p70

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

Journal of Mathematics Research   ISSN 1916-9795 (Print)   ISSN 1916-9809 (Online)

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