A Study on the Effect Brought by Different Types of Ownership Control—Based on the Evidence from China’s Listed Companies

Shaoheng Duan

Abstract


By tracing the identity of large shareholders, this paper groups China’s listed companies into four categories by different controllers and argues that these distinct types of owners have different objectives and motivations. As a result, this will affect how they exercise their control rights over the firms they invest in. In particular, the author contends that private ownership of listed firms in China is not necessarily superior to certain types of state ownership. To test the arguments the author investigates the relative efficiency of state versus private ownership of listed firms and the efficiency of various forms of state ownership. The empirical results indicate that the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies varies across the type of controlling shareholder and the results are consistent with the predictions in the introduction.


Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.5539/ijbm.v4n1p149

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International Journal of Business and Management   ISSN 1833-3850 (Print)   ISSN 1833-8119 (Online)

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