Budgetary Transparency and Democracy: The Effectiveness of Control Institutions

Robson Zuccolotto, Marco A. C. Teixeira

Abstract


The objective of this paper is to identify the effectiveness of the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) and of the legislatures in relation to the fiscal transparency of countries. To test the theory empirically, an analysis was also conducted of how transparency improves accountability and how transparency and accountability jointly relate to the degree of democracy of a country and to the perception of corruption. To conduct the proposed test, multiple linear regression models were used with the ordinary minimum squares method. The data were obtained from official reports on transparency, democracy and corruption, such as Open Budget Partnership, Transparency International, The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index and Index Mundi. The results have shown that countries in which the legislatures and the SAIs have greater constitutionally determined interdependence have greater budgetary transparency. It was also found that countries that are more transparent have more and better accountability mechanisms and, consequently, a greater level of democracy and less corruption, all of which points to the importance of transparency in the process of democratic consolidation.

Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.5539/ibr.v7n6p83

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

International Business Research  ISSN 1913-9004 (Print), ISSN 1913-9012 (Online)

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