Theoretical Aspects of World Value Survey: Main Principles, Challenges and Critics

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Abstract

In this article are discussed values and their role in forming and developing society. In the article we approach theoretical aspects, in particular: modernization theory and stages of its development, modernization and democracy development, classification of values and their changes, as well as results of the World Values Survey; also, we consider methodological difficulties and problems related to the survey and in conclusion we offer an alternative methodological approach in the studying of values and their development.

Keywords: values, alternative methodological approach, development

1. Introduction

The notion of value takes a prominent place in social science. Although there is no unified definition of the notion of value, most often in social science is cited Clyde Kluckhohn's definition of a value: "A conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action". (Kluckhohn, 1951)

Values are important at both macro and micro levels. Societies and their individual institutions are formed around the values, the values help define at which level of development is a society, nation, individual institution or person. Every day theoretical and practical discussion and comparison of values take place. For a certain social group the most important thing may be family, while for others work and career may play the most important role. One political group claims that it pursues the goal of promoting equality, while others prefer the ideas of personal freedom.

The values permanently interact and there study should be of complex nature, i.e. it is impossible to pull out a value from the social development context and review without its relation to other values. Also, the values should be studied in their dynamic and the study should be of systematic nature. This is necessary as the values and their hierarchy constantly evolve. Separate values just as their hierarchy are not static; the system undergoes constant development and change. The halt of this system development entails the cut in the society development and its further degradation.

As a result, based on the presence of certain values and the structure of their hierarchy the stage of social development can be defined and compared to previous stages. When they try to classify values and based on that diagnose the stage of social development, most often people refer to the concept of American political scientist Ronald Inglehart. In this article we try to demonstrate both strengths and weaknesses of this concept and to a certain extent offer for your consideration an alternative path for values studies.

2. Concept of Value and Phenomenogy

The search of values has a long history. However, after so-called renaissance – and consequent technical and bourgeois revolutions – the traditional values started to gradually get replaced by some non-traditional (currently, par excellence traditional) values. At the same time, philosophy that was "authorized" to search for, invent or re-invent values was not much engaged in this activity. Instead, it started to mostly deal with scientific cognition and technological analysis (after Bacon, Descartes and others) as well as the cognition of cognition itself (after and thanks to Kant).

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The man we are all obliged to for the revival of the search for / identification of value was Edmund Husserl. He discovered the major reason of the crisis of not only philosophy, education and culture, but of the entire Western civilization (or "Western mankind" in the Husserl's own words) was the total lack of the ground, motivation and intention for the revealing and establishment of values. The thing is not dubiously notorious (or "dubious and notorious") "spiritual values", whatever this concept may mean, but a Value as the source and the target of cognition – the pinnacle of the human activities.

In the opinion of Prof. Herbert Spiegelberg, Husserl saw his goal as one of moral "renewal". Although a steadfast proponent of a radical and rational autonomy in all things, Husserl could also speak "about his vocation and even about his mission under God's will to find new ways for philosophy and science," observes Spiegelberg. Even the objective of Husserl's critique of psychologist and his combat against historicism was the establishment of the true and positive values where logical truth and piety are not only ontological correlate but also essentially related, inter-dependent that should preclude from both scientific relativity (or cognitive relativism) and frailty (even moral impotence).

Parallel (and almost simultaneous) to Husserl, another from Austria-Hungary also came to the primacy of values. Heinrich Rickert, the first ever of the Neo-Kantian school, gave the definition of value: it is the spiritual goal and the life's practical attitude that express the living nerve of culture, its kernel and its dynamics. Actually, Rucert developed and deepened the view of Kant and Husserl: for him value is what gives sense to the senseless, what makes chaos the cosmos.

The importance of value has one more aspect. The consideration of facts and events as phenomena can (and will) change both subject and object. Here, these actors are respectively, observer or examiner as well as body under observation or contemplation object phenomenology is an engagement of phenomena, while simultaneously a waiting for its self-governances; it is not a methodical procedure of observation as if its object is stationary. This, the particular attitude attitude (the German concept used by Schaller can be translated as "disposition of the spirit" or "spiritual posture") is crucial for the seeing, or disclosure, so to speak. This attitude is fundamentally a moral one, where the strength of philosophical inquiry rests upon the basis of love. Such is the position (and meta-position) of Max Schaller, the "godfather of phenomenology".

We should stress that phenomenological consideration is not supposed to "humanize" the external world, that is, to make the objective with its eternal laws something that is dependent or subject to our thoughts, views and contemplations. Just the opposite - we should regard, for instance, the logical and mathematical laws as being independent of the human mind, and also as autonomy of meanings. It is essentially the difference between the real and the ideal or unreal, such as meanings in general: logical truths, mathematical entities, truths of mathematics, moral ideals and, perhaps, moral standards.

This position, as we can see, is slightly more than just scientific views and philosophical creed – this is closer to a civic stand. This is the position, or better, the weapon of modern experts and scientists against the "value-free science". One of most eminent researchers, Robert N. Proctor, lucidly demonstrates the way such "value-neutrality" is a reaction to larger political developments, including the use of science by government and industry, the specialization of professional disciplines, and the efforts to stifle intellectual freedoms or to politicize the world of the academy. Proctor shows the history, the major stages of this "value-neutralization". After the rapid growth (actually, the technical revolution) in the 17-18th centuries, the search for useful knowledge allowed a new and closer tie between theory and practice, but, at the same time, it also isolated moral knowledge from natural philosophy. Another version of neutrality was introduced by the mechanical conception of the universe, in which the idea of a benevolent, human-centered cosmos was replaced with a "devalorized" view of nature. Such a picture of the external world pretty soon "devalorized" and "dehumanized" the observer itself, a human being.

At this stage, the approach of American political scientist Ronald Inglehart is essential. Values are important at both macro and micro levels. Societies and their individual institutions are formed around the values, the values help define at which level of development is a society, nation, individual institution or person. Every day theoretical and practical discussion and comparison of values take place. For a certain social group the most important thing may be family, while for others work and career may play the most important role. One political group claims that it pursues the goal of promoting equality, while others prefer the ideas of personal freedom.

The values permanently interact and there study should be of complex nature, i.e. it is impossible to pull out a value from the social development context and review without its relation to other values. Also, the values should be studied in their dynamic, while the study itself should be of systematic nature. Separate values just as their hierarchy are not static; the system undergoes constant development and change, perhaps, even further degradation.

3. Modernization Theory and World Values Survey

In the last decade, modernization theory again got in the focus of scholars and practitioners. One may say that the World Values Survey turned to be an impetus for modernization theory development and its change. According to the World Values scholars, "economic development is associated with shifts away from absolute norms and values toward values that are increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory". (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). "Cultural change, however, is path dependent. The broad cultural heritage of a society—Protestant, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Confucian, or Communist—leaves an imprint on values that endures despite modernization. Moreover, the differences between the values held by members of different religions within given societies are much smaller than are cross-national differences. Once established, such cross-cultural differences become part of a national culture transmitted by educational institutions and mass media" (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

Industrialization - the key concept of modernization theory - generates growing social and cultural results demonstrated by the increase of the educational level and shifts in gender roles. Industrialization is viewed as a core element of the modernization process affecting almost all components of social life. To put it briefly, the values researchers believe that economic development is followed by systemic and somewhat predictable cultural and political results.

The core idea of modernizations theory is the following: economic development is associated with consistent and somewhat predictable changes in culture and sociopolitical life.

Shortly one can say that, in human history we have two transitions: 1. from traditional society to industrial – early industrialization and the rise of working class and 2. from industrial society to post-industrial – related to wealthy being in leading industrial countries and the rise of service and knowledge sectors.

4. Classification of Values and Changes

As we noted earlier, different groups of values dominate at different social development stages. According to the World Values Survey researchers, two opposing groups may be identified: traditional-secular/rational and survival-self-expression.

1) **Traditional values** – society with dominating traditional values shows relatively low level of tolerant for abortion, divorce and homosexuality. This society tends to emphasize male dominance in social and political life, deference to parental authority and the importance of family life. In general, it may be said that the society tends to prefer relatively authoritarian type of governance and place strong emphasis on religion.

A main goal in traditional societies is to make one's parents proud – one must always love and respect one's parents, regardless of how they behave. Conversely, parents must do their best for their children even if their well-being suffers. People in traditional societies idealize large families, and they actually have them. Yet although the people of traditional societies have high levels of national pride, favor more respect for authorities, take protectionist attitudes toward foreign trade, they accept national authority passively: They seldom or never discuss politics. Also, they have a pro-life stance on abortion, euthanasia and suicide. These societies emphasize social conformity rather than individualistic striving, believe in absolute standards of good and evil, support deference to authority, and have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic look (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

When secular values dominate in the society, the role of above traditional values is significantly decreased and the key role is played by values that are based and focused on the individual.

- 2) Survival values in the countries shaped by insecurity and low levels of well-being, people tend to emphasize economic and physical security above all other goals. They feel threatened by foreigners, by ethnic diversity and by cultural change. This leads to intolerance of gays and other outgroups, an insistence on traditional gender roles and an authoritarian political outlook. These societies show relatively low levels of subjective well-being, are relatively low on interpersonal trust, relatively intolerant of outgroups, are low on support for gender equality; their emphasize materialist values, have relatively high levels of faith in science and technology, are relatively low on environmental activism and relatively favorable to authoritarian government and familiar norms in an attempt to maximize the subjective sense of stability and steadiness in an uncertain world
- 3) **Self-expression values** these values emerge when survival begins to be taken for granted. In this period ethnic and cultural diversity become increasingly acceptable. "Indeed, beyond a certain point, diversity is not only tolerated, it may be positively valued because it is interesting and stimulating. In advanced industrial societies, people seek out foreign restaurants to taste new cuisine meals; they pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures. Changing gender roles and sexual norms no longer seem

threatening" (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

5. Modernization and Democracy Development

In scholarly circles for centuries has been debated whether what kind of connection is between economic development, democracy building and shifts in values. The World Values Survey cycle enabled scholars to enrich this theoretical discussion with empirical data. However with positive effects this led to the adjustment of theory to empirical data.

According to Inglehart, Welzel and other founders of the World Values Survey, the modernization process is defined by the interaction of three components. These components are socioeconomic development, effective democracy and self-expression values.

6. Three Components of the Process

Socioeconomic development includes technological innovation, growth of productivity, improvement of health care service and increase in life expectancy, level of education, information accessibility and improved overall social situation (Welzel, Inglehart et al., 2003). Socioeconomic development expands market and increases social mobility which on their part lead to diversified and intensive human activity (commercial activity and civil transformation). This makes stronger horizontal partner relations and weakens vertical authoritarian relations that decrease the level of human autonomy.

Expansion of human autonomy is described by different terms: formation of civic culture (Almond and Verba); individual modernization (Inkeles & Smith); post-material values (Inglehart); liberal values (Brint, Flanagan & Nevitte); anthropocentric values (Burklin) and self-expression values (Inglehart & Baker) (Welzel, Inglehart et al., 2003). As a result of this process, traditional values that subordinate human autonomy to a group discipline step back and give way to emancipation values that stress the importance of human choice.

The third component is democratization which implies the introduction of formal democracy or democratic institutions. Huntington describes this process as the third wave of democracy and changes in existing democratic systems, i.e. development of direct democracy (Cronin & Scarrow) and increase of direct civil participation (Barnes, Budge, Dalton & Norris) (Welzel, Inglehart et al., 2003).

The authors argue that all three components develop simultaneously. One or two of them cannot develop without the development of the remaining ones. It is not clear the development of which particular component leads to the development of others but it is very easy to make a post-factum grouping. As the authors argue, these three components affect each other.

These ideas and views are not new. They are described in detail in classic modernization theory (Lerner, Lipset, Kolemab & Diamond). Inglehart and his followers were the first to enrich the theory with empirical data. This data is from the World Values Survey series that have been carried out regularly for years and included 180 nations. Five waves have already been completed.

The authors describe existing theories and argue that these theories do not describe social transformation events in their complexity. In particular, modernization theory supporters believe that there is a strong connection between socioeconomic development, level of democratization and emancipation values; these phenomena however have not been considered in conjunction. Modernization has been used either as an umbrella for unifying separate components but not integrating them (Lerner) or has been described as a general definition – "functional differentiation" (Mouzelis) unifying everything in "modernization". (Welzel, Inglehart et al., 2003).

The empirical research has revealed this shortcoming. Most of scholars have focused on one of the three components even if two or three components have been discussed. The components have been viewed separately as three parallel vectors. A major question: what is common for these three components? What causes simultaneous development of these three components? These have been questions remaining unanswered. Lewis has introduced the principle of human choice. Anand and Sen have introduced the principle of human development. They have argued that freedom of choice or the possibility to choose the way of life should be guaranteed by social progress. Inglehart and Welzel added to existing two components the third political culture.

As we have noted, the theoretical frame is enriched with empirical data. Variables of the values are drawn from different waves of the World Values Survey, as socioeconomic variables are used socioeconomic data from Vanhanen, for political variables are used civil and political rights ratings from Freedom House and estimates on corruption from Transparency International.

The authors of the concept believe, socioeconomic development, emergence of self-expression values and effective democracy in conjunction increase human choice in the society. Socioeconomic development includes

such processes as urbanization, social mobility and job places diversification, increases social complexity and makes social relations among the individuals diverse, i.e. increases individual resources; and these resources generate objective means for personal choice. In other words, if one has nothing, nothing can be chosen and one will have to fight for survival.

On its part, self-determination value is the second component of the choice. When growing individual resources (either material or fiscal) increase the limits for individuals' possibilities (i.e. more types of activities are possible), self-expression, autonomy and emancipation find more fertile soil and make stronger human desire for the freedom of choice and control over one's life. In other words, money provides one with choice and the value prompts to use this choice for self-expression.

Democracy is a third component of human choice and development. Democracy ensures legal rights that guarantee human choice in public activity and private life. For that is important not a formal democracy but rather a democracy in action, i.e. effective democracy. Money provides one with choice, value prompts to use this choice for self-expression and democracy guarantees legitimacy of that self-expression.

All three components of development are focused on choice. Progress in any of these components improves a society's "conditio humana", giving people larger means, stronger motivations and wider guarantee to make use of their personal potential. Development of mankind (society) means growing human choice on a large-scale/mass level.

The complex of mankind development is wider than the standard modernization theory as it is simultaneously focused on the increase or decrease of choice and, on the other hand, it deals with all components (socioeconomic development), value and democratization.

The authors believe that development trend originates from two linkages: a means-motives linkage and a motives-rule linkage. This is the first inconsistence: nowhere in the text is discussed the means-rule linkage and what is also important it is not explained why this linkage is fully ignored.

According to the authors, the growth of means (i.e. economic well-being) transformation into the rule (i.e. effective democracy) takes place only through the motive (i.e. increased level of self-expression).

7. Means-Motives

An impoverished individual has limited means for activity and respectively limited choice. The less suppressing is and more enabling is the social environment, the more satisfied is the individual.

There is a strong correlation between human satisfaction with life and the level of freedom in people's choices. In a depressive environment people put less emphasis on self-expression and psychological result is dissatisfaction with life: one is focused on survival. A part of a survival strategy is division on "our people" and "outsiders" (i.e. enemies). "Outsiders" are viewed as competitors in the fight for scarce resources and that causes distrust. Distrust strengthens community discipline in "our people" which diminishes personal autonomy. In other words, less money means less tolerance and more attention to group discipline, social control, hierarchy, moral rigidity and strong authority (traditional values). Conversely, more resources mean greater tolerance to human diversity, higher level of life satisfaction and greater respect to individual freedom.

Motives-rule – self-expression in the public activity and private life sooner or later requires freedom based legislative basis. If growing economic resources give rise to motives in an autocracy, people will consider that authoritarian rule as an illegitimate restriction of their rights. If the elite is not willing to allow democratization, the level of illegitimacy increases and retaining status quo costs too much (in all aspects) for the elite. This leaves two ways for development: a faction of the elite will mobilize popular support for liberal reforms and democrat dissidents will demand free elections, i.e. resulting in regime change. The second option implies the course change by the ruling elite itself resulting in the institution of a democratic regime through an evolutionary path.

If all this occurs in a democratic environment, the likely result is not regime change but more effective use of freedom. Even a democracy can be ruled by corrupt elites. The corrupt elites may limit individual freedoms. In an impoverished society people have neither resources nor motivation to change the situation. However where the demand for self-expression is higher, people have greater motives for change. In Verba's words, "in all nations, citizens appear to convert socioeconomic resources into political involvement" (Verba, Nei et al., 1978).

In democracies elites are recruited from the electorate. Thus, changing values among the citizens will affect the elites. From a rational choice perspective, there is no reason to expect that elites avoid maximizing their incomes through corruption, unless popular pressure eliminates this option.

As we have noted, the authors fully rule out means-rule direct linkage. However we should note that there is an alternative view. The founders of elitism and democratic elitism fully agree with Pareto principle that the elite plays greater role in the development of the country than "unorganized mass". History knows examples when transformation has followed economic growth based on elite decision or consensus among elites when masses have not been ready for that (Higley & Pakulski, 1992). As an example Turkey and Chile may be cited.

8. Cross-National Analyze Versus One Country Approach

In there article "The theory of human development: A cross-cultural analysis" Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann discuss about the importance of cross-national analyze.

The empiric data in the article demonstrate that the positive correlation between values, individual income and education on the individual level within one nation is 0.29 and on the national level is 0.91 (Welzel, Ingle hart et al., 2003).

The authors explain this difference by the following: citizens of one nation are united by the institutions that socialize them based on the common traditions. Therefore the society within the nation tends to form a "central vector" which is common for its citizen and differentiates them from citizens of other nations (societies). Because of that the differences among the citizens of different countries are greater than differences among the citizens of one nation.

In other words, within a nation the citizens are central vector oriented and the differences among these individuals are minimized, while the central vectors of different countries vary based on cultural, historic, economic and other factors. The authors note however that the central vectors may explain only 40 percent of individual variations in all four waves of the World Values Survey (Welzel, Inglehart et al., 2003). In fact, the differences are only on the national level and not on the individual level; this is something that makes the theory critics arguments stronger for its superficiality and mass approach (Zedania, 2006).

Let us discuss the linkage between resources and values and admit that both are distributed by concentration within in-country sampling. This means that only a small part of these variables will be substantially different from the central vector. In other words, the majority will be lost in the estimates when the resource variable is not reflected in the values variable thus decreasing correlation within the nation. For the cross-national analysis there is no central vector or it includes a small group and deviations are significant; accordingly, the probability of correlation of these two variables is higher. That is why cross-national analysis is so important.

The authors cite the example of Germany – income of a post-war German increased four times but because of the social distribution system average income also quadrupled and deviation from the central vector remained unchanged. If we compare the nations, after the war differences between poor and rich nations substantially increased. This emphasizes again that the comparison should take place on the cross-national level. This discussion is true for nations with developed economies but what shall be done with the cast based societies (India) or economies in transition where deviation from the vector may be substantial or changing at various stages?

The correlation between the countries variables will be higher when not individual but average data are used. The average or aggregated data compensate the extremes (they are mutually exclusive), errors and meaningless cases. We deal with raw figures and their adjustment to the theory is easier. At the same time it is not possible to track the global vector. To have a valid theory it should be considered as axiom that the average data are represented by the most characteristic indicators for the nation and society. This confirms again that the theory is mass (group) and encounters problems when going down to the individual level. On the other hand, some kind of generalization is needed when we work with large mass of data. The major question that arises is what portion of the population falls within compensated extremes and what is the role played by these extremes in forming the real values? As we noted this question is particularly relevant for societies in transition in which the share of extreme in forming the society is substantial.

9. Criticism

As we have noted earlier, the theory of Ingle hart and his followers is rather superficial and mass. In other words, it may be applied only during the large sampling and with inclusion of various additional factors. As the authors admit, the theory works well on the cross-national (society) level rather than in one society, i.e. it is valid when sampling level is high and numerous different factors (religion, history, culture, economics) are included, thus allowing the adjustment of empiric data to the theory. If this is not sufficient, the authors introduce additional variables, such as genes, past, etc.

A clear example of that is the authors discussion on subjective happiness, economy, democracy, genes and

values.

Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dietrich Klingemann note in their work "Genes, Culture, Democracy and Happiness" that subjective happiness of an individual society cannot be explained by objective indicators, i.e. the level of education, economic development and democracy. "The differences in income, education, occupation, gender, marital status and other demographic characteristics explain surprisingly little of the variation in people's levels of subjective well-being. As one would expect, those with higher incomes report somewhat higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction than those with lower incomes, but the differences are small, generally explaining no more than 4 percent of the variation – and education, occupation, age, religiosity, and gender explain even less" (Inglehart & Kligemann, 2000).

That is why the authors introduce an additional factor- genes and as they state "growing evidence that an individual's happiness levels largely shaped by genetic factors has aroused widespread interest, Neuroscientists have found close linkages between reported happiness and dopamine and serotonin levels in the brain, and they have found that genes seem to play a major role in regulating these levels (Inglehart & Kligemann, 2000). Accordingly by introducing a new factor it is possible to explain why the low income Indian people are happier than Estonians holding higher economic and educational level (see Table 1 Happiness, Life Satisfaction and Subjective Well-Being in 65 Countries).

Table 1. The level of happiness, life satisfaction and subjective well-being

	Year of Survey	Happiness	Life Satisfaction	Well-Being
Island	1990	97	91	94.0
Netherlands	1990	93	92	92.5
Dania	1990	94	90	92.0
North Ireland	1990	93	91	92.0
Switzerland	1996	95	89	92.0
Finland	1996	92	91	91.5
Swiss	1996	95	87	91.0
Ireland	1990	93	88	90.5
Norway	1996	94	86	90.0
Belgium	1990	93	86	89.5
USA	1995	94	85	89.5
Australia	1995	94	85	89.5
New Zealand	1998	95	84	89.5
Puerto Riko	1995	91	86	88.5
Great Britain	1998	90	85	87.5
Italy	1990	86	83	84.5
Canada	1990	79	90	84.5
Colombia	1997	90	77*	83.5
West Germany	1997	84	82	83.0
Taiwan	1995	89	76	82.5
South Korea	1996	89	76*	82.5
France	1990	92	72	82.0
Japan	1995	90	74	82.0
Austria	1990	91	72	81.5
Ghana	1995	72	88	80.0
Venezuela	1995	93	66	79.5
Philippine	1996	93	66	79.5

Spain	1996	87	70	78.5
China	1995	84	72	78.0
Uruguay	1996	81	75	78.0
Argentina	1995	83	72	77.5
Brazil	1996	83	72	77.5
Pakistan	1997	83	72*	77.5
Mexico	1996	71	83	77.0
Chile	1996	80	74	77.0
Nigeria	1995	81	71	76.0
East Germany	1997	79	72	75.5
Portugal	1990	73	76	74.5
Dominican Republic	1996	74	75	74.5
Poland	1996	86	62	74.0
Bangladesh	1997	85	63	74.0
India	1996	77	67	72.0
Turkey	1996	90	54	72.0
Czech Republic	1990	73	66	69.5
Slovenia	1995	74	65	69.5
South Africa	1996	79	56	67.5
Croatia	1995	70	62	66.0
Hungary	1998	78	52	65.0
Peru	1996	63	61	62.0
Bosnia	1997	76	47	61.5
Yugoslavia	1996	71	51	61.0
Romania	1990	62	57	59.5
Azerbaijan	1995	78	41	59.5
Macedonia	1996	63	49	56.0
Slovakia	1990	52	59	55.5
Latvia	1996	71	36	53.5
Estonia	1996	65	37	51.0
Georgia	1996	65	35	50.0
Lithuania	1996	57	40	48.5
Bulgaria	1998	57	33	45.0
Armenia	1995	57	29	43.0
Russia	1995	52	44	39.5
Tambov (Russia)	1995	57	33	36.0
Belorussia	1996	46	24	35.0
Ukraine	1996	48	20	34.0
Moldova	1996	44	21	32.5

Source: world value study, wvs.isr.umich.edu

This example in addition to other examples shows mass and superficial nature of the theory. Besides, the authors' choice for determining socioeconomic and political indicators gives rise to numerous questions.

As we have noted earlier, the level of individual resource volume is measured by Vanhanen power resource index. The index in aggregated form includes physical and intellectual resources. The theory authors do not use GDP because per capita GDP, according to Anand and Sen, does not represent society's human resources and GDP generally does not include distribution element or how accessible is this wealth for each individual. GDP does not reflect society's complexity and for that reason UN uses Human Development Index (HDI). However this characteristic has its weaknesses, for instance life expectancy has nothing to do with individual resources (Welzel, Inglehart et al., 2003). Some economists and international organizations (World Bank and IMF) do not share this view.

To define the political indicators and democracy level the authors applied the Freedom House and Transparency International data. From the beginning we should note that both of these indices belong more to political journalism rather than in-depth scholarly work. The data is received from various sources which have different value and scholarly basis.

The Freedom House data reflect individual freedom, which is important, but it absolutely ignores the real activity of and performed work by public institutions. Without this it is impossible to see the entire picture. The data is based on experts assessments who try to convert qualitative data (legislation, media coverage, statements) into quantitative data or scale. Experts also attribute a certain weight for each component and freedom coefficient is calculated. One may agree that this approach is rather subjective and largely dependant on experts consideration. At the same time, the conditions of formation of the individual sources are not taken into account: research, article, media coverage. It is known that in closed societies factually no alternative sources are available and accordingly local researchers (journalist, researcher or NGO activist) are under strong censorship. Accordingly, the report delivered from such a society will contain only positive essence. If in a country democratic principles are ensured on the legislative level, the chances are great that the index based on the Freedom House data will be high. A clear example of that is the self-proclaimed Abkhaz Republic, which falls within the "partly free" countries category (see www.freedomhouse.com). Therefore unquestionable acceptance of such data is not correct. Similarly the Transparency International corruption index may be debated.

This causes certain problems especially when we try to analyze an individual country using the Inglehart's theory. To illustrate that it is sufficient to explain the Georgian society's values and situation using existing tools and theoretical frame. Let us use the survey of 2005-06.

10. Survey Methodology

The values survey of the Georgian society was initiated in December 2005. In the Open Society Georgian Foundation implemented project took part David Aprasidze, Giga Zedania, Levan Tarkhnishvili, Gigi Tevzadze, Sergo Ratiani, Giorgi Khelashvili, Emzar Jgerenaia. It should be mentioned that to study Georgian society's value scholars have used two questionnaire - One of the questionnaires was an altered version of Inglehart's World Values Survey questionnaire (among other changes were added the questions targeted at the Georgian population attitude toward Euro-Atlantic structures) and the second questionnaire was based on the original concept of values. To develop the second one we used expert consultation and focus groups, as well as based on the values survey related social science texts. The two surveys were going in parallel using exactly same sampling.

Each field included 1100 respondents on the whole territory of Georgia. The random (probability) sampling was used for the given research and face-to-face personal interviews were applied for the research. The interviews were conducted in the summer 2006.

10.1 Sampling

We used a two-staged clustered random. The base of sampling was population census conducted in 2002. At the starting level of sampling formation Tbilisi was be divided into strata. Strata formation included two principles:

- 1) region
- 2) type of settlement (town/village)

The whole amount of sampling (1100 interviews) was distributed in strata proportional of the population size. Respondents will be broken down into 6 age groups

- 1) 18-24
- 2) 25-34
- 3) 35-44

- 4) 45-54
- 5) 55-64
- 6)65 +

For guaranteeing the proportional distribution of respondents into sex/age groups sample size of each stratum was distributed in sex/age groups proportional to their population size. The preliminary sampling point was a district. The amount of sampling districts was generated from the calculation that in each sample districts 3-4 interviews will be conducted.

The amount of interviews and settlements are presented below (Table 2) in the scale by regions:

Table 2.

region	interviews
Tbilisi	275
Kakheti	95
Shida Kartli	80
Kvemo Kartli	110
Samtskhe-djavakheti	50
Adjara	95
Guria	40
Samegrelo, Zemo Svaneti	110
Imereti	165
Mtskheta-Tianeti	30
Racha-Lechkhum, Kvemo Svaneti	50
Total	1100

Sampling of districts was conducted according to the PPS (Probability Proportional to Size) method.

In sample districts 'random walking' procedure was applied to the households sampling. Sampling of respondents in each household will be conducted according to the quotas from the sex/age distribution.

10.2 Random Walking Procedure

Selection of sampling points (SP)

- a) Urban Areas
- 1) Each town selected was divided into squires with approximately equal population size;
- 2) The number of squires, that was approximately equal to the number of sampling points in this town will be selected at random using PPS method;
- 3) Each selected squire will be our sampling point.
- b) Rural Areas A village chosen in the sample was a sampling point.
- 3 starting points were selected per sampling point in rural settlements, one in the geographical center of the SP and the rest at its edges, in different sides, so that they are maximally separated from each other.

As for urban areas, randomly selected streets within SPs were start points and they were given to the interviewers in advance. Interviewers will move from starting point with preliminarily established route.

The first household to be interviewed was the closest one to the starting point; every 5th household in settlement of private houses and every 11th in block of flats were selected.

There were selected respondents aged 18+ guaranteeing the maintenance of age quotas. Sample size was 1100 respondents, this guarantees 3% error and 95% reliability of the results.

11. Main Findings

According to the Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris analysis, in today's world is widely accepted consensus on the need of a democratic political system. On both sides of Huntington's civilization fault line the same number of respondents (61 percent) categorically rejects the form of authoritarian governance and "strong leaders" who "do not bother with parliaments and elections" (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). In Georgia, we see a dualistic attitude in this regard: on the one hand, 67.8 percent of the population positively assess democratic political system but almost the same portion of the population (63.4 percent) positively views the possibility of having a strong leader that would not bother with parliament and elections (see Table 3 Please Assess Different Political System). Also, Georgian political leaders (presidents) have always enjoyed greater level of trust and popularity than parliament or any other collective body. (Tarkhnishvili, 2006).

Table 3. Please assess different political system

Political System	Very Positive	Somewhat Positive	Somewhat Negative	Very Negative	Don't Know
Have a strong leader who should not care about parliament or elections	42%	21,4%	6,5%	7,5%	22,6%
Experts, not government, should make decision in accordance what they think will be good for country	19,3%	34,5%	9,5%	7,5%	29,3%
Military Regime	9,2%	15%	16,2%	36,9%	22,7%
Democratic Political System	36,3%	31,2%	5,7%	2,9%	23,9%

Source: key values of georgian society. www.osgf.ge. national vide survey, size of sample 1100.

The Georgian society in general demonstrates skepticism to impersonal trust. Only 13 percent of the interviewed respondents note most people can be trusted, 30.1 percent believe that "one cannot trust an unknown person", and 8.9 percent go even beyond that claiming that "nobody but relatives can be trusted" (Tarkhnishvili, 2006). We may say that the Georgian society is divided into "our people" and "outsiders" which is characteristic for traditional pre-modernist societies. The same conclusion can be made by judging the response to the question: What do you think, would the majority use you if they had a chance or would treat you fairly?)" (see Table 4 What do you think, would the majority use you if they had a chance or would treat you fairly?).

Table 4. What do you think, would the majority use you if they had a chance or would treat you fairly?

Statement	%	
Treat Fairly	27,2	
Use me	44,2	
Do not know	28,6	

Source: key values of georgian society. www.osgf.ge. national vide survey, size of sample 1100.

Ingle hart and his followers pay great attention to the role religion plays in the society and political life. As the authors believe "Muslim societies display greater support for religious authorities playing an active societal role than do Western societies. Yet this preference for religious authorities is less a cultural division between the West and Islam than it is a gap between the West and many other less secular societies around the globe, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America" (Inglehart & Norris, 2003).

In Georgia in this regard is a clear line between the public administration and other spheres. On the one hand, as the survey shows, the church is the institution with the highest reliability rate in Georgia (Tarkhnishvili, 2006). The population believes that religion plays a great role in the social life. 93.3 percent of respondents state they belong to a religious confession and 81.2 percent note they deem themselves religious individuals (Tarkhnishvili, 2006).

However the role of the church in daily life and public administration is minimal. Only 38.4 percent of respondents state that the church responds adequately to social issues the population has faced. For comparison reasons we would note that the question related to family problems, individual's moral problems and needs and individual's spiritual needs a similar response is given respectively by 50.1, 57.2 and 72.2 percent (Tarkhnishvili, 2006). Even more, religion plays a real role in marriage and child upbringing, while in all other issues its role is insignificant (see Table 5 The Role of Religion). Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the second part of the questionnaire. Orthodoxy and religion in general are important (among top five) for the functioning of the following institutions and values: tradition, cultural diversity, kinship, family, patriotism, personal freedom, school, virginity, charity, tolerance. As we see, neither state nor business structures are on the list.

Table 5. The role of religion – what role religion play while you make decision on the following issues?

Issues	Main Role	Insignificant Role	Do not Play Any Role	Do Not Know
Related to Family Finances	22,1%	22,6%	42,7%	12,5%
Marriage and Child Upbringing	63,4%	18,6%	9,4%	8,6%
Career	12,5%	23,8%	44,6%	19,1%
Relation with Colleagues	13,6%	23,5%	43,8%	19,1%
While Voting	8,9%	16,8%	60,6%	13,6%
What Watch in TV	21,5%	30,3%	34,4%	13,8%
Health Issues	35,5%	25%	27%	12,5%

Source: Key values of georgian society. www.osgf.ge. national vide survey, size of sample 1100.

[&]quot;In spite of claims by the majority of the population that they are believers:

a) only 17 percent of them attend religious ceremonies at least once a week;

b) only 14 percent listen or watch religious shows on radio or TV at least once a week;

c) only 13 percent read religious literature at least once a week;

d) more than half deem that it is not necessary for the child to acquire religious belief in the family" (Tarkhnishvili, 2006)

e) 55.6 percent deem that for successful marriage it is not necessary to be guided by religious views (see Table 6 Which of Following Issues Guide to Successful Marriage);

Table 6. Which of following issues guide to successful marriage

	Very important	Rather important	Not very important
Loyalty	91.4%	7.5%	1.2%
Children	62.5%	29.1%	8.4%
Mutual respect	29.0%	28.9%	42.1%
Sufficient income	71.5%	26.6%	1.8%
Understanding and tolerance	42.5%	38.7%	18.7%
Good housing conditions	16.5%	14.5%	69.0%
Common taste and interests	58.5%	35.7%	5.7%
Sharing religious views	22.8%	21.5%	55.6%
Distribution of domestic tasks	47.9%	37.9%	14.2%
Same ethnicity	38.1%	42.6%	19.3%
Same social group origin	85.9%	12.6%	1.5%
Living away from parents	43.8%	41.5%	14.6%
Agreement on political issues	30.5%	27.6%	41.9%

Source: Key values of georgian society. www.osgf.ge. national vide survey, size of sample 1100.

One of the key indicators for modern democratic society development is tolerance, personal freedom and self-expression values. As the survey shows, Georgia is a nation in transition even by that component. As we noted earlier, trust in Georgia is strongly personified and divides the society into "our group" and "outsiders". The Table 7 below is another clear example of that. The respondents answer in the following way the question: "How much do you trust the following groups of individuals?"

Table 7. The role that church play

Types of Society	Moral role	Spiritual Role	Role in Family	Social Role
Agrarian	75%	72%	75%	80%
Industrial	59%	53%	59%	76%
Postmodern	39%	34%	39%	58%
Georgia	57,2%	72,2%	50,1%	38,4%

Sources. Key values of georgian society. www.osgf.ge. national vide survey, size of sample 1100 and world value study www.worldvaluesurvey.com

It should be noted that the picture described above does not vary by respondent's ethnic origin, Armenians and Azerbaijanis living in Georgia similarly divide the society into "our people" and "outsiders". Accordingly we may say that the case is based more on civil-historic experience rather than on ethnic one (Tarkhnishvili, 2006).

It is well known, the society's attitude toward marginal groups is a good indicator of society's readiness for equality. Tolerance to a group with wide popular positive attitude has never been a problem. However if we want to measure how tolerant is a nation, we should find out which is the most negatively viewed group and ask afterwards what the society members think about that group. Inglehart and Norris deem homosexuals as such a group. Based on the World Values Survey, they make a conclusion that "in authoritarian and quasi-democratic states, the negative attitude toward homosexuals is deep-rooted: in Egypt and Bangladesh – 99 percent, Iran – 94 percent, China – 92 percent and India – 71 percent. Conversely, this indicator is substantially low among respondents interviewed in stable democracies: U.S. – 32 percent, Canada – 26 percent, Britain – 25 percent and Germany – 19 percent". In Georgia this indicator is 79 percent (Tarkhnishvili, 2006).

Another indicator for society's openness is sexual equality, granting of equal rights and opportunities for women. Georgia in this regard is in the middle again. Almost 47 percent agree that men are better political leaders. The

respondents are also convinced that a) women and men must have equal opportunities for education and b) women must have an opportunity to realize their potential at work. The question "When the number of job places is limited whether men should be given a preference" is answered negatively by 47 percent and the question "Can a working woman have as warm and strong relations with children as a non-working woman?" is answered positively by 82 percent (Tarkhnishvili, 2006).

Sexual equality is indicated by the fact that the question "What sex of a child would you favor if this is your only child?" is answered "Does not matter" by 53 percent. Almost similar is the level of unacceptability of married men's and women's adultery. As it was expected, most unacceptable for the society is homosexual behavior (Tarkhnishvili, 2006). So, it may be said that the political area remains more or less pro-men sphere, while in other areas of social life we may already see sexual equality.

The Georgian society in comparison with traditional society is more egalitarian in its attitude toward single mothers. Table 8 shows, that in total more then 40 percent of respondents justify women's desire to have a child as a single parent.

Table 8. How much do you trust the following groups of individuals?

	Fully trust	Trust	Neither trust nor distrust	Trust less	Do not trust	Donot trust fully	DK
Your family	89.6%	7.7%	0.9%	0.4%	0.2%	0.2%	1.0%
Georgians in general	26.3%	44.0%	18.6%	5.1%	1.4%	0.3%	4.4%
Individuals of other ethnic origin	10.5%	21.0%	39.1%	13.7%	4.9%	1.5%	9.4%
Individuals of other religious belief	8.5%	14.2%	35.0%	17.2%	10.6%	3.0%	11.5%
Armenians	9.6%	17.8%	32.4%	15.6%	9.5%	3.5%	11.5%
Azerbaijanis	8.5%	18.4%	35.5%	16.9%	7.6%	2.1%	10.9%
Russians	8.8%	21.0%	36.5%	13.7%	7.6%	2.8%	9.5%
Jews	7.9%	19.8%	34.9%	15.3%	6.7%	2.3%	13.1%
Abkhaz	6.9%	16.5%	32.5%	17.0%	9.7%	3.8%	13.5%
Ossetians	7.9%	15.3%	33.0%	17.4%	9.8%	3.8%	12.8%

Source: Key values of georgian society. www.osgf.ge. national vide survey, size of sample 1100.

All abovementioned shows that Georgia's position cannot be explained by the application of traditional tools and theories. On the one hand, a substantial part of our values still remains traditional but at the same time in the society may be observed both modernist and post-modernist values. This reconfirms our supposition that it is difficult to study and explain events occurring in the society in transition by the theory and tools of Inglehart and his followers.

Also, the values need in-depth analysis. They should be considered in their interconnection. The essence respondents put into a value is more important than statistical data. And this cannot be done by a standard quantitative questionnaire. On the other hand, it is impossible to generalize for the entire society the data obtained through application of only a quantitative method.

That is why a group of Georgian scholars started looking for alternative approach and offer alternative tool aimed at the study of the Georgian society.

12. Theoretical Background and Questionnaire

The aim of second questionnaire was to study the existing values structures of Georgian society and level of acceptability of different values by Georgian society. The starting point was question from comparative sociology: during the multi-national surveys we are asking the same and adopting questions in different societies; however have the values under same label same structure and contain in different society? And can it be that same values in different societies have absolutely (radically) different meaning? These questions do not have simple answer and because of this we decided to develop instrument which allow us to study value structure in

the framework of ONE society.

Taken into account that aim was to study structure (not only attitudes) we developed the questionnaire based on phenomenological sociology, specifically Luckmann-Berger sociology of knowledge version (G. Tevzadze, 2006). As a starting point we viewed the notion that the structure of social reality was constructed by subjective meanings and social reality is the unity of social facts (things). We made assumption that structure of social reality is build from values, which have subjective meanings. It is not correct to assume that values are atoms of social reality. In this case it will be impossible to differentiate them, even on the level of intuition, in different socialites and culture.

As we agreed that values are part of social reality (at least one of the parts) we should admit that values consist of subjective meaning that members of society have, on the other hand values as things have some structure. In order to share subjective meanings of values member of society need to make them real or institutionalized. Consequently, society consisted of institutionalized subjective meanings. The number of such meanings in each society is potentially unlimited; however the process of institutionalization became them limited. In the words, we can say that values consisted of limited institutionalized subjective meanings. Moreover, we can assume that more subjective meanings are participating in construction of concrete value, the more significant (stronger, decisive) this value is in concrete society. Consequently, we can build the hierarchy of values based on number of subjective meanings. We should also taken into account that concrete value can also participate in construction of other values as subjective meaning. One more question for research is the link between social institutions and values. It is obvious that social institution is the value. The question is how we can identify value, which is not a social institution?

To define the main area for research we developed a list of values/institutions functioning in Georgia regarding which there was to be a certain social accord. The list was developed after 4 Focus Groups, with participation of sociologists, psychologists, social scientists, politicians, students and representatives other social and professional groups (see list in Appendix 2). The list include values that exist in Georgia and society have developed certain consensus on them i.e. they became real. On the other hand as the control value we added values that according to experts no more exist in Georgia or not exit yet – cultural diversity, collectivism and free sexual relations.

At a glance this is a complicated base but it easily translates into a questionnaire. Subjective meanings making up values may be detected by the question: what do you think, which of the listed points are important for existence of (name of the value, e.g. "family") in Georgia? (Please rate this meaning by a 7-point-scale, where 1 means "very important" and 7 - "absolutely unimportant").

13. Conclusion

As a result of the survey three types of concepts of the values in the society system were developed: institutionalized and total values and subjective meanings. The Georgian scholars offer the following classification:

- 1) Institutionalized values, i.e. institutionalized ones, are means-orientation for daily social life; They are New Technology, Ecology, Education System, Leisure, Legislation, Rule of Law, Private Business, Private Property, Orthodox Church, Family, Relatives, Parliament, Police, Religiosity, Fight for Country, Juridical System, School, Traditions, University, Army.
- 2) Total values that are institutionalized but their structures are so omnipresent that society members perceive their presence as a constant they are the most active participants in social life and also play a significant role in constructing institutionalized values as subjective meanings and in constructing subjective meanings as constructing elements; They are Human Rights, Economic System, Friendships, Patriotism, Government, Career, Statehood.
- 3) Subjective meanings values existing only in textual or verbal form and are significant only as components of other values/institutions; do not play a defining-orientation role in daily life. They are Personal Freedom, Non-Orthodox Churches, Plenipotentiary System, Virginity Institute, Charity, Tolerance, Justice, Political Parties, Independent Associations/Unions, Free Sexual Relation, Collectivism, Cultural Diversity.

As a result of the survey, was developed a methodology for defining the composition values: with standard preciseness that depends on the volume of survey and resources may be determined a number of elements that construct each target value and their "share" in the construction of a specific value.

This concept and survey methodology must help us compare "without losses" societies and understand the construction of each target value (their component subjective meanings): this, on its part, will be helpful not to

fall into "a vicious circle" of a values related standard questionnaire when we admit that the same verbal constructions have the same meanings in two different societies.

This methodology affords multiple generalizations and conclusions:

- a) by defining the interrelation of these three types of values in each society it is possible to define the types of societies;
- b) determining the target value structure may be corresponded to the type of society and through time-series surveys their changes may be compared.

We offer this approach as alternative methodological tool for studying of value stricture and its development inside one society, however it can be use also for country comparison approach.

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Appendix

List of Key Values of Georgian Society

1.	Human Rights	21.	Family
2.	Non-Orthodox Churches	22.	Parliament
3.	New Technology	23.	Patriotism
4.	Ecology	24.	Personal Freedom
5.	Education System	25.	Political Parties
6.	Leisure	26.	Police
7.	Economic System	27.	Religiosity
8.	Independent Associations/Unions	28.	Justice
9.	Free Sexual Relation	29.	Fight for Country
10.	Career	30.	Juridical System
11.	Legislation	31.	Plenipotentiary System
12.	Rule of Law	32.	Statehood
13.	Private Business	33.	School
14.	Private Property	34.	Traditions
15.	Collectivism	35.	University
16.	Cultural Diversity	36.	Virginity Institute
17.	Orthodox Church	37.	Charity
18.	Friendships	38.	Army
19.	Government	39.	Tolerance
20.	Relatives		

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